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A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ATTACKS ON AVIATION AND THE BRITISH RESPONSES 
ABSTRACT 
This research examines the effects on Great Britain of international terrorist attacks on 
aviation. The methodology is utilitarian. It is also eclectic, drawing upon scholarly and 
operational sources. The first objective was factual: to establish the origins of international 
attacks on aviation, their effects on Great Britain, and the British responses. It found that the 
attacks were a "blocked tactic! ' product of the Palestine conflict. They had neither political 
nor economic effect on Great Britain. HMG was steadfast in its neutrality. The second 
objective was analytical: to assess the value of the attacks to their exponents, and the 
effectiveness of the British response. The evidence is that the attacks, despite tactical 
successes, were strategically counterproductive to the Palestinians; they assisted Israel's 
endeavours to label all Palestinian resistance to Israel as terrorism. By targeting the West 
and forming' alliances with its enemies, the Palestinians deprived themselves of Western 
diplomatic and economic resources crucial to their cause. Since renouncing terrorism 
(1988), they have made more progress than in the preceding 40 year's. The international 
response is not to be measured in the number, but in the implementation of enactments. It 
has been inadequate. The British response was re-energised by the atrocity of Lockerbie. 
The conduct of HMG, both MPs and civil servants, has been laudable. Britain's aviation 
security programme is effective, but the relationship between government and industry is 
now confrontational. The third objective was to derive proposals for improvements in 
aviation security. The recommendations are for government financial contribution, a 
partnership between government and industry, and a holistic approach. Bilaterals and 
alliances are the best means of obtaining international progress. Attacks on aviation have 
abated but may recur. Countermeasures should be systematically strengthened. The 
research has recognised the need to withhold information of value to attackers of aviation. 
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PREFACE: The Objectives and Methodology of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to address a practical issue with academic rigour. To 
some degree it differs from convention in its values, objectives and methodology. 
This Preface therefore offers a short guide to these differences and to the structure of 
the research. 
The value system by by which the research assesses all human activities is utilitarian. 
Utilitarian is used in the dictionary sense "useful for a purpose" rather than in the philosophic 
sense "producing the greatest good for the greatest number". Thus the research enquiry on 
any activity, whether terrorist, counterterrorist, or other, is "how well did it achieve its 
purposes? " Where appropriate, the utility of the activity's purpose is also assessed - the 
researcher takes the view that strategic analysis must encompass both the selection of 
objectives and their pursuit. 
The methodology is eclectic; it is submitted that a unified approach to a multi-disciplinary 
subject cannot, per se, yield a general overview. The researcher draws on scholarly works, 
the reports of well-informed investigations, and other written sources. He draws upon the 
advice of scholars and of experts from government and industry. He also draws upon his 
own 18 year involvement in aviation security. This inclusion is unavoidable. It is suggested 
that personal experience can, and arguably should, be included in an eclectic methodology. 
The obiectives derive from the subject matter of the research: the investigation of the origins 
of international terrorist attacks on aviation, and of their products from the perspective of 
xx 
Great Britain. The first objective is factual: to establish their origins, and the reasons and the 
methods by which this new weapon had entered the international terrorist armoury, to 
assess its effects upon Great Britain, and to examine the international and British responses. 
The second objective is analytical: to review the data as it unfolded, in order to make 
informed judgements upon the value of this weapon to international terrorists, upon its future 
re-use, and upon the effectiveness of the responses. The third objective is methodological: 
to derive proposals for improvement in the response. 
Pursuit of these objectives necessarily leaves other, equally worthwhile, objectives to be 
pursued by others. Amongst these are a study of the effect of contagion: of how the use of 
the weapon spread globally, a study of the political responses of the liberal democracies, 
both within and beyond Europe, and a study of the strategies used in responses worldwide. 
The research also raises interesting questions: how the performance of international 
organisations can be assessed from a utilitarian viewpoint and what that assessment might 
be; the extent to which commercial and other self-interest disrupts political alliance and 
overrides morality in liberal democracies; the degree and method by which the different 
strengths of government and industry can be synergised. The research suggests two 
general areas of immediate interest: the methodology of making peace with terrorist 
organisations, and the strategy of counterterrorism. It also suggests two specific areas of 
interest. The first is the record of extradition and legal processes relating to international 
attacks on aviation. The second is the costs of attacks on aviation and of the 
countermeasures. 
Section 1 explains the four perspectives from which the research approaches its subject 
matter. The fourth perspective also defines the scope of that subject matter. Violence 
xxi 
directed against a liberal democracy is not to be equated with violence against a totalitarian 
regime. Therefore attacks on aviation are studied within the context of liberal democracies, 
the dominant interest being the effects of attacks on Great Britain. 
Section 2 reviews the background to international attacks on aviation. It submits that it is the 
Palestinian - Israeli conflict which constitutes the background and the origin of these attacks. 
It is therefore central to their context. Section 2 reviews this conflict. It does not offer new 
information. It does strive to offer an objective analysis. Inevitably, partisans of each side 
will challenge its claim to objectivity. The Section concludes that the Palestinians' attacks on 
international aviation were counterproductive to their cause. 
Section 3 reviews and analyses the data on attacks on aviation. It submits that important 
data on the methodology of attacks and on the subsequences to the attackers is not 
normally recorded. An appropriate format for such records is constructed. Section 3 
contains an analysis of the different motivations of attackers. It gives a short account of 
each important attack on British aviation, and discusses the significance to Great Britain of 
the hijack of the BOAC VC-1 0 to Dawsons Field in September 1970. 
Section 4 assesses the political effects on Great Britain of international attacks on aviation. 
It reviews the effects on HMG, using Hansard as a primary source of government policy 
statements. It examines the record of British trade with Israel for indication of Palestinian 
terrorist influence. Finally it discusses the significance of British public opinion to 
Palestinian terrorist objectives, and analyses the results of pertinent opinion polls. 
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Section 5 assesses the economic effects on Great Britain of the attacks. Satisfactory 
calculation of the total costs of aviation security is not possible because the essential 
constituent data is not currently recorded by the civil aviation industry. 
Section 6 is an extensive review of the British response to attacks. It includes the 
international activities of ICAO and ECAC which were important components of the 
response. It also records the activities of pilots' organizations, IFALPA and BALPA. The 
researchers own experience of ECAC and of the pilots' organizations furnishes some of the 
data in this Section. 
Section 7 is an initial strategic assessment of the British response to attacks on aviation. The 
Section considers key publications on the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare. It identifies the 
contributions of a number of authors to a possible strategy of counterterrorism and suggests 
some key dimensions. It draws conclusions upon which it bases the proposal for a major 
adjustment in the philosophy of aviation security administration in Great Britain. 
Section 8 offers a short overview of the research. It identifies three areas of 
counterterrorism in which there is an an apparent need to formulate a more systematic 
approach. The first is negotiation with terrorists. The second is the pursuit of international 
agreements. The third is the securing of public support for counterterrorist actions. 
The Appendix is a database of the 141 most significant attacks on aviation. 
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1. PERSPECTIVES ON AVIATION SECURITY 
1.1 Introduction : Perspectives and Definitions 
This research approaches Aviation Security from four perspectives. They are outlined 
in this Section. 
The first is the perspective of the researcher. It is a declaration of interest, intended to 
facilitate assessment of the objectivity of the research. 
The second is the operational perspective. Aviation Safety is an established and 
successful management activity which has much in common with Aviation Security. It 
balances the conflicting financial demands of profitability and safety; it has 
commercial, national and international aspects. Aviation Safety is therefore used as 
an operational parallel to Aviation Security. 
The third is the intellectual perspective. It is that of political science, approached from 
the utilitarian viewpoint that it should provide understanding of the practical world. 
The fourth, the ethical perspective, is provided by the ethos of liberal democracy. To 
consider attacks on a liberal democracy within the same framework as attacks on 
oppressive or absolutist regimes is potentially confusing. There are fundamental 
differences in the causes of and motivations for such attacks, and in the responses 
available to the State. 
The defining of terrorism is vexatious. Political scientists have been unable to agree a 
definition; this has not been overlooked by those whom they criticise for failing to 
implement an adequate counterterrorist policy, an altogether more challenging task. 
Discussion of definitions is confined to the clarification of general concepts and 
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terminology, minutae not being important to this research. The concept of 
international terrorism is elaborated later, and two sub-species are postulated (It 
1.2 The Researcher's Perspective 
The researcher was a professional pilot for 31 years, the first 5 with the Royal Air Force and 
thereafter with British Airways (formerly BOAC), flying 707s, Tristars and 747-400s, until his 
retirement in August 1993. His perspective on Acts of Violence against Aviation derives 
directly from every pilot's perspective on air accidents, unremitting opposition. 
1.3 The Aviation Safety Perspective 
1.3.1 The Management of Aviation Safety 
There is a fundamental difference between safety and security. Failures of either may lead 
to loss of life. However, failures of safety are the product of error, whereas failures of 
security are the product of intent. Safety is therefore the defence of assets against 
negligence and mishap; security is the defence of assets against an antagonist. 
Paradoxically this apparent distinction is the foundation of a vital common concept: losses 
can be incurred only when system defences are inadequate. The antagonist seeking to 
breach security defences is an attacker, often a terrorist; the antagonist seeking to breach 
safety defences is mischance, colloquially known as Sod's Law. Therefore the Management 
of Aviation Security has much in common with the Management of Aviation Safety. 
Aviation Safety has four support structures. Firstly, it permeates the aviation industry. It is 
deeply integrated along the chain of primary functions: aircraft manufacture, maintenance 
and operation, and embracing the support functions of supply, navigation and air traffic 
control; it is also the philosophy of all personnel who work in aviation, from the pilots ("first 
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on the scene of any accident") and others directly involved with aircraft to those with a more 
distant involvement. 
Secondly, the highest practicable standards of operation are laid down and are clearly 
understood by those responsible for achieving them. 
Thirdly, comprehensive systems for monitoring, inspecting and testing performance are in 
place. They are complemented in all responsible countries by Incident Reporting Systems 
whereby information on incidents, whether of system failure, engineering failure or human 
error, must (mandatory) be reported - often by the person responsible for the error - in order 
that the experience of the incident can be disseminated and utilised to pre-empt recurrence. 
Additionally, Aviation Safety, being central to the ethos of the profession, gives rise to a 
valuable informal information exchange. 
Fourthly, the total Aviation Safety activity is enshrined in international agreements and in 
national legislation. In Great Britain the Civil Aviation Act (1982) empowers the Civil 
Aviation Authority to legislate on safety standards and procedures; the Authority issues its 
Directions by means of a variety of documents, primarily the Air Navigation Order, and the 
Certificate of Airworthiness attached to each aircraft and which defines the standards 
required for its operation. International standards are agreed and defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), an arm of the United Nations. It 
promulgates standards by means of Annexes to the Chicago Convention (1944) under which 
ICAO was established. 
Thus a complete system of Aviation Safety has evolved with its host body. Aviation is more 
than creditably safe. It is a benchmark of competence in human endeavour. Part of the 
attraction of aviation to the terrorist derives from the shock of a catastrophe in an industry 
which, in the developed world, is the epitome of safe transport. 
4 
Aviation Security is a newer science than Aviation Safety; it does not yet have the 
commensurate benefit of four similar support structures, and is moving only slowly towards 
the Aviation Safety blueprint. Costs are one key determinant of progress. Levels of security, 
like those of safety relate directly to expenditure (assuming managerial competence). There 
is thus an important judgement to be made when setting expenditure limits. There is a level 
at which the commercial operation of aircraft would become uneconomic even to the best of 
airlines. Therefore an intermediate level must be found where safety and expenditure are 
both deemed acceptable. This is a dilemma as old as aviation. 
"(In 1934 the US Army's Chief Aviator issued the order ... ) 'There will be no more accidents! ' 
Such an injunction might give a great deal of satisfaction to the man who sends it, but it took 
one of General Westover's zone commanders to put things in a proper perspective when he 
signalled back: 'There will be no more flying'. " I 
1.3.2 Aircraft Accidents: Level of Acceptability 
It is instructive to note the change in the Royal Air Force accident rate over the past five 
decades. 
The sobering statistic emerges that, during the war (193945) the RAF may have lost as 
many aircraft to accidents as to enemy action. 
"(In 1943) the Inspector General of the RAF, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, 
wrote that 'our incidence of aircraft accidents is the enemy's best friend and ally in the promotion 
of the air war against us, and probably accounts for about as many of our aircraft as the 
Luftwaffe itself. ' Throughout the RAF as a whole, between 1939-45 a total of 80,000 aircraft 
were accidentally destroyed and a further 160,000 were involved were involved minor 
I BROOKES, Andrew. Crash. Shepperton: Ian Allen, 1991, p 36 
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contretemps. As only 125,000 were built many must have gone through the accident mill more 
than once. Between 1940-45 home based RAF lost 25,271 aircrew in non-operational flying 
accidents and Ludlow-Hewitt estimated that the total loss, including overseas RAF elements, 
was'in the order of 10,000 trained and semi-trained flying men each year. Here is the foe within 
our gates ......... 
Similarly for our allies, 
... 
"The Americans lost more aircraft and crews in training and routine flights than in CoMbat. "2 
The figure of "80,000 aircraft ... accidentally 
destroyed 
... 
11 is not confirmed by references to other 
sources by Brookes and is difficult to reconcile with the statement that "125,000 were built"; 
this latter figure the researcher was able to cross-check by reference to an official 
publication3, which gave a total of 122,306 aircraft produced in the UK, 1938-44. 
Unreserved credence should not be placed in the figures quoted, nor should other factors 
(eg, aircraft delivered to the Royal Air Force from the US and elsewhere) be overlooked. 
However a reasonable general conclusion may be that the accident rate was over ten 
thousand per year. This was not the result of disinterest, nor of inexperience in Flight Safety 
(the Royal Air Force term for Aviation Safety). 
"(Sir Hugh Trenchard) wrote to the Times in February 1931 'There is no subject which has 
caused me greater anxiety during the decade in which I held the post of Chief of the Air Staff 
and none to which that I devoted more time and thought (than flying accidents)' ". 4 
2 BROOKES, Andrew. lbid, p 37 
3 POSTAN, M. M. British War Production. London: HMSO, 1952, Appendix C 
in parenthesis, Postan gives the revealing information that in 1944 UK factories produced 
26,461 new aircraft, whereas the Germans produced 39,275 despite the best attentions 
of the Royal Air Force. Albert Speer, Minister of Production, attributed this excellent 
performance to the destruction of all paperwork by the Royal Air Force. 
4 BROOKES, Andrew. Crash. Shepperton: Ian Allen,, 1991, p 35 
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The statistic from the 1940s has an important lesson for the 1990s. It spotlights a key 
determinant of accident rates: acceptability. During the war it was imperative to keep flying 
and to this imperative were subordinated pilot selection and training standards, aircraft 
airworthiness, meteorological conditions and all the many factors which combine to 
constitute Aviation Safety. 
A Spitfire cost E3000 (1940). A Tornado (1993) costs c. E18m. Herein lies the key to the 
ever-increasing importance of Flight Safety. Britain is no longer at war and therefore the 
resupply of the armed forces is not the country's highest priority. Furthermore, to an RAF 
with 100 fighters (1993) the loss of one Tornado may be viewed as 200 times more 
catastrophic than the loss of one Spitfire to an RAF with 20,000 fighters (1940). 
In civil aviation the decision on acceptability is made by a wider audience: the civil aviation 
industry, regulatory authorities, insurers and the public and their lawyers. The industry 
believes that "acceptability relates more to the absolute number of accidents than to the rate 
of accidents per sector or passenger-kilometre because each major accident receives 
extensive coverage in the media, which reports each accident as an event, irrespective of 
the number of contemporaneous eventless flights". 5 The cost of accidents may be the more 
fundamental factor. Further the direct cost of an accident may now amount to hundreds of 
millions of pounds sterling, with the possibility of more than a billion. Loss of public 
confidence leads to loss of revenue to the industrygLW The public may view accidents in 
general to be inevitable; it does not regard any accident in particular as either unavoidable 
or acceptable. This unacceptability is manifest in the searching investigation of an accident, 
the public exposure of deficiencies and the punitive costs concomitant with and resulting 
from the consequent legal actions. 
The landmark in this progress is the accident to the Turkish DC10 which crashed into the 
forest of Ermenonville after a door blew off and control was lost (March 1974). All 346 
persons on board were killed. The significance of this accident was that a class action was 
5 interview with David Learmount, Operations/Safety Editor, Flight Intemational, 19th January 1994 
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organised on behalf of the bereaved. 6 Thus the defendants, the aircraft manufacturer 
Douglas and its insurers and lawyers, found themselves facing not distraught, disorganised 
and vulnerable widows but unified and purposeful professionals. Settlements were in the 
order of E100m. Equally importantly, the integrity of the manufacturer was publicly examined 
and found wanting, and the conduct of the regulatory body, the (US) Federal Aviation 
Agency, was exposed and severely criticised. 7 The attendant damages and costs were 
unprecedented in civil aviation. This public investigation was a landmark in that a new 
public interest - that of the bereaved - established its precedence over the old supposed 
public interests, the. well-being of the manufacturer as a contributor of prosperity and 
employment to the public, and the need to maintain confidence in Government regulation. 
There are however two caveats. 
The first is that insurers routinely seek to delay payments by use of appeals and legal 
technicalities. This is a long-standing practice; it is made more beneficial than ever to 
insurers by the interest earned on the huge sums involved ($800M has been set aside by the 
insurers to cover potential liabilities in the Lockerbie case of Pan Am 103). 8 The second 
caveat is that the aircraft manufacturers now go to great lengths to avoid long drawn-out 
legal proceedings in a desire not only to minimise legal costs, but also to avoid the 
attendant public exposure of their, or their products' failings. Out of court settlements in 
major cases are normally accompanied by a secrecy clause which prevents disclosure not 
only of the settlement figure but also of the evidence revealed by the investigation. Thus the 
pendulum of safety advancement is swinging back from the pressure of public disclosure 
towards the discretion of the manufacturer. 
In the last three years there have been two accidents of major significance. In both of these, 
aircraft of types operating in great numbers worldwide have suffered failures which resulted 
in unavoidable loss of control by the pilot (El Al Boeing 747, Amsterdam, 4 Oct 1992, and 
6 EDDY, Paul, Elaine POTTER and Bruce PAGE. Destination Disaster. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 
1976, 
p 276 
7 lbid, pp 149-175 
8 The Times. London, 7th April 1994, p 24 
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Lauda Boeing 767, Thailand, 26 May 1991). In the former case two engines separated from 
the heavily laden aircraft after take-offi; in the latter case a thrust reverser engaged in flight 
and the aircraft is believed to have turned upside down. 10 In both cases the public debate 
has left serious questions unanswered. There is therefore no public reassurance that 
appropriate corrective action has taken place and therefore no grounds for judging whether 
public confidence in manufacturers, airlines, airports and regulatory authorities is fully 
justified or badly misplaced. 
Aviation Security must find its answer to the same conundrum: who decides the public 
interest, the public or its elected Government? If the former, the process may be distorted by 
the vested interests of the media and litigious lawyers. If the latter, it may be distorted by the 
vested interests of the airlines and aircraft manufacturers and by their lawyers and insurers, 
and by civil servants and politicians. 
1.3.3 Parallels with Aviation Security 
It has already been suggested that the integration of Aviation Safety into the civil aviation 
industry provides a parallel for Aviation Security. Clearly this parallel is incomplete because 
the Threat, a quantity external to the industry, is not addressed. 
Another parallel to be drawn is between the public investigations of the 1974 DC1 0 accident 
and of the 1988 terrorist destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. In each case public 
interest developed such magnitude that it became a powerful influence on governments. 
And in each case the anger of the bereaved was organised into an uncompromising force 
(DC-10 class action and the Lockerbie Victims Group) which skillfully maintained the all- 
important public pressure. However, proponents of Air Safety have the easier task, the 
imposition of their wishes upon the major manufacturers of civil aircraft in the world (of 
9 Netherlands Aviation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report, 92-11 




whom there are only three- British Aerospace/Aerospatiale, Boeing/Douglas, and Fokker). 
Proponents of Aviation Security have to persuade all countries of the world to implement 
adequate security measures. This raises the knotty problem of Host-State Responsibility, a 
third parallel between safety and security, (see below 8.3). 
Airlines are an international entity. Their maintenance, fuel supply and control are not 
confined to the country of registration but are effected worldwide, any deficiency may 
prejudice the safety of the aircraft and passengers. There is therefore a multi-faceted 
mechanism to implement a minimum safe international standard and it is broadly successful, 
Security is a more difficult issue because it involves less the activities of airlines' agents, and 
more those of government agencies. Often the airport authority is an agency of the Host- 
Government. Therefore insistence on security standards will impinge upon national 
sovereignty. 
The difficulties are more apparent than real. It is not a question of Government A dictating 
standards to (for example) the airport police force of Government B. It is a matter of 
Governments A and B agreeing the international security standards of ICAO. It is 
fundamentally no different from common international safety standards in runway 
construction or Instrument Landing System performance. However common standards in 
security are rarely achieved in practice, a fact that defaulting countries do not wish to 
acknowledge. 
1.4 The Political Science Perspective 
1.4.1 Criterion of Contribution 
10 
Professor Jack Spence, Director of Chatham House, sugested three criteria by which the 
value of political science should be judged". He said that it assisted in stretching the mind, 
aided intellectual development, and contributed to policy development. These amount to a 
single criterion: contribution to understanding. It is necessary to examine the concept of 
"understanding" before discussing the contribution of political science to the subject under 
discussion. 
Political science can draw upon the resources of both the sciences and the arts. From 
science should come objectivity, on which to base analysis, to establish facts, from which to 
derive hypotheses, which can be tested by predictions, which can be validated by 
subsequent occurrences. 
The arts, in the study of social behaviour, should contribute objectivity, on which to base 
analysis, to facilitate description, from which to induce theories, which must offer 
explanations of past events, and which will, at the least, increase understanding of 
underlying patterns, relationships and trends; from these may be derived probabilities and 
methods of influencing future occurrences which may in turn be vindicated by subsequent 
events. 
The origin of Aviation Security as a management activity and as a subject for study, lies in 
the need to protect expensive assets and crews and passengers and staff from a range of 
actual and threatened acts of violence against aviation. Of these "terrorism" is the most 
significant in terms of magnitude and effect and is the most complex, and thus interesting, as 
a subject for study. It is therefore "terrorism" towards which most effort has been directed. 
II Address, Department of International Relations, University of St Andrews, 24 Nov 1993 
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The term "political scientist" may fairly be applied across a broad spectrum, from the 
detached academic to the involved counterterrorist. One of the key roles of the latter is 
threat assessment, which has much commonality with the predictions of the former. The 
threat assessor is less concerned with generality and theory than his academic counterpart, 
and is more likely to use immediate intelligence, both open and covert, plus his knowledge of 
specific terrorist groups to make his prediction. In meteorological terms the academic is 
more the climatologist and the threat assessor is more the local forecaster. There are vital 
contributions to be made by both. 
Simple science, in which a small number of variables can be measured and controlled, has 
little relation or relevance to the complexities of advanced science or of social science. A 
current scientific view is: 
"that the whole is to be understood only be taking it into pieces, that the individual bits and 
pieces, the atoms molecules, cells and genes are the causes of the properties of the whole object 
and must be separately studied if we are to understand complex nature". 12 
This is daunting to the social scientist, and the meteorologist who might be forced into 
lengthy sabbaticals to await the emergence of computers of massive modelling power. 
Fortunately at a macro-level there are forces so overwhelming that they take the atoms, 
molecules, cells and genes along with them. These forces are underlying conditions; thus 
climatology can explain the formation and passage of the monsoon and calculate its 
probable effect on a given location at a given time. The questions in political science are, 
firstly whether there are underlying conditions of magnitude sufficient to impose a general 
pattern upon the atoms of society - self-determining human beings with supposedly 
individual choice; secondly whether these underlying conditions can be identified and 
described with accuracy, enabling political scientists to explain observed behaviour and 
predict future behavioural patterns with accuracy. 
12 LEWONTIN, RC. The Doctrine of DNA. London: Penguin, 1993, p 12 
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The researcher accepts that the process, per se, of political science has great potential 
value, in that dialectic involves the rejection of unsustainable theory. This pre-supposes that 
such rejection results in the emergence of a sustainable product, in the form of description 
or explanation or valid theory, leading to a greater understanding of the subject studied - in 
the present instance "terrorism". As aviation "terrorism" is living history, straddling the 
immediate past, the present and the immediate future, such understanding as emerges must 
inevitably be of value to the counterterrorist. Therefore the researcher concludes, with 
Professor Jack Spence, that the best measure of the worth of the product of the theoretical 
political scientist is utilitarian, its value to the practical counterterrorist. 
A sharply contrasting view is implied in the opening paragraph of the leading and most 
comprehensive guide to academic work on terrorism. 
"The search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on. There continues to exist 
considerable uncertainty about what the right way to think about the problem is. At the same 
time, maLiy authors seem fatigued about the need to still consider basic conceptual questions. 
This is a dangerous attitude as it plays into the hands of those experts from the operational anti- 
terrorist camp who have a "we-know-it-when-we-see-it" attitude that easily leads to double 
standards which produce bad science and also. arguably. bad policies'. 13 (Researcher's 
emphasis) 
This statement indicates that students of terrorism have polarized into two groups, the 
academics and the operational anti -terrorists. Such a schism is regrettable. 
Academics, if they succeed in obtaining understanding of the causes, nature or course of 
terrorism, would be in a position to make a valuable contribution to the work of the 
operational counterterrorist. Equally, counterterrorists have experience of the reality of 
terrorism against which they could test, validate and refine the definitions, concepts and 
13 SCHMID, Alex P and Albert J JONGMAN, et al. Political Tefforism, A new guide to actors, authors, 
concepts, 
data bases, theories and literature. Amsterdam: Swidoc, 1988, p1 
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models which the scholars might develop. It has already been argued that the foundation of 
scholarship, whether of the arts or of science, is objectivity, a commodity sorely lacking in 
the statement that "experts from the ... anti-terrorist camp .,.. have a 'we-know-it-when-we-see-it 
attitude' which easily leads to double standards which produce bad science and also, arguably, bad 
policies". Where is the evidence that anti-terrorists have the alleged attitude? Could they not 
be basing their recognition on (for instance) the legal definition of terrorism in the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 1974? (" ... use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for 
the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear". 1.5 below. ) Why does a 
'know-it-when-we-see-it attitude' lead to "double standards"? Again no evidence is offered. 
Correct identification of an act of violence is more likely, in a competent force, to lead to an 
appropriate (standard) response than to double standards. The further extrapolation to "bad 
science" apparently assumes that counterterrorists are seeking to construct -a school of 
unified scientific thought.. They are primarily concerned with the management of response to 
attack, not the generation of theoretical papers. Schmid continues "this same attitude ... easily 
lead ... arguably ... to bad policies", 
but no supporting argument is offered. The whole of the 
statement on counterterrorists is closer to tabloid slur than academic objectivity. They might 
be forgiven if, having read Schmid and Jongman's comprehensive review of academic 
profusion, they called it confusion and postulated a'wouldn't-know-it-if-they-saw-it' school of 
academia. Even more regrettable than the general denigration of the practical 
counterterrorist is the polarisation of two groups of experts, who should be working together 
for their own, and the common good. 
1.4.2 The Liberal State and Terrorism 
Scholars who seek to relate their intellectual findings to the realities of counterterrorism can 
find themselves sharply criticised by their colleagues. Professor Paul Wilkinson pioneered 
discussion of the dilemma posed to the liberal state by modern terrorism. 141-low should the 
state react? Must it abide by its liberal principles in opposing violent attacks which are 
seeking to destroy its assets, its citizens, the liberal character of the state itself, and which, 
14 WILKINSON, Paul. Tefforism and the Liberal State. London: Macmillan, 1977, second edition 1986 
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under the guise of political process, adopt breach of the democratic law as a modus 
operandi? The state has a clear obligation to defend its democratic structure because that 
structure, unlike all others, is the free choice of its citizens. It must also defend their lives 
and personal safety. The state therefore has to examine the spectrum of possible 
responses to terrorism: retaliatory attack (US bombing of Libya, April 1986), interception of 
terrorist suspects in international airspace (US action against Egyptair B-737, October 
1985), and even stronger responses: attack on terrorist bases within sovereign states or 
targeted assassination of terrorists, which some states (Israel) have already openly 
adopted. The democratic state must also develop a policy on the freedom of the media to 
report terrorist activity. The balancing of its response is a dilemma for democracy and 
therefore a proper concern for the people of democratic states; they may hope for and 
expect guidance from their most talented fellow citizens, amongst whom will be numbered 
the scholars. This guidance cannot easily, or perhaps cannot possibly, be separated from 
moral value judgements. How many citizens' lives should be sacrificed to protect the 
democratic nature of the society in which they are living in supposed safety? Professor 
Wilkinson's stance of opposition to terrorism which he described pithily and accurately as 
"sheer bloody murder" has not diverted him from insisting that the liberal state must respond 
with minimal force, respect the guiding liberal principle of international relations - non- 
interference (into other sovereign states), operate its security apparatus entirely within the 
constraints of the law and safeguard the freedom of the press. 
Examination of Professor Wilkinson's guidelines would have to commence with definitions of 
"minimal" (force) and of "within the constraints of the law" (security apparatus). 
Notwithstanding that discussion, his guidelines are strictly in accord with the highest liberal 
principles and would debar assassinations, retaliatory strikes on sponsors and strong-arm 
activities by the security services. 
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The professor has sought to make a thoughtful academic contribution to the debate on a 
fundamental dilemma of life and death, and this work is widely regarded as a classiC. 15 
However his constructive effort was rewarded by one media sociologist with the description 
"counterinsurgency doctrine masquerading as political science". 16 Leaving aside Schlesinger's 
apparent confusion of insurgency and terrorism, the word "doctrine" is normally understood 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990) to be "a set of (political) principles" or "dogma", and 
"doctrinaire" is defined as "seeking to apply a theory or doctrine in all circumstances without regard 
to practical considerations". Insofar as Wilkinson is doctrinaire it is by virtue of adherence not 
to counterinsurgency doctrine but to liberal or political science doctrine, exactly the opposite 
to Schlesinger's charge. Further there are two non sequiturs in the description: 11... doctrine 
masquerading as political science"; firstly it is masquerading, if at all, as counterterrorist strategy 
not as political science; secondly, as Wilkinson's work is an exploration of the practical effect 
of liberal policies it can hardly be damned as being "without regard for practical considerations". 
The utilitarian view is that the validity of a theory or school of thought is established, not by 
its acceptability to adherents of rival schools of thought, but by its applicability to the real 
world of terrorist activity. Applicability obviously involves compatibility with observable facts. 
It assumes the value judgement that terrorism directed against a liberal democracy is bad 
and should be fought. For pilots and their passengers, potential victims of terrorism, this is 
an easy judgement. It should also be an easy judgement for members of liberal 
democracies, the very essence of whose societies is the constitutional proscription of 
political violence. Most would agreed that there is, at some point, political violence may be 
justified. Within a true democratic society nowhere is that point reached and never does 
murder become a justifiable method of influencing government decision. Therefore the 
researcher suggests that any theory of political science, unless Marxist, anarchist or 
otherwise opposed to the principles of liberal democracy, must be based upon the value 
judgement that political violence has no place within a liberal democracy. Upon that value 
15 CLUTTERBUCK, Richard. Terrofism, Drugs and Crime in Europe after 1992. London: Routledge, 1990, p 
212 
16 SCHLESINGER, P. On the Shape and Scope of Counterinsurgency Thought, in G. LITTLEJOHN et al, eds. 
power and the State. London: Croom Helm, 1978, pp 98-127 
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judgement political science can base its exploration of the liberal society's proper response 
to violence. 
Thus the liberal society must decide how far it will abide by any set of rules in 
defending itself against enemies who abide by no rules; it may elect to abide within its 
liberal rules, or operate outside them, or to change them to suit the changed 
circumstances of modern terrorism. 
1.4.3 Definitions of Terrorism 
An understanding of the nature of terrorism has direct relevance to Aviation Security. 
The lengthy first chapter17 of Schmid and Jongman's work researches academic and 
government views on the definition of terrorism, using the authors' own definition from the 
first edition (1984) of their guide as a basis for their survey. At the end of the chapter they 
offer a revised (1987) definition: 
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) 
clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, 
whereby in contrast to assassination-- (sic) the direct targets of violence are not the main 
targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators. Threat- (sic) and violence-based communication processes 
between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. "18 
17 SCHMID and JONGMAN, ref 13, p 1-51 
18 1 bid, ref 13, p 28 
17 
The authors offer their opinion that "we are, in my estimate, somewhat closer to solutions than we 
were some years ago". 19 Others might take a more sceptical view of the value of their 116 
word definition. 
Schmid and Jongman's methodology was unusual; they canvassed academics and reviewed 
other published definitions, seeking to establish the frequency of occurrence of the 
constitutent elements; from these they compounded their definitions. The results throw 
doubt on the value of the democratic process as a scientific methodology. 
In their 1984 guide the authors identified 22 "Elements" or components which attracted 
varying degrees of support for inclusion in the definition. 
1.4.4 Purpose of Definition 
A major difficulty is the requirement that a definition must not only be accurate, ie meet the 
requirements of academic truth, but also must be appropriate to its intended function. 
Several parties have an involvement and an interest in terrorism: political scientists, lawyers, 
law-enforcement agencies, the military, politicians, the media and the general public. It is 
unlikely that the political scientists' definition, whether it be the suggestions of Schmid and 
Jongman or any other combination of the 22 elements, would be of any use whatsoever to 
any of the other parties. It would be incomprehensible to the general public which already 
has its own, widely differing understandings of the word. It would be useless as a 
foundation-stone for the enactment of law - though the lawyers would reap prodigious 
financial benefit as they laboured through the verbiage and terrorists might reasonably take 
offence at criticism of their own impenetrable prose. Further, political scientists have an 
interest in the history and development of terrorism, an interest not much shared by the other 
parties who are focused on terrorism as a contemporary apologia for murder. A definition 
which covers not only the many and various present manifestations of terrorism but also past 
manifestations must necessarily be wide and all encompassing. Such generality must, by its 
19 lbid, ref 13, p1 
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nature, lack specificity, and therefore cannot give the spotlight illumination of current 
terrorism needed by the other parties, general public and law-enforcement forces alike. 
This is not to say that the efforts to find a workable definition are pointless. On the contrary, 
terrorism must be defined for the purposes of law enactment. An agreed definition would 
also have practical value in the utilization of databases, which are not easily compared, 
largely because of differences in definitions. Similar conclusions could be drawn about 
academic studies of terrorism. 
There are two routes to the formulation of a definition. The first is to start by identifying the 
underlying core concept or concepts, thus to generate the definition. The second is to start 
by specifying the purpose to which the definition is to be put and then to derive the definition. 
A practical solution is to take both routes simultaneously and to obtain maximum 
convergence within the time frame available. What has so far proved to be impracticable 
has been the formulation of a definition which is acceptable to all interested parties and well- 
adapted to all intended purposes; the researchers view is that such an objective is 
unrealistic and unachievable. 
The minutiae of definition are important to understanding, to the formulation of law, and to 
the delineation of the responsibilities of law enforcement agencies. 
1.4.5 The Elements of Terrorism 
1.4.5.1 General 
Schmid and Jongman's 22 elements do not constitute 22 different concepts. TABLES 1 and 
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Rearranging this Table and suggesting general headings for each Group produces TABLE 
2. 
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Using TABLE 2 to derive a loose definition yields: 
"A Group pursuing a Political Purpose by Means of Violence on Victims who 
may be Surrogates for the Target, a Liberal Democratic Government". 
(The elements Terror and Publicity which are not included in the definition are discussed 
below, 1.4.5.7&8 ) 
1.4.5.2 Group 
It is conventional to define the activities of a lone attacker as "lunatic! ', and those of a group 
as "terrorist". This may be a useful convention; there are differences in individual and group 
behaviour which assist analysis. It would be understandable if an individual deemed 
"lunatic" felt that this was an unfair comparison with terrorism. 
1.4.5.3 Political 
Although there are clear differences between criminal and political groups in their objectives, 
there is nonetheless a certain attraction in the deliberate rejection of the concept of 
"purpose". A pilot with a Kalashnikov held to his head is a victim of criminal violence 
whether the attacker is seeking transport to a congenial country, publicity for a worthy cause, 
publicity for an unworthy cause or martyrdom for his beliefs. The passengers in the aircraft 
are at risk from the moment the pilot's freedom to ensure their safety is circumscribed. If 
lives are lost the deaths will remain a fact whatever the underlying motivation; thus there is 
no a priori need for the legal retribution to take account of the motivation for the act which led 
to the loss of life. But, as before, if understanding is advanced, there is advantage in 
distinguishing different motivations, even if they culminate in a common manifestation. 
Criminal ly-motivated behaviour and politically-motivated behaviour do exhibit different 
patterns. In essence the objective of a criminal attack is relatively simple, the extortion of 
money or the commandeering of transport; the victim attacked (the airline) is likely to be one 
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and the same as the target of the demands (money, transport). In contrast a political attack 
has an underlying political purpose, most often in the form of concession required of 
government (release of prisoners, change of government policy, publicity, ransom). If it is an 
attack not accompanied by demands but intended as a reprisal or as a warning, it 
nonetheless has a political connotation. The targets of the attack - the addressees, 
recipients of the message, are a wider audience, government, governments, general public 
or others - than the unfortunate victims. In contrast to criminal motivation - which boils down 
to personal gain - political motivation is a complex reflection of many and various political 
ideologies and situations. It may involve the opposite to personal gain, deliberate personal 
sacrifice: risk of imprisonment, injury or death in pursuit of a "cause". To distinguish 
criminal ly-motivated attacks from political ly-motivated attacks is a useful step towards 
analysing the differences in the causes, motivation, methodology and objectives of the two 
patterns of behaviour. 
1.4.5.4 Violence and Force 
Violence (the illegal use of force) is a core concept in distinguishing terrorism from 
legitimate, non-violent, political activity. Hence a convention has been adopted: force is the 
legitimate use of physical force by the State, or within the law, violence is force used 
illegally. 
1.4.5.5 Target and Victim 
Another convention names the person who suffers personal injury from attack the victim, 
and the State, organisation or person whom the attack is intended to influence, the target. 
These victims are surrogates for the target, which is the Government and its policies. This 
substitution of an accessible, perhaps symbolic, victim for the true target is not uniquely 
political; criminals extort ransoms from commercial organisations by holding employees 
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hostage. However it becomes political when the target, the addressee of the message, is a 
Government. 
It would be possible to confine the definition of terrorism solely to attacks on surrogate 
targets, thereby excluding direct attack on Government officials, but this exclusion would not 
be useful. Groups with a political purpose have proved themselves catholic in their victim 
selection, therefore such restriction of definition would confine study to one part of a group's 
total activities, leaving the rest outside the scope of the investigation. This is more likely to 
be confusing than illuminating. 
1.4.5.6 Liberal Democracy 
This research is concerned only with liberal democratic governments. Totalitarian, 
dictatorial or otherwise repressive governments which are not the subject of free elections or 
which maintain their position by non-democratic or violent methods cannot be examined in 
the same context as liberal democracies. Therefore to exclude them by distinguishing them 
not only clarifies study but also offers the researchers answer to the tired perennial, "one 
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". 
1.4.5.7 Terror 
The inculcation of terror, ie terrorizing, has long been held to be a sine qua non of terrorism. 
This belief has been reinforced by the dominant position of the word "terror" within the word 
"terrorism". The validity of the belief is another matter. 
Terrorizing is a method, a means by which the perpetrator seeks to advance his purpose, 
whether political or criminal or insane. Sub-criminal terrorizing, as in bullying behaviour, is 
not relevant to this study. 
Terrorism is a broader concept which may, or may not, involve terrorizing as a method. 51 % 
of Schmid and Jongman's respondents, hardly an overwhelming majority, "emphasised fear or 
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terror as an essential of terrorism". 20 , This did not lead Schmid and Jongman to reexamine 
carefully the evidence that terrorizing is an essential ingredient of terrorism. They discuss 
the issue briefly under the heading "Terrorism without Terror? " but conclude lamely: 
"Yet to remove the element of 'massive overwhelming fear which is designed to 
act upon the mind of some person other than the immediate victim' (RP Hoffman) 
would be tantamount to abandoning the core concept of terror". 21 
This is uncomfortably close to adhering to a chosen position not because of its validity but 
because of the inconvenience of abandoning it. 
Communities may be coerced not in order to drive them out, but to intimidate them and bring 
them under their oppressors' control. In most cases these communities are those within 
which their attackers are based and of which their attackers are members. The Provisional 
IRA in the Bogside and in parts of West Belfast use violence across the spectrum from 
verbal threat to murder to preserve their near-control of their own Catholic community. This 
could reasonably be described as terrorizing. This is not to say that the primary purpose of 
every attack on the rival community, IRA on Protestant, or Loyalist on Catholic is to terrorize; 
such attacks are often intended to eliminate leaders or simply as revenge. All violence is 
frightening whether it is an attack by an unpleasant dog, a mugger, a housebreaker, a 
football crowd, the Luftwaffe or a terrorist; each attacker, doubtless hoping that his victim 
will be cowed by his violence, could thus be said to be terrorizing; it is not a province 
exclusive to the "terrorist". Indeed in democracies, some of the clearest cases of using 
terror as a tool, that is, terrorizing into obedience, are not political but criminal. Gangsters: 
the Krays, the Mafia, the Triads and the Yakuza have all run successful and extensive 
extortion operations within a community or geographical area. Further, insofar as the hostile 
populations deferred to their control and not to that of the lawful government, their criminality 
20 lbid, ref 13, p5 
21 lbid, ref 13, p 19 
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achieved more political power within liberal democracies than all the efforts of politically- 
motivated terrorists. 
The truth is that terrorization is an objective of many forms of serious violence. It is not the 
distinguishing feature of all modern terrorism. Undeniably, early seminal thinkers advocated 
the spreading of terror as a core concept and an essential to the methodology of terrorism. 
The famous dictum "kill one, frighten ten thousand" may still inspire the pipedreams of 
terrorists who confuse widespread disgust with widespread terror. Some of them therefore 
continue to seek to instil fear. Others seek attention and use violence to obtain it. 
1.4.5.8 Publicity 
The central position in the methodology of terrorism once occupied by the spreading of terror 
is now occupied by the spreading of the message, though they are sometimes one and the 
same. The propaganda of the deed can be carried by modern media to all the world's 
politicians and the majority of its households. Terrorists can hold to ransom and, very 
publicly, humiliate governments; they thus can establish the strength, and therefore by 
strange implication, the legitimacy of their cause. Appearance on television establishes the 
reality of their existence, raises the terrorists' status amongst fellow-terrorists, heartens their 
supporters and bothers their foes; any demonstration of their competence attracts the 
grudging respect of their audience and even of their enemies; to a terrorist it is the ultimate 
feel-good experience. The methodology has developed from the original "kill one, frighten 
ten thousand". 
"Is it better for our cause to kill ten of the enemy in the countryside of Telergma, where no-one 
, will speak of it, or one in Algiers, that will be mentioned the next day in the American press? "22 
This simple objective is reiterated in a PIRA statement: 
22 PALETZ, DL and AP SCHMID. Tefforism and the Media. London: Sage, 1992, p 50 
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" 'Why did you kill a harmless old man like Mountbatten? ' asked a reporter ... 'Why are you 
calling from New ZealandT came the (Sinn Fein) reply. 1123 
Palestinians have had a hand in many of the terrorist attacks on Western civil aviation. 
Their strategy was enunciated clearly at the beginning of their terrorist campaign by George 
Habash: 
"Attacks will not bring about the liberation of Palestine but they are justified in terms of 
worldwide public attention to the Palestine cauself. 24 
The sophistication of terrorist exploitation of the media is well, and clearly, documented. 
Attacks have been planned at events where the media were already foregathered (Munich 
Olympics', 1972). In similar vein, one of the greatest attractions of aircraft hijack to terrorists 
is that it simultaneously achieves a media hijack. In a captivating aviation setting, the 
ingredients of a life or death drama are added the spice of catastrophe and the humiliation of 
authority, all of which make for irresistible theatre. The hijack of the Kuwaiti B-747 (16 days, 
Larnaca, Algiers and elsewhere, 1988) did not achieve the terrorists' objectives of the 
release of prisoners from custody. It did however become a major media success, with 
murder committed to maintain media interest, and newspapers ordered to the aircraft door by 
the terrorists. It was an operation designed to spread not terror but the message. Such is 
the methodology of modern terrorism. 
1.5 The Liberal Democracy Perspective 
Terrorism must be opposed through carefully constructed policy, based on the best available 
advice and utilizing the legislative, military, economic, media and other resources available 
to government. The policy of a liberal democracy must balance the freedoms of its citizens 
23 lbid, p 78 
24MERARI and ELAD. International Dimensions of Palestinian Terrorism. (JCSS Study) # 6, p 18, in Jin-Tai 
CHOI, Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation, unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1992 
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with the interests of their safety. The determination of the point of balance is a matter for the 
judgement of the elected government. 
Terrorism directed against a liberal democracy is, in its causes, very different from political 
violence directed against repressive regimes. Furthermore, the responses available to a 
liberal democracy are circumscribed by constitutional restraints and by the many pressures 
on an elected government. 
The first of these pressures is international. The airlines of major countries operate 
worldwide; it is therefore an empty exercise to harden defences in the home country whilst 
leaving the same target invitingly exposed elsewhere. The raising of overseas standards is 
a subject in itself; it is a necessity, the key to which is diplomacy. Countries need to work 
together for their mutual advantage. Examples will be given of purportedly friendly countries 
allowing terrorist activity against their neighbours or allies, or of entering such agreements 
with terrorist organisations, in exchange for immunity for themselves. Additionally, the 
constraints and conventions of diplomacy inhibit a robust response: countries take grave 
offence at any public condemnation of their conduct; the impression is that denunciation of 
connivance with terrorism is a graver offence than such conduct itself. Amongst the 
conventions to which liberal democracies adhere are those of diplomatic immunity - even in 
the extreme case of the unprovoked murder of a policewoman (WPC Yvonne Fletcher, shot 
by staff of the Libyan Embassy, St. James's, London, 17 April 1984) - and of the inviolability 
of the diplomatic bag, long-established source of terrorist supply. Finally, liberal 
democracies are not free to arrange the harassment, imprisonment or murder of foreign 
nationals on their territory, a bargaining counter not denied to unscrupulous regimes. 
The second pressure is economic. The need to secure reliable oil supplies and lucrative 
commercial contracts is a major factor in government policy. Nowhere is it more clearly 
illustrated than in the British Government's involvement in the supply of armaments to the 
Iraq of Saddam Hussein, a notorious sponsor of terrorism. The Supergun and the Matrix- 
Churchill affairs culminating in the Scott Enquiry (1994) very publicly exposed the hazards of 
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the simultaneous pursuit of incompatible policies and did little to raise public confidence in 
contemporary British statesmanship. Similar embarrassments have befallen other liberal 
democracies: Colonel North's supply of embargoed arms to the Iranians (USA, 1989), 
French, West German, Italian and Japanese supply of chemical warfare capability to the 
Libyans (Rabta, 1985-1988). 25 
The third pressure is that of legality because, in principle, the governments of liberal 
democracies operate only within the framework of the law. Closely bound into legality is 
openness; to indulge in extra-legal operations a government must not only take the steps of 
authorising the actions and mustering the resources, but it must also maintain secrecy, not 
an easy task with media which are not only free but also astute, intrusive and sensation- 
seeking. The greater the scale of terrorist activity the greater the difficulty of concealing 
extra-legal response. In other words the greater the threat to its citizens the more that strict 
legality limits the self-defence activity of a liberal democracy. Thus, when confronted by a 
"new" phenomenon, terrorism, for which the sanctions of existing law are inadequate, it must 
legitimise the required response by extending the framework of the law. This involves 
submitting its proposals to the test of parliamentary acceptability, and thus to public and to 
expert scrutiny; it also offers an opportunity for guardians of civil rights to express their 
anguish (which the uncharitable would say is their favorite occupation) and for terrorist 
sympathisers to cry foul. 
Law which does not provide a vehicle for successful prosecution fails in the task. Legal 
draftsmen must work to the imperatives of clarity and unambiguity. Their enactments will be 
searchingly examined by defending counsel, eager to exploit any deficiencies. The UK 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 and subsequent amendments is an example of a 
government extending its legal powers in order to face a new situation, the increased 
activity of PIRA. The 1989 Act, Section 20 (1) defines terrorism thus: 
25 ADAMS, James. Trading in Death. London: Hutchinson, 1990, pp 243-4 
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" 'terrorism' means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear. " 
This definition is used in this research. It is much simpler than Schmid and Jongman's 
definition which sought to accommodate all shades of academic opinion. Different 
definitions are needed for different purposes. 
It is the task of a liberal democracy to develop an effective counterterrorist policy and one 
which accommodates international, economic and democratic considerations. This policy 
must, as far as possible, be expressed in legislation. Extra-legal government activity conflicts 
with the principles of liberal democracy; it must therefore be kept to a minimum, though it is 
perhaps idealistic to expect to eliminate it entirely. For this reason this study of the strategic 
aspects of aviation security is conducted from, and constrained by, the perspective of liberal 
democracy. 
1.6 Conclusion: Perspectives and Definitions 
The four perspectives and the definitional concepts outlined in this Section offer an 
indication of the methodology of the research. No model is propounded, nor are there 
hypotheses to be validated. A uni-dimensional approach to a multi -dimensional 
subject must, per se, be limited in value. It may well be misleading if the factors 
outside the dimension are dynamic. For such reasons the research is pragmatic. It 
reviews Palestinian attacks on aviation from a viewpoint of utility: their causes, their 
objectives and their effects. It reviews the British responses from a similar viewpoint, 
and offers a perspective of their utility by reference to international activity. The 
viewpoint on the actors: HMG, industry, international government and other 
organisations, and pilots' organisations, is utilitarian. Their measure is their 
contribution to the general good, that is to the progress of aviation security. 
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2. ATTACKS ON AVIATION : BACKGROUND 
2.1. Introduction: Aviation Terrorism 
Political violence is a long-established human activity. Over the centuries its 
methodology has changed, following the developments of social structures and of 
science. The incorporation of mass air travel into its methodology was predictable. 
The degree of that incorporation is still unresolved; it depends upon the outcome of 
the contest between the methodology and the countermeasures. The first recorded 
hijack was on 21 February 1933 in Peru. 26 The first recorded airliner sabotage was on 
31 October 1933 in California. 27 Prior to 1968 at least 167 hijacks and attempts and 21 
sabotage attacks had occurred. 28 In the majority of the hijacks, including the USA- 
Cuba epidemic, the aircraft was commandeered as a means of transport. 
In 1968 the Palestinians adopted attacks on aviation as a tactic to damage Israel and 
to commandeer world attention. To assess the effects, the success, and the 
probability of the re-use of the tactic, it is essential to establish its context. Therefore 
this section includes a short and non-partisan review of the Palestinian conflict. It is 
clear that the Palestinian attacks on aviation were a classic "blocked response" to 
Israeli policies in Palestine (2.3). It is also clear that no strategic control was imposed 
upon the tactic. The actions of Palestinian extremists earned them the enmity of the 
influential Western world. They assisted Israel to stereotype the Palestinians as 
26 MICKOLUS, Edward F., et al. International Terrorism in the 1980s, Volume 11980-83. Ames: Iowa State 
UP, 1989, p8 
27 COX, Matthew and Tom FOSTER. Their Darkest Hour. London: Arrow, 1992, p 258 
28 FAA. US and Foreign Hifackings - Summary (1986) 
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terrorists and thus to present all Israeli violence as the legitimate reactions of a state, 
even though the, Israeli record of military invasion and brutal repression was as 
callous as any terrorism. It is not the task of this research to assess the relative 
culpabilities of the parties to the conflict. Neither emerges with credit. However it is 
clear that Palestinian attacks on aviation were strategically counterproductive to the 
Palestinian cause. 
The extensive use of attacks on aviation by other terrorist groups, by criminals, 
fugitives and others is acknowledged. The research focuses upon the Palestinians 
because their role was central to the emergence of the tactic. It is submitted that their 
coercion of media and government attention pioneered a principal method of modem 
international terrorism, although there is no agreed definition of international terrorism 
(2.2.2 & 3). 
2.2. Attacks on Aviation 
2.2.1. Introduction 
Attacks on aviation are a phenomenon new to the world. They are an unwanted by-product 
of this century's most exciting achievement, aviation. Although the contemporary technology 
involved - aircraft and sophisticated modern weaponry - was not available to previous 
generations, the analysis of attacks on aviation must begin by considering whether they 
contain elements of longer standing. 
Various motives have been ascribed to those who have attacked aviation: political, criminal, 
transportation, ideological, military and insane. The category central to this study is political 
which, since serious violence is involved, equates to terrorism. Ideologists have sought to 
disrupt aviation (animal rights movement, GB, 1995) but have not yet used extreme violence. 
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Early attacks on aviation (1950s to early 1970s) were predominantly to obtain transportation 
(USA to Cuba, Eastern Europe to West) or the acts of violent criminals. These motivations 
are simple and need not be considered in a wider context. They are a continuing threat to 
aviation which must not be overlooked. 
Politically motivated attacks may originate anywhere along a continuum, one end of 
which - the positive - is support for a cause (eg nationalism or animal liberation), and 
the other end of which - the negative - is hostility to the target (eg capitalism, religious 
opponents). Distorting the continuum are the corruptions which develop from 
terrorist activity: the need to maintain the material and psychological well-being of the 
group, and the mercenary potential of violence which in the cases of, for example, 
some Irish terrorism, the Abu Nidal group, and others has certainly overtaken and 
probably supplanted the original political motivation. Accommodated within the 
continuum at the negative end are attacks motivated by the hostility of one nation (or 
regime) to another, as in actions against the United States instigated and funded by 
Iraq, Syria, Iran, or Libya. Such cases are acts of war in all but name; they are 
deniable because no war is declared and because the actions are purportedly those of 
non-state actors; they are therefore recorded not as acts of war but of terrorism. For 
the counter-terrorist, identification of the participating terrorist group is not the end of 
the investigation, but one step towards identifying the prime mover, the instigator. 
Understanding the aetiology of attacks is one of the most important tasks of research; 
it is the key to their prediction and interception, and to the discouragement of their 
repetition. 
By 1968 the era of the jumbo-jet had begun; the world was opening to travellers of all 
classes as, twenty years earlier, the local region had been opened by the charabanc. 
The Palestinian campaign of attacks on aviation also began in 1968. 
The coordination of serious attacks into a campaign was pioneered by the 
Palestinians who went on to demonstrate its viability and effectiveness. In the 1940 
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decade there were 14 attacks on aviation, in the 1950 decade there were 23, in the 
1960's 132, in the 1970s 342.29 
2.2.2. The Nature of International Terrorism 
Thus a new mutation of international terrorism made its unwelcome appearance; its seeds 
were the age-old sources of conflict; the means of its fruition was the advent of modern 
aviation. Its modus operandi was an amalgam of contemporaneous technological advances - 
jet aircraft, real-time mass communications and television. If the ideal crime is the one 
which goes undetected, then the ideal terrorist action is the one which the whole world 
witnesses. Successful terrorist action directly pressures a government by humiliating it, and 
indirectly by prompting pressures upon it from other governments and from the population 
governed. This last is especially significant in liberal democracies where the incumbents 
may be voted out of prestigious office, substantial salary, and accompanying benefits by its 
electorate. Tyrants and dictators, although not subject to electoral pressures, are super- 
sensitive to public humiliation; their consequent control of the media is one of the many 
means by which they maintain their tyranny and by which they resist terrorist pressure. 
"Saudi Arabia bans all satellite dishes. 1030 
"A statement by the Interior Ministry said that satellite dish owners have one month to get rid of 
theequipment. Anyone violating the decree will be fined between L17,000 and 186,000 . .... 
Foreign broadcasts will be received by the Information Ministry via satellite, screened and 
retransmitted 'to viewers through a cable system in the kingdom matching with its religious and 
social values". 31 
29 US Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts 
involving Civil Aviation, 1980-1985; and Criminal Acts involving Civil Aviation, 1.986-1988. 
30 The Independent, 29 June 1994, p2 
31 The Times, 1 July 1994, p30 
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These reports (July 1994) relate to Saudi Arabia, a country which, though some way from 
liberal, emancipated democracy, is even further from those repressive regimes of the Middle 
East to whom torture, murder and genocide are the normal instruments of state control, and 
where censorship is no longer newsworthy. 
Interestingly, terrorists too are super-sensitive to their personal, as well as their group's, 
image. Most deeply dislike to be labeled terrorist, which strips from their lifestyle the 
sophistry of their self-justification. There are many examples of their insistence upon more 
flattering descriptions, and of death threats to uncooperative journalists. Gerry Adams, 
supposedly no longer a terrorist, expressed resentment at a cartoon in the Irish Times which 
portrayed him as an unattractive politician. The cartoonist, Martyn Turner, told Sinn Fein to 
"grow up", adding that "It is a bit strange that Sinn Fein should accuse me of being cruel to them after 
what they did for 25 years ......... 
32 Whether Mr Adams is a terrorist or a democrat, he is clearly 
aware that the ultima arbiter of his image is the media; it is not his self-image that they 
communicate to his audience. 
In liberal democracies television coverage of terrorist successes are party political 
broadcasts on behalf of terrorism; the power of the media is hijacked to the terrorist cause 
by the gripping and horrifying spectacle of the terrorizing and murder of innocents. 
The utilisation of aviation by international terrorists is at the heart of their activities. It 
enables them to operate out of safe havens, protected by international law and by their 
sponsors; they no longer have to conceal themselves close to their target or to depend upon 
local support. They are thus exposed to counter-terrorist forces for a minimum period before 
and after their attack, with a high probability of escaping retribution. Additionally modern 
technology offers stand-off capability. The bomb that murdered 270 people on 21 December 
1988 at Lockerbie, Scotland may well have been inserted into the system in Malta, 2400 
miles and 11 hours earlier. By the time it exploded its dispatchers could have been in 
32 The Times, 2 Jan 1996, p2 
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Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Iran. Though hijackers run a greater risk than bombers, many 
have escaped either at the end of their operation or soon thereafter through coerced or 
unprincipled release from custody. 
Three further factors favour both the terrorists and their sponsors by reducing the probability 
of retribution. The first is the task of gathering conclusive evidence of their guilt; the second 
is the liberal sensitivity of the Western civilisation which is shy of not only ultra-legal and 
violent reprisal, but also of judicial capital punishment. The third is the demise of gun-boat 
diplomacy, not least because of terrorist response. Liberal democracies are presently at a 
disadvantage. They have not responded adequately to their new enemy, international 
terrorism, with an effective legal framework and an operational strategy. 
It is not terrorism that is new, but its truly international nature. International aviation 
terrorism is an airborne disease. It cannot be permanently eradicated and therefore 
more successful methods of treatment and control are needed. 
There are various definitions of "international". Mickolus' definition, in his first Chronology 
(1980) is: 
to... when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its 
institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend 
national boundaries. "33 
In his second Chronology (1989) he repeats this but also makes a different statement: 
"International or transnational terrorism concerns terrorist activities involving terrorists or 
government participants from two or more nations. ... Any terrorist incident that includes the 
33 MICKOLUS, Edward F. Transnational Tefforism. A Chronology of Events, 1968-197.9. 
Greenwood: Westport, 1980, pp XIII-XVIII 
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governments, the citizens, or the institutions or two or more countries is considered 
transnational. ft34 
This is simpler and more useful but, as we will see in the next paragraphs, still too broad. It 
includes all terrorist attacks save those exclusively domestic, although leaving some 
questions unanswered. In fact Mickolus does include many examples of domestic terrorism 
in his Chronologies, so the titles he gives them "Transnational Terrorism" (1968-79), and 
"International Terrorism" (subsequent volumes) are misleading. 
2.2.3. The Distinction Between International And Domestic 
2.2.3.1 Definitional Difficulties 
A strict definition of domestic terrorism which excluded all international connotations: 
support, funds, weapon supply, victims, etc, would exclude most terrorist attacks. The value 
of distinguishing between domestic and international terrorism lies in the clarification which 
is thereby provided to counter-terrorists and to scholars. Thus the IRA is widely seen to 
pursue domestic objectives ("Brits Out") but to utilise international sources for funds 
(Noraid), weapons (Libya), safe havens (Eire) , terrorist training (Palestinian) and support 
(Baader-Meinhof, Action Directe). Does this make the IRA an international group? Is their 
murder of a British soldier in Belfast an international incident? There is no fundamental 
distinction; therefore it is a matter of judgement, with much more to be gained for 
understanding and progress by the consensus of experts than by their eternal striving for a 
theoretical unachievable accuracy. 
Only the most trivial of domestic terrorism has no international connotation, whether it be 
newsworthiness abroad or the nationality of a participant. Explosives are indiscriminate in 
their effects, and an IRA bomb in Oxford Street or a Tamil bomb in Colombo are likely to 
34 MICKOLUS, ref 26, px 
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claim foreign lives. Terrorists may express regret but do not allow it to affect them, or their 
subsequent conduct. 
Terrorism may be described as "international" both usefully and unambiguously if the 
jurisdictions of more than one government are involved. Then the investigation of the attack 
and the prosecution of the culprits will necessitate international cooperation, and all that is 
thereby implied in terms of vacillation, ineptitude and differing political agendas. The flight 
of attackers abroad and the need for extradition proceedings is so common that most 
incidents will involve the jurisdictions of more than one government in both their investigation 
and in the subsequent legal proceedings. Therefore even attacks exclusively domestic in 
their victims, targets, objectives and participants are likely to have an international 
dimension and, by the suggested criterion, invite the classification "international". A sub- 
category "domestic-international" might be more appropriate. Be that as it may, it is clear that 
international cooperation is crucial in combating terrorism because all terrorism has either 
international connotations or the potential therefor. A common criminal act is a simpler 
matter, having neither the objective nor the defence of a "political" offence, and a lesser 
possibility of subsequent coercion; all of which reduces the putative embarrassment to 
governments; cooperation may therefore be expected of all but the venal and corrupt who, 
though numerous, tend to be dangerous associates for terrorists. 
Mickolus includes "governments" in his definition. Thus any form of state sponsorship 
(weapon supply, funds, training, logistics, safe haven, et al) by a foreign government would 
constitute an "international" dimension. This may be an accurate description but it is not a 
helpful one, state sponsorship being an activity clearly distinguishable from other aspects of 
an "international" act. For that reason it is preferable to retain the term "state sponsorship" 
as a description of that activity, and to accept that it is the norm for domestic groups to be 
aided by the state enemies of their target government. 
Finally there is the possibility of international cooperation between domestic groups which 
I 
share a commonality of purpose, whether anti-capitalism, religious fundamentalism, or other. 
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At the point at which terrorist cooperation became terrorist coordination, government 
cooperation would have to become government coordination and the terrorist activity would 
have to be classified "international". 
Any terrorist action involves violence and four other essential elements: the territorv on 
which the attack takes place, the attackers, the victims and the target. In the case of the 
simplest domestic incident all these elements would relate exclusively to one country. 
2.2.3.2 Territory 
Territory has immediate relevance in determining whether jurisdiction is a matter for a single 
government, or for more than one. Thus a letter bomb posted in Country A and received in 
Country B would involve at least two jurisdictions, as would an explosive device placed on 
an aircraft in Country A and detonated or discovered in Country B. 
2.2.3.3 Nationalities of Attackers 
The attackers' nationalities do not give a clear-cut distinction between "domestic" and 
"international". The presence of a foreigner in a domestic terrorist group would not by itself 
make that group's activities international. However at some point the proportion of 
foreigners in a group would necessitate re-classification of the whole group. The objectives 
and activities of the group would also be relevant. The links, eg between Baader-Meinhof, 
Japanese Red Army and Palestinian groups, included common objectives and constituted an 
international dimension which was central to the investigation of otherwise "domestic" 
incidents. 
2.2.3.4 Nationalities of Victims 
Similarly the victims' nationalities are not a simple key to classification. The question 
of intent must be considered. Thus the "accidental" death of a Dutch sailor who was 
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murdered in Northern Ireland by the IRA, who mistook him for a British soldier by reason of 
his short haircut, was not perpetrated to obtain coverage in foreign media nor to influence 
the Dutch government, nor did it put the incident into Dutch jurisdiction. 
2.2.3.5 Nationality of Target 
Targets are more problematic; a foreign victim may be deliberately selected, either to 
discourage foreign investment, or to obtain international publicity, or to make a "keep-out-of- 
our-territory" statement; each of these could be seen as an attempt to international ise the 
dispute by involving a foreign government; nonetheless no outside jurisdiction is necessarily 
involved and therefore the classification "domestic! ' is more helpful. This would not be true 
of an attack on a foreign aviation target, because international aviation is covered by 
international conventions, which specifically empower more than one jurisdiction. Thus an 
attack on an aircraft of Country B carried out by domestic terrorists of Country A within the 
territory of Country A would be an "international incident". Strictly this would not be true of a 
similar attack on the airline office of Country B, as the international conventions would not 
apply. 
2.2.4. Palestinian Attacks on Aviation 
The Palestinians resorted to attacks on civil aviation in 1968. Some sources lay the 
responsibility for this tactic at the door of the Afro-Asian-Latin-American Peoples Solidarity 
Conference (also known as the Tri-Continental Communist Congress, Cuba) held in Havana 
in January 1966; this allegation is examined (2.4.3.3) 
Prior to 1966, there had been a total of 69 hijacks in the 18 year period 1947-1965, 
approximately three per year. 18 of the 23 hijacks (78%) 1947-56, were escapes from 
behind the Iron Curtain. In 1958-59 there were 6 hijacks associated with the Cuban 
revolution. Two previous Cuban hijacks (22 Oct 58 and I Nov 58) had resulted in, 
respectively, the disappearance of a DC-3 and the crash of a Viscount which killed 17 of the 
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20 aboard. From 1958-66, there were 11 hijacks of Cuban aircraft, probably to escape 
Castro, and one hijack inbound. After Castro encouraged supporters to join his revolution, 
an epidemic broke out: 29 hijacks to Cuba in 1968,71 in 1969,29 in 1970,18 in 1971,23 in 
1972 and 4 in 1973.35 In all, the aircraft was targeted for its value as transport. The 
targeting of aircraft as a symbol of an enemy nation was started by the Palestinians in 1968. 
They thus pioneered a technique of pursuing hostilities which they could not, being 
stateless, legitimise as war. 
In 1967, the year after the Congress in Cuba, the Arab-Palestine cause suffered a massive 
defeat in the Six Day War. The Israelis destroyed the Egyptian and Jordanian Air Forces, 
two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force and 80% of the Egyptian army's heavy equipment. They 
defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies. They captured Sinai and the Golan 
Heights. They also captured East Jerusalem. This was the greatest blow of all, not only to 
the Palestinians, but to the psyche of the whole Arab world. Thus the Israelis multiplied 
Palestinian desperation and desire for retribution whilst at the same time demonstrating the 
futility of attacking Israeli defence forces in large scale conventional war. To those inclined 
(or driven) to violence, terrorism was an obvious option. Given the high level of security 
within Israel itself, attacks on Israeli targets elsewhere were inevitable. 
1968 set the scene for the 20 years of international terrorism that followed. 36 In that year 
Fatah carried out three attacks in Israel: 
18 March 1968: 2 Israelis killed, 28 injured when a bus hit a mine 
18 Aug 1968: 8 Israelis, 2 Americans injured by 3 grenades in Jerusalem 
18 Aug 1968: No injuries resulted from a bomb in Jerusalem 
The PFLP carried out one attack in Israel: 
35 FAA, ref 28 
36 MICKOLUS, ref 33. 
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22 Nov 1968: 10 Israeli Jews, 2 Arabs killed, 55 injured by a bomb in Jerusalem. 
PFLP claimed credit "in retaliation for Israeli terrorist actions" (in occupied territories). 
The PFLP carried out the first two acts of international terrorism against aviation targets: 
23 Jul 1968: An El Al 707 was hijacked out of Rome and taken to Algiers 
26 Dec 1968: An attack with incendiary grenades and a machine gun was made on an 
El Al 707 awaiting take-off at Athens. One passenger was killed and a stewardess 
was injured. 
For the first of the Fatah attacks (18 Mar 1968), which killed 2 and injured 28, the Israelis, in 
reprisal, attacked a Fatah base in Jordan, killing 150 and capturing a further 150 guerrillas 
(21 Mar 1968). The Jordanian army intervened and the Israelis retreated. This was the 
battle of Karameh, famous in Palestinian folklore. It was not perhaps as famous a victory as 
the Palestinians subsequently claimed. However their perception of it as such was of great 
significance. The Israelis were no longer an invincible foe, but an enemy with vulnerabilities. 
This changed perception was an echo of history sounding across two millennia from Ancient 
Greece. Then the Spartans were the invincible foe. They too combined total self-interest 
with a willingness to accept personal self-sacrifice; they too had routinely defeated their 
surrounding enemies, their fellow Greeks - until the battle of Leuctra: 
"In (BQ 371 occurred an event which shook Greece to its foundations. Thebes defeated the' 
Spartan Army in a straight fight at Leuctra. They had at the moment what was rare in Thebes, 
two men of genius, Pelopidas and Epan-ýnondas, and these men had devised a new and bold 
military tactic. Instead of drawing up the heavy infantry in a line eight men deep (with'cavalry 
and skirmishers on the flanks), they thinned one wing and the centre and drew up the other wing 
to the extraordinary depth of fifty men. This mass of men, acting like a rugby scrum, broke 
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through the Spartan line by its sheer weight, and the unbelievable had happened. But Thebes 
had no new political idea to contribute. 1137 
The Palestinians' "victory" at Karemeh was not the product of military genius, but of simple 
courage. Unfortunately they, like the Thebans, desperately lacked new political ideas. 
Interestingly, the enemies of the Thebans, the Spartans, are also remembered as much for 
their merciliness and their devious self-interest ("Spartan promises") as for their military 
prowess. 
The Israelis' immediate response to the PFLP attack at Athens (26 Dec 1968,1 killed, 1 
wounded, some damage to aircraft), was a commando raid on Beirut International Airport 
destroying 13 civil aircraft of 3 Lebanese airlines (28 Dec 1968). Damage was estimated at 
a massive $43m. 
These few incidents set the pattern for the next 20 years. The Palestinian attacks within 
Israel were trivial in terms of deaths and injuries inflicted on the target, the Israelis, but costly 
in collateral death and injury to fellow Arabs and innocent passers-by. The El Al hijack was 
mounted out of Rome, pistols and grenades were used, gratuituous and vicious violence was 
involved, the aircraft was taken to Algiers and the Algerians deployed their formidable 
negotiating skills to save the lives of the hostages. Prior reconnaissance had been carried 
out with the alleged assistance of a state intelligence agency (Egypt); a serious mistake had 
been made: Ariel Sharon, an Israeli General, had been believed to be on board. The hijack 
achieved the release of 16 Arabs by the Israelis. Two of the attackers utilised their 
experience in subsequent hijacks. The paramilitary attack in December took place in 
Athens, killed one person and injured another and led to the customary Israeli over-reaction 
and disregard for UN condemnation. Similarly the Israelis reacted to the 2 deaths in the 
Fatah attack on a bus with a major military operation, killing 150 at Karameh. Finally the 
capture of the two terrorists in Athens led to their imprisonment for three months, after which 
their release was successfully coerced by the hijack of a Greek aircraft. All these elements 
37 KITTO, HDF. The Greeks. London: Penguin, 1979, p 154 
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of 1968 were repeated monotonously in the subsequent 20 years. Thus in the first year of 
attacks on aviation, the Palestinians had identified and successfully employed 10 of the 13 
essential items in a hijack; the remaining three (use of an aircraft as a strongpoint and as 
transport, power of hijackers to coerce governments to negotiate with them, and facility with 
which hijackers could command the media and a mass audience) were revealed in the JAL 
and Olympic hijacks of 1970. 
In 1969 the Palestinians widened their target from Israel itself to encompass supporters of 
Israel, starting predictably with the USA. A TWA B-707 operating to Tel Aviv from Los 
Angeles, via Paris, Rome and Athens was the first victim (29 Aug 1969). Once again Rome 
was selected by the attackers for their access to the target. As in the two previous incidents 
the group responsible was the PFLP. This hijack was led by Leila Khaled who was soon to 
be involved in the Dawsons Field hijack extravaganza (6 Sept 1970). Attractive, young and 
a good publicist she became an icon and an encouragement to the struggling Palestinians. 
The value of such encouragement to a people dispossessed of their land, hopelessly unable 
to recover it by waging conventional war, without diplomatic representation, and with few 
active sympathisers in the Western world was central to maintaining the momentum of the 
Palestinian movement. A strong statement was made to Israeli Air Traffic Control: "We have 
kidnapped this American plane because Israel is a colony of America and the Americans are giving the 
Israelis Phantom planes"38 and subsequently Leila Khaled remarked in an interview "hijacking is 
one of the aspects of our war against Zionism, and all those who support it, including the US. [The 
TWA plane was hijacked] because it brought visitors and tourists to our enemies who are occupying 
our land by force of arms". 39 The subsequent repeated targeting of TWA may well have been 
a reflection of its regular service to Tel Aviv. After the aircraft landed in Damascus the flight- 
deck and nose area were extensively damaged by explosives, but the intended destruction 
of the aircraft was not achieved. The passengers were well-treated throughout, though two 
Israelis were held for three months to coerce the release of 71 prisoners held by Israel. 
Allegedly Leila Khaled had been told that Yitzhak Rabin would be on board4O; he may have 
38 AREY, James. The Sky Pirates. London: Ian Allen, 1972, p 82 
39 MICKOLUS, ref 33, p 133 
40 MICKOLUS, ibid 
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been the "assassin" to whom she had referred on the passenger address system. If the 
allegation is true, this was a second Palestinian Intelligence failure. 
In the same year (1969) the PFLP carried out an attack with machine guns, and incendiary 
grenades on an El Al 707 at Zurich airport. The pilot was killed and 6 persons were 
wounded. The hijackers were imprisoned by a Swiss court on 22 Dec 1969 and their release 
was coerced nine months later by the hijack of a Swissair DC-8 (6 Sept 1970, Dawsons 
Field). One subsequently trained the Japanese Red Army group which attacked passengers 
at Lod Airport (Tel Aviv) 30 May 1972. 
The next year saw the first Palestinian sabotage attacks on airborne aircraft (21 Feb 1970). 
A Swissair Coronado crashed killing all 47 on board after a bomb in the rear luggage 
compartment exploded and the crew were incapacitated by the resulting smoke. On the 
same day an Austrian Caravelle survived the explosion of a similar bomb, the force of which 
was fortuitously absorbed by surrounding consignments of newspapers. 18 years later the 
structure of Pan Am 103 was not similarly protected. Some sources suggested that both 
bombs were in mail bags destined for Tel Aviv, which the saboteurs had expected to be on 
board El Al aircraft, but which were refused for carriage by El Al. Other sources suggested 
the deliberate targeting of Swiss and Austrian aircraft. It was two years before the 
Palestinians next attempted sabotage in the air (El Al 16 Aug 1972); they fortunately failed to 
destroy the aircraft. This hiatus perhaps partly resulted from the public revulsion, manifest in 
adverse publicity at the employment of indiscriminate murder as a tactic. More important, 
hijack was proving to be a more rewarding tactic. Although a number of planned hijacks had 
been intercepted on the ground (Athens, 21 Dec 1969; Munich, 10 Feb 1970 and 17 Feb 
1970), others had succeeded and had reaped dividends. Two significant hijacks in 1970 
identified the three other bonuses which were available from this style of attack. 
The first (Japanese Air Lines B-727,31 Mar 1970) was hijacked by nine Japanese members 
of the JRA, armed with a variety of weapons including samurai swords, pistols and pipe 
bombs. They demanded to be flown to Pyongyang, North Korea. The Captain told them that 
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he had insufficient fuel and they therefore allowed a landing at Itazuke near Fukuoka. In all 
previous hijacks bar one (TWA B-707, hijacked from the USA to Rome by ex US Marine 
Minichiello, 1 Nov 1969) the attackers had been able to proceed directly to their chosen 
"friendly" destination without an intermediate landing and confrontation with hostile 
authorities. The JAL aircraft was on the ground for 5 hours at Itazuke and subsequently for 
3 days at Seoul. During this time both the Japanese and South Korean governments 
attempted to recover possession of the aircraft and were successfully defied by the 
terrorists. Even worse, the whole proceedings were televised and witnessed by millions. 
This incident was an object lesson to the Palestinians, demonstrating the value of an aircraft 
both as a strongpoint for the hijack team and as a taxi-cab from one destination to the next, 
and showing that the hijack itself could force a major government to acknowledge terrorists, 
to negotiate with them and to accept humiliation by them, all the while attracting 
unprecedented worldwide and public coverage by reason of the suffering and potential 
murder of the hostages, to which the media flurried like vultures scenting a meal. 
The Palestinians put this learning into practice with the second terrorist hijack of 1970, an 
Olympic B-727 operating from Beirut to Athens which was attacked en-route (22 Jul 1970). 
It continued to its destination, Athens, but now under the command of the hijackers, where it 
was used as a bargaining counter with the Greek government to obtain the release of 7 Arab 
terrorists who were being held, awaiting trial, in Greece. All hostages were released in a 
settlement under which the Arab terrorists were tried and sentenced (for up to 18 years), and 
then promptly released; the prosecutor told them that he hoped to see them back as tourists. 
This operation was mounted to coerce the release of terrorists in custody following their 
attacks on aviation [attack on El Al B-707 at Athens (26 Dec 1968), foiled hijack of TWA 13- 
707, Athens (21 Dec 1969), grenade attack on El Al office, Athens (27 Nov 1969)], and it 
succeeded totally. 
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2.2.5. Conclusion: Attacks on Aviation 
Thus by August 1970, two years after their first foray (El Al, 23 Jul 1968), the 
Palestinians had developed the hijack of civil airliners into a weapon of unique value, 
with which they scored tactical successes and one from which their fighters had a 
good chance of returning to join the celebrations. In all respects it was precisely what 
the Palestinians needed, a terrorist tactic far superior to their pinprick suicide attacks 
in Israel or their equally suicidal conventional confrontations with the Israeli Defence 
Forces; it yielded heartening tactical successes and unparalleled publicity. For the 
next twenty years they exploited the methodology, reaping rich tactical rewards but, 
as will be seen, at serious strategic cost. The technique of hostage seizure was soon 
utilised outside aviation [Munich Olympics (1972)]. It was combined with aviation in 
the spectacular seizure of the OPEC Ministers, who were flown out to their intended 
murder in an aircraft demanded of, and provided by the Austrian government (1975). 
The Palestinians also sabotaged aircraft and made armed attacks on airports. 
The use of aircraft hijack has been adopted by other Middle Eastern groups, most 
notably Hizbollah who have carried out several murderous attacks. In their most 
recent hijack (Kuwait Airways B-747 May 1988) they held the world to ransom for 16 
days. Since then the Arab-Israeli peace talks have progressed, albeit fitfully, the Gulf 
War has been fought (Jan 1991), Gaza has been liberated from the Israelis (Jun 1994) 
and Yasser Arafat has returned to his homeland. These events have had the effect of 
bringing to an end Palestinian attacks on aviation. It is highly unlikely that attacks will 
be resumed by mainstearn Palestinians. Palestinian mercenary and maverick groups 
are less predictable, but they and their state-sponsors will be keenly aware that the 
Western democracies would unite in their response to a return to atrocities against 
aviation, and that there are no safe havens from modern technology. 
The period 1966-94 thus represents a complete phase of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict; in 1966 the Cuban Congress met to discuss the international promotion of 
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Communism; in 1967 the Arab forces suffered a massive defeat in conventional 
warfare and the humiliation of losing Jerusalem, the Palestinians were forced to look 
to other methods of pursuing their cause. In 1968 they turned to aviation terrorism. By 
1970 they had carried out attacks on airline offices, attacks on airports, hijacks and 
the airborne destruction of an airliner. They continued to use these techniques over 
the next 20 years. They demonstrated the ease and efficacy of the tactic to others; 
criminals, terrorists, refugees, the mentally disturbed, and, most important, to state 
sponsors. During this period a whole range of responses developed, ranging from the 
payment of protection money to terrorists, to the utilisation of US Air Force to bomb a 
state-sponsor. This period encapsulates not only a discrete phase of the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict, but the conception, birth and growth of attacks on aviation and of 
security counter-measures, to their current stage of maturity. Attacks on aviation 
(1968-94) can therefore be examined as the formative influence on aviation security, as 
an instrument of Palestinian policy, and as a cost and challenge to liberal 
democracies. 
2.3. Palestine :A Century of Conflict 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This Section of the research, ATTACKS ON AVIATION, offers three substantial 
conclusions. 
The first has already been advanced, (2.2.4): the Palestinians introduced the tactic of 
attacks on aviation into the armoury of international terrorism. 
The second conclusion is perhaps the most important. The Palestinians were the first 
combatants to use terrorism as a means to endeavour to internationalise a local 
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conflict. They elected to attack non-partici pant, third parties, in order to publicise 
their grievances and to draw the international community into their dispute. Both 
George Habash's PFLP and Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC were Marxist in orientation and 
advanced the Marxist argument "if you are not for us you are against us". The 
Palestinian recourse to terrorism was counterproductive; it gave them an image 
worldwide not of peoples dispossessed of their land, but of indiscriminate murderers. 
The PLO was branded a terrorist organisation; it was therefore not only excluded from 
the world's dominant decision making circles, those of the West, but worse, it made 
enemies of them. This greatly eased the pressures on Israel, which used the respite to 
consolidate its hold on Palestinian territory. 
The third conclusion is that their attacks on aviation were tactically successful,, but 
strategically prejudicial to their cause. 
The course of the Arab-Israeli conflict is central to these conclusions. It is therefore 
discussed in broad terms. The researcher writes from the perspective of international 
relations, and freely accepts that some historians may, and that partisans will, contest 
his views. This sub-section is confined to trying to identify the forces driving the 
conflict, both global and local, the characteristics of the conflict, and the milestones in 
its progress. 
The global driving force was Zionism and its quest for a Jewish homeland or state. 
This force was variously assisted, deflected or influenced by the superpowers - British 
imperialism (1898-1948), US-USSR manoeuvring (1945-95), and by Arab States' politics 
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(1948-1995). Zionism had consistent and coherent support from many influential 
Jewish individuals and organisations worldwide. Zionism was energised by the 
horrors of the Holocaust, and re-energised by the Palestinian denial that Israel had a 
right to exist. Zionism was opposed by Palestinians, Muslims and Muslim States; their 
opposition was characterised by their consistent and apparently congenital inability to 
unite. 
The local forces driving the conflict were the products of the local political maelstrom. 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq and Iran have all been deeply involved in 
open or terrorist war with Israel. 
The milestones in the conflict were the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948,1956,1967 and 1973, 
UN Resolution 242 (1967), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), Arafat's recognition 
of the State of Israel (1988) , the Oslo Agreement (1993), and the return by Israel of 
some territory to limited Palestinian rule (1995). 
Amongst the characteristics of the conflict was the consistent progress by Israel 
towards its objectives, the inability of the Palestinians to coordinate their opposition, 
the double standards of Israel in the matters of the rights of Jews and Palestinians, 
and the international isation of the conflict across most continents of the world. 
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2.3.2. The Course of Events 
The land of Palestine is the cause of its troubles. Following the biblical age, it was occupied 
for centuries by Palestinians. More recently it has been selected by the Jews for their 
rediscovered homeland. Over the last 100 years, persecuted Jews have reversed their 
diaspora, congregating and multiplying in Israel and forcing upon the Palestinians a 
diaspora of their own. 
The Jews' desire for a land or home of their own has long historical origins. Widespread 
anti-Jewish feeling in Europe and Russia during the 19th century including riots and, in 
Russia, massacres (1881); these added urgency to the Jews' search for refuge. The hostility 
to Jews was tribal. They retained a clear identity of their own whilst living within another 
community. Whether by choice or through rejection many did not assimilate into their host 
communities. They thus constituted a well-defined target for hostility, both engendered by 
generalities (tribal rivalry or the desire for a scapegoat) and by specifics (intelligence and 
financial skills). The Jewish quest for a homeland in Palestine was a key component of the 
agenda of the First Zionist Congress (Basle, 1897). 
The founding Zionists were careful to use the term Jewish "home", not Jewish "state. "41 By 
1919 the concept had developed into, or had been publicly revealed as, the objective of the 
foundation of a Jewish state. 
"the whole administration of Palestine shall be so formed as to make of Palestine a Jewish 
commonwealth under British trusteeship". (Chaim Weizmann, 19 19)42 
41 OVENDALE, R. The Middle East since 1914. New York: Longman, 1992, p 33 
42 INGRAMS, Doreen. Palestine Papers 1917-1-922: Seeds of Conflict. In David GILMOUR. 
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Thus the underlying cause of the century of conflict was simply a contest for territory, the 
land of Palestine. Inevitably the ambition to achieve control of a territory involves the 
domination of its existing inhabitants, by power, by numerical superiority, or by their eviction. 
"the Zionists would 'greatly expropriate' Arab property and 'try to spirit the penniless 
population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while 
denying it any employment in our own country"'. (Theodor HerzI c 1900)43 [Researcher's 
emphasis] 
Thus Herzl set the scene for a territorial battle which simmered and boiled throughout the 
20th century. It ended with the substantial victory of the Jews. The fruition of Zionism is the 
expanded State of Israel; its continued existence is not in serious doubt; its eradication 
would involve its enemies in suicidal recourse to nuclear war. 
2.3.3. Land and People 
It would be a mistaken exercise to compile a scorecard of atrocities, or of rights and wrongs, 
in an endeavour to come to a judgement on the conflict. However there is no reason to 
condemn all Palestinian violence as illegitimate, being in defence of the stateless, nor to 
accept Jewish violence as legitimate, being in defence of a state. Such a proposition should 
be absolutely refuted, being a justification of ethnic cleansing. 
The Dispossessed. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980, p 39 
43 lbid, p 40 
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The following paragraphs examine two propositions: that the increase in Jewish population 
was at the expense of the Palestinian population, and that the increase in Jewish land 
ownership was at the expense of the Palestinian land ownership. Both of these movements 
are seen as evidence for the major proposition that they were purposively achieved in 
pursuance of territorial conflict. 
2.3.4. Peoples of Palestine 
In 1914 the population of Palestine is estimated to have been 650,000, of whom 80,000 
(12%) were Jewish and 570,000 were Palestinian Arab. 44 
By the end of 1946 the population was 1,877,000 of whom 608,000 (32%) were Jewish and 
1,269,000 Arab. 
The partition of Palestine by UN vote (29 Nov 1947) into two states, Jewish and Arab, and 
the war of 1948 not only changed the boundaries of Palestine, but also led to a large Arab 
refugee exodus. Thus the basis for assessment of population numbers was changed, 
invalidating comparisons between Palestine (pre 1947) and Palestine/Israel (post 1947). 
The war of 1967 had similar effect, enlarging the area occupied by the state of Israel once 
more 
In 1983 the population of Israel including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (4 Jun 1983 
census) was 4,037,620 of whom 3,349,997 (83%) were Jews. Official estimates (31 Dec 
1990) gave the figures of 4,818,7000, of whom 3,941,000 (82%) were Jews. 
44 SMITH, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: St Martins Press, 1992, p 25 
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Over the century the population movement was Jewish immigration and Arab emigration. 
The major Arab exoduses were in 1947/48 and 1967 when they were driven or terrorised (in 
the true sense of the word) out of their homes and property. The Jewish intention was to 
secure the vacated property for Jewish occupation. 
"These massacres were calculated to panic the neighbouring villages into flight. After 254 
civilians in Deir Yassin 'had been deliberately massacred in cold blood', as Jacques de Reynier 
of the Red Cross described it, the wretched survivors were publicly paraded through Jerusalem 
in order to spread terror among other sections of the population. Arthur Koestler called the 
bloodbath of Deir Yassin 'the psychologically decisive factor in this spectacular exodus' and it 
was expertly exploited by the Zionists. A Christian missionary in Jerusalem recalls a 
loudspeaker blasting out this message to the Arab population: 'Unless you leave your homes, 
the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate'. And according to Menachem Begin, who was 
responsible for the massacre, the Arabs of Haifa fled to the boats crying 'Deir Yassin! '. 45 
"The significance of Dayr Yasin went far beyond its immediate fate. The killings and disposal of 
the bodies became a staple of Irgun and Hagana propaganda, proclaimed from mobile 
loudspeaker units that beamed their messages into the Arab areas of major cities such as Haifa 
and Jaffa; Arab radio also publicized the incident. These broadcasts had a major impact on the 
Arab will to resist, especially when the population found itself betrayed by its leaders. ... Fifty 
thousand fled in three days. In short, Zionist psychological warfare and terror tactics, which 
included the destruction of villages and the ousting of their populations, combined to produce a 
state of panic that resulted in the flight of over 300,000 Arabs by 15 May. 1146 
45 GILMOUR, David. The Dispossessed. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980, p 69 
46 SMITH, ref 44, p 143 
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"The exact number of refugees was never accurately established. The UN Economic Survey 
Mission's report in 1949 put the total at 726,000; the Refugee Office of the UN Palestine 
Conciliation Commission placed it at 900,000. The answer is probably somewhere in 
between. 1147 
The Jewish apologia that the refugees left voluntarily is specious, for they were not permitted 
to return. 
"Or as Dayan put it with more honesty on American television when asked whether Israel could 
not absorb the refugees and the inhabitants of the conquered territories: 'Economically we can 
but I think that is not in accord with our aims in the future'll. 48 
"(In 1949) The United Nations, which had contributed so much towards the establishment of 
Israel, now asked the Zionists to take the refugees back. The UN mediator in Palestine, Count 
Folke Bernadotte, reported to the UN secretary-general: 'It would be an offence against the 
principles of elemental justice if these victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to 
their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, offer at least the threat of 
permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries'. 
The General Assembly agreed with Bernadotte and its resolution of December 1948 
recommended 'that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return'11.49 
47 GILMOUR, ref 45, p 74 
48 SMITH, ref 44, p 76 
49 GILMOUR, ref 45, pp 74-75 
54 
Count Bernadotte was prescient. The Arab refugees have been permanently replaced. 
Bernadotte was assassinated by Jewish terrorists (18 Sep 1948) "in the midst of a vitriolic 
press campaign against him". 50 Widespread vilification as a stimulus of assassination was 
cited 47 years later, by the widow of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzak Rabin, also murdered 
by Jewish extremists (4 Nov 1995). 
In addition to the large Palestinian-Arab exoduses occasioned by the wars of 1948 and 
1967, the Israelis have continually coerced their departure with violence, and with 
maltreatments of every description, and by the appropriation of Arab land and 
property. The Israelis have unremittingly pursued an aggressive settlement policy, to 
which they adhered throughout the Peace Process (1993-96). They have thereby 
continuously sought to increase the Jewish population and displace the Arabs. To 
the Israelis, peace appears to mean that they continue to secure the land of Palestine, 
while the Arabs relinquish the right to violent resistance. 
2.3.5. Land of Palestine 
Israel Zangwill's slogan "a land without people for a people without land"51 invented a fallacy 
which was repeated by Zionist apologists for decades. It is true that in 1901 Palestine was 
not a nation in that the peoples on its land had a sense of national identity; they were ruled 
from afar by the Ottomans and their sense of identity was regional, tribal or family. To 
represent such a territory as a "land without people" is spin-doctoring at its least credible. I 
Zangwill's misrepresentation set the scene for the next 94 years, during which the Jews 
50 SMITH, ref 44, p 146 
51 ZANGWILL, Israel. The Return to Palestine. In GILMOUR, ref 45, p 44 
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pursued their objective of obtaining the land for a state of their own by all methods ranging 
from war through outright coercion to legal purchase; their single-minded pursuit was 
accompanied by continual protestations of legitimacy, none of which stand up to serious 
investigation. 
The initial land acquisitions were facilitated by a fund established by the far-sighted founding 
Zionists for the express purpose of purchasing and developing land for Jewish settlement in 
Palestine. The fund played a major role in the acquisition of land that was intended to 
become inalienably Jewish, never to be sold to or worked by non-Jews, as part of the 
program to establish a dominant Jewish presence in the area. 52 Prior to that early settlers 
had received substantial funds from wealthy Western Jews. Similar funding enabled the 
Jews to increase their land holdings over the next 4 decades. On the Arab side there was 
no balancing single-mindedness, as would have been provided by a coherent national 
identity. The leading families of rich Palestinians, both absentee and resident landlords, 
were consumed by mutual antagonism; they sold land to Jews, often whilst advocating the 
opposite course. The poor Palestinians, the "fellahsn having land but neither cash funds nor 
cash flow, also sold land to the Jews "the only financially viable segment of Palestine's population 
at the conclusion of World War J11.53 There were protests. The First Palestine Arab Women's 
Congress asked "every Arab to buy nothing from the Jews but land, and to sell them everything but 
land" (1929). 54 Unfortunately for the Arabs this foresightful injunction was a cry in the barren 
wilderness of Arab common purpose. Thus the individual Arab's economic need and, in the 
cases of the larger landowners, economic greed, not being counterbalanced by an Arab 
national policy, facilitated the steady transfer of land to Jewish ownership. 
52 SMITH, ref 44, p 31 
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In 1937 the Peel Commission concluded that the hostility and continual violence between the 
Arab and Jewish populations made the (British) Palestine Mandate impossible to sustain. 
The Peel Commission put forward a Partition Plan. It was strongly opposed by some, but not 
all, Arab leaders and the violent Arab Revolt (1937-39) began. As well as attacking British 
troops and Jews, the Arabs characteristically attacked those of their fellow Arabs who did not 
join or cooperate with the Revolt. 
in response HMG produced another partition plan in a White Paper (1939). This was more 
favourable to the Palestinian Arabs who once again rejected it because it did not give them 
everything they wanted, which was immediate independence and a halt to Jewish 
immigration. 
After the war, Britain passed the intractable problem to the international community. In 
response the UN approved another partition plan (1947). The Palestinian Arabs mobilized 
and went to war against it. Inevitably their actions, lacking unified command, were again 
characterized by lack of cohesiveness and again included inter-factional clashes. In 
contrast, rival Jewish factions, Hagana, Irgun and LEHI managed some coordination of their 
activities, despite continual and bitter differences. The Hagana, the "official" army of the 
Zionists was militarily well organised. The Jewish forces forcibly took control of that part of 
Palestine allocated to Jews under the UN Partition Plan in order to found the Jewish State of 
Israel and thereby to pre-empt international trusteeship. They also drove or terrorised the 
Arabs out of some Arab areas including Jaffa and Haifa (family home of Leila Khaled). Thus 
yet again the Arabs ended up worse off than at the start. 
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In the 1967 war the Israelis annexed the West Bank (a significantly large proportion of 
former Palestine) and Gaza. This annexation was condemned by the UN (Resolution 242, 
1967) and has subsequently been repeatedly condemned by the world community. Israel 
has ignored these protestations and pursued an aggressive policy of settlement construction 
around Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank which continues to this day (1997). 
"In addition, Israeli occupation, until 1977, did not seem particularly threatening to the lives of 
most Arabs in the territories. Jewish settlements were relatively isolated from Arab communities 
and the rate of growth of these settlements was slight, especially when compared to that which 
occurred once Menachem Begin took office. At this point changes in policy occurred that soon 
seemed to constitute a major threat to Palestinian existence. As noted previously, the growth of 
settlements intensified: whereas an annual average of 770 Israelis settled in the territories from 
1967-1977, that average increased under Likud to 5,960 annually from 1978 to 1987. 
Settlements were oflen designed to abut Arab communities and often took over their lands, 
constituting a visible threat designed from Afiel Sharon's point of view to intimidate Arabs and 
encourage them to leave. "55 
"While Israel declared itself 'prepared to discuss any option which is presented', Shamir 
revealed his real intent when he responded to rightist critics charging that any promise of 
autonomy would lead to Palestinian independence: 'We shall not give the Arabs one inch of our 
land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years. We won't give them a thing'. 1156 
Shamir's reference to "our' land referred of course to Israeli de facto possession. UN 242 de 
jure legitimacy did not suit the Israelis, so they did not use it. 
55 SMITH, ref 44, p 292 
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The widely welcomed Peace Settlement arising from the Oslo Conference (1993) in fact 
leaves the bulk of the West Bank not in Palestinian but Israeli hands and Israel still 
maintains a stranglehold on the water resources and the economy of the whole area. 
Thus, at every step, 1895-1995, the Jews secured territory from the Arabs, by 
economic means, by coercion, by terrorization and by war. 
2.3.6. Conduct of the Israelis 
The researcher repeats his affirmation that he is not compiling a scorecard of atrocities. In 
recounting Israeli conduct he seeks only to examine its nature and legitimacy. 
I 
Jewish terrorism played a major role in the establishment of the State of Israel. Not only did 
Jewish terrorists pursue their Zionist ambitions by attacks on the British during the Mandate, 
but thereafter they subjected Arab Palestinians to a campaign of atrocities (most notoriously 
Deir Yassin) to terrorise them into flight from their land. Subsequently the terrorist leaders 
Menachem Begin and Yitzak Shamir became Prime Ministers of Israel, and supposedly 
respectable statesmen. 
The Jewish settlers' ready recourse to violence became the Jewish nation's modus operandi. 
The Israelis used violence as deliberate provocation from the 1950s under Ben-Gurion 
(Bombing of American and British Embassies, Cairo, 1954; Gaza Attack, 28 Feb 1955), to 
the 1980's under Meir and Begin and to justify Sharon's pre-planýed invasion of Lebanon (6 
Jun 1982); they used violence to disrupt the peace process, as in the bombing of the PLO 
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Headquarters, Tunis, by the Israeli Air Force, September 1985; they used overkill violence 
as retaliation from 1953 when a special force under Ariel Sharon was formed to undertake 
punitive assaultS, 57 to the Munich Olympics (1972) when they retaliated for the murder of 11 
Israeli athletes with a vengeance raid on refugee camps in Lebanon that killed 40058, to the 
litany of their response to the intifacla (1987 on); they used assassination to dispose of 
enemies, both those espousing violence and those advocating peace. 59 They also resorted 
to the ultimate violence, war, when it suited them (1967). The Israelis argued that their 
violence was, unlike that of their enemies, discriminate. The assassinations of humane 
statesmen and peacemakers (Lord Moyne, Count Bernadotte) were not discriminate, but 
foul. Sometimes the victims were Palestinian men of war (3 Black September leaders, Beirut, 
9 Apr 1973; Hassan Salemeh, Beirut 22 Jan 1979; Abu Jihad, Tunis, 16 Apr 1988). 60 But 
more often the actions were appallingly indiscriminate, as in the many artillery and air 
operations in Lebanon, and as in the Israeli facilitation of the massacres in the Sabra and 
Chatila refugee camps. 
From the founding of the State of Israel, the Israelis exploited the Palestinians, mistreated 
them and subjected them to murder and violence, acknowledging no morality but their own 
interests. The "iron fist" policy of "force, might and beatings" for Palestinian demonstrators 
in the intifada is too well documented to require examples. When compared to the Israeli 
treatment of Jewish extremists6l it reveals the deeply held underlying Jewish attitude to 
Arabs. 
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"In October 1973 the British MP, Robin Maxwell-Hyslop, told the House of Commons about 
the attitude of David Bacohen, then the influential chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs 
Comn-ýttee: 
'Six weeks after that war [June 1967] six hon. members of this House, three from each side, 
including myself, went to Israel and to Jordan as the guests of those countries. There was a 
horrifying moment for me. We were all present as guests at lunch of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Knesset in Jerusalem. After lunch the chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Knesset spoke with great intemperance and at great length to us about the 
Arabs. When he drew breath I was constrained to say, "Doctor Hacohen, I am profoundly 
shocked that you should speak of other human beings in terms similar to those in which 
Julius Streicher spoke of the Jews. Have you learned nothing? " I shall remember his reply 
to my dying day. He smote the table with both hands and said, "But they are not human 
beings, thpy are not people, tha are Arabs". He was speaking of the Arab refugees. ' 1162 
"Sir John Chancellor summed up this attitude in his May 1930 dispatch to the King's private 
secretary: 'What makes them [the Zionist Jews] very difficult to deal with is that they are 
regardless of the rights and feelings of others and are veEy exacting in pressing their own 
claims. Even as a minority of the population of Palestine the Jews adopt towards the Arabs 
an attitude of arrogant superiority, which is hotly resented by the Arabs with their traditions 
of courtesy and good manners'. 63 
The underlined words (researcher's emphasis) encapsulate the double standards which the 
Jews have applied throughout the century. Having vacated Palestine back in the mists of 
time, they opened Palestine/Israel to all Jews from everywhere, whilst forbidding return to 
62 GILMOUR, ref 45, p 94 
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Palestinian Arabs who "abandoned" their property (even 10 days previously); Begin likened 
Palestinian claims to land to those of Hitler to Sudetenland64 -a very dangerous analogy for 
Jews given their own conduct. Jews with dual nationality were welcomed, whilst 
Palestinians continually faced 'transfer, ie eviction. 65 The Jewish writer, Stephen Brook, 
provides a laconic comment on these Israeli double standards: 
"It has not escaped notice that the Palestinian programme is modeled on its Zionist precursor 
The Palestinian Declaration of Independence contains entire paragraphs lifted from Israel's 
Proclamation of Independence. That matters little, but what disturbs Israelis more is the 
Palestinian adoption of the Zionist principle of the 'Ingathering of the Exiles', namely, that any 
Jew has the right to come and live in Israel. It does seem anomalous that a Jew who has lived in 
New York all his life has the right to 'return' to Israel, while a Palestinian whose family actually 
live in, say, Jaffa till 1948 has no such right. The consequence of a Palestinian Law of Return in 
some newly established Palestinians state is the theoretical possibility of that state becoming 
home not only to the two million Palestinians now under Israel's control, but to the five million 
Palestinians dispersed worldwide. Now that would be the demographic argument -with a 
vengeance. 1166 
Preferential, economic and fiscal treatment of Jews was the norM67 as was the confiscation 
of Arab land68, whilst the non violent Arab Boycott drew a howl of protest of anti- semitism, 
and spawned several books of staggering partiality-69 The land policy of the Jewish National 
64 SHINDLER, Colin. Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream. London: IB Tauris, 1995, p 147 
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Fund was directed at the exclusion of Arabs, but this did not stop the Jews from protesting 
vigorously at British restrictions on land sales to Jews. 
In parenthesis it is instructive to note that the Israelis are remarkably free with the English 
language. They describe attacks upon their armed forces occupying S. Lebanon not as 
legitimate defence against invaders, but as "terrorism"; this Israeli definition is an exercise in 
propaganda, not a product of scholarship. 
"The Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, for his part, during the Security Council debate, 
attributed several international atrocities carried out by Abu Nidal's gunmen to the PLO. In a 
letter to The Times, the president of the Board of Deputies similarly attributed Abu Nidal's 
attack on the synagogue in Vienna to the PLO. Even the publication after the war of selected 
documents captured from the PLO in Lebanon did nothing to dispel the deliberate confusion of 
the two organizations. Given the Israeli government's image of the PLO as solely a terrorist 
organization that wished to push the Jews into the sea, and Arafat's half-hearted and inept 
attempts to distance himself from that projection, it was easy to load moral blame onto the 
PLO. 1170 
Any Palestinian leader with the credibility to undertake serious peace negotiations (and 
thereby to force Israel either to make concessions or to attract public odium for refusing to 
make concessions) was likely to be the subject of disinformation or the ViCtiM71 of an Israeli 
or Palestinian extremist assassination squad (Abu Jihad, 1988). For the'same reason other 
advocates of the peace process faced reprisal: 
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"... two Arab lawyers from Gaza who defended demonstrators in Israeli courts were invited to 
speak on the goals of the intifada at a gathering at Tel Aviv University in the spring of 1988. 
They did so, advocating peaceful coexistence in separate states. Within two weeks each had 
been arrested and sentenced to six months detention without legal recourse in Ansar 3, a new 
prison built in the Negev to house such individuals. The Israeli organizers of the conference had 
no doubt as to the reasons for such detention; advocacy of peace was again more threatenin 
I 
than pursuit of violence". 72 Researcher's emphasis. 
The Zionists have on many occasions themselves been likened to Nazis by Churchill, 73 by 
Bevin, by Palestinians (during the siege of Beirut 1982), by modern writers, and by Israeli 
liberals. This Nazi analogy is deeply and loudly resented by the Jews. A more balanced 
view is offered by Lerman of the Institute of Jewish Affairs: 
"The linking of Jews with Nazis was a European-wide phenomenon and when employed by 
journalists was especially offensive. But was it anti semitism? Whether we like it or not, the 
language and images relating to the Nazi Holocaust are public property. Sometimes they are 
used in contexts which result in the debasement of language. But they can also be used to 
prick consciences successfully and produce an enhanced humanitarian response to disaster. As 
Michael Marrus put it in November 1983, 'Every era operates in the shadow of its historical 
past, and it is inevitable that the great reference points of our own time - particularly Hitler and 
the Nazi genocide against Jews - will be used and misused to describe what people think and 
feel about momentous political upheavals'. Jews are also guilty of using fascist, Nazi and 
72 lbid 
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Holocaust associations as epithets and insults, gratuitously to non Jews and also to Jews. This 
is linguistic excess but not a sign of anti-semitism. 1174 
Menachem Begin was described as having a "Holocaust comple, )e' by Professor Nadav 
Safran of Harvard. 75 Certainly the Israelis seem to claim, based on their sufferings in the 
Holocaust, a "moral immunity" (Uri Avneri)76 and a "purity in arms" in their own violence, 
even when pursuing "a final solution"77 or elimination of the Palestinians. 
It is a sad lesson in human behaviour to see the manner in which the victims of the 
century's most horrific genocide have rebounded from their tragedy. They have 
learned not humanity to their fellow men, but the attractions of ethnic cleansing and 
of military might. The Jews' have, in turn, brought tragedy to another land and to 
another race of victims, in their own pursuit of lebensraum. 
"The sentence has to reflect the value of human life. " Judge Shalom Brenner, of Jerusalem 
district court, jailing a West Bank settler for five months for the murder of a Palestinian 
shopkeeper. 78 
74 LERMAN, Antony, (untitled) Paper on European Press Coverage of the Middle East. IJA, pp 23-24 
75 FISK, Robert. Pity the Nation. London: Andre DeutSCh, 1990, p 391 
76 Ibid, p 394 
77 FRANGI, Abdullah. The PLO and Palestine. London: Zed, 1983, p 201 
78 The independent. Quote Unquote, 3 May 1990, p1 4 
65 
2.3.7. Conduct of The Palestinians 
2.3.7.1 Introduction 
Tempting though it is to conclude that the Palestinians have been their own worst 
enemies, it is not necessarily accurate - bearing in mind the preceding paragraphs. 
Nonetheless, in their 30 years of endeavour, they have chronically failed to obtain 
redress for one of the most legitimate grievances of the 20th century. 
There have been three insuperable flaws in their strategy. First, they denied (until recently) 
the right of the State of Israel to exist. Second, they never achieved the capability to sustain 
a unified strategy. Third, they made pioneering and prolonged recourse to international 
terrorism, and they dismally failed to renounce it with conviction when it proved disastrous to 
their cause. 
2.3.7.2 The Denial of Israel's Right to Exist 
The denial of Israel's right to exist has enabled the Israelis to play the Holocaust card, 
saying to themselves and to the world, you cannot let this happen to us again. In fact the 
Palestinian National Charter of 1964 did not specify the destruction of the State of Israel, 
though it made references to "the liberation of the homeland". 79 The Charter of 1968 
represented a significant hardening of the PNC position. Article 9 specified "Armed struggle 
is the only way to liberate Palestine. ... " Arafat, committed to its removal within 6 months of 
the signing of Oslo 2 (the Taba) Agreement (28 Sept 1995), succeeded in so doing at a 
79 Preamble and Articles 4,9,10,12,13,14,15,16,23 and 25 
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difficult time. Nowhere in the PNC Charters is the phrase "the destruction of the State of 
Israel" to be found, notwithstanding Israeli allegations. 
2.3.7.3 Lack of Unified Strategy 
The lack of unified strategy has bedeviled the Palestinians since their troubles began. One 
of the underlying factors was intense "tribal" rivalry. Some writers affirm that this is endemic 
in Arab society. 80 Be that as it may, it is very clear that two aspects of Western democracy 
are rarely to be found in Arab countries: democratic decision making and Cabinet 
responsibility. Decisions are those of the power-holder and subsequent support for them by 
his rivals is by no means the norm. This is a very strong argument for the benefits of 
democracy, properly administered, in which there is a mechanism for participating in 
decision making and a mechanism for removing decision makers at specified intervals. 
National identity may occur outside democracies, however without adherence to democratic 
principles, long term considerations of national identity may be subordinated to short term 
tribal or family ambitions. The first of which may be self-advancement by violent removal of 
the power holder. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization was less of an organisation than of a forum for the 
enactment of rivalries of Palestinian leaders, and of the Arab States, through a continual 
power struggle between Palestinian factions. Whilst there may have been a common 
purpose - the liberation of Palestine, there never was a common strategy. The PLO concept 
of factions independent militarily but united politically, was deeply flawed. Acceptable as a 
start up mechanism to bring rivals under a single umbrella, it never developed into a 
80 PRYCE-JONES, David. The Closed Circle. London: Paladin, 1990 
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mechanism for agreeing strategy. Much of the failure was the result of rivalries, intense 
animosities, and frequent wars, between Arab States; they used the Palestinian factions 
which they commanded (by the provision of funds and of safe havens) to act out these 
differences inside the PLO. Thus they prevented their subordinate factions from pursuing a 
common PLO strategy, even supposing that those factions so wished, for which there is no 
evidence. 
"it wasn't that we didn't want to [get rid of the PFLP]. But it was practically impossible to 
unify the commando organizations when each one of them was supported and subsidized by one 
or another Arab country whose causes and quarrels they espoused. That is why the Central 
Committee of the Palestinian Resistance, instead of being a coordinating and decision-making 
body, turned out to be a sort of parliament where all the conflicts and intrigues of the Arab 
world were reflected. Yasir Arafat, speaking for more than half the Fidayin members, - had to 
deal as an equal with the delegate of a tiny groups just because the latter was the prot6g6 of one 
of the richest Arab states [Iraq]. That's how difficult, if not impossible, it was to enforce even a 
minimum of discipline at the very heart of the movement". " 
This is not to say that the Palestinians were mere pawns in the hands of the Arab States. 
The Palestinians threatened the very existence of Jordan and had to be violently evicted 
(Sept 1970). They brought total destruction to the Lebanon and showed themselves as 
capable of foul atrocity as any (Damour, Jan 1976). 82 Indeed, the Palestinians killed 
thousands of their potential allies, Palestinians and Muslims, but only a few hundreds of their 
enemies, the Israelis. Between warring factions of the PLO, between Muslim factions in 
81 ROULEAU, Eric. Les Palestiniens face au trone jordanien, IV: Le dilernme. In KERR, The Arab Cold 
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Lebanon, between hard-liner and (supposed) collaborator in the Occupied Territories, 
murder was routine. Little wonder that Moshe Dayan remarked that he would worry only 
when he saw Arabs form an orderly queue at a bus stop. 
2.3.7.4 Recourse to International Terrorism 
The Palestinian recourse to international terrorism is easy to understand. With it they 
achieved, for the first time, a series of notable tactical successes. It thus became a weapon 
too tempting to abandon. It offered their terrorist groups immediate publicity, status amongst 
other terrorists, probable extortion opportunities, and it attracted sponsors. 
Strategically it was a disaster. It quite unnecessarily made the Palestinians the enemy of the 
most influential and powerful countries of the world, the Western bloc; it excluded them from 
entering diplomatic negotiations; it labeled them, in world opinion, as perpetrators of atrocity 
and murderers of innocents. 
The Palestinians are quoted as often repeating the phrase "the world is ruined, let it be 
ruined more". 83 It is difficult to think of a worse strategy for advancing a cause. 
It must be appreciated that those Palestinians who sought to renounce terrorism and pursue 
a peaceful solution to the conflict were a part of the same organisation, the PLO, as those 
who were implacably committed to violence. Peace-seekers were in serious danger of 
assassination by Palestinian extremists. More important (in political if not personal terms) 
they could neither convincingly dissociate themselves from violence in the eyes of Western 
83 PRYCE-JONES, ref 80, p 312 
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(US and European) governments, nor could they claim to be the sole representatives of the 
Palestinians. At no time 'did the PLO succeed in sustaining a coordinated military and 
political operation, unlike the IRA and Sinn Fein. 
Arafat made many half-hearted statements seeking to disassociate himself - and his faction 
of the PLO - from violence. It was 15 years after his "gun and olive branch" speech at the 
UN (1973) before he achieved credibility with his public recognition of the State of Israel 
(Press Conference, Geneva, Dec 1988), which opened diplomatic doors and culminated in a 
peace agreement with Israel (Oslo 2, Sept 1995). 
Arafat's unequivocal disavowal of terrorism (Dec 1988) was very late and very reluctant. All 
the signs are that it was not terrorism he was reluctant to abandon, but equivocation. His 
renunciation was squeezed out of him by the combined pressure of his advisers and the 
Americans. It is to them, as much as to the Palestinian leader, that the present (Feb 1996) 
State of Palestine owes its existence. 
2.3.8. Conclusion 
The Palestinian failure to develop and adhere to a viable strategy played into the 
hands of their enemies. The Israelis have used the years 1967 to the present day to 
consolidate their occupation and control of the former land of Palestine. The 
Palestinians tried war (1967), fedayeen and "terrorist" actions in Israel (1955-1995), 
international terrorism (1968-1980s), and half hearted diplomacy (1967-88), none of 
which recovered their land. They failed to unite against their formidable enemy, 
Israel. That country exploited their disarray with great skill. It represented the 
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Palestinians not as a people dispossessed, but - as terrorists threatening the 
fundamentals of democracy. For decades the Israelis thus successfully excluded the 
Palestinians from any peace process in which their cause could have been advanced 
with the winning weapons of logic and reason, and forced them on to different 
battlefields where they could only lose. 
With this Israeli strategy the Palestinians unwittingly colluded. They precluded 
themselves from a unified alliance by their endemic inability to subordinate personal 
and factional differences to the common good. This in turn both excluded them from 
meaningful diplomacy and prevented them from developing into a significant military 
force. 
The result was small factions. They had neither diplomatic nor military capability, 
therefore terrorism was the only alternative to capitulation. The Palestinians were 
already at war with the single-minded Israelis. By their recourse to international 
terrorism, they made enemies of the whole Western world. With their atrocities they 
obscured the heinous conduct of the Israelis and their own just cause. In the final 
analysis the Palestinians were their own worst enemies. 
2.4. The Emergence of Aviation Terrorism 
2.4.1. Introduction 
By 1968 the Palestinians had been economically, politically and militarily worsted by 
the Jews. A decade of ineffective fedayeen attacks had been followed by the 1967 war 
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which obliterated Arab conventional forces and Palestinian hopes. In 1968 the 
Palestinians introduced a new tactic to their armoury, terrorist attacks mounted 
outside Israel. This, the researcher submits, was the true beginning of modern 
international terrorism. 
The remainder of this Section considers other influences on the emergence of aviation 
terrorism. It also makes the point that the intifada and the peace process are alternative 
means which have been used by the Palestinians to pursue their political objective, and that 
both have been demonstratively more successful than international terrorism. 
2.4.2. Aims of Terrorism: General 
All terrorist groups have reasons for their actions, and for their immediate aims. It would be 
seriously misleading to induce that all have a strategy. Most are emotional rather than 
thoughtful. Very few (eg, PIRA, Hizbollah) construct and adhere to a multi-faceted strategy 
At the least thoughtful end of the spectrum lies violence for the sake of violence. This has 
two attractions: the thrill of "feasting with panthers" (Oscar Wilde, De Profundis) and the 
meaning that it gives to otherwise empty lives. Walter Laqueur calls this "terrorism as a cure 
for personality problems". 84 Closely related is an obvious relish for cruelty of which there are 
countless illustrations. 
84 LAQUEUR, Walter. Tefforism. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, p 209 
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"Bernardine Dohm, leader of the Weather Underground, on the Sharon Tate murder; 'first they 
killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork 
into a victim's stomach! Wild! `85 
At the more thoughtful end of the spectrum are strategists such as Marighella. The Brazilian 
urban guerrilla theorist sought to utilise terrorism as a firelighter, a means of igniting a 
national liberation army of size sufficient to confront the conventional forces of Brazil. This 
is "terrorism in a valuable auxiliary role". 86 In the anti-occupation category, terrorism has 
often the leading role, that of inflicting a casualty rate which either the occupying power or its 
public opinion would find unacceptable. This objective the Palestinians had failed to achieve 
with the Israelis. 
2.4.3. Aims of Terrorism: Palestinian 
2.4.3.1 The Scene is Set 
The Palestinians have always had an objective - recovery of their territory. Analysis 
suggests a degree of inevitability in their abandonment of "blocked" tactics - tactics which 
had failed - and in the recourse to international action. However the many groups which 
together constitute the Palestinians never devised, let alone adhered to a unified strategy 
by which to pursue their objective. The Israelis were not a colonial power governing a foreign 
land, nor were they unwilling to accept casualties. They were the new occupants of a 
territory which they intended to make their home; they accepted the conflict, and the 
casualties, as a cost of defending that home. 
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"No matter how many casualties, we would never be defeated even if we remained alone. We 
still need this truth today, the truth of the power of war, or at least we need to accept that war 
is inescapable, because without this, the life of the individual has no purpose and the nation has 
no chance of survival. 1187 (Yitzak Shamir) 
By the end of 1967 the Arab countries were being supported by the Soviet Union, and Israel 
had become an American prot6g6. The Arab countries' relationships with each other, a 
roulette wheel on which red and black were replaced by love and hate, had put Egypt, Syria 
and Iraq in one camp; Jordan was in the other, and being vilified for having wisely refused to 
accept the stationing of the other camp's armies in Jordan. Arafat had failed to mobilize a 
mass army of liberation on the newly occupied West Bank. This new nadir in their fortunes 
(though deeper nadirs were to come) fueled the discontent from which emerged the PFLP 
(Dec 1967). 
The Marxist PFLP was founded by Dr George Habash and Ahmed Jibril. Predictably it too 
soon split into rival factions, Jibril forming the more Marxist PFLP-GC and Hawatmeh 
forming the even more Marxist PDFLP. The factions each sought state sponsors, Habash 
turning to Iraq when Syria, his original sponsor, gave assistance to his rival Hawatmeh. 
In 1968 the Palestinians, having failed to progress their cause in 20 years of local actions 
against Israel, decided to attack Israel where she was more vulnerable. The battleground 
moved outside Israel, and modern international terrorism was born. The Palestinians thus 
invented a new weapon. Characteristically its use was the subject of internecine dissent, 
often violent, and its deployment was not accompanied by a viable political strategy. 
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Further, within a few years, the Palestinians' agenda had become subordinate to the aims of 
their state sponsors (Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran) to the temptations of extortion (Carlos, Wadia 
Haddad) and to the perpetration of atrocities (Abu Nidal). Nearly always these actions were 
carried out in the name of the Palestinian cause. The Palestinians were therefore 
inextricably linked with attacks on aviation by reason of their responsibility for pioneering the 
early spectacular successes, and of their close involvement in subsequent attacks, albeit 
carried out at the behest of other masters. 
The Palestinians, branded as international terrorists by their actions and by grateful Israeli 
propagandists, were thereby excluded from a meaningful peace process until 1988. Their 
recovery of (any of) their land was set back 20 years. Their chosen sword, international 
terrorism, had turned in their hand. 
2.4.3.2 The Influence of Marxism 
In 1967 revolution was rife and Marxism was not yet widely discredited. The Berlin Wall and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were still standing. There were seemingly viable 
Marxist regimes through Eastern Europe and in China. The Algerian FLN had liberated 
Algeria from French rule (1962), Nasser had liberated Egypt (1952-56) from the British, and 
FLOSY was active in Aden against the British. Castro had triumphantly installed himself in 
Cuba (11958). Revolutionary fires were beginning to burn in South America and Africa. There 
was a powerful popular movement in the United States, politically active in its opposition to 
the Vietnam War. Palestinian Marxists were on apparently good ground. 
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They did not identify the essential differences between their own and the other causes. The 
Palestinian people were already burning with revolutionary fire but were battened in within 
the occupied territories, or within refugee camps, or within the countries of their diaspora. 
They lacked not the fire but the means of directing it at their oppressors. 
The peoples of the Western bloc were an unlikely source of kindling for any 
revolutionary fire. Europe was slowly recovering from the bloodbath of the Second World 
War. The United States was unhappily embroiled in Vietnam. It was the age of flower 
power. The popular protest was anti-military and anti-war. The Palestinian Marxists were 
seeking to spark an interventionary, pro-war protest, in favour of interceding in a conflict 
between two third parties. 'Their chosen seed bed, the Western Bloc, was not one in which 
Marxism could take root, let alone flourish. 
The Palestinian mood of 1967-73 can be judged by their statements. 
"We act heroically in a cowardly world to prove that the enemy is not invincible. We act 
tviolently' in order to blow the wax out of the ears of the deaf Western liberals and to remove 
the straws that block their vision. We act as revolutionaries to inspire the masses and to trigger 
off the revolutionary upheaval in an era of counter-revolution. (Words of an unnamed 
comrade)"88 
"In today's world no one is innocent, not one is a neutral. A man is either with the oppressed or 
he is with the oppressors. He who takes no interest in politics gives his blessing to the 
prevailing order, that of the ruling classes and exploiting forces. (Habash, 1970)1189 
88 KHALED, Leila. My People Shall Live. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973, p 126 
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The prospect of triggering a third world war doesn't bother us. The world has been using us and 
has forgotten us. It is time they realised we exist, it is time they stopped exploiting us. Whatever 
the price, we'll continue our struggle ... 
9'. 90 
Fliat Justitia et Pereat Mundi has a splendid ring to it. As a recruitment strategy it lacks 
appeal. 
2.4.3.3 The Tri-Continental Conference 
The Tri-Continental Communist Congress is a not very short, but nonetheless worthwhile, 
abbreviation of the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America held in Havana, Cuba, 6-10 January 1966. The importance of this Conference to 
the birth of international terrorism is cited by many writers. One of the most recent was in 
1992. 
"Since its ideological apotheosis at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, Cuba ... 
". 91 
"Thus by late 1964, the Polit Buro increased ten fold its funding (of revolutionary movements) 
and in January 1966 supported the Tricontinental leftist conference at Havana, Cuba, based on 
the guerrilla experiences of Brazil's Carlos Marighella and Cuba's Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara, and in contrast to the rival Chinese guerrilla model dominant in Vietnam. The success 
90 STERLING. Claire. The Teffor Network. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981, p 114 
91 RIMANELLI, Marco. Foreign Comrades in Arms: Italian Terrorism and International Ties (1968-91), in 
Yonah ALEXANDER and Dennis A. PLUCHINSKY, European Terrorism. Washington: Brassey's, 1992. 
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of the Tricontinental conference in inspiring the birth in the late 1960s and 70s of the new anti 
Western international terrorist groups in Europe and Latin America .... 11.92 
One of the most quoted books is The Terror Network by the journalist Claire Sterling (1981). 
Her index lists nine references to the Conference. She does not go so far as Rimanelli in 
naming the Conference the "ideological apotheosis .... of terrorism". 
The essentials of her 
record are: 93 
"Its purpose was to devise 'a global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of 
American imperialism"'. (p 14) 
"It was in 1966 that the Tricontinental Conference in Havana launched its global assault on 
Western imperialism and, with Soviet blessings, opened an era of international guerrilla 
warfare". (p 62) 
An earlier work by the journalists Dobson and Payne also is specific: 
"The Tricontinental was, quite simply, a conference designed to coordinate worldwide 
revolution and terrorisnf'. 94 
Jillian Becker, also a journalist, affirms: 
"The PLO attended the (Tri-Continental) conference". 95 
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Speculation that the Congress was "a conference designed to coordinate worldwide 
terrorism" appears to have been extrapolated to the allegation that the conference 
Purposively directed the Palestinians to international terrorism and to attacks on aviation. 
Examination of primary source material96 on the Conference provides no evidence that the 
Conference was either "designed to coordinate worldwide revolution and terrorism" or uthe 
apotheosis of terrorism". Palestine is mentioned only twice, once within a list of 19 countries 
in the context of the struggle against imperialism and once within the Draft Agenda of the 
Exec Secretariat " ... fully supports the PLO in its armed struggle to 
liberate Palestine ... and appeals 
to (the) peoples (of the world) to give their solid support to all the Arab peoples ... 11 
97. These same 
words are repeated in the French language report of the Conference98- 
These primary sources do not include the names of delegates, so cannot be said to prove or 
disprove the presence of Palestinians or of known terrorists. The sources contain little other 
than turgid revolutionary dogma. 
There is no evidence of a Conference Resolution to turn to terrorism or t6 attacks on 
aviation. In fact it is unlikely that such a decision was made by the Conference, given the 
Soviet Union's dominant role and wish to keep control of all revolutionary forces. It was at 
the time seeking to work through local communist parties, not local insurgents. 
96 Bulletins published by the Chairmanship of the International Committee of the First Solidarity Conference 
of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin American and Cuban National Committee. 
97 Bulletin, ibid, No. 4, p9 
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Luttwak99 and Stohl'OO suggest that the Soviet leaders may also have had doctrinal reasons 
for not sponsoring terrorism. 
In summary, the evidence does not prove or disprove the proposition that the Conference 
purposively conceived international terrorism. The probability is that this proposition is an 
oversimplification. The current openness of the former Soviet Union suggests that a 
definitive account of the 1966 Tri-Continental Conference could be obtained. 
It is likely that the Conference did act as an introduction bureau for terrorists from South 
America, Europe and the Middle East. Without a list of delegates and attendees it is not 
possible to state who met whom, but it remains probable that the first strands of the 
international terrorist network were woven in Cuba in 1966. That it was a purposive action by 
the Soviet Union is not proven. 
involvement. 
2.4.4. Early Attacks on Aviation 
There is no doubt about the USSR's subsequent 
The Palestinians did not invent hijacking. The first recorded was in 1931 in Peru. In the 11 
years from 1947 to 1957 there were 24 hijacks , all but 3 associated with escapees from 
communism requesting political asylum. From 1958 to Jan 1966 (year of the Tri-Continental 
Conference, Cuba) the incidence doubled; there were 45 hijacks, of which 19 involved Cuba, 
mostly inbound. 101 Perhaps the first recourse to attacks on aircraft by "terrorists" was that of 
99 LUTTWAK, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union. In Robert 0 SLATER and Michael STOHL, 
eds. Cuffent Perspectives on International Tefforism. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1988 
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Raul Castro, commander of Column Six of his brother Castro's forces. "His mission was to 
harass transport and disrupt communications. ... 
(He) accused the airline (Cubana) of transporting 
President Babista's troops from Havana to fight his men. ... Radio broadcasts by Column Six warned 
Cubans not to fly on Cubana planes as they risked being shot down". 102 According to Phillips, 
Column Six hijacked two DC-3s to its rebel strip (22 Oct and 6 Nov 1958). Youths seeking to 
join Column Six hijacked a Cubana Viscount out of Miami. They were unable to navigate it 
to a suitable landing ground. It crashed, after several unsuccessful approaches in darkness 
to short, unlighted landing strips. 103 It must have been a terrifying experience for the 
passengers. Seventeen of the twenty on board were killed. 
In parenthesis it should be noted that this accident is a prime example of a grave danger too 
often overlooked. If the aircraft commander is under duress, his judgement is subordinated 
to the instructions he receives. In any hijack the safety of the aircraft is therefore seriously 
prejudiced. Such coercion has caused several aircraft accidents and fatalities. 
In the 30 months between the Tri-Continental Conference and the first Palestinian attack on 
aviation (23 Jul 1968) there were 23 hijacks. The hijack of a British HS-125, flown by two 
British- pilots, is relevant. The aircraft was hijacked (30 Jun 1967) by a shady French ex 
convict, Francis-Joseph Bodenan. Bizarrely, Bodenan had himself chartered the aircraft. 
On board was Moishe Tshombe, former Prime Minister of the Congo. The aircraft landed in 
Algiers. There are allegations of French Secret Service involvement and of Algerian hopes 
to use Tshombe to lever Israeli advisers out of the Congo. This remains uncertain. However 
this incident inaugurated the Algerians' long involvement in hijack negotiation and 
manipulation. The pilots were twice interviewed on television. The Algerians gained 
102 PHILLIPS, David. Skyjack. London: Harrap, 1973, p 42 
103 AREY, ref 38, p 53 
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experience. This they may or may not have shared with the Palestinians, of whom they were 
vocal supporters. Tshombe was still captive in Algeria when the Palestinians arrived with 
their first prize, an El Al B-707 (23 Jul 1968). 
2.4.5. Palestinian Attacks on Aviation 
George Habash founded the PFLP in late 1967.104 McForan makes the important allegation 
that shortly afterwards Feltrinelli urged Habash to international ise the conflict. 105 
Unfortunately he does not cite his reference source, which may well have been Sterling, who 
is included in his bibliography. Habash was imprisoned in Syria (Mar-Nov 1968). In his 
absence the differences in the group became serious; the consequent splits did not occur 
until the following year, Jibril founding the PFLP-GC in January 1969 and Hawatmeh the 
PDFLP in February 1969.106 They were supposedly still members of the PFLP at the time of 
the PFLP's first two attacks on aviation. However the evidence suggests that the attacks 
were masterminded by Habash and his Chief of Operation, Wadia Haddad. [Haddad broke 
with Habash in the mid 1970s and founded the PFLP-Special Command; he died in 1987. ] 
Their intentions were clear. As well as the aims discussed above of drawing attention to 
their cause, starting a revolution and declaring any friend (loosely defined) of Israel to be an 
enemy, they sought to damage Israel both symbolically and commercially. 
104 LIVINGSTONE, Neil C and David HALEVY. Inside The PLO. London: Hale, 1990 p 75 
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"Skjacking was a deliberate tactic, following the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war, to widen 
the conflict against Israel: to attack her not only in raids across the river Jordan but also to strike 
at her people and property abroad. 
To begin with air piracy was the speciality of only one of the ten guerrilla groups operating in 
the Middle East, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Dr George Habash 
Habash had not picked on skyjacking simply as a grandiose means of publicizing his group and 
the Palestinian cause. He saw it as an opportunity to deal Israel's economy an effective blow. 
Israel, surrounded by Arab countries, depended on El Al to maintain its link with friendly 
powers 
To Dr Habash, El Al was the symbol of Israel abroad, the flag-carrier which flaunted the 
permanence of a state the Arabs refused to recognize. He hoped that by hijacking and shooting- 
up El Al's fleet of seven B-707s he could reduce significantly the major contribution the airline 
made to Israel's foreign currency reserves. Turn passengers into hostages; blow them out of the 
sky; attack them in terminals. Deter people from flying El A]; deter them from even visiting 
Israel at all. "107 
"The non-Israeli passengers are on the way to Israel. Since we have no control over the land 
that was stolen from us and called Israel, it is right that whoever goes to Israel should ask for 
107 PHILLIPS, ref 103, pp 130-131 
83 
our permission... And we will continue our present strategy. It's a smart one, you see; would 
you really want to fly El Al? " (Habash)108 
"We think that killing one Jew far from the field of battle is more effective than killing a hundred 
Jews on the field of battle, because it attracts more attention7. (Habash)109 
2.5. Outside Influences on Palestinian Terrorism 
If the Palestinians were will-served by their nature, they were also ill-served by their stars, 
the many and powerful outside interests by which they were manipulated. 
2.5.1. The State of Israel 
On the world stage Israel used, until recently, every available mechanism to abort any 
peace process and the concomitant restraints on its violent conduct and its acquisitions of 
terroritory. It branded the PLO "terrorists" and then made every attempt to prevent it from 
shedding that pariah image and transforming the Organization into a legitimate 
representative of peoples seeking remedy for their legitimate grievances through peaceful 
negotiations. 
In 1982 an Israeli journalist wrote: 
"It is not cynical to conclude that the Israeli government is making use of the bloody deeds of 
Abu Nidal and his murderers as ammunition in its total war against the PLO, which before and 
108 LAFFIN, John. Fedayeen. London: Cassell, 1973, pp 48-49 
109 STERLING, ref 90, p 114 
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after the war in Lebanon is viewed as the number one enemy - not because it constitutes a 
military threat or because of the potential damage of its terrorism, but by reason of its political 
pay-off. In Israel, these tactics are successful because the public is hardly aware of the 
differences between the various organizations and the deadly rivalries between them: terrorist 
attacks are carried out by organisations of murderers - and that means the PLO". ' 10 
(Fýesearcher's emphasis) 
These right wing efforts still continue (Mar 1997). The high profile of right wing extremists 
and their success in sustaining Israel's expansion has tended to obscure the activities of 
their opponents in Israel. In contrast to the Palestinians, the Israelis have a free press, a 
peace movement (Peace Now) and the benefit of many talented Jewish writers in Europe 
and the USA. Polls of the Israeli public (New York Times, 9 Apr 1989) and amongst 
American Jews (1988,1989) showed that "both ... were willing to give the PLO an 
opportunity to show that they had turned away from terrorism This is exactly the 
opportunity which the Israeli extreme right wing did not want to offer. Thus by their 
renunciation of terrorism the Palestinians removed their self inflicted exclusion from peaceful 
negotiations, marginalised the Israeli extremists and entered a dialogue with the Israeli 
nation and the Israeli public, and with the international community - not the Likud - acting as 
referee. 
110 Ha'aretz, 18 Oct 1982. In, Colin SHINDLER, ref 70, p 228 
III SHINDLER, ibid, p249 
85 
2.5.2. American Jewish Lobby 
Second in significance to the activities of the State of Israel were those of the American 
Jewish lobby. By its leverage on the US electoral system and its vocal energies it did much 
to maintain the financial underwriting by the US of Israel's military, its economy and its new 
settlements. Significantly it was Arafat's progressively less equivocal renunciation of 
terrorism (Cairo Declaration, Nov 1985; PNC, Algiers, Nov 1988; Press Conference, 
Geneva, Dec 1988) which weakened the Israeli grip on US policy. It allowed the United 
States to enter into official dialogue with the PLO. The subsequent peace negotiations 
exposed to the public and, more important to President Bush and Secretary of State, James 
Baker the true intentions of Shamir and his right wing government. 
Soon thereafter the Secretary of State pithily summarised the Israeli conduct: 
"Despite Baker's rumbustious determination to move the peace process forward, Shamir now 
stonewalled to the point of saying that a dialogue with the Palestinians was no longer relevant. 
An exasperated Baker spoke disparagingly about the Israeli tactics at the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee: 'I can only say "Take this number 202-456-1414" [the White House] and when 
you're serious about peace, call US'. ". 112 
Significantly Bush and Baker, Republicans, assessed that they need not defer to the Jewish 
lobby: 
112 SHINDLER, ibid, p 256 
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"After Geneva, there was clearly an impetus to solve both the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli- 
Arab conflicts. Unlike their predecessors, new holders of office did not mince their words. The 
Republican administration decided that it had little need for the Jewish community either in 
terms of votes or donations. " 113 
Baker was invited by AIPAC, the main lobby organisation for Israel on Capitol Hill, to 
address them His speech called for American support for the 'reasonable middle ground'. His 
appeal to the Arab world to end violence, reach out to Israel, end its economic boycott of Israel, 
and repudiate the UN Resolution that 'Zionism is Racism, ' were all well received by the 
delegates. 
His next remarks, however, were heard in total silence, He told the AIPAC delegates that 
Israel should turn aside from 'the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel, forswear annexation, stop 
settlement activity, allow schools to open, and reach out to Palestinians as neighbours who 
deserve political fights', and that 'land for peace' was the only genuine channel for a real peace 
process". 114 
Two years later (Sept 1991) President Bush's commitment to peace had not been deflected. 
He resisted American Jewish pressure to give loan guarantees to Israel (for the financing of 
new settlements): 
"Bush did not give way and instead castigated the instigators of pressure: 'I heard today that a 
thousand lobbyists on the Hill are working the other side of the questions. We've only got one 
113 SHINDLER, ibid, P253 
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lonely little guy here ... I 
don't care if I only get one vote'. Bush's reference to 'some powerful 
political forces' was unprecedented - no president of the United States had ever used such 
language about the pro-Israel lobby". ' 15 
2.5.3. The United States of America 
Powerful driving force that it was, the US Jewish lobby was only utilising an existing US 
preoccupation, that of countering the activities of the Soviet Union. The Arab-Israeli wars of 
1967 and 1973 were regarded by contemporary military analysts, and still are by scholars'16, 
to have been the most dangerous of flashpoints in the Cold War. The Arab world had great 
strategic importance to the USA and its NATO allies and to the Soviet Union by reason of its 
oil, and its size and position; had it been persuaded into one camp or the other, the balance 
of power would have been upset. Therefore the support of the USSR for Egypt inevitably 
allied the USA to Israel. By the 1967 war the USA had become Israel's most visible military 
supplier. In the 1973 Yom Kippur war, American resupply was critical in halting the Arab 
advance. 
"... Israel faced the problem, as one of its leaders explained at the time (1950, beginning of the 
Korean War), of 'how to keep on milking the (American) cow when we are not prepared and 
not able to give her anything'. "117 
The United States' close association with the Shah of Persia brought it the vocal emnity of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. He represented America as the enemy of the revolution and the 
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friend of Israel, and therefore as the enemy of the Islamic world., This was a preposterous 
allegation, albeit convenient to the many dictatorial Islamic regimes who seek to divert their 
populations' attention from their leaders' corruption or savagery or economic ineptitude. 
The USA has not been a manipulator of Palestinian terrorism, unlike Israel and the terrorism- 
sponsoring states. However, by their terrorist attacks on US targets the Palestinians 
deprived themselves of US economic aid and discouraged US diplomatic support. They 
obtained the media attention which they sought, but that very attention, in highlighting their 
terrorist atrocities, obscured their just claims. By precluding peaceful negotiations they 
facilitated the Israelis' continued acquisition of their territory. 
Unfortunately for their cause, Palestinian emnity to the USA for its role as Israel's lifeline, 
developed synergy with Islamic emnity to the USA, first that of the Ayatollahs and then that 
of Hizbollah. This served to lock the Palestinians into the anti-American camp. 
As an exercise in realpolitik, the injudicious choice of Syria, Iran and Iraq (in various 
combinations) as allies in preference to the USA was a folly of Olympian proportions. It was 
not until November 1988, when the Arafat unequivocally renounced terrorism, that the might 
of the USA was unharnessed from, the support of Israel and redirected to the pursuit of 
peace, to the great benefit of the Palestinians. 
2.5.4. The Countries of the Middle East 
The Palestinians are difficult bedfellows. They brought turmoil to Jordan, destruction to 
Lebanon and conflict with Israel to the Arab world. The researcher, in frequent travel to the 
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Middle East, 1967-1993, heard the same assessment time'and again: that the Israeli 
treatment of the Palestinians was evil, that Israel was the common enemy of the Muslim 
world, but that the Palestinians were a demanding and troublesome people and a liability 
that no country could accommodate in great number. This assessment proved to be well 
founded when, as late as 1991 they sided with Saddam Hussein against their Kuwaiti hosts 
when he invaded that country with less justification than the Jews had invaded Arab 
Palestine in 1947. 
The West Bank had been claimed by King Abdullah in December 1948 and annexed into his 
kingdom of Jordan. In 1950 over half million Palestinians, the largest single block, lived in 
Jordan and had been granted Jordanian citizenship, where they comprised a third of the 
population. The Israelis captured the West Bank in 1967. Thereafter the territory was a 
source of conflict between King Hussein and the PLO, each claiming jurisdiction. After the 
Dawsons Field hijack King Hussein gave the preservation of his throne and his country 
understandable priority over the Palestinians' objectives. 
In March 1979 Egypt similarly distanced itself from the Palestinians in order to recover 
territory lost to the Israelis and to remove itself from the combat zone. In Lebanon the 
Palestinians, an ever-meddlesome private army, brought the country's fragile democracy to 
a violent end, prompted Israeli and Syrian invasions, and destroyed the country. 
Other Arab countries, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and Iran, shared 
the Palestinians' hostility to Israel but were careful not to allow the Palestinians to deploy 
their destructive capabilities within their regimes. 
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Thus, for good reasons, the Palestinians were unable to establish a long-term alliance with 
any country of the Middle East. Instead they were exploited. Syria, Libya and Iraq 
sponsored and directed the operations of Palestinian terrorist groups for their own state 
purposes. 
2.5.5. The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 
The theory that a campaign of international terrorism was master-minded and directed by the 
Soviet Union was popularized by influential journalists. 118 Earlier, it had been given 
credence by important Western leaders, eg: 
"We are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily 
on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence. " (JFKennedy)"9 
Kennedy's words are no more than a statement of the obvious. However those believing in 
an international conspiracy could, by equating "terrorism" to "covert means", interpret the 
President's pronouncement as evidence supporting their case. 
In parenthesis, it may be noted that US political and military adherence to the conspiracy 
theory, of which the quotation provides a definitive example, had chilling consequences. It 
caused the US to assess minor regional conflicts as components of the Soviet propagation 
of communism and therefore as anti-capitalist and anti-American. This led to counter- 
measures worldwide and to its disastrous entanglement in Vietnam. Vietnam was a regional 
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conflict fueled by nationalism. It was not the international battleground, contrived by the 
Soviet Union, which the conspiracy theorists postulated. 
Stohl also makes the point that subtle differences between words were escaping the 
attention of some writers, as for instance whether: 
"the Soviet Union benefus from or directs terrorist activity". 120 
Glasnost has now confirmed that Palestinian terrorists were provided with valuable support 
by the Soviet Union's allies. It is arguable that the support was sometimes vital, whether in 
the provision of training or sanctuaries or of life-saving medical treatment. However 
Glasnost has not revealed evidence that the Soviet bloc directed or controlled Palestinian 
terrorism. 
The probability is that the Palestinian conspiracy is a simplistic model forced on to a 
complex, even chaotic pattern. This does nothing to advance understanding. 
2.6. Alternatives to Terrorism 
2.6.1. The Intifada 
A system of categorising terrorism by objective would not clearly distinguish the three forms 
of Palestinian political violence: fedayeen, international and the intifada. Each is a different 
tactical approach to the same objective: restoration of the land of Palestine to the 
Palestinians. The three strands become clear when they are categorized by method. The 
fedayeen method was a hit and run attack into enemy territory, returning to a base outside. 
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International terrorism, the subject of this research, was an attack on the enemy, its 
supporters or upon the uninvolved and carried out outside the disputed territory. The 
intifada was an uprising, an insurrection within occupied territory. 
The failure of attacks on aviation and of international terrorism to advance the Palestinian 
cause is thrown into relief by the impact of the intifada - the "shaking" (Arabic). It was a 
spontaneous rebellion, triggered (9 Dec 1987) in Gaza by the death of four Palestinians in a 
road incident, which may or may not have been an accident. It rapidly spread to the West 
Bank. 
The reasons for the failure of one form of terrorism, international terrorism, and the success 
of another form of violence, the intifada, lie in the three important differences between the 
two. The intifada was large-scale, long-lasting, and aroused widespread sympathy; to none 
of which the Israelis had an effective response. 
International media coverage of Palestinian youths and children suffering brutality at the 
hands of Israeli troops was broadcast worldwide. 
"Officials accused reporters of anti-Israel bias and in some cases anti-Semitism. It was not long 
before Israel's hard pressed military began declaring wide swaths of the West Bank and Gaza 
closed to the press, and more particularly to television crews. For Israel's propagandists, the 
unpleasant story told through the unblinking eye of the television camera was almost impossible 
to counter, and nowhere was television making a bigger impact than in the all-important court of 
American opinion. 'The Israeli feeling that the world is against them is being fed by the 
enormity of the coverage, ' Harry Wall, director of the Jerusalem office of the Anti-Defamation 
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League of B'Nai B'rith, would complain late in January (1988). 121 The news for Israel 
throughout the first months of the intifada went from bad to worse. Two episodes seemed 
particularly shocking. In one, Israeli soldiers attempted on 5 February to bury alive four 
Palestinian youths in the village of Salem near the large Arab West Bank town of Nablus. In the 
other, late in February, the American CBS network filmed four soldiers brutally beating two 
Arab youths in Nablus itself in a long sequence that was almost unbearable to watch, even for 
the most hardened observers of violence in the territories". 122 
The coverage of the intifada destroyed the- image carefully nurtured by Israel, that it was a 
I 
civilized Western democracy facing barbarians at its gates. The American political 
establishment embarked (June 1988) on the process of confronting Shamir's right-wing 
Israeli government with the unreality of its ambitions. 
This same media coverage also led to widespread unease in Israel itself at the Israeli routine 
of violence, officially sanctioned and otherwise. These factors, combined with the enormity 
of the task of quelling a mass uprising, ultimately deflected the Israeli government from its 
chosen course of no compromise, of no peace before final victory. Thus the peace process 
gathered momentum. 
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2.6.2. The Peace Process 
It is unfortunate that the phrase "peace process" has come to mean the conducting of peace 
negotiations. This tends to obscure the fact that "at peace" and "at war" are opposite ends 
of the continuum, which is the process of living. 
The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process must be judged, not on the terms of the current (Mar 
1997) peace agreement, nor the terms that may be reached in the future, but as a prevailing 
state of coexistence between Palestinian and Israeli, more peaceful than the state which 
preceded it, and likely to lead to greater states of peace in the future. It has five major 
implications. Firstly Palestine and Israel are no longer at undeclared war, with the 
consequence that individuals who continue to perpetrate violence can be branded 
"terrorists" and subjected to their nation's legal processes. Secondly, the citizens of those 
countries have a greater degree of self-government of their lives, and can live with less fear 
of outside violence. Thirdly, the countries of the world, international organisations and 
international law have better mechanisms for managing relationships with and between 
states, than for dealing with leaderships in limbo, as the PLO was until 1995. Thus the 
international community can more easily encourage the states of Israel and the emergent 
Palestine to consolidate their peaceful coexistence and similarly can apply sanctions to 
either party which makes recourse to violence. Fourthly, within the two combatant nations, 
the culture of peace replaces the culture of war. The majority of citizens, given reasonable 
social and economic conditions, will not wish to return to daily death and violence; they will 
not support leaders advocating avoidable war. Fifthly and most important, the renunciation of 
terrorism -a precondition of the peace process - enables the most powerful countries of the 
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world (North America and Europe) to commit themselves even-handedly to the achievement 
of just and lasting peace terms. 
The present terms of the peace agreement do not remove Israeli political control of 
Palestine. They also leave Israel with hundreds of settlements over the West Bank and with 
an economic stranglehold on Palestine through control of water and electricity resources, 
and employment, and transport. They are based on the 1967 boundaries of Israel, and 
make no recognition whatsoever of the territory acquired by the Jews by war in 1947. 
Criticism of the agreement by thoughtful commentators is therefore to be expected. 
"Every Middle East initiative has been based on finding a way for the Arabs to surrender with a 
fig-leaf of dignity, " Mr, Heikal said. "The peace did not get a independent state, nor did they 
get any control over Jerusalem. I do not think the deal will survive for long. " Mohammed , 
Heikal quoted in The Times, 3 January 1996 Page 13. 
It would be an error to interpret this criticism as a condemnation of the peace process (the 
state of being "at peace"), when what is really implied is that the terms of peace satisfactory 
for the present are not terms which will be satisfactory for a final and permanent agreement. 
It should in no way obscure the achievement of moving from a state of war to a state of 
peace. 
The Palestinian-Israeli peace process is a milestone in history. It has established, for the 
first time ever, a Palestinian nation, albeit not yet free. It has given the Palestinians a 
national home and a degree of self-government, and has returned some of their territorY. 
Thus the peace process has already brought them gains which 20 years of 'international 
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terrorism notably failed to achieve. It has also given them the international respectability 
and status long denied to them by their terrorist activities. It has thus opened the door to 
economic assistance programmes upon which a Palestinian nation can be built. 
The prospects for the future are good because both the external and internal forces 
driving the conflict continue to diminish. 
Externally, the CIS has not the same capacity for mischief as the USSR. The USA is no 
longer an uncritical supporter and bankroller of Israel. Syria is facing up to the reality 
that it is more likely to recover the Golan Heights by negotiation than by war. 
Internally, the PLO could not realistically return to terrorism, it would lead to the forfeit 
of its considerable diplomatic potential and bring rapid Israeli reprisals on to its 
territory. The Palestine National Government has the status of a government, 
maintaining diplomatic relations with other states, and moving towards formal 
diplomatic relations with Israel. 
It is likely that some extremists on each side will continue to seek to destroy the peace 
process. Hamas bombings are a serious danger. If not checked, they will allow the 
Israelis once again to demonise all Palestinians and provide them with an excuse by 
which to stall the peace process. If the Palestinians still have not learned that the best 
is the enemy of the good, they again prejudice their own future. 
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2.7. Other Terrorist Attacks on Aviation 
The Palestinians' early successes with attacks on aviation popularised the tactic, and the 
threat spread worldwide. There were several hijacks of Indian aircraft in the course of Sikh 
(Khalistan) and Kashmiri separatist movements. Most of these hijacks were to Pakistan, a 
country with a deep undercurrent of hostility to India and therefore unlikely to offer close 
cooperation. Hijacks of Pakistani aircraft by domestic terrorists also occurred. The most 
noteworthy ended in Kabul and led, uniquely, to an international embargo (against 
Afghanistan, 1981,8.3.4). The Tamils destroyed an Air Lanka Tristar with a massive bomb 
(1986); a fortuitous delay saved all on board being blown up in mid-air. Narco-terrorists 
destroyed an Avianca B-727 in Colombia, killing all on board (1989). Armenians (ASALA) 
attacked Turkish aviation targets. Nor was the tactic confined to large or long-established 
terrorist movements. The short period of Fijian ethnic violence involved an attempted hijack 
of an Air New Zealand B-747 (19 May 1987). 
In the Middle East cauldron of mutual enmity, attacks on aviation became a routine tactic. 
Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Libyan, Kuwaiti, Iranian and Iraqi aircraft were amongst 
those attacked, mostly hijacked. Islamic terrorists adopted the tactic. They were closely 
linked to Iranian fundamentalists, who expressed deep hostility to non-Islamic culture, which 
extrapolates to cover democracies, the Western world, and particularly the Great Satan , the 
USA. Islamic terrorists were responsible for the Kuwaiti hijack (April 1988), and the planned 
multiple attacks on US aircraft, (Manila, Dec 1994), and also for the bombing of World 
Trade Centre (New York 1993). They have sought to abort the peace process by attacks on 
Israelis within Israel. Their violent methods, indiscriminate targeting and their ill-defined, 
unrealistic or vengeful objectives are reminiscent of Palestinian terrorism (1955-85). They 
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have supplanted the Palestinians as the most serious threat to aviation. Their wide-ranging 
hostility has been misconstrued by those who see Islamic fundamentalism as a single unified 
force, directed by Teheran. There is a danger that the grouping of a complex of diverse 
activities into a single category may produce another misleading conspiracy theory. 
Renegade Palestinian groups (Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC, Abu Nidal's Group) also remain a 
danger. They may put their expertise at the disposal of the fundamentalists. However they 
are without doubt tightly controlled by their state sponsors who, in turn, are under great 
international pressure to distance themselves from terrorism. These groups cannot afford to 
incur their state sponsors' displeasure nor is it likely they would survive it. The PLO has 
learned from experience that terrorism is counter-productive, and now has much to lose by 
returning to it. This lesson has yet to be understood by Islamic fundamentalists. Extremists 
may never heed it. Attacks on aviation have been established in terrorist methodology. Any 
group, old or new, domestic or international, may choose to attack aviation targets. The new 
hazard has taken root. 
2.8. Conclusion 
Although the overwhelming majority of attacks on aviation (1968-72) were on US 
passenger aircraft and were the work of criminals and the deranged, this research 
suggests that it was the Palestinians who established attacks on aviation within the 
armoury of political terrorism (1968-1970). They popularised the tactic with terrorists 
worldwide. Air travellers now face a threat from terrorists of all descriptions, as well 
as from extortionists, the disaffected, fugitives, the disturbed and from hoaxers. 
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This research has already suggested that Arab/Palestinian culture values tribal and family 
loyalties above national loyalty, and that it lacks a democratic mechanism for the 
displacement of leaders. Another writer (Pryce-Jones) postulates that it includes a powerful 
shame-honour axis, or a see-saw, which drives both individual and group behaviour. This 
allows fuller rein to the vanity and self-promotion of leaders than does a Western 
democracy. The military autonomy of the various Palestinian terrorist groups allowed to each 
leader the role of war lord and thus accommodated his vanity. It is doubtful that they would 
have been capable of living subordinate roles within a single political organisation. ' This 
was the first of three important reasons for the persistence of terrorism long after its strategic 
inefficacy must have become obvious. The second reason was the support and direction of 
terrorist groups by state sponsors for their state purposes. Thirdly, some groups continued 
to pursue violence for reasons of lifestyle or ideology. 
Nor was the PLO itself able to sustain a twin-track policy of diplomacy accompanied by 
terrorism in the Sinn Fein-PIRA model, because its diplomats were targeted for 
assassination by its terrorists. The PLO was not divided so much by outside interests as by 
its own nature; but, divided as it was, it was easily ruled by outside interests. Thus it was 
locked into a self defeating policy, terrorism, by which it pursued an unattainable aim, the 
destruction of the State of Israel. 
There are different views on the value to the Palestinians of their recourse to terrorism. One 
Israeli writer, Ariel Merari, has concluded that terrorism has, on balance, assisted the 
progress of the PLO: 
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"Palestinian terrorist attacks in Western Europe began in 1968 and reached a peak in 1973. They 
were condemned strongly by the European Community. In a few years, however, the PLO was 
allowed to open representations in practically all European countries, and in 1974, about a year 
after the imposition of oil embargo by the Organization of [Arab] Petroleum Exporting 
Countries and the increase in oil prices, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was invited to speak in 
front of the General Assembly of the UN, and the PLO was granted an observer status in that 
international forum... " 
Admittedly, it is impossible to isolate the net effect of terrorism and to assess accurately its 
relative contribution to the legitimation (sic) process of the PLO, alongside with other factors, 
such as economic and political pressures by Arab states. There can be little doubt, however, 
that in the last count, terrorism has had a beneficial rather than a deleterious effect on PLO's 
legitimacy. " 123 
In the first of these paragraphs Merari cites diplomatic offices permitted to the PLO. He does 
not explain the causal connection between these privileges and the PLO's terrorist activities, 
nor does he specify the tangible benefits which flowed from those privileges. The conclusion 
in his second statement is an assertion unaccompanied by evidence. 
Shindler takes the opposite view: 
"After 20 years of conflict, there was little to show for it in concrete terms. Israel was thriving 
and the Palestinians had moved in every direction except forward. For the inhabitants of the 
123 MERARI, Ariel. Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. T& PV. 5 (4), p 241 
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camps, who lived in squalor and deprivation, there was no amelioration of the Palestinian 
condition". 124 
Both Merari and Shindler are respected Jewish writers; they have reached different 
conclusions from viewpoints which were perhaps similar. 
The findings of this research strongly support Shindler's position; they suggest that both the 
conception and execution of the Palestinians' long indulgence in international terrorism 
were, overall, at the least disadvantageous to their cause; arguably and more probably they 
were disastrous. 
The Intifada - an extensive uprising of the population at large, in a credible cause, using 
limited violence against the brutal tactics of an occupying power - succeeded. International 
terrorism - the infrequent actions by autonomous cliques, with unrealistic objectives, 
committing atrocities against innocents uninvolved in the conflict - was comprehensively 
counterproductive. 
The true curiosity of Palestinian terrorism is not its failure, but the reasons for which 
the Palestinians failed for so long to abandon it. The preceding paragraphs suggest 
that the Palestinians have gained more in the first two years of the peace process than 
in the previous forty years, the 20 years of fedayeen attacks (1947-67) and the 20 years 
of international terrorism (1968-88). The reasons lie equally in their stars and in their 
natures. 
124 SHINDLER, ref 70, p 254 
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International terrorism, atrocities inflicted upon innocents, projected an image of 
Palestinians as a mindless and merciless people. Their actions could not have been 
better planned to destroy the potential external sympathy with their cause. 
This section provides evidence that strategy is indispensible to the pursuit of a long- 
term objective. No Palestinian leader stamped his authority upon the rival factions. 
The warlords were not prepared to relinquish their autonomy. Thus the Palestinians 
never achieved control or coordination of their disparate activities. They fought a 
terrorist war which they could not win, but did not offer the alternative of a credible 
peace. Their terrorism was not of a magnitude to damage Israel seriously, but their 
atrocities and rhetoric allowed Israel to imply that its existence was threatened, 
echoing memories of the Holocaust and eliciting vital financial and military aid. 
Worse, they distracted world attention from factors which could only have advanced 
their cause: the justice of their grievances and the ruthless conduct of Israel. Each of 
these is relevant to an objective study of Palestinian methodology. They are therefore 
recorded in this research. 
Cold War dynamics militated that the USSR's support of the Palestinians was 
inevitably counterbalanced by the USA's support of Israel. Thus Great Britain's ability 
to contribute to a solution was limited, despite her experience and understanding of 
the Palestine issue. 
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Palestinian terrorist attacks targeting the USA, Great Britain and their NATO allies, 
prevented any major diplomatic intervention on behalf of the Palestinians. 
Responsible countries find it difficult to give support to any cause which espouses 
terrorism, a dilemma not yet resolved (x-ref). The activities of mischief-making state 
sponsors of terrorism - suppliers of funds, weaponry, logistics and documentation - 
both increased the powers of the terrorists and posed a new challenge to liberal 
democracies. 25 years later, in the 1990s, those democracies have been able to 
organise a more effective response, but in the 1970s and 1980s they were in disarray. 
Thus, for 21 years (1968-89), the aviation terrorists roamed the world, not effectively 
countered. In that period they demonstrated the effectiveness of their tactics. 
More important, they proved that terrorist atrocities, even of the magnitude of 
Lockerbie, are powerless to divert liberal democracies from their national purposes. A 
terrorist may hijack an aircraft, but he cannot hijack national policy. 
The damage that Palestinian terrorists did to the Western world is nothing to the 
damage that their terrorism did to their own cause. Fiat Justitia indeed. 
3. ATTACKS ON AVIATION: DATA 104 
3.1 Perspective 104 
3.1.1 Overview 104 
3.1.2 FIGURE 1. Attacks by Country facing 106 
3.2 Attack Statistics 107 
3.2.1 Data Sources and Limitations 107 
3.2.2 FIGURE 2 -. Attacks on Aviation facing 107 
3.2.3 FIGURE 3: Hijack facing 107 
3.2.4 FIGURE 4: Sabotage facing 107 
3.3 Aftack Analysis 108 
3.3.1 Data Requirements 108 
3.3.2 Database Design 110 
FIGURE 5- Primary Database facing 110 
3.3.3 Primary Database : Notes ill 
3.4 Attack Aetiollogy 
3.4.1 Attack Objectives 
3.4.1.1 Reprisal 
3.4.1.2 Tactical Objectives 112 
3.4.1.3 Sub-Strategic Objectives 112 
3.4.1.4 Strategic Objectives 113 
3.4.1.5 Casualties : Perspective 114 
3.4.1.6 FIGURE 6: Casualties facing 114 
3.4.1.7 Costs: Perspective 115 
3.4.2 Attack Stimuli 115 
3.4.3 Terrorist Group 115 
3.5 Attac k Methodology 116 
3.5.1 Attack Methods 116 
3.5.2 Armed Attack 116 
3.5.3 Sabotage 117 
3.5.4 Hijack 117 
3.5.5 Additional Data 118 
3.6 Attack Outcomes : Criteria of Success 119 
3.7. Attac k Subsequences 121 
3.8 Attac ks on British Aviation 123 
3.8.1 Summary 123 
3.8.2 Hijack of BOAC VC-1 0 from Bahrain, 9 Sept 1970, to Dawsons Field 124 
3.8.3 Hijack of BA VC-1 0, Beirut, 3 March 1974 131 
3.8.4 Hijack of BA VC-1 0, Dubai, 21 November 1974 131 
3.8.5 PIRA Bomb on BA Trident, Manchester, 23 July 1974 132 
3.8.6 Hijack of BA BAC1 -11, Manchester, 7 January 1975 133 
3.8.7 Armed Attack on El Al Crew, Europa Hotel, London, 20 August 1978 134 
3.8.8 Hijack of BA B-747, Hong Kong, 22 March 1984 134 
3.8.9 Bomb Explosion, Terminal 2, Heathrow, 20 April 1984 134 
3.8.10 PIRA Attacks on Heathrow, 19 May 1974,26 July 1974,9,11 & 13 
March 1994 135 
3.8.11 Attacks on Airline Offices 1970-94 135 
3.9 British Involvement in Attacks on Non-British Targets 135 
3.10 Conclusion 138 
104 
3. ATTACKS ON AVIATION : DATA 
3.1 Perspective 
1.1 Overview 
There are two distinct species of modem international terrorism. Each has evolved 
from a different origin. 
The first species is state-sponsored terrorism directed at other states. It is a new 
mutation of war, in which terrorism is the chosen weapon. Being undeclared and 
therefore deniable, it is more convenient than conventional war. It is a form of conflict 
between nations, and should be analysed in the context of international relations. A 
sub-species is state violence directed at groups or individuals; it should be viewed as 
the product of national interest or, more likely, of the interests of the governing 
faction. 
The second species is sub-state violence, the actions of politically motivated groups. 
It has evolved from classical terronsm, once, but no longer, confined to a domestic 
battlefield by the absence of an international transport system. It is more often 
directed against state than against sub-state targets. 
In both cases international terrorism is a means of expressing hostility. In each there 
may also be an intention to influence the policies of the target nation by actions which 
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impact upon either the national economy, or government pride, or public opinion. 
Terrorists are mistaken if they believe that terror can easily be spread in a population 
by occasional actions, or that such terror would advance their cause. The contexts in 
which this has occurred are those of widespread and prolonged violence : state-terror, 
guerrilla war, ethnic conflict, and within closed communities. Populations of 
advanced liberal democracies are not terrified into conceding to their enemy even 
when subjected to massive or prolonged attack, their reaction is to unite in 
opposition, viz decades of IRA activity and two World Wars. If a population does arise 
to press its government, it does so, not for fear of the enemy but for sympathy with 
him, as in the anti-Vietnam war protests. This is more obvious now than it was in 1968; 
nonetheless the Palestinians' own statements make it clear that their intentions were 
to propagate their message to a world unconcerned with their plight, and to conduct 
hostilities against their enemies - Israel and the USA. 
States waging war against western democracies may pointlessly murder innocent 
citizens. They cannot, by reason of their chosen methodology, inflict serious damage 
upon the democracies themselves. They are limited to occasional atrocity for fear of 
triggering a massive response, in which the personal comfort of unilateral warfare is 
replaced by warplanes bringing personal discomfort. Thus for the past 30 years both 
species of terrorism have been pursuing the same aim: sending a message. The 
message from the terrorist states is 'see, we can hurt you', whilst most terrorist 
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Attacks on aviation offer state- and group-terrorists an unparalleled method of 
securing global attention - of supporters, of the uncommifted, and of opponents. 
The details of terrorist attacks on aviation are often horrific. Airline passengers are mutilated 
or blasted to destruction by murderers pursuing a grievance against their enemies on the 
other side of the world. The innocent victims have no real connection with the war in the 
name of which they become casualties. For that reason the atrocity commands a worldwide 
audience; the perception is the key: anyone, given a similar accident of time and place, 
could be extinguished by a terrorist act. The horror of the event overshadows and obscures 
the extreme improbability of suffering the same fate. This section reviews the numbers and 
details of attacks. They should be kept in perspective. As a numerical cause of death they 
are without significance. As a manifestation of inhumanity they are without equal. 
There are many chronologies of terrorism. They are all narrative accounts, derived mostly 
from open sources, the products of the information available. They are valuable records and 
essential to the production of statistics. This section of the research examines the 
information needed for more detailed analysis, and outlines the headings under which that 
information could usefully be recorded and presented. 
Finally, the few attacks of any significance on British aircraft-and the intermittent PIRA 
forays on airports are briefly reviewed. The section is intended to put the incidence of 
attacks on aviation, particularly on British aviation, into perspective. 3.1.2. FIGURE 1, which 
follows shows how very few attacks most countries have suffered. 125 
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3.2 Attack Statistics 
3.2.1 Data Sources and Limitations 
There are several chronologies of terrorism in the public or semi-public domain. All draw 
their data predominantly from open sources, newspapers and broadcasts; many use the 
same sources. All present their accounts of incidents in narrative form. The best known are 
the University of St Andrews - RAND database, now published annually in the Journal of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, the chronology in four volumes by Ed Mickolus, and the 
chronologies produced annually by the US government agencies126. Circumspection is 
needed in comparing the results; the chronologies are based upon different definitions and 
systems of classification. The narrative structure is ill-suited to the needs of detailed 
analysis. 
The chronologies make little or no attempt to record arrests, legal processes, or extradition 
proceedings. They therefore do not contribute to the tracking of the subsequences of 
attacks, a study vital to serious analysis. The task of collecting data on subsequences is not 
to be underestimated, it is nonetheless essential to the process of understanding terrorism 
and to the formulation of counterterrorist strategy. 
Chronologies are valuable sources for the compilation of statistics. They provide raw data: 
dates, number and type of incident, and casualties, from which an overview can be obtained. 
The three Tables opposite give a perspective to attacks on aviation since the 1960s. The 
Appendix to this reseach contains a Table: Significant Attacks on Aviation 1968-1996, which 
126 For more details and examples of chronologies and databases see T&PV, Winter 1995, pp 171-229. 
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lists the most serious terrorist attacks on British and Western aviation together with other 
significant attacks on aviation targets. 
3.3 Aftack Analysis 
3.3.1 Data Requirements 
Serious analysis must investigate the aetiology, methodology, outcome, and subsequences 
of attacks. A comprehensive record is needed not only of each attack but also of all attacks, 
in order to establish both the detail and pattern of tactics. Past records fail on one or both 
counts. It is possible that a full and adequate record is maintained somewhere by an 
intelligence agency, however all indications suggest not. The compilation of such a record 
from open sources is unlikely to be possible. If forensic data is not collected at the time, 
much of it is lost for ever. The majority of attacks took place prior to Lockerbie (21 Dec 
1988), the atrocity which re-energised aviation security. In 1986 the IATA Director of 
Security informed the IFALPA Security Committee that, in the aftermath of an incident, the 
first action of many authorities was to "sweep up the mess and return as quickly as possible 
to normal operations. "' 27 The most informative accounts of many incidents are to be found in 
contemporary books by good journalists. Valuable though they are, they are not written with 
the needs of analysts in mind, nor do they cover any but the most spectacular events. 
The aetioloqv of attacks must be established for the purposes of threat assessment and 
attack prediction. The first component is the political cause in the name of which the attack is 
mounted. The second component is the obiectives of the attackers. The third, and often 
overlooked, is the stimulus or trigger of the attack, the reason underlying the timing of the 
127 WALLIS, Rodney. IFALPA Security Committee meeting, Washington. October 1986 
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attack: to mark an anniversary, to influence forthcoming negotiations, etc. (In some cases 
there may be no specific stimulus. ) 
The methodoloqv of attacks, must be established for the purpose of implementing 
appropriate and adequate security countermeasures, as well as to assist identification of the 
culprits. One expert considers that terrorists are conservative in their methodology. 128 
Certainly they are likely to re-use a method of proven effectiveness if it remains available to 
them. Unfortunately they have demonstrated some flexibility in aviation, moving from El Al to 
softer targets, and moving from hijack to sabotage when anti-hijack measures became an 
obstacle. Further, different attackers favour different methods; the PFLP favoured hijack, the 
PFLP-GC bombs in hold baggage or mail, Abu Nidal armed attack, the North Koreans a 
bomb in cabin baggage, etc. The fact remains that authorities who fail to identify, or who do 
not exert themselves to close off security loopholes, are in serious dereliction of their duty; 
they would face the probability of massive punitive damages in any competent court in the 
event of re-use of an established loophole. Analysis of attack methodology is essential to 
the implementation of appropriate countermeasures. 
The outcomes of attacks : success/failure of the terrorists' tactics, their escape/capture, the 
granting/rejection of demands, and the management of the event, all have an important 
bearing on the repetition of the tactic, and on the adequacy of the countermeasures. 
The subsequences: apprehension, extradition, and conviction of the attackers, is central to 
the terrorists' perception of their success. It is also an important indicator of the 
effectiveness of international cooperation. 
IVI HOFFMAN, Bruce. Aviation Security and Terrorism. * An Analysis of the Potential T77reat to Air Cargo 
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3.3.3 FIGURE 5: Primary Database: Notes 
Columns K, L and M, N highlight the need to identify the point at which security 
countermeasures failed to apprehend the weaponry (M, N) and, where appropriate, the 
attacker/s (K, L); Place refers to the airport of penetration and Access to the channel, (eg 
hold bag, cabin bag, catering, etc. ) 
Columns AA and AC record variables (Duration, Media Coverage) by which aftackers are 
likely to gauge the success of their operation. 
The Database is elaborated (3.4 -3.7, below). 
3.4 Aftack Aetiology 
3.4.1 Attack Objectives 
3.4.1.1 Reprisal 
It has been submitted that state-instigated terrorist attacks on other states are acts of war de 
facto if not de jure. Some actions may be simply a reprisal, as perhaps Lockerbie was a 
reaction to the US Navy's destruction of an Iranair Airbus over the Gulf. In such cases the 
reprisal is an end in itself. 
Other attacks include an element of reprisal for a policy of the target state. The bombing of 
US military barracks in Dhahran (25 Jun 1996) may have been partly reprisal for US military 
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support for the Saudi regime and partly to further the objective of withdrawal of US forces 
from the area. Correct analysis is essential. A reprisal is likely to be a one-off action; a 
residual objective implies probable repetition of attack. 
In all attacks in which reprisal is an element, the message is: 'we can and we will hurt you. ' 
3.4.1.2 Tactical Objectives 
At the tactical level an attack may have specific short term objectives; to extort money, to 
obtain the release of prisoners or, more simply, to inflict casualties, damage, or financial 
losses. These objectives should be recorded. In some cases they may be clearly articulated 
by the attackers. In others they must be surmised by the investigators. This may present 
difficulties, governments generally being opposed to making concessions to terrorists and 
always being reluctant to admitting them; extortion is a particularly sensitive issue. 
3.4.1.3 Sub-Strategic Objectives 
The term 'sub-strategic' has been coined to cover objectives that lie between tactical and 
strategic. Two can be identified. 
The first is solipsistic, or inwardly directed. The objective is to sustain the terrorist group by 
demonstrating capability. This gratifies sponsors, heartens supporters, and maintains the 
cohesion and morale of the group. 
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The second is publicity, media coverage. This achieves the same solipsistic benefits as are 
described above. It also has an outward ly-d i rected component, attracting the attention of 
opponents and the uncommitted to the message that the terrorist group is a force to be 
reckoned with, and to the cause they are purporting to espouse. 
"A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-Tung, an 
earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the 
world like the operation at Munich ... it was like painting the name of Palestine on top of a 
mountain that can be seen from the four comers of the earth. "129 
3.4.1.4 Strategic Objectives 
In the earlier examination of the emergence of Palestinian attacks on aviation it was 
suggested that it would be mistaken to ascribe the tactic to thoughtful strategy. These 
paragraphs address the general and perhaps hypothetical case of terrorists with a strategy, 
and one which may utilise attacks on aviation as a tactic in an auxiliary role. 
This research indicates that attacks on aviation were a hindrance to the progress of the 
Palestinian cause. Their very success of the deeds in capturing publicity rendered it 
impossible for governments to assist the Palestinians without being accused of surrendering 
to terrorism. Thoughtful terrorist groups are likely to be aware of this and may therefore 
choose to eschew the tactic as being counterproductive to strategic aims. It is axiomatic that 
it is the less thoughtful groups who are more likely to attack aviation targets. 
129 HIRST, D. The Gun and the Olive Branch. In Conor GEARTY. Terror. London: Faber & Faber, 1991, 
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3.4.1.5 Casualties: Perspective 
Modern airliners commonly carry 400 passengers and sometimes over 500. To a terrorist 
group seeking to inflict a massive death toll, a large aircraft presents a first choice target. 
[How such a group can be deemed worthy of the privilege of human rights is mystifying. ] It is 
suggested that 'since the beginning of the century fewer than half a dozen terrorist incidents in fact 
have occurred that resulted in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at one time. "10 The same paper 
quotes Brian Jenkins in amplification of the point: 'Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a 
dozen or more additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, the criterion has to be lowered to 
25. This in itself suggests that it is either very hard to kill large numbers of persons or very rarely 
tried. '131 (Wording sic. ) 
3.4.1.6 FIGURE 6: Casualties 
FIGURE 6 (opposite) gives the death tolls attributable to single incidents. Some were acts 
of terrorism, others accidents. Each accident was selected as an event which could be re- 
enacted deliberately by a terrorist group. The first two incidents were acts of war, the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the associated death tolls make those of the other 
events pale into insignificance, a chilling indication of the inevitability of nuclear terrorism if 
nuclear weapons are allowed to fall into the hands of those who seek to maximise 
casualties. 
130 HOFFMAN, ref 114, p7 
131 JENKINS Brian. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND P-7119, July 1985 
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3.4.1.7 Costs: Perspective 
The costs of attacks are discussed in Section 6. The subject is mentioned here only as a 
reminder that it is, or may be, relevant to terrorist objectives. It is not suggested that costs 
should be included amongst the primary data on attacks. 
3.4.2 Attack Stimuli 
It is clear that, on many occasions, a specific stimulus has prompted a terrorist attack: to 
influence court proceedings, or to disrupt peace talks, or to mark important anniversaries. 
One expert study of Hizbollah suggests that the stimulus for the most recent important hijack 
(Kuwait B-747,5 April 1988) was a forthcoming election in Iran and the sponsors desire to 
enhance his electoral profile. 132 The identification of all such stimuli is central to attack 
prediction. They are included in the primary data format to alert investigators to the need to 
record any relevant evidence which can be obtained from statements of attackers or 
elsewhere. 
3.4.3 Terrorist Group 
It is self-evident that the name of the terrorist group making the attack should be recorded. 
An understanding of the terrorist causes and groups which may be involved in attacks on 
aviation is fundamental to threat assessment. Similarly, the names of the attackers 
themselves is vital information. Those who survive the event and are subsequently able to 
132 RANSTORP, Magnus. Radical Shfism in Lebanon, Western Government Crisis Management Techniques 
in Dealing with Hostage Incidents 1982-9Z Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, Aug 
1994 
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return to their colleagues take with them increased experience and expertise; this is likely to 
be deployed in further attacks on aviation, or utilised in the training of others. Information 
recorded on terrorist groups and individuals is relevant to both attack aetiology and attack 
methodology (below). 
3.5 Attack Methodology 
3.5.1 Attack Methods 
Three forms of attack on aviation can be distinguished: armed attack, sabotage, and hijack. 
In this research the term "armed attack" is used when armed attackers are present. 
Sabotage is a stand-off attack involving weaponry but not necessarily the contemporaneous 
presence of an attacker. Hijack requires both weaponry and attacker. The significance of 
these differences relates to the points at which protective security can intercept the attack. 
3.5.2 Armed Attack 
The boundary at airports between public areas and security-controlled areas is the landside- 
airside barrier. The landside area is open to the public and, apart from police patrols and 
surveillance systems, is no more protected by security systems than streets, shops and other 
areas of the country to which the public has general access. Landside areas have been the 
site of attacks: PIRA bombs in car-parks, Heathrow (1974), armed attacks at Rome and 
Vienna Airports (1985), etc. However they are not prestigious targets, nor, at major airports, 
are aircraft positioned within them. Aircraft are much more desirable targets, symbolic and 
prestigious and, if hijacked, difficult to recapture and capable of flight. Attacks on airports 
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landside are nonetheless attacks on aviation and should be recorded as such. As a 
methodology they have implications for airport design. In the event of their becoming an 
established modus operandi, appropriate countermeasures would be necessary. Similarly, 
public roads and other off-airport areas have been utilised over the decades to attack targets 
within the airport (PFLP attack on El Al, Zurich 18 Feb 1969, PIRA mortar attacks on 
Heathrow March 1994). 
3.5.3 Sabotage 
Sabotage requires the positioning of a weapon, usually an IED, at the target. If the target is 
an aircraft, the device or its components must be conveyed across the airside/landside 
barrier. The Place (airport, etc) and means of its access must be established. There is a 
limited number of possible means of penetrating the airside/landside barrier and reaching an 
aircraft: by passenger or staff access, or via hold baggage, carry-on baggage, or aircraft 
stores. The importance of this information is self-evident. It is not available in the published 
chronologies, and there are good grounds for not publicising methods of circumventing 
security. However, the existence of a comprehensive analysis in privileged circles is open to 
serious doubt. 
3.5.4 Hijack 
Similar reasoning applies to hijack. In this case both a person or persons and weaponry (or 
imitation weaponry) must be positioned for the attack. Most frequently, the hijackers reach 
their target by means of the passenger stream. There are other methods. The hijackers of a 
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PanArn B-747 (Karachi, 5 Sept 1986) disguised themselves as security personnel and 
gained access to the airport at a staff entrance. Weapons may be carried by the hijackers 
themselves. Alternatively they may be pre-positioned by accomplices, most likely at one of 
the many airports where security is a cosmetic process, eyewash that fools passengers but 
not terrorists. 
3.5.5 Additional Data 
The Primary Database accommodates only basic data, the tip of the iceberg. The fullest 
possible details must be recorded outside the Primary Database; some of these will be of 
equal or greater importance. Hijackers have sometimes been accompanied by 'sleepers'. 
The researcher had often heard this affirmation; the first corroborative evidence emerged 
during the course of this research. Both a British and an American pilot hijacked to Dawson's 
Field confirmed the presence on their aircraft of sleepers, including in one case an apparent 
father and child (3.8.2). Similarly it is alleged that hijackers have on occasion had drugs to 
maintain alertness, or short-wave radios to communicate with their controllers. The 
importance of informing all security personnel fully of attackers' modus operandi is obvious. 
All such relevant data must be disseminated. There are very few attacks on aviation (see 
3.1.2 Figure 1). Therefore dissemination depends in the first place upon the exchange of 
data amongst liberal democracies. In the second place, it depends upon the passing of the 
information by government authorities to the security personnel responsible for the 
interception of would-be attackers. Needless to say, data cannot be disseminated unless it 
has first been recorded. 
There is a need for an international system of collection and communication of data. 
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3.6 Attack Outcomes : Criteria of Success 
It is a tautology that thoughtful terrorists seek success. It may be true that the less 
thoughtful and the deranged also seek success, but their criteria of 'success' may not be 
rational. Hinckley, a loner who attempted to assassinate President Reagan, reportedly asked 
at the moment of his arrest 'Was it on television? ' Protection against lunatics and suicides 
presents special difficulties. Happily it is often provided by the countermeasures put in place 
against other adversaries. 
Those who dispatch terrorists on their attacks will not necessarily have the same criteria of 
success as the terrorists themselves. Both viewpoints must be assessed. Success is a 
function of the attack objectives. Therefore, as a preliminary to gauging the terrorist 
perception of the success of the outcome, these objectives must be surmised. For that 
reason they are deemed to be primary data, to be included in the database. 
Four categories of objectives have been postulated: reprisal, tactical, sub-strategic, and 
strategic. 
Of the sub-strategic obiectives, one - the obtaining of media coverage - will be achieved in 
any attack. Even in the case of an attack which ends in abject failure, the terrorist group will 
attract some publicity. This it will welcome; it is commonplace that any incident of terrorism 
or suspected terrorism is followed by competing claims of responsibility from a number of 
groups. To a lesser degree, the other sub-strategic objective - sustaining the terrorist group - 
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will also be achieved regardless of attack outcome. Success provides heroes; failure 
provides martyrs; only humiliation is detrimental to the group. 
Achievement of the reprisal obiective or of anv tactical oboective, is contingent upon the 
success of the attack. Extortion, coercion of prisoner release, violence to property or 
persons, all depend upon the successful penetration of security by weaponry and, in all but 
sabotage, by the terrorists themselves. This underlines the importance of effective 
security countermeasures. It is also evident that, even when security is breached and 
attackers have taken hostages, success can still be denied to them at the second stage by 
refusal to concede their demands. This is much easier to state as a policy than to adhere to 
in practice. The decision-makers have to calculate whether the price of saving the lives 
currently at stake will be the subsequent loss of a greater number of lives. Extortion is 
broadly similar. Monies paid to terrorists may buy more weaponry' for later attacks. It is 
equally likely to be used to fund a comfortable lifestyle and a pension nest-egg for the 
terrorists themselves. Either way, no responsible government would willingly concede to 
extortion demands. Unhappily there is a convincing body of evidence that a number of 
governments were happy to buy the terrorists off their territory and on to that of their 
neighbours. It is unlikely that a complete record of extortion payments could ever be 
compiled. There is one good reason for maintaining contemporary confidentiality on 
extortion successes, and that is to avoid the encouragement of the tactic. Equally, it is 
essential to expose venal governments whose concept of responsibility to their allies is 
concocted in the kitchens of the Borgias. Therefore data on extortion should be collated as 
far as possible, though not necessarily made available in the public record. 
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Two strategic obiectives in international attacks on aviation have been l2ostulated: the 
influencing of government policy and of public opinion. In each case the terrorist message is 
conveyed to the intended audience through a duplex mechanism, the action itself and the 
media reports of it. Each component has a'magnitude and value to the terrorists which is 
directly dependent upon the noteworthiness of the action; this in turn is a function (not a 
product) of the significance of the target and the success of the attack. Unfortunately, 
aviation is now established as one of the most significant targets of all, for reasons already 
discussed. The less the success of the attack, the less its noteworthiness; however 
noteworthiness does not reduce to zero when success is zero; the action itself constitutes a 
message from the terrorists. Nonetheless, terrorists with the ability to think in strategic terms 
will be clearly cognisant that tactical success is a pre-requisite of the attainment of strategic 
objectives. 
To aver that success is central to the encouragement of terrorism may appear to be a 
tautology. A review of terrorist objectives indicates that it is a truth which stands up 
to examination. Therefore the policy of denial of success to terrorists, well- 
established within the perspective of law enforcement, is vindicated and reinforced 
from the perspective of political conflict. The value of effective aviation security 
countermeasures is underlined. 
3.7 Aftack Subsequences 
The term 'subsequences' relates to the terrorists and covers the legal and political 
processes following an attack. It is self-evident that, if terrorists have the ability to carry Out 
an attack and then return safely to their base, terrorism will be established as a low-risk and 
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therefore not unattractive occupation. Further, if captured terrorists are promptly released by 
their captors, then they are only at risk during the brief period of their action. All of which 
would give immense encouragement to terrorism. This, unfortunately, was the norm during 
the first nine years of attacks on aviation. This period of relative immunity was ended by the 
Israelis at Entebbe (4 July 1976) and by the West German GSG9 at Mogadishu (18 October 
1977). Both were brilliant military actions and both took place in remote countries possibly 
sympathetic to the terrorists and where they would have felt relatively safe; few of them 
survived. This ended the Palestinian hijack epidemic. It is significant that the end came 
about as a result of the hijacks having an 'unsuccessful' outcome,, not because the 
subsequences - the legal and political processes - had been put in order by the international 
community. 
The efficacy of the subsequences is measured by the punishment of terrorists. This requires 
their capture, trial, conviction, sentencing, and their serving of the sentence. it may also 
involve extradition. There appears to be no comprehensive record of subsequences in the 
public domain. It is remarkably difficult to compile one. The researcher approached several 
governments, all of whom stated that they did not maintain records in a suitable form. If this 
is true, then the governments are failing to monitor the performance of an important 
component in the anti-terrorist armoury. 
The subject of extradition proved equally difficult. Only two governments of several 
approached were prepared to offer any cooperation, HMG and The Netherlands. Others 
either did not reply or, more honestly, stated their unwillingness to release information. Even 
the governments of Canada and the USA, normally the most helpful and open, provided no 
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information; one of several applications to the US government was made under the Freedom 
of Information Act and was as unsuccessful as the others. 
A comprehensive record of subsequences could be compiled from legal records. It would 
involve searches in all the countries involved and would be a major and costly research 
undertaking. Without government cooperation the extradition record would probably be 
incomplete, the political decisions not being in the public domain. 
The subject of the role and responsibility of the government is examined in more detail in 
Section 9. 
3.8 Attacks on British Aviation133 
3.8.1 Summary 
In FIGURE 1, the word "serious" refers to the intent of the attackers and is used in reference 
to organised terrorist groups. However the researcher wishes to repeat and re-emphasise 
that any interference with the safe operation of an airliner puts the lives of the occupants at 
risk. Therefore any attack is serious in its potential outcome. 
Prior to 1968 there had been a small number of attacks on British aviation targets. On 14 
April 1950 a bomb exploded in the rear toilet of an airborne BEA Viking causing severe 
damage and wounding a stewardess. In 1956, during the Cyprus conflict, a bomb exploded 
133 Main references for sub-section 3.8: MICKOLUS refs 26 and 33 
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in the forward freight hold of a Skyways Hermes (4 Mar 1956) and in a British-owned Cyprus 
Airways aircraft (27 Apr 1956), both on the ground in Nicosia. During the Aden conflict, an 
airborne Aden Airways DC-3 was destroyed by a bomb, killing all 28 on board. (22 Nov 
1966) and an empty Aden Airways Viscount was blown up on the ground., On 12 Oct 1967 
an airborne BEA Comet crashed into the sea after a bomb exploded; the attack was widely 
blamed on Turkish terrorists who supposedly believed General Grivas to be on. board; 
another theory suggests a crime committed for insurance monies. Thus by 1968 the first 
terrorist targeting of British aircraft had already occurred. 
3.8.2 Hijack of BOAC VC-10 from Bahrain, 9 Sept 1970, to Dawsons Field'34 
On 6 September, PFLP terrorists hijacked a TWA B707, a Swissair Coronado, and a Panam 
B747. Leila Khaled and a male colleague failed to hijack an El Al B707, which landed at 
Heathrow. Khaled was detained by the authorities; her accomplice died. 
Three days later (9 Sept), a BOAC VC-10, routed Bombay-Dubai-Bahrain-London, was 
hijacked out of Bahrain and diverted to Beirut. It is suspected that the weaponry was 
positioned for the hijackers by accomplices in Dubai and/or Bahrain, perhaps in catering 
stores. In Beirut the original five hijackers were joined by more (perhaps five) and received 
additional weaponry. The aircraft was directed to Dawsons Field where it landed safely. 
The VC-10 was blown up by the PFLP (12 Sept). The hostages were released in stages. 
On 17 September the Jordanian armed forces attacked the Palestinian fighters on its 
territory. The last hostages were rescued by the Jordanians on 25 September. All crew and 
passengers survived. 
134 Primary reference for sub-section 3.8.2, personal interviews(12 JulyI996) with BA and TWA Captains, both 
hijacked to Dawsons Field, 1970 
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The hijackers were skilled at the mechanics of hijacking. They controlled the occupants of 
the aircraft successfully. They concealed the final destination from the pilots by releasing 
navigational information step by step. However they were very ignorant about the operation 
of aircraft. The VC-10 was obliged to make a night landing in the desert. Although the 
landing strip was long, the inadequate lighting (headlights of a few cars) suggested that it 
was dangerously short. There were no radio communications or landing aids on the landing 
ground. The Captains of the BOAC VC-10 and the TWA B-707 had previously flown large 
aircraft in their respective Air Forces. Thus they had valuable experience in landing with 
minimal lighting; this was normal practice in wartime when enemy aircraft would lie in wait at 
airfields, awaiting the return of the night sorties. Landing a 100 ton jet aircraft with a touch- 
down speed of around 160 mph on a dark unprepared strip is dangerous in the extreme. 
Without a highly skilled pilot it could be expected to destroy the aircraft and all on board. 
When the hijacked Swissair DC-8 landed, the sound of the impact led other prisoners to 
believe that it had crashed. It is reported that the PFLP had made virtually no preparation 
for the arrival of three aircraft and their passengers, and were apparently surprised and 
overjoyed at their success. On the aircraft the hijackers were very nervous and reluctant to 
talk. It is convincingly reported that both the TWA and BA aircraft had "sleepers" on board 
who revealed their presence only after landing. This operation became known as the 
Dawsons Field extravaganza, a colourful phrase which distracts attention from its 
significance. 
From the point of view of the Palestinians the operation itself was an unprecedented and 
resounding success, putting Palestine on the front pages of the world's newspapers. 135 
135 Between 7 Sept and I Oct, the Times was published on 22 days, on 17 of which the operation 
was front page news. 
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Operationally they were lucky. By professional military standards their planning had lethal 
flaws: the female hijacker of the TWA did not know how to put the pin back in her 
fragmentation grenade, the airstrip was dangerously short and badly lit, and the hijackers 
were ignorant of aircraft operation; all of these were potential sources of catastrophe. The 
wider consequences of the operation were disastrous to the Palestinians. It prompted their 
forcible eviction from Jordan. Its success in attracting publicity led the Palestinians to retain 
attacks on aviation as a tactic, not understanding that publicity of their later barbarity, far 
from benefitting their cause, was fatally impeding its progress. Arguably, they committed 
one of this century's great strategic errors. 
The international community was spurred into action. The Hague Convention (relating to 
unlawful seizure, ie hijacking) was enacted three months later (16 Dec 1970). 
To Great Britain, Dawsons Field was a formative event. Britain had become involved 
through an accident of fate - the landing at Heathrow of Leila Khaled on the El Al B707. The 
PFLP had no British nationals with whom to coerce her freedom, although they claimed that 
they had. 136 They therefore hijacked the BOAC VC-10 to Obtain British bargaining counters; 
52 of the 116 passengers and crew were British. It is instructive to see why this, the first use 
of the tactic against the British government, was the only occasion on which it was 
successful. The PFLP demanded the release of Leila Khaled from Britain. They were also 
demanding the release of six terrorists held by West Germany and Switzerland and up to 
3000 (reports vary) guerrillas held by Israel. Thus the governments of GB, Switzerland, 
West Germany, USA and Israel were involved in deciding how to respond to the Palestinian 
demands. Israel was clearly in a different position to the other countries. She was the front- 
136 O'BALLANCE, Edgar. Language of Violence. Presidio Press: San Rafael. 1979. p 88 
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line enemy of the Palestinians and had already developed a policy of minimum concession 
and maximum retaliation to attack. It is likely therefore that Israel advocated this policy to 
the other countries. 
"Switzerland and West Germany at first agreed to meet the commando demands to release six 
Arab guerrillas held in the two countries. but reversed their decisions Sept 8 in favor of joint 
international effort to negotiate the passengers' release ....... (Researcher's emphasis) 
"The Israeli government made clear Sept 8 that it would not be bound by any agreement reached 
in negotiations between the guerrillas and the Red Cross that did not include the release of the 
Israeli nationals being held. At the same time the Israelis were adamant against a reported 
guerrilla demand that an estimated 3,000 guerrillas held prisoner in Israel be freed in exchange 
for the release of the passengers. " 137 
The role of HMG is central to this research. Keesing's gives the following account: 
"Earlier press reports had intimated that both the Swiss and West German Governments were at 
one time considering a straight exchange of their nationals for the Arabs in Swiss or West 
German custody, but that the British Government had insisted that ý all the hostages without 
exception should be released together, irrespective of their religion, race or nationality -a view 
which was understood to be shared by the US Goverment. Eventually, all the Governments 
involved agreed on this common stand, concerted through the co-ordinating committee in 
Berne. Although Israel was not represented on this committee .... 
"9139(Researcher's emphasis) 
137 Facts on File. Facts on File Inc: New York. Sept 3-9 1970, p 638 138 Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Sept 26-Oct 3 1970, p 24026 
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"... PFLP were prepared to release all the hijacked hostages, except for 'Israelis of military 
status', provided the Swiss, West Gennan and British Govermnents set free the seven Arabs in 
their custody. It was proposed that Israeli passengers, and those possessing dual US and Israeli 
nationality, should continue to be held for separate bargaining with Israel on an exchange for the 
release of an undetermined number of Arab guerrillas held in that country. It was understood, 
however that all the Western Govermnents were standing firm in their view that all the hostages 
must be released in a single 'package deal', without regard to their religion, race or 
nationality. " 139 
The fault line in this position would have been the Israeli's known policy. On 12-13 Sept the 
Israelis arrested 450 Arabs, many from influential families, in West Bank and Gaza, 140 thus 
improving its bargaining position in case it became isolated, which by then was becoming 
more probable. These hostages were released in batches on 16,17 and 18 September. 
This analysis is supported by contemporary comment: 
"All those governments whose hijacked nationals are still held by the Palestinians have got to go 
on working together. This means that the western countries have got to go on working with 
Israel, for so long as Israel goes on working with them. When the Israelis began rounding up 
hostages of their own on the West Bank the British Goverment was not at all happy about it. 
It may be that the Israelis felt that the west would sell them out in the end and were taking their 
own precautions. " 141 
139 Keesing's, refl38 
140 ibid, p 24207 
141 7he Economist. Sept 19 1970, p 12 
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There is no primary evidence in the public domain by which to judge these accounts. 
However the secondary evidence is persuasive. It is not credible that HMG would have 
subordinated British lives or Britain's interests to Israel's prosecution of her conflict with the 
Palestinians; 1970 was three years after the passing of the British sponsored UN Resolution 
242 which Israel was showing no sign of respecting. It is probable that HMG pressed West 
Germany and Switzerland to adopt a common front as a means of strengthening their ability 
to insist that all passengers (that is, including Jews and Israelis) were released. This same 
conclusion has been reached by at least one respected analyst-142 
Even after the release of all British hostages, HMG maintained its policy of a united front: 
"Britain and west (sic) Germany will not break ranks with the Americans over the release of 
Palestinian prisoners in spite of the fact that all British and Gennan hostages in Jordan have now 
been freed. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, and Herr Walter Scheel, his west 
German counterpart, gave this pledge in separate statements today. " 143 
By 29 September all PFLP hostages had been released unharmed. They had been 
hijacked, landed on a disused desert strip and then caught in the crossfire of a vicious war. 
They had been lucky. They had also been well-served by their governments. 
HMG's release of Leila Khaled is a stark contrast to its subsequent firm policy to refuse 
concessions to terrorists. Dawsons Field was Great Britain's first involvement with 
international terrorists acting against Israel. At the time it gave the appearance of an 
isolated event. Therefore HMG would have had an immediate aim of securing the safety Of 
142 CLUTTERBUCK, Richard. Living with Terrorism. London: Faber and Faber, 1975, plOl 143 7he Times. Sept 26 1970, pI 
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the hostages and a general policy of avoiding embroilment in the Palestinian conflict. HMG 
was not to know that Palestinian terrorism would lose focus and develop into indiscriminate 
and murderous attacks on victims selected at random. Thus Dawsons Field was not an 
isolated event, but the entry point to 18 years of international terrorist atrocities. This 
became clear over the next two years. After the Munich Olympic massacre (Sept 1972) 
HMG established the Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) team within the SAS. This 
reflected HMG's realisation that international terrorism was not a transient phenomenon. 
HMG's consequent hard line was broadcast to terrorists worldwide when the SAS CRW 
stormed the Iranian embassy (1980). 
Dawsons Field was a significant event in many respects. It spurred the international 
community into action. It demonstrated that, in 1970, aviation security was utterly 
ineffective. Armed terrorists were welcomed aboard four of the world's leading airlines. 
Worse, there was no contingency plan to raise standards in the face of a raised threat. 
PanAm 93 had recorded in its log the three other 6 September hijacks in the three hours 
directly preceding its own hijack. Three days then elapsed before the hijack of the British 
VC-10, in which security measures could have been implemented to intercept the attackers 
or their weaponry. Terrorists used an attack on a British airline as their means of targeting 
HMG. Dawsons Field was therefore HMG's and British aviation's 'entry point to the modern 
battlefield of international terrorism. 
Dawsons Field was the first occasion on which HMG was confronted directly by 
modern international terrorism. It was the only occasion on which HIVIG sought an 
accommodation with terrorists by meeting their demands. Thereafter this tactical 
response to terrorist blackmail was replaced by a strategy of resolute resistance. 
131 
3.8.3 Hijack of BA VC-1 0, Beirut, 3 March 1974 
The BA VC-10 was hijacked out of Beirut by two male terrorists. They intended to land at 
Athens to coerce the release of terrorists facing the death penalty for their armed attack at 
Athens airport (5 Aug 1973). Their weapons were positioned in specific seats in the aircraft 
by accomplices, probably during the turnround at Beirut. Incomprehensibly, the hijackers 
ordered the Captain and the Flight Engineer off the flight deck. The aircraft was then flown 
by the two First Officers to Amsterdam, after permission to land at Athens had been refused. 
All passengers and crew were allowed to leave unharmed. The hijackers then set fire to the 
interior of the aircraft. "Credit" was claimed by ANYLOP, a group founded by Ahmad Abd al- 
Ghafur, an associate of Abu Nidal. 
Release of these hijackers from Holland was coerced by the next attack on a British aircraft. 
3.8.4 Hijack of BA VC-1 0, Dubai, 21 Nov 1974 
Four members of ANYLOP gained access to the airport either by climbing the airport fence 
or by staff collusion. They fired on staff, wounding two, and gained access to the aircraft. 
The Captain, who was in the terminal building, was coerced on board by threats to the life of 
a passenger. The aircraft was flown to Tunis where a passenger was murdered in a callous 
scene. The hijackers demanded the release of three groups of terrorists: 5 imprisoned in 
Egypt (Rome Airport attack, Dec 1973), 8 more in Egypt (Khartoum Embassy murders, 
March 1973) and, in a demand surprisingly made later, the two from the VC-10 hijack (Mar 
132 
1974). They successfully coerced the release of the first and third groups, but not the 
second. 
This hijack was one of the group of early attacks on aviation which introduced sadistic 
behaviour and in which Abu Nidal had some involvement. This methodology did much to 
label the whole Palestinian movement barbaric and thus to block its progress towards its 
political objectives. The ANYLOP violent methods were opposed by the PLO, who had 
assassinated Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur in September 1974. The PLO claimed to have 
imprisoned the four hijackers after this incident. 
Operationally the most interesting point in this incident was that the Captain, speaking 
Swahili, was able to pass valuable information to a South African Airways aircraft, 
unbeknownst to the hijackers. 
3.8.5 PIRA Bomb on BA Trident, Manchester, 23 Jul 1974 
An IED, brought on board by a passenger within a bundle of dirty nappies, was left on a 13A 
Trident at Belfast. A telephoned warning (either too late or not acted upon promptly) did not 
prevent the aircraft from taking off. The aircraft then made an emergency landing at 
Manchester. No-one was hurt. The bomb was found by a police dog which carried it to its 
handler waiting outside. The evidence is that PIRA did not intend to destroy the aircraft. 
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3.8.6 Hijack of BA BAC1-1 1, Manchester, 7 January 1975 
The BA BAC1 -11 which took off from Manchester was hijacked at the top of descent into 
Heathrow by a man in Arab headdress armed with a pistol and grenade. The aircraft landed 
at Heathrow. The hijacker allowed all passengers to leave but kept the five crew on board. 
He demanded to be taken to Paris. Whilst seemingly acceding to his demand, the aircraft 
was flown to Stansted, where a reception team from the Police, SAS and Security Service 
was in place. The hijacker was captured when he disembarked from the aircraft. He was a 
mental case and his weapons were fake. 
The importance of this event was that it provided many valuable lessons in incident 
management. In 1975 pilots received no security training. Thus the Captain was ill- 
prepared, and unaware of the requirements of the authorities. The crew formed the opinion 
I 
that the hijacker was volatile and dangerous. As a result the authorities and the crew failed 
to coordinate their efforts. One important consequence was that no secure land-line link was 
made with the aircraft. The aircraft radio was therefore used for communications; it was 
monitored by interested listeners, including the media. After the aircraft landed at Stansted, 
the hijacker left the aircraft accompanied by a steward. Reportedly, the presence of the 
steward disrupted the good intentions of the waiting SAS trooper; when the steward 
subsequently ran off, a police dog - being trained to attack the more violent individual - bit 
him. The Chairman of the long haul pilots, at that time at loggerheads with the short haul 
pilots, observed that a toy aeroplane had been hijacked with a toy gun. However it was a 
most valuable training experience. 
134 
3.8.7 Armed Attack on El Al Crew, Europa Hotel, London, 20 August 1978 
Arab terrorists made an armed attack on an El Al crew outside the Europa Hotel, London on 
20 August 1978 killing one and wounding nine. El Al security guards returned fire. 
Intelligence forewarning of an attack led to the deployment of a large military force at 
Heathrow. This, it is believed, caused the terrorists to change their plans. It is not clear 
whether the carriage of arms by El Al personnel was authorised by HIVIG. 
3.8.8 Hijack of BA B-747, Hong Kong, 22 March 1984 
A BA B-747, flying from Hong Kong to Peking, was hijacked over the China mainland by a 
lone male. He handed a letter to the crew threatening to detonate explosives if the aircraft 
did not divert to Taipei. The Captain complied. The hijacker surrendered to the authorities 
and proclaimed himself an anti-Communist. He had no explosives. 
3.8.9 Bomb Explosion, Terminal 2, Heathrow, 20 April 1984. 
A bomb in a suitcase injured 23 people in the unclaimed baggage area of Terminal 2. 
Libya was the prime suspect, the stand-off at the Libyan Embassy, London, being in 
progress. 
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3.8.10 PIRA Attacks on Heathrow, 19 May 1974,26 July 1974 9,11 and 13 March 1994 
On 19 May 1974 a bomb exploded in a car park at Heathrow injuring three, including one 
American. On 26 July 1974 another bomb exploded in a car park without casualties. 
On 9,11 and 13 March 1994 PIRA made successive mortar attacks on Heathrow. No 
mortars exploded; all were supposedly viable. Some mortars fell on a runway and others on 
aircraft movement areas. it is fortuitous that no aircraft was hit. These attacks were a 
propaganda success for PIRA, which obtained front-page coverage. 
3.8.11 Attacks on Airline Offices 1970-94 
Twelve attacks on British airline offices are recorded (1970-94) in the University of St 
Andrews-RAND Chronology. It is likely that some, including the one on a minor British 
Airways office in Oxford Street, were directed at other targets adjacent. However airline 
offices, particularly those of the national airline, are an established and symbolic target. 
3.9 British Involvement in Attacks on Non-British Targets 
Any attack on aviation may involve Great Britain by way of British victims, security 
standards or jurisdiction. All attacks teach lessons in security. The main formative 
influences have been Dawsons Field - where Britain was forced to make concessions, the 
1972 attack at the Munich Olympics - which prompted the formation of the SAS CRW, and 
the Lockerbie atrocity. This last, an attack on a non-British aircraft, was the most formative 
event of all. It prompted the transformation of British aviation security to its present levels. 
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British subjects may find themselves victims of any attack on aviation, whether as pilots or as 
passengers. A British Midland B-707, wet-leased (ie with a British flight crew) to Kuwait 
Airways was hijacked out of Beirut (8 Jul 1977). Happily, no-one was hurt. The Captain of 
the Kuwait Airways Airbus A-31 0, hijacked to Teheran and held for five days (4-9 Dec 1984), 
was British. His detailed report of the event was most informative. His chilling evidence of 
the hijackers' sadistic pleasure in the act of murder gainsays any supposed political purity in 
terrorism. British passengers on the hijacked Kuwait B-747 (5 Apr 1988) were released early 
on in Mashad, the hijackers saying to them that "We have no quarrel with you". 144 It is 
reasonable to suppose that the hijackers were also reluctant to quarrel with the SAS. The 
myth surrounding the SAS, and it reputation for invincibility, is likely to have been a major 
deterrent to attacks on British aviation since its widely publicised storming of the Iranian 
Embassy (May 1980). 
Britain's hard-line response to terrorism was illustrated in another incident (Heathrow, 17 Apr 
1986). Nezar Hindawi duped his pregnant fiancee, booked to fly El Al, into carrying a bomb 
in her cabin baggage This deception, particularly foul even by the barbaric standards of 
terrorism, was in fact a well-used Middle Eastern modus operandi (Rome, 28 Jul 1971; 
London, 1 Sept 1971; Rome, 16 Aug 1972). The bomb was detected by El Al security. 
Hindawi was arrested and sentenced to 45 years imprisonment. Syria was deeply involved 
in the attack, therefore Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations. They have not yet been 
fully restored (1997) because of Syria's continued terrorist connections. There thus is 
consistency in Britain's response to terrorism, from the maintenance of SAS capability to 
denial of diplomatic relations. 
144 WALLIS, Rodney. Combating Air Terrorism. New York: Brasseys, 1993, p 21 
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Two hijacks of foreign aircraft have ended in Great Britain (Air Tanzania, 26/28 Feb 1982, 
and Sudan Airways, 25-27 Aug 1996). In both cases the surrender of the hijackers was 
successfully negotiated and no-one was hurt on British territory. In neither case were the 
hijackers released as part of the deal (cf. common practice in negotiations). However 
neither hijack involved a major international terrorist group. An important security lesson 
was relearned in the Air Tanzania incident. The hijackers were armed only with imitation 
weapons. However they found and appropriated real weapons belonging to passengers, 
which were being carried in the cockpit. This supposed security measure was, at one time, 
normal practice. Later it was forbidden on British aircraft. 
Great Britain is fortunate in that its aviation activities have not come under serious attack. 
PIRA, which has a formidable capability, has clearly decided that murdering innocent 
passengers of different nationalities would be counterproductive to its progress. -The true 
Palestinian groups attacked British aircraft only when they wished to coerce the release of 
colleagues. The Middle Eastern murder groups did not include Great Britain amongst the 
targets of their atrocities. Their reasons must remain the subject of speculation. They are 
likely to include HIVIG's stance against Israeli atrocities and territorial expansionism, HIVIG's 
policy of not making concessions to terrorists, relatively high standards of British aviation 
security, and the formidable reputation of the SAS. The significance of the Lockerbie 
atrocity, which radically changed HIVIG's management of aviation security, is examined in 
Section 6, British Responses. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
Attacks on aviation are spectacular atrocities. They are a means of causing deaths in 
large number. They obtain extensive publicity, and give solipsistic satisfaction. For 
these reasons, they are a methodology attractive to both state and sub-state 
attackers. Attacks on powerful liberal democracies are likely to be counterproductive. 
They may arouse some fear. They will not arouse sympathy for the terrorist cause, 
and are likely to provoke a hostile response. The three most serious attacks on 
British aircraft were Palestine-related. PIRA have also attacked aviation targets, but 
apparently without seeking to inflict serious casualties. 
The subsequences of attacks, the apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of 
attackers are central to the instigators' perception of success, and thus to the likely 
re-use of the tactic. In many cases, the subsequences have been reprehensively 
inadequate. A full record would be illuminating. It will be difficult to compile without 
the cooperation of governments, which all but two withheld from the researcher. 
Effective aviation security countermeasures can only be developed from a full 
understanding of aviation terronsm. Much of the data essential to understanding is 
not available in the public domain; there is no evidence that a complete record is 
maintained anywhere. Analysis requires the structured collection of data, and the 
recording of the motivation, methodology, outcomes, and subsequences of attacks. It 
also requires the generous sharing of data by countries having a common Interest in 
combating aviation terrorism. 
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4. POLITICAL EFFECTS ON GREAT BRITAIN 
4.1 Perspective : Potential Effects of Attacks 
This Section reviews the political effects of attacks, tracks them over the period 1968- 
94 and investigates their relationship with Middle Eastern attacks on aviation. 
The study is confined to political effects in the UK. To widen the study to include 
other countries would be a major undertaking and would be increasingly speculative. 
The effects chosen are HMG policy towards Israel and Palestine, and UK public 
opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United Kingdom remains an influential world 
power, a member of the UN Security Council, a major trading nation, a renowned 
military force and arms manufacturer, and with a long association with both the Middle 
East and with international diplomacy. Any of these attributes lent to the support of a 
combatant nation would be welcomed by the recipient. UK public opinion is a 
secondary factor; it can act only as an indirect pressure. 
This research distinguishes three potential political effects of attacks. The first is a 
direct effect: the influence of the attack on government policy. The second is indirect: 
the effect of the government's handling of the terrorist attack upon its own standing. 
The third is the direct effect of the attack upon public opinion. The effect of economic 
damage is considered separately (Section 5). 
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The first potential political effect is direct, the influence of attacks upon government policy. 
Each of the three serious Palestinian attacks on British aircraft had the same direct political 
objective: that of influencing government policy to obtain the release of terrorists in custody. 
Only in the first case was the prisoner (Leila Khaled) in Britain. 
However for two decades (1968-1988), direct pressure on government policy was sustained 
by the serious threat to British aviation, reinforced by a demonstrated capability. To a 
certain extent, Britain had attracted Arab opprobrium for her perceived betrayal of Arab 
interests in Palestine after the First World War and during the course of the Mandate, and 
for her role in the Suez expedition (1956). On the other hand, having first hand experience 
of Jewish terrorism, Britain was not susceptible to Israel's protestations of purity. Following 
Israel's unremedied breach of UN 242 (1967 on) and first invasion of Lebanon (1982), it 
must have been evident to the clearer-sighted Palestinians that Britain was neither an 
admirer nor a supporter of Israel. HMG did not have a pro-Israeli policy, the abandonment of 
which could be a terrorist objective. This suggests that there was little threat to British 
interests from thoughtful Palestinian groups with a coherent political agenda. However other 
groups, the mindless murderers, were a very serious threat. However there is no evidence 
that the Palestinians mounted attacks on British aviation targets - or indeed on any British 
targets - which were primarily intended to influence HIVIG policy towards Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
The second potential political effect is indirect, that of the government bringing discredit 
upon itself by its mishandling of terrorist attack or threat. 
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However HMG has a long tradition of excellence in the civil service, centuries of experience 
at dealing with Irish and other terrorists, and politicians of integrity. It is unlikely to bring 
discredit upon itself by culpable failure. 
4.2 The Role of Her Majesty's Government 
The Jewish quest for a homeland in Palestine was facilitated by HIVIG (1916-17) in the 
supposed interests of the war effort. Palestine was then part of the Ottoman Empire, which 
stretched from Turkey across Arabia to the Yemen. Entry of the Ottomans into the war on 
the side of the Germans led to the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) which 
"delineated territories for the British in Palestine and in Iraq, for the French in Syria and 
Lebanon". 145 The League of Nations formalised the position (1922) when it awarded 
mandates for the territories to Britain and France. The transfer of Palestine from the 
Ottomans to the British gave the Zionists a more accessible and sympathetic ear for their 
representations. There were dissenting voices: 
"I myself do not recopize that the connection of the Jews with Palestine, which terminated 
1200 years ago, gives them any claim whatsoever. Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary, 
1920146 
From 1922-44 the British conduct of the mandate was subject to the conflicting forces of the 
Zionist desire for mass immigration and the violent Arab opposition thereto. 
145 PRYCE-JONES, ref 80, p 108 146 OVENDALE, ref 41, p 33 
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As war with Germany approached and then broke out, Britain sought peace in Palestine. It 
wished to concentrate its attentions and resources on the war. It also wished to safeguard 
vital fuel supplies from interruption by maintaining good relations with the Arabs. However 
the Holocaust, the mass murder of an estimated 5.7m Jews by the Nazis, added urgency to 
the Zionist demands for unrestricted immigration to Palestine. British unwillingness to 
accede to these demands led to increasing Jewish terrorist attacks (1940 onwards) on 
British targets in Palestine, including murders and atrocities. By 1948 the country had 
become an Arab-Jewish battleground and therefore an international problem. Britain 
sensibly withdrew, handing over to the UN. Her good intentions had been rewarded by the 
enmity of the Zionists for her opposition to their territorial ambitions, and by the enmity of the 
Arabs for the failure of that opposition. 
Palestine showed that nationalism harnessed to the territorial urge could prevail over 
modern military might fettered by democratic sensibilities. This lesson the Americans had to 
learn for themselves in Vietnam thirty years later. 
Palestine also demonstrated that peacekeeping is an invidious role and that it does not 
resolve an underlying conflict. At the best it may save lives whilst the process of conflict 
resolution is running. 
In 1967 the simmering hostilities between the Arab counties and Israel erupted into full-scale 
war. The Palestinians then resorted to international terrorism; the influence of which on HM 
Government policy is important to this research. 
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HMG might have moved in a direction beneficial to the Palestinian cause for three reasons. 
First, Palestinian terrorism could have made HMG more aware of Palestinian grievances. 
Given Britain's 28 year immersion in Palestine and its long colonial association with the 
Middle East, the suggestion that terrorism heightened its awareness is not persuasive. 
Second, terrorism could have heightened public awareness, which in turn could have 
pressured HIVIG. In the short term, and given the feelings of the times (4.6.2), this pressure 
is likely to have been anti-Palestinian. Third, the Government could have moved to favour 
the Palestinians in order to "buy off" the terrorists. 
Conversely, hostility to Palestinian terrorism might have pushed the Government towards the 
Israeli camp, as fellow-enemies of the Palestinians and as exponents of anti-terrorist 
methods not available to Great Britain. 
Finally, there is the possibility that the Government proclaimed one policy publicly whilst 
following a different one unreve'aled. Whilst unrecorded dialogue is a normal part of 
diplomatic and intelligence service activity, and will include exploration of policy options, it 
cannot be deemed to override declared policy unless its manifestations, sooner or later, can 
be seen outside privileged circles. A major component of the Arab/Israeli conflict was the 
battle for the moral high ground, from which the support of world opinion could be 
harnessed. This battle is fought with public statements and with publicity. It is not credible 
that secret Government policy to support one of the protagonists would not in the long run 
include support in this key area and would remain undisclosed, either by the other side's 
sympathisers or by their intelligence services. Therefore, over the 28 year period under 
review, from 1966 to 1994, and in the absence of revealed inconsistency, it may be taken 
that the public position of HM Government accurately reflects its true position. 
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4.3 Political Effects on the UK Government 
4.3.1 Methodology 
Three indicators have been selected to track the conduct of HMG towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict: statements in Hansard, Foreign Office Background Briefs, and trade figures with 
Israel. 
Figures of trade with Israel (1970-93) have been reviewed. It is not suggested that they are 
a direct indicator of HMG policy, but that they may provide some illumination of the 
background. In assessing the GB export figures there are two key factors. The first is the 
Israeli shortage of foreign exchange; the second is the British arms embargo; this was 
imposed after Israel's invasion of Lebanon (1982); it was raised in 1995, following the initial 
successes of the peace process. Israeli export figures must be assessed bearing in mind 
the importance of its fruit and vegetable products to the UK market and British reluctance to 
buy Israeli arms. 
Trade figures with Arab countries are not considered to be helpful in view of the many 
changes in their leadership, policies and alliances. Though their opposition to Israel may 
have been constant, it has frequently taken second place to their hostility to each other. 
Further their attitudes to the Palestinians and to the solution to the troubles of Palestine 
have always been ambiguous and have undergone many changes over the period surveyed. 
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Furthermore, and in contrast to Israel, most Arab countries have huge revenues from the oil 
industry. Oil consuming countries will obviously be seeking to reduce their balance of 
payments deficits by exports. There is no embargo on exports of arms to most Arab 
countries; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have made massive arms purchases. Therefore 
British trade with the Arab countries, collectively or individually, cannot be taken to be an 
indicator of British policy on the Arab/Israeli dispute. 
The primary indicator is the statements of Government policy made by Ministers in the 
House of Commons. This has been compiled from a review of Hansard 1965-1993. 
Statements in the House of Lords were not reviewed, nor were statements at international 
gatherings. They can be taken to be compatible with statements in the Commons, all being 
drafted by the same source, the Foreign Office; furthermore any inconsistencies would 
rapidly have been drawn to public attention by the Parliamentary Opposition or by one of the 
parties in the conflict. 
The feasibility of using the number of references to Palestine/Israel as an indicator of the 
importance of the subject was investigated. Unfortunately the number of entries in Hansard 
reflects the interest in the subject, not of the Government, but of MPs. Review of Hansard 
makes it clear that the bulk of entries originate from a very small number of MPs - between 2 
and 4 in any one year - who have a commitment to the subject. Several MPs appear to be 
partisan, the Israeli/Jewish lobby being the more active and brazen. 
Hansard remains the primary source of Government foreign policy statements. Statements 
at other venues, if sufficiently important, are read into the record or otherwise included. 
However, short of a major study, inconsistencies in indexing make it difficult to be sure that 
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all relevant references have been located. The many references located, probably over 90% 
of the total, revealed consistency; it is therefore unlikely that any significant contradiction 
remained unrevealed. 
4.8.1 gives a representative selection of Hansard entries on the Arab/Israel conflict. 
4.3.2 Government Statements: Policy'47 
During the period 1956-1967 the balance of power in the Middle East was maintained. The 
USSR armed the Arab countries and the Western powers armed Israel. Cold War tension 
was high and the Middle East was held to be a possible flashpoint for world war. 
Prior to the Six Day War (June 1967), Israel's successful expulsion of Palestinians and 
occupation of their land had resulted in 2-2.5m'48 Palestinian refugees and the consequent 
denial by the Arab world of Israel's legitimacy. Assistance to the refugees was complicated 
by their close involvement with the fedayeen attacks on Israel. HMG contributed to the UN 
aid programme; it was not on good enough terms with Israel or with the Arab world to exert 
much political influence. 
I In November 1967, following the full scale war which, though short, had momentous 
consequences, resolutions were submitted to the UN Security Council from, amongst others, 
the USSR, USA and UK. Bearing in mind the Cold War tension, agreement on Resolution 
147 Official report of the Parliamentary Proceedings of the House of Commons 1966-1993 148 OVENDALE, ref 41, p 106 
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242 was a considerable achievement by the world's statesmen. It was proposed by the UK; 
this may have some bearing on its consistent advocacy thereafter by HM Government. 
The review of Hansard entries which fall under the general heading 'Policy' reveals 
remarkable, and commendable, fairness and consistency. 
4.3.3 Government Statements: Acts of Political Violence 
A review of entries in which HM Government comments on specific events is equally 
revealing. These entries fall essentially into two categories - steps in the peace process, 
and acts of political violence. The former can be ignored; there are few of them, all - not 
unexpectedly - in favour of the peace process. There is more potential for bias to be 
revealed in statements on acts of political violence, for example by condoning the violence of 
one side or the other on grounds of provocation. In fact there is once again unbroken 




6 Jul 1970 803-1w 
20 Jul 1972 839-70w 
2 Jul 1975 894-438w 
20 Jun 1988 135-416w 
12 Jul 1989 156-547w 
7 Feb 1990 166-687w 
14 Jul 1993 229-978 
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4.3.4 Government Statements: Arab Boycott and Israeli Settlement Policy 
Both the Arab Boycott'50 (of companies trading with Israel) and the Israeli policy of obtaining 
de facto control of Palestinian land by introducing Jewish settlers151 were consistently 
condemned by HMG. 
4.3.5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Briefs 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Briefs include a warning that they "(have) 
been prepared for general briefing purposes. (They are) not and should not be construed or 
quoted as an expression of Government policy". This warning can be accepted at face 
value. However the well-named Background Briefs furnish useful insight into the facts and 
thoughts that lie behind HMG policy; both Policy and the Briefs emanate from the same 
source, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Policy is the highly condensed product of much fuller documents and discussions. It has 
ministerial endorsement and constitutes a formal statement of HMG's position, and is 
therefore couched in diplomatic, ie, bland or coded terms. Background Briefs enjoy greater 
freedom of expression and therefore furnish supplementary information on FCO thinking. 
150 Boycoft: Hansard 
14 Jul 1966 731-238w 
26 Jun 1979 969-155w 
5 Feb 1986 91-272 
14 Jul 1993 228-978 
2 Feb 1994 236-872 
151 Seftlements: Hansard 
25 Jan 1985 71-512w 
5 Feb 1986 91-271w 
9 Mar 1994 239-244w 
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They can be examined for indications of HMG sympathies which could not be admitted at the 
policy level. 
There is no evidence of successful Palestinian pressure on HMG in the many 
condemnations of political violence recorded in Hansard. Nor does such evidence emerge 
from 14 Background Briefs (1982-94) on the Middle East. 152 Sentence by sentence their 
contents are simple statements of fact (4.8.2). The few value judgments that appear are 
measured, in the style not of a partisan advocate but of a good judge in his summing-up. 
"There is little doubt that, under international law, the settlements in the Occupied Territories 
are illegal, since they contravene sections of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (including Article 49 dealing with transfers of 
population). Israel disputes this, maintaining that the West Bank and Gaza are not 'enemy 
territory' as defined in the Convention, and that the legal status of the territories is unique 
because Jordan's sovereignty over the West Bank was never internationally recognised and 
Egypt never claimed sovereignty over Gaza. "153 
The information in the Background Briefs constitutes a serious indictment of the conduct of 
the Israeli government. Confirmation of much of the content is to be found in the Human 
Rights Watch World Report 1995154, (4.9). There is no evidence of bias or of falsification of 
fact in the Briefs - rather the opposite, certain paragraphs were reissued over a period of 15 
years without material change. 
152 The 14 FCO Background Briefs are listed in the bibliography 153 Background Brief: Israel Policy and Practices in the Occupied Territories. Jul 1990 154 Human Rights Watch World Report 1995. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995 
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4.3.6 Conclusion 
This research seeks to establish whether there was any relationship between Palestinian 
attacks on British aviation targets and HMG policy on Palestine/Israel. In both Hansard and 
the Background Briefs there were more condemnations of Israeli than of Palestinian 
violence. There are more credible reasons for this than successful Palestinian pressure on 
HMG. Firstly, Israel has a government 'recognised by HMG. By contrast, Palestinian 
activists had no diplomatic status and thus could not be formally recognised by HMG. Their 
terrorist operations further militated against such recognition; HMG would have faced the 
charge that it was associating with terrorists, and recognition would have contravened 
HMG's long-standing policy of denying terrorists gains from their actions. Thus while HMG 
could respond to each act of violence perpetrated by Israel, it would have sought to deny 
publicity to Palestinian terrorist actions. Secondly, the greater number of condemnations of 
Israeli violence arguably, reflected its preponderance. Whether Israel's habitually violent 
conduct constituted state-terrorism is a definitional irrelevance. It was a forty year catalogue 
of political violence and as such could be expected to attract continual condemnation by any 
neutral country. Had HMG sought to appease Palestinian terrorists by public criticism of 
Israel there was no shortage of opportunity. 
It is perhaps more surprising that the United Kingdom, whilst vehemently opposed to all 
terrorism, has nonetheless remained supportive of those claims of the Palestinians which 
are just. Zionists would undoubtedly claim that this proves United Kingdom bias against 
them. The Foreign Office would probably reply, were it at liberty to do so, that it is the facts 
that are against the Israelis. For the same reason the researcher concludes that there is no 
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evidence that Palestinian terrorism influenced the government of the United Kingdom to 
favour the Palestinians. 
HMG policy on Palestine/Israel (1966-94) was exemplary; it did not deviate from its 
advocacy of a settlement fair to each side, based on the principles of the 1967 UN 
Resolution 242; it condemned acts of political violence. Consistent HMG policy was 
maintained under three Conservative and two Socialist Prime Ministers. 
4.4 UK Trade with Israel 
4.4.1 Preamble 
Trade figures have relevance to terrorism if a relationship between the two can be 
established, or if it can be shown that the economic penalties of trade reduction may exert 
on a government pressures similar to those which terrorists seek to impose by violence. 
Thus trade restraint may be an objective of, or an alternative to, terrorism. 
This research does not attempt to 'prove' a relationship between attacks on aviation and 
trade with combatants; it sets out only to review the possibility of that relationship. 'Proof 
would have to penetrate the barriers of obfuscation erected by governments, by commercial 
interests, and by the combatants and their supporters. The most public exposures of such 
denied activities have related to the arms industry - the US Contra Affair and arms deal with 
Iran linked with US hostages in Beirut (1985-86)155, the GB cases: Matrix-Churchill (Scott 
Enquiry 1993-95) 156 and Greenhill (1995). These have revealed government breaches of 
155 WRIGHT, Robin. In the Name of God. London: Bloomsbury, 1991, p 143 156 The Times, 16 Feb 1996, p 30 
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arms embargoes for political and economic reasons, and commercial breaches for 
commercial reasons. Thus, on the supply side, there are at least two parties (government 
and commerce) who may have reason to obfuscate their actions, sometimes working in 
concert, sometimes in opposition. 
There are a number of firms who specialise in the analysis of trade statistics. The Managing 
Director'57 of one advised the researcher that it would be a grave error to take trade 
statistics at face value; he added that leakage of embargoes was the 'norm' and named the 
countries known to offer an easy conduit. He observed that both Israel and South Africa had 
been subjected to commercial boycott and embargo over much of the period studied (1968- 
94) and that they had made successful common cause. Israel evaded US restrictions even 
on detonators for nuclear bombs (kryptons) with the cooperation of an American Jew, Smyth, 
in the early 1980s. 158 Inability to control components of nuclear weapons suggests that 
governments are unlikely to be halfway competent in enforcing embargoes on harmless 
goods. 
Israel also obtained -highly classified information by espionage against its allies. The 
Israelis'jet fighter, the Kfir, was based on designs of the Mirage 111, stolen for them by Alfred 
Frauenknecht (1968-71)159. They stole from the intelligence agencies of their greatest ally, 
the USA, quantities of the most sensitive data (JJ Pollard, 1984-85)160. The limited efficacy 
of sanctions is now acknowledged: 
157 Unattributable Interview, 26 Sept 1995 
158 RAVIV, Dan and Yossi MELMAN. Every Spy a Prince. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, p 304 159 DOBSON & PAYNE. The Dictionary of Espionage. London: Harrap, 1984, pp 51-52 
160 RAVIV and MELMAN, ref 135, pp 301-323 
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UK TRADE VOLUMES (ISRAEL) 
SOURCE: Visible Trade Section, CSO, private communication to researcher, 1 Jan 1995 
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"The CIA has told Capitol Hill that American sanctions have failed to damage Iranian support 
for Islamic terrorism and will have no long term impact unless supported by the international 
community. ... the Tehran regime was expected to remain in power for the next three years in 
spite of economic difficulties caused by the sanctions. "161 
"In a direct challenge to America, China has agreed a multi-million pound venture to supply Iran 
with nuclear processing technology used for making nuclear weapons. "162 
The defence industry of Great Britain is important to the country as a provider of export 
revenues and of employment, though quantifying the latter gives some difficulty: 
"Defence expenditure ... 
indirectly supporting in excess of 100,000 jobe'. 163 
"Defence industry supports 560,000jobs". 164 
However the imposition of an arms embargo on Israel following its invasion of Lebanon 
(1982) was more a statement of political disgust than a self-injurious commercial restriction. 
FIGURE 7 (opposite) illustrates that British exports to Israel were close to a nadir in 1982 
and thereafter steadily increased. Thus, though the arms embargo may have been painful to 
a few individual small firms, it had little or no effect upon the country's economy as a whole. 
In fact it was probably contributory to the highly beneficial growth in arms exports to Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States. 
161 The Times. 13 Oct 1995, p 14 
162 Sunday Times. 15 Oct 1995, p 1.22 163 Statement of the Defence Estimates. Cmd 2270, July 1993, p 74 164 Statement of the Defence Estimates. Cmd2550,1994, p66 
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FIGURE 8 (opposite) plots Total Trade Volumes, that is Great Britain's World Export and 
Import Trade. The figures (implied Volume Index) are indexed to 1990 to correct for inflation 
and currency changes; they thus closely represent Trade Volumes. The slope of these 
figures may be compared with those in FIGURE 7- Trade Volumes (Israel). 
The figures in FIGURE 7 have also been corrected for inflation and currency changes, but 
not to the accuracy of the World Figures (FIGURE 8), hence their title: Estimated Volume 
Index. 
4.4.2 UK Imports and Exports (Israel) 
It can be seen that UK Imports from Israel loosely follow the trend of UK Imports (World). 
There is thus no prima facie case that attacks on aviation influenced the UK Import (Israel) 
figures. There is a possibility at second differential level that, but for attacks on aviation, the 
figures might have departed from the trend; this is indeed possible but given the multitude of 
factors involved and Great Britain's historically cool attitude to Israel, it is highly speculative; 
the research therefore notes it as a peripheral improbability. 
The UK Exports (Israel) figures exceed the World Trend in 1970-73 and 1992-94, and fall 
markedly below it (1973-81). This last invites the hypothesis that Middle Eastern attacks on 
aviation (1968-82) were a contributory cause of the fall of UK Exports (Israel) (1973-83). 
The validity of the hypothesis would be indicated by evidence of: 
1. A direct correlation between attacks and exports. 
2. GB Government restrictions on exports. 
3. Commercial policies to restrict exports. 
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4. Covert agreements between terrorists and either GB Government or British 
commerce. 
The first may be assessed by relating Middle Eastern attacks both on Western aviation, to 
UK Exports (Israel). No correlation is evident. During the first period of serious attacks, 
1970-1975, UK exports first rose then fell. The second period of serious attacks was 1984- 
89. They were more the actions of state sponsors, Shiites, and breakaway groups (Abu 
Nidal) than mainstream Palestinian terrorists. It can be seen that UK exports to Israel 
increased at a rate greater than the world trend during this period (1981-87), perhaps as a 
product of the very low level to which UK Exports (Israel) had fallen. 
The second indicator is UK government restrictions on exports. Such embargoes are! 
imposed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and are enforced by HM Customs & 
Excise. Embargoes may be on all goods other than humanitarian supplies - as in force in 
October 1995 on Serbia, Montenegro and Iraq; more often they relate only to military and 
strategic goods, or certain categories thereof. Other trade restrictions are unusual; 
Customs & Excise have no record of restrictions on trade with Israel 1970-81165. This is in 
conformity with long standing HMG policy not to respond to coercion by making concessions. 
There is the theoretical possibility of secret deals in conflict with public policy. Even if HMG 
wished to pursue this option there are grave difficulties in applying it to trade, which is a wide 
ranging and open activity, the restriction of which would affect commercial interests who 
would undoubtedly express their grievances publicly. There have been no allegations of 
HMG restrictions either from Palestinian activists or from the vociferous Israelis. The 
165 Interviews, Customs and Excise, November 1995 
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F research concludes that 
HIVIG restriction of UK exports to Israel as a result of terrorist 
activity is unlikely to have occurred (1970-1981). 
The third indicator is commercial restriction of trade as an outcome of terrorist pressure. 
FIGURE 7 shows a very significant fall in UK Exports (Israel) between 1973 and 1981. A 
causal connection with attacks on aviation is unlikely. No British commercial organisation 
was as a publicly and symbolically linked with Israel as British Airways. The airline has 
withdrawn services from destinations when it has deemed that the threat was unacceptable 
(Beirut 1970s and 1980s, Teheran 1979). It has also refused to carry Salman Rushdie for 
the same reason. Thus the airline will in certain circumstances, curtail activity in response to 
terrorist or other threats. Whether the airline received serious specific threats from 
Palestinian terrorists is not known but they certainly were a serious general threat. British 
Airways at no time reacted to the terrorist threat by withdrawing its regular service to Tel 
Aviv. Its response was to apply special security measures to its Tel Aviv flights. At no time 
did the Palestinians achieve the capability of sustained and serious attack on British 
commerce, nor is there evidence that they attempted it. 
The fourth indicator of the effects of attacks on aviation is the existence of covert 
agreements between terrorists and government or commerce. In the absence of hard 
evidence, assessment of the probability of covert agreements must be based on the strength 
of allegations and the known modus operandi of those involved. No serious allegations 
have been published against the British government whose modus operandi eschews deals 
with terrorists. There is neither allegation nor evidence of British agreements with terrorists. 
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4.4.3 Arab Commercial Pressures: The Boycott and OPEC 
The Arab Boycott was formally imposed on 2 Dec 1945.166 It was never likely to be decisive. 
The Arab nations were racked with internecine tensions and despite various alliances (Arab 
League, United Arab Republic) were unable to sustain united action; clearly, for the boycott 
to have had impact it should have been long-sustained to exert pressure on the target 
nation and on unwilling participants. Those opposing the boycott - the target nation, and 
those resenting interference in free trade - would have been constant in their opposition. 
Finally and decidingly, even if the boycott had been effectively imposed, the desired 
catastrophe would not have befallen Israel during the Cold War (1945-85), because the 
NATO powers would have intervened with economic aid. 
The League of Arab States (the Arab League) was established with British encouragement in 
October 1944. The founding members were Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen and therefore comprised all states of the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Arabia under British and French influence. One of the Arab League's first actions was to 
declare a boycott on "Jewish products and manufactured goods" (2 Dec 1945). 
The provenance of the boycott went back to earlier decades, when organised Jewish 
purchasing power was being deployed in Palestine to transfer land from Arab to Zionist 
control. In 1922 the First Arab Women's Congress asked "every Arab to buy nothing from 
the Jews but land, and to sell them everything but land". 167 This elegantly expressed piety 
was to no avail. 
166 PRIME &NELSON, ref 54, p 10 167 BAHTI, JH. The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel. In PRITTIE and NELSON. Ibid, p9 
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"The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 ... had (concentrated landholdings) into the hands of a 
few 
tribal leaders and family heads. These landowners were willing to satisfy Zionist demands to 
purchase, and over the years were to do So". 168 
Similarly, in 1936 the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem proclaimed a boycott of all Jewish shops and 
tradesmen. Thus the Arab Boycott (1945) was a repetition of a well-tried tactic. 
The countries of the Arab League were hamstrung by their dependence on the West for their 
economic and technological development. The Gulf States relied heavily on Britain for their 
defence. Others (Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran) were linked with Britain in military alliance 
through the (anti-Soviet) Baghdad Pact (1955), renamed CENTO (1959-1979). 
It was not until the Yom Kippur War (1973) prompted the Arab States to deploy their oil 
weapon that they appreciated the true strength of their position. The Americans came to the 
aid of the Israelis with a massive airlift. 
"In order both to punish the United States for the support given to Israel after she had been 
attacked, and in order to pressure the United States to compel Israel to sign a cease-fire 
agreement on terms favourable to the Arabs ... Saudi Arabia... -announced 
immediate cuts in oil 
production and threatened to stop supplying the United States altogethee,. 169 
Other oil producing countries took similar action. Oil prices rose rapidly as a result of the 
combined effects of OPEC prices rises and of market over-reaction. Oil prices went from US 
$2.59 a barrel (Jan 1973) to US $11.65 (Dec 1973). In 1974 the oil producers took steps to 
168 PRYCE-JONES, ref 80, p 189 169 PRIME and NELSON, ref 54, p 19 
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extend their ownership and control over the oil companies. Thus by a combination of price 
rises, production limitation, embargoes on unfavoured nations, and a good grip on the oil 
companies, the OPEC countries - the majority of which were anti-Israeli Arab states - found 
themselves in a position of unforeseen strength, and extreme wealth. Whilst the Americans 
enacted anti-boycott legislation (22 June 1977), HMG opposed the boycott but refused to be 
drawn into action against it To a degree HMG acquiesced by authenticating signatures on 
export documents to conform with boycott regulations. Predictably this aggrieved supporters 
of Israel. The Jewish MPs Malcolm Rifkind and Greville Janner raised the issue in the 
Commons; the response of the FCO Minister, Frank Judd, defined the British position: 
'... Our aim as a Government is and must be to expand British exports throughout the world. 
Ile boycott is an obstacle, a highly objectionable obstacle, but one which we must help 
companies to surmount. ... until (the) hoped-for goal (a just and lasting peace) is achieved, the 
Government's efforts must be directed to ensuring that British firms can conduct their trade 
with the minimum of hindrance 170 
The reference to 8a just and lasting peace' was a reminder that Israel remained in breach of 
UN 242, the resolution defining the conditions for aa just and lasting peace". Thus Britain 
espoused neither side in the conflict, but acted in the best interests of British commerce. 
1973-81, the period of falling UK Exports to Israel, was also a period of high profile terrorist 
attacks on aviation, including two Middle Eastern hijacks of British aircraft (1974). However 
UK Exports to Israel rose during the other period of repeated serious attacks on aviation 
(1982-88). There is thus no prima facfe case of any relationship between terrorism and 
170 HANSARD. 4 Jul 1977 
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exports. Nor is there any apparent relationship between politics and exports. Israel's 
invasion of the Lebanon in 1982 destroyed its facade of a civilised innocent surrounded by 
barbarians. Exposure of Israeli conduct by the world's media began in the Lebanon. As 
Israel's political standing fell, UK Exports to Israel rose. The Arab Boycott failed to capitalise 
on increasing Western impatience with Israel. 
Thus the Arab Boycott had little effect pre 1973. The fall in UK Exports to Israel (1973-81) 
related primarily to use of the oil weapon and to the new-found wealth of the Arab countries 
The rapid climb of UK Exports (Israel) after 1981 was a recovery from a nadir. It was aided 
by successful Jewish opposition to the boycott, and by the collapse of Arab unity following 
the Khomeini revolution [19791. 
4.5 The Effects on UK Public Opinion 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The logic which led the Palestinians to turn from conventional war to international terrorism 
has already been identified (2.3). The target of their first three attacks on aviation was their 
enemy, Israel (23 Jul 1968,26 Dec 1968,18 Feb 1969). Finding that they had discovered a 
most effective weapon they progressively widened their targeting to include any country 
Which had incurred their displeasure. Predictably the first was the USA. On 29 Aug 1969 
Leila Khaled hijacked a TWA B-707, overflew Tel Aviv and landed in Damascus. Leila 
Khaled stated that TWA was targeted because 'The American government is Israel's 
staunchest supporter. 171 
171 KHALED, ref 88, p 142 
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By her account - and allowing for the fact that her book was intended as publicity for the 
Palestinian cause - the hijack was simply a propaganda spectacular. As such it was a great 
success; no one was hurt; the aircraft was blown up on the ground; the Palestinians 
obtained worldwide publicity. Initially the PR object of attacks was to capture Western 
attention. Then, as so often in Palestinian affairs, the single strategi gave way to the 
conflicting aims of rival groups. On 21 February 1970 a Swissair Coronado was brought 
down by a bomb, killing all 47 on board; an Austrian Caravelle, similarly attacked, escaped 
destruction. These attacks were attributed to Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC, which had broken 
from the PFLP. They were the first of many attacks, which were not constructive but 
vengeful. 
Soon Arafat was seeking to shed his terrorist image - at least in Western eyes. In 1974 he 
made his agun and olive branch* speech to the UN General Assembly in New York. In the 
same year he announced to the New York Times that the PLO had arrested the five 
terrorists who had killed 35 in the attack at Rome Airport-172 
He publicly renounced terrorism (Cairo 1985). However it was not until an unequivocal 
statement - which had to be squeezed out of him at a Press conference, after he had failed 
to give it to the UN General Assembly in Geneva (1988) - that his renunciation was accepted 
by the US and British Governments'73. Meanwhile other Palestinian groups, notably Abu 
Nidal and PFLP-GC, with the active involvement of state sponsors, continued to machine 
gun airports and bomb aeroplanes. 
172 LIVINGSTONE. Neil and David HALEVY. inside the PLO. London: Hale, 1990, p 101 173 GOWERS, Anthony and Tony WALKER. Behind the Myth. London: WH Allen, 1990, pp 302- 303 
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Thus at no time (1968-95) was there a single, Palestinian, public relations policy. At no time 
did the 'official' PLO policy govern Palestinian attacks on aviation and there were different 
policies at different times. Therefore to assess the effects of attacks on UK public opinion is 
not to assess the effects of Palestinian public relations policy because the attacks and the 
policy were not related. 
4.5.2 Other Influences on Public Opinion: The Jewish Network 
Attacks on aviation are only one of many groups of events in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Public 
opinion is influenced by all of these and also by everything else which relates to Arabs or 
Israelis. Overlaying all influences are the activities of interested parties intended to obtain 
favourable coverage of their side. Jews have been integrated into the life of this country 
over the centuries. Many have reached commercial, political and professional positions of 
standing and influence. Their natural sympathies are with their fellow Jews in Israel, to 
Whom they are bound by the collective horror of the Holocaust. 
'Deep down I have always had the feeling that something may be stirred up again; that 
somebody may start screaming and shouting, and that we may have to take up our bundle and 
run .... II that securijy in this count1y is centred around Israel. If Israel goes, it will make it a 
lot worse for us". (Sir John Cohen of Tesco)'74 - Researcher's emphasis 
At the level of logic and given the extreme improbability of Sir John having to take up his 
bundle and run, this is a extraordinary statement. It is also a startling revelation of the power 
of atavism which constrains so many Jews to support Israel. British Jews have wealth and a 
174 ARIS, Stephen. The Jews in Business. In PRIME and NELSON, ref 54, p 18 
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network throughout all walks of life in Great Britain. Most important of all, they have a 
presence at, or access to, points of decision. Jewish MPs have been unashamed in their 
advocacy of Israel in the House of Commons; the Board of Deputies has access to the Prime 
Minister. The Institute of Jewish Affairs (IJA) is active in promoting the cause of Israel and 
compiles scholarly papers. One, sent privately by the Institute to the researcher, was a high 
quality product of careful research. 175 
By contrast the Arab and Palestinian viewpoint is represented, not by an extensive network, 
but by the modest Arab-British Centre, an umbrella for five small Arab friendship bodies. 
One, the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), seeks to 
advance the Arab point of view. CAABU was founded in 1967. It does not appear to have a 
capability which approaches that of the IJA. The Palestinian nation also maintains an office 
in London, the Palestinian National Delegation. It is not called the PLO office, which spares 
HMG the embarrassment of accommodating an organization once synonymous with 
terrorism. It is clear that the office has a tiny budget, although it is effectively the Palestinian 
Embassy. 
Happily, the election system in Great Britain - unlike that of the United States of America - 
does not lend itself to easy manipulation by vested interests. MPs' election expenses are 
limited to some E7,000.176 In America, flawed expenses controls allow organized groups of 
single interest voters to make or break a candidate, and achieve control of the vital 
Committees which determine foreign policy, defence export policy, foreign aid, et al. For 
example Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) received from pro-Israel PACs (Political Action 
175 LERMAN, Anthony. Untitled Paper on European Fýess Coverage of the Middle East. IJA, 1995 176 COL Parliamentary Elections. London: HMSO, 1991 
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Committees) $85,000 for 1991 election expenses, and a career total of $263,423.177 One 
month before the 1984 elections these PACs had contributed $1.2m "thus far" to 29 
candidates and $851,873 to senators not facing re-election in 1984.178 In 1991 Pro-Israel 
PACs outspent Pro-Arab PACs by 369: 1.179 
"According to figures supplied by the National Association' of Arab Americans, of 2m 
Americans of Arab ancestry fewer than 100,000 belong to an Arab-American organisation, 
while of 5.9m. Jewish Americans, 2m, are active. Many Arab-Amencans claim that therein lies 
the problem. Where Jewish groups, they say, lobby with cohesion, Arab-American groups 
continue to be splintered on many issues`ý. 180 
Whilst British Jews have to be more subtle than their American equivalent, they still 
constitute a formidable network. They are capable of organising crowds to lobby MPs in the 
House of Commons and of the sophisticated targeting of opinion-leaders. 181 Equally they 
have resources and commitment to detail. When the International Federation of Airline 
Pilots decided to hold its Annual Conference in Jerusalem (1988), it - an apolitical 
international organisation - thereby excluded and gave grave offence to all Arab 
Pilot 
Associations. It was a decision of blinding stupidity, even by the standards of international 
organisations, and BALPA sought to have it rescinded. News of this reached the media and 
the Chairman of BALPA received a series of calls accusing him of anti-Semitism. (The calls 
came from apparently ordinary members of the Jewish community, one of whom was running 
177 LORENZ, Andrea. Pro-Israel PAC Outspending Arab-American PACs 369% In Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs. Jun 92, pp 22-25 
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179 
84, pp 4-6 
LORENZ, ref 154 
180 MILSTEIN, Mark H. AIPAC Considered One of Top US Lobbies. In Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs. May/June 91, p 15 
181 Jerusalem Post Weekly. 29 Jan 74. Lefter from official of London Israeli Embassy. In Christopher 
MAYHEW and Michael ADAMS. Publish It Not. London: Longman, 1989, p 45 
165 
a shop and had to break off the call, asking the Chairman to hold on, whenever a customer 
came in. ) Only a motivated and extensive organisation can operate at that level of detail. 
Similarly the Israelis have no hesitation in interfering with ministerial appointments. 
Christopher MayheWs sympathies for the Arabs cost him the post of Deputy Foreign Minister 
as a result of Israeli complaints to the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson (1974). 182 More 
recently (1994) the Israelis lobbied for the appointment of Malcolm Rifkind, a Jew, as 
Secretary of State for Defence, and opposed Ministerial appointment for Jonathan Aitken, 
known for his contacts with the Arab world. The Arabs' lack of commitment, and of 
understanding of the British public and media has been no match for the Jews' formidable 
skills. It certainly failed to redress the hostility engendered by Arab terrorism against 
Western targets. Only since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982) and the intifada (1987- 
1995) has Israeli conduct been widely publicised. This has been brought about not so 
much by Arab or Palestinian publicists but by the courageous work of journalists, amongst 
whom Robert Fisk, David Yallop and Patrick Seale are perhaps the most notable. They 
have faced the inevitable charge of anti-Semitism' 83. 
It is ironic that the Palestinians who felt so deeply that their just cause was 
misunderstood by the WesteM world mounted no credible and sustained public 
relations campaign to counter the proficient Jewish activities and to dissociate 
themselves from terrorism. They desperately needed a weighty and professional 
public relations campaign in Great Britain . There was no campaign. They showed 
neither strategic nor tactical judgement In their pursuit of favourable world opinion. 
Their increasingly favourable coverage in the British media has been the product of 
Israeli excesses, brave intifada activists, and the finest traditions of British journalism, 
182 MAYHEW and ADAMS, ref 158, p 25 
183 FISK, ref 75, p 414 
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and latterly of the peace process. The propaganda war between Arab and Jew has 
been no contest. 
4.5.3 The Importance of Public Opinion 
The importance of public opinion lies in its effects. In Great Britain decisions relating to 
terrorist objectives are made not by the public but by politicians and civil servants within the 
democratic decision-making process. However when public opinion is strong, (Falklands 
1982, Kuwait 1990, Serbia 1991-95), HMG is both'influenced and constrained. Though 
public opinion is only one of many factors, it has electoral implications which are ignored at 
peril. Therefore British public opinion has the potential to influence HMG policy on an 
overseas conflict, although its ephemeralities are not likely to deflect the mandarins of the 
Foreign Office from their pursuit of Great Britain's global interests. 
Public opinion would be important to a terrorist group seeking to inflict commercial damage 
by influencing consumer spending, as in Egyptian fundamentalist attacks on tourists to 
discourage tourism. Palestinian terrorists sought to disrupt Israel citrus exports by injecting 
poison into fruit in a number of European countries (1978). The campaign did not last long. 
Had it been more "successful" in terms of revenue lost to Israel the danger to children would 
have undoubtedly increased European hostility to the Palestinians. 
To groups with the general aims of seeking to generate public pressure on the government, 
the tracking and interpreting of public opinion is problematic. Often it is surmised from the 
media rather than assessed scientifically. Professional polling agencies are not likely to 
accept commissions from terrorist groups. Small movements of opinion may not influence 
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decision-makers, but large ones probably would. However, to the terrorists themselves any 
favourable movement will constitute encouragement. 
Marxists see the masses as victims of false consciousness. Conveniently, this enables them 
to explain why their actions are not appreciated outside their own circles. They'would 
therefore probably not regard public opinion polls as an important measure of their progress. 
However terrorist activities designed "to blow the wax out of the ears of the deaf Western 
liberals ... (and) ... to inspire the masses and trigger off revolutionary upheaval ... 
" (2.4.3-2) 
are directed at capturing the attention of a public, neither participant in the conflict, nor 
oppressed and ready to be ignited into revolutionary fire. Logically, such terrorists should 
track public opinion in order to assess the success of their actions. Had Palestinian 
terrorists made use of such simple management skills they would have found that their 
methods were counterproductive to their objectives. 
4.5.4 The Role of the Media 
Much more important than public opinion is media opinion. The two are inter-related and 
I 
often confused. Media comment can constitute a significant pressure on democratically 
elected politicians and their civil servants. It is also the source of information for, and thus 
the formative influence on public opinion. The two tend to keep in step; if the media offends 
its customers it may lose them. 
The Observer opposed and denounced the 1956 Suez Expedition. In response it was 
accused of being unpatriotic at a time of national need. Contrary to received wisdom, its 
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circulation did not fall heavily. 184 What did happen was that it attracted a 'bleeding heart' 
image, which depressed its circulation in the longer term. The point is more clearly illustrated 
(albeit in a different context): 
'( An editor) acknowledges the restraint: "No-go people are created by cynical decision; is it 
worth ruining the reputation of someone so loved by the public? If we ran the story, the people 
would turn against the papee'. "" 
It is probable that television channels are under similar pressure. In assessing the impacts 
of television and of newspaper coverage, three significant differences between the two 
media must be kept in mind. Firstly, newspapers are better adapted to give lengthy 
coverage and careful analysis. 
"However, one must also consider that the time constraints on TV newscasts are far more 
severe than the ý space restrictions on newspapers. A former president of CBS News had the 
transcript of one of his network's evening broadcasts (30 minutes minus seven or eight minutes 
reserved for commercials) typeset to compare its volume to that of a leading newspaper. He 




Newspaper circulation (ABC Figures) 
Date Observer Sunday Times 
Jan-Jun 1955 564307 606346 
Jul-Dec 1955 573632 603042 
Jan-Jun 1956 601402 618540 
Jul-Dec 1956 633064 650274 
Jan-Jun 1957 641417 740133 
Jul-Dec 1957 633537 776175 
Jan-Jun 1958 638074 795192 
Jul-Dec 1958 647103 832657 
Jan-Jun 1995 476639 1252982 
Sunday Times Colour Magazine. 29 Oct 1995,, p26 
RAIVINEY, Austin. Channels of Power. In Brigitte L NACOS. Terrorism and the Media. New York: 
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Secondly, television coverage of violence and its aftermath can achieve more immediate and 
graphic impact than newsprint. Thirdly, and without necessarily accepting Susan Sontag's 
view that the only reality is that captured on camera, television coverage of a terrorist event 
conveys its reality across barriers of language and literacy to a worldwide audience to which 
no newspaper has access; this coverage reinforces the support of those who applaud the 
event and conveys a threatening message to those who oppose it. 
The argument which applies to terrorist actions applies also to the coverage of terrorists and 
their statements. Their importance is affirmed, in contradiction to government attempts to 
minimise their significance. Further, the very act of conveying terrorist political agenda (or 
apologia) gives it legitimacy. 
"There mere fact that the terrorist is interviewed by respected media representatives and treated 
cas someone whose contribution to public debate is worthy of attention'187 elevates the person 
virtually to the level of a legitimate politician". ' 88 
Nacos suggests that this legitimacy is furthered if the terrorist appears on the same 
programme or panel as a legitimate politician or diplomat. 189 To legitimise the terrorist is not 
to legitimise his murders, but does very dangerously distract from them. 
The adversarial system of advocacy in British courts encourages advocates to influence the 
course of justice by distracting attention from the facts of the deeds to the personalities of 
defendants and witnesses. This may not wash in a Diplock court before a hardened and 
cynical judge. Before a jury, adherence to this controversial but legal technique is proof that 
187 O'SULLIVAN. Media Publicity Causes Terrorism. In Brigitte L. NACOS, ibid, p 66 188 NACOS, Brigitte L. lbid 
189 NACOS, Brigitte L. lbid 
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it works. During the 0J Simpson trial (Los Angeles 1995) surveys showed that the 
personality of the defendant -a black, and an accomplished, good-looking, athlete - was an 
influence and a distraction to the public perspective of his innocence or guilt. It is not to 
well-informed judges, but to the public and to their own supporters that terrorists seek to 
send their message. Thus for as long as terrorists employ violence, there is a danger that 
their media appearance may legitimise that violence. 
"Due to intensive media coverage, the FLQ was depicted as an equal partner in a political 
dialogue between symmetrically powerful adversaries. This image of equality was further 
accentuated by the privatisation of Premier Bourassa which was created by widespread publicity 
of Mr Laporte's 'My Dear Robert' letters, coupled with the elevation of Robert Lemieux into an 
official emissary for the negotiating FLQ. This leveling effect contributed to the concerted and 
increasingly coordinated pressure on the Quebec leader to negotiate a release of the FLQ 
prisoners. Despite Prime Mnister Trudeau's attempt to counter the image of the FLQ as 
legitimate political actors by emphasising their violent tactics and labeling them 'bandits', media 
coverage continued to depict the terrorists as legitimate partners in a continuing dialogue with 
the Quebec Govemment". 190 
During the next phase of their modus operandi, when they eschew violence and seek a 
political agreement, their media appearance is an important component in leading their 
followers from violence to peace. Unavoidably it helps, them to make the transition from 
terrorist murderer to (apparently) peaceful politician. 
190 WILKINSON, Paul and Alisdair M. STEWART. Contemporary Research on Tefforism.. Aberdeen: The University Press, 1987, p 441 
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The many studies of terrorist use of propaganda deal convincingly with its effectiveness in 
encouraging terrorist activists and supporters. 191 Lustick names this internally directed 
activity "solipsistic", (in a dubious application of SolipSiSM). 192 The studies also examine, but 
with less success, the relationships between terrorist activity and public opinion, and 
between government action and public opinion (often in times of support or approval of 
government action). There is a key question which remains unanswered - have terrorists 
succeeded in influencing public opinion and thereby obtained government decisions 
advantageous to the terrorists? 
In hostage situations, governments cannot ignore public concern for the hostages. Nacos 
discusses the cases of Presidents Carter (US Embassy, Teheran 1979), Reagan (TWA 
hijack Beirut 1985) and Bush (Beirut hostages 1989). In each case it was widely assumed 
that the President's reelection prospects were at stake. 
"From his vantage point in the White House, Gary Sick observed, 'The media contribute to the 
process of transforming an international issue into a domestic political crisis for the president. 
There is perhaps no other type of situation that subjects the president to such intense public 
scrutiny, and the president is aware that his image as a decisive and effective leader is constantly 
at risk' 11.193 
It is predictable, and proper, that politicians of the United States should take account of 
public opinion. Although they may overrule it on occasion, the Procrustean option exercised 
91 WRIGHT, Joanne. Tefforist Propaganda. New York: St. Martins, 1990.; NACOS, Brigitte L., ref 163; 
PALETZ and SCHMID, ref 22; HEWITT, Christopher. Consequences of Political Violence. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1993; WILKINSON, Paul and AM STEWART, ref 167 192 LUSTICK, Ian. Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences. In, Martha CRENSHAW. 
193 
Tefforism in Context. Pensylvannia: Pensylvannia State UP, 1995. 
SICK. Taking Vows. in Brigitte L. NACOS, ref 163, p 141 
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by terrorists and their sponsors is a luxury not available to liberal democracies. Thus it is 
clear that both public opinion and the anguish of relatives constituted powerful pressures on 
the Presidents. This is not the same as demonstrating that public opinion was the 
determinant of Presidential decisions. Any decision regarding terrorists or hostages is open 
to criticism: a deal with terrorists legitimises them and gives them a "success"; failure of 
negotiations implies government ineptitude and/ or callousness. The best course for a 
government is pursue a thoughtful policy and to take all possible steps to convince the 
public of its competence. In most, if not all cases the terrorists are seeking to damage or 
pressure the credibility of the government, therefore there is a need for the government to 
include a damage limitation PR operation in its counter terrorism strategy (8.11). 
In the general case, media opinion lies between public opinion and the decision makers. 
Even when public demonstrations seek to exert pressure directly on decision makers, the 
media's coverage and assessment of their significance remains important. Thus the media 
is both the communication channel linking the decision makers and the public, and also a 
major formative influence on both. 
4.5.5 Palestinian Media Failure 
The primary reason for the conduct of Middle Eastern terrorist operations in Great Britain 
was its convenience as a battlefield. Most of these attacks were directed against the 
Israelis, or against rival Middle East factions or states. 
Palestinian terrorists already had overwhelming grass-roots support amongst the Arab 
masses. They needed international political support for a State of Palestine. There is no 
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evidence that UK Public Opinion was the subject of careful thought, let alone strategic 
planning, by the Palestinians. Their earliest terrorist actions seem to have been the product 
of two attitudes to the Western world, both counterproductive. The first was that violence 
was the best means of bringing Western attention to their cause; the second was that 
anyone not espousing their cause was an enemy. 
The PFLP operations 1968-70 succeeded in attracting attention to Palestine. This attention 
could have been put to positive use whilst their attacks were directed at their "legitimate" 
target Israel, and whilst loss of life was minimised. The Palestinians failed to capitalise on 
this window of opportunity because their objective - elimination of the State of Israel, was 
unrealistic and because their activities were not coordinated with those of a parallel, non- 
terrorist, negotiating organisation. The window began to shut in 1970 when their actions 
became atrocities (Sab/Air of Swissair Coronado). The Munich Olympics massacre (Sept 
1972) removed any semblance of reasonable "legitimacy". Had an opinion poll been 
conducted it would probably have associated the Palestinians first and foremost with 
terrorism, a direct result of their actions being televised worldwide. They had chosen the 
Olympics to bring the Palestinian issue to the attention of the world. Instead they implanted 
an image of barbarism. This is easily and quickly done, whereas the explanation of the 
injustices of a political situation is a laborious process. It is best pursued by attracting 
sympathy. Instead the Palestinians attracted odium. 
Their dictum "if you are not a friend you are an enemy" led them, unnecessarily, self- 
defeatingly, into war with the Western world. The Israelis were quick to capitalise on this 
gross strategic error; they represented the Arab-Israeli conflict not as a simple ethnic and 
territorial mutual violence, but as a war between terrorism and democracy or between 
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barbarians and civilization. Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the Likud Party and Prime 
Minister' of Israel (1996) made a masterly choice of title for a book which he edited : 
"Terrorism: How the West Can Win". In his Preface (p. A) he writes: 
"The West, the principal target of international terrorism, must organize itself for battle. It must, 
and it can, adopt a variety of means - political, economic, and military - with which to fight 
back. But underlying them all must be the moral understanding that terrorism, under whatever 
guise or pretext, is an inexcusable evil, that it obliterates the political and moral distinctions 
which are the foundations of humane and free life under the rule of law; that the West, in short, 
must resist terrorism and ultimately defeat it. Hence the title of this book and its purpose". 
In the Index no reference will be found to the Haganah, to the Irgun Zwei Leumi, or to the 
Stern Gang, to Lord Moyne, to Count Bernadotte or to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. 
Netanyahu would apparently have the world accept that terrorism is defined as action 
against Israel. 
Objective scholars are unlikely to be impressed. Crenshaw dismissed Netanyahu's latest 
(1996) effort in this field with the first sentence of her review: 194 
"This book is not a product of academic research or scholarship but of what Avishai Margalist, 
in his review ('The Terror Master', 7he New York Review of Books, 5 Oct, 1995, pp 17-22) 
defines as Hashara, a Hebrew term meaning literally 'explanation' but implying a mixture of 
propaganda, preaching, indoctrination, apology, rhetoric, and even self-righteousness. " 
194 CRENSHAW, Martha, Review of NETANYAHU, Benjamin, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can 
Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism. T& PV, 1996,8 (1), p 177 
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Not all academics are as coolly objective as Crenshaw. Professor Amos Perlmutter of the 
American University, Washington DC describes the West Bankers as being: "liberated by 
the Israeli Defence Force from Jordanian rule in 1967" (in the Six Day War). 195 Professor 
Yonah Alexander's account of the birth of the State of Israel is so partisan that it also invites 
the description Hashara. 196 Academic prejudice does scholarship a disservice. It raises 
doubts on the impartiality, and thus the value, of the academic community; this is especially 
damaging to those members of it who are Jewish. If undetected it constitutes a insidious 
influence on public opinion. 
It is certain that both Israelis and Palestinians have been subject to severe censure by the 
media on many occasions. Whether the total account constitutes a greater indictment of one 
side than of the other remains undetermined. On the matter of the protagonists' active 
management of the media and of public opinion there can be little doubt that the Israelis 
have been hyperenergetic and adept; and that the Palestinians' efforts have been neither 
united nor sustained nor competent. 
I 
4.5.6 The Effect of Atrocity 
The public has a certain fascination with violence and atrocity. It is a staple ingredient of 
books, and video games. In all of these it remains in the imagination, a vicarious thrill safely 
confined to fiction. Similarly, historical accounts are safely confined to the past. The normal 
person will not feel pleasure when contemporaries are alive at the beginning of the day, and 
dead and bloody at the end of it. This is not safely vicarious. It is an unwelcome reminder of 
195 PERLMUTTER, Amos. The Crisis of the PLO. Encounter 70 (3) 
196 ALEXANDER, Yonah. From Terrorism to War: The Anatomy of the Birth of Israel. In Yonah 
ALEXANDER, ed. Intemational Terrorism. New York: AMS, 1976, pp 211-257 
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the nightmare of death or injury to loved ones. Therefore perpetrators of violence, other 
than in legitimate defence, are likely to attract odium; if the perpetrators are actively seeking 
to inflict violence on the audience, they may be assured of the hostility of that audience. 
These gross errors were inherent in the terrorist strategy pursued by certain Palestinian 
revolutionary and militant Islamic factions. Such a strategy may be viable when the 
audience is more closely involved in the conflict (as in classical terrorising) or if the coercion 
is both powerful and sustained (as in the state violence of Iran and Iraq and the current 
[1995-7] activities of Islamic extremists in Algeria). A distant and disinterested audience, if 
forced into action, will not side with its attackers. 
Palestinians who sought to catch the attention of the outside world showed no awareness of 
their effect on their audience. The first hijack of the El Al B-707 (23 Jul 1968) and the hijack 
of the TWA B-727 (21 Dec 1969), and the Dawsons Field extravaganza (Sept 1970) were , 
relatively bloodless. There was a degree of logic in the targeting. The audacity and success 
of the actions had to be admired. Leila Khaled was a compelling figure. The Palestinians 
had the foundations of a huge public relations and propaganda success. Not only did they 
badly fail to build on it, but they also proceeded, self-satisfied and self-deluding, to two 
decades of public relations disasters. The disgust that greeted the sabotages of the Swissair 
Coronado and Austrian Caravelle (21 Feb 1970) should have warned the Palestinians and 
shaped their future policy. Their fragile hold on coherence slipped after Dawsons Field. 
Black September chose to attack Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics to utilize the 
worldwide television coverage and "to prove the existence of the Palestinian people". 197 
197 Abu Iyad, In BECKER, ref 82, p 107 
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What the world saw was a bungled shoot-out and a helicopter fireball, during which nine 
Israeli athletes, a German policeman and five terrorists died. 
From this point Palestinian targeting lost all semblance of logic and conveyed an impression 
of mindless atrocity (massacres at Lod, Vienna and Zurich, murder of Klinghofer, Achille 
Lauro 1985). All this was set to a background of internecine murder within terrorist groups, 
warfare with fellow Muslims, and atrocities against civilians. Palestinians who sought to 
advance their cause by more peaceful means were branded traitors, vilified, and sometimes 
murdered (Said Hammami, London 1978 killed by Abu Nidal's agents. ). 198 The Palestinian 
image to the world was that of barbarians, meting out mindless violence, which was 
true; it was not that of a dispossessed people, shamefully wronged, which was equally 
true. 
Meanwhile their enemies, the Israelis, continued with their own self-interested agenda of 
murder. The essential difference was that they managed to cloak it in an appearance of 
some legitimacy. The targeting was thoughtful (assassinations of Black September leaders, 
Beirut 1973, of Abu Jihad, Tunis 1988, and of various key scientists) and the operational 
skills were often brilliant (Entebbe, 1976). All the while Israeli anti-war campaigners (Amos 
Oz, Jacobo Timerman) were advocating peace and were not being assassinated; . Israeli 
soldiers were publicly condemning the excesses which they observed (Colonel Geva and 
others 1982 on). The loss of Israeli credibility was self-inflicted by their own conduct (Beirut 
1982, intifada 1988 on) not by the Palestinians. 
198 Abu Nidal's commitment to violence has impeded the Palestinian cause to the extent that it has been 
surmised that he is controlled by Mossad. SEALE, Patrick. Abu Nidal. New York: Randorn House, 1992 
178 
Until 1988 the Palestinians remained locked into violence by the frustrations and fury 
of the refugees, by their extremists, by their inability to devise and adhere to a more 
constructive strategy. Had they eschewed arbitrary violence after Dawsons Field and 
embarked upon a thoughtful course of action, they might have achieved by public 
relations and by diplomacy that which they could not and did not achieve with 
terrorism. They fought with their hearts but not with their heads. The Israelis fought 
with both. The Israelis won. 
4.6 Opinion Polls 
4.6.1 Palestinian Strategy 
It is fortunate that terrorists do not put as much thought into the construction of their strategy 
as scholars give to its deconstruction. Terrorist lifestyle is not conducive to open discussion, 
nor does it accommodate the dialectic through which thoughtful strategy can be evolved. 
Dissent is the mechanism of dialectic but dissent, in terrorist circles, is often equated with 
betrayal. The assassinations of colleagues by the LEHI (Palestine 1943 - 48), by the JRA 
(1970's) and other groups, pale into numerical insignificance in comparison to the mutual 
murder endemic in Palestinian terrorism. Their intolerance of dissent was manifest in the 
frequency of the splitting of splinter groups from the main body, often followed by sub- 
splitting and sub-splinters. This post-Darwinian method of propagating lethal rivalries, 
thereby endangering the species, is a source of some satisfaction to those unsympathetic to 
terrorism.. An example already touched upon is that of the ANM (Arab National Movement) 
from which split the PFLP (under George Habash), from which split the PFLP-GC (under 
Ahmed Jibril), from which split the OAP (Organization of Arab Palestine), and the PLIF 
179 
(Palestine Liberation Front)199. - George Habash's close allies Naif Hawatmeh and the 
influential Wadia Haddad also chose to leave the PFLP to found their own groups, the 
Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the PFLP-Special Operations 
respectively, though there are suggestions that there were covert links between Habash's 
and Haddad's supposedly separate groups. Ideologically all these groups were Marxist- 
Leninist. The process of continual fracture cannot therefore be attributed to fundamental 
ideological differences. It was much more a reflection of the failure of the Arab culture, the 
dynamics of which neither accommodate serious dissent nor provide for the democratic 
displacement of leaders. This structural characteristic is also inimical to the development of, 
and adherence to, a broadly based strategy. 
It is therefore not surprising to find no evidence that any Palestinian group gave 
sophisticated consideration to UK Public Opinion - an "Uncommitted Audience" in Joanne 
Wright's term. 200 The Palestinians would have done better to have retained a professional 
public relations firm to devise a 10 year strategy for attracting the sympathy of the UK public. 
The researcher has identified 10 opinion polisconducted in the UK by Gallup, MORI and 
NOP which relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict (1955-95) [bibliography]. Apart from two polls, 
they were not conducted in a series which was designed to track changes in opinion. Each 
poll was discrete, a snapshot of one aspect of an issue. Comparisons between such polls is 
a speculative exercise. Certain generalities may be induced from the polls, but attempts to 
be specific may be misleading. 
199 SCHILLER, David Th. A Baftlegroup Divided. In, David C. RAPOPORT. Inside Tefforlst Organizations. 
200 
London: Frank Cass, 1988 
WRIGHT, Joanne, ref 168 
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One poll (NOP, April 1976) was commissioned on behalf of the PLO by Eurabia Media 
Representation I, td. It addressed the future of the Palestinian refugees and its results were 
subsequently used in an isolated foray into UK public opinion, a PLO advertisement in the 
Guardian (14 May 1976). In August 1982, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO 
commissioned a detailed poll from MORI the results of which were clearly supportive of the 
Palestinian cause. There is no evidence of serious follow-up action to capitalise on this 
public sympathy. 
The PLO was massively disrupted as a consequence of the Israeli invasion. Geographically 
it was scattered; the leadership ended up in Tunis. Internally its normal bubbling dissent 
was brought to a boil by the inescapable necessity for strategic decision. Dissent could be 
accommodated in "normal" times by allowing autonomy to the constituent fractious groups 
and, more important, to their often vainglorious leaders. The PLO, having been uprooted 
from its bases, faced a real possibility of total disintegration. It was riven by the violent 
efforts of its factions to direct its strategy, and by the attempts of countries, particularly Syria 
and Jordan, to subordinate the PLO to the politics of their states. It was indeed a very 
difficult time for the PLO, but in later, calmer years the Organization still failed to address 
the subject of UK public opinion, and to capitalise on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the 
concomitant vindication of much of the PLO's message about Israel. 
These two instances appear to be the sum total of a professional approach to public opinion 
polls by the PLO (1954-1988). As the moulding of public opinion is a process which 
necessitates a prolonged campaign, isolated single shot efforts are close to useless. 
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4.6.2 Poll Results 
The Poll Results (FIGURES 9,10 and 11) are neither adequate nor suitable for scientific, 
analysis. They do merit discussion. 
4.6.2.1 UK Public Sympathy 
FIGURE 9 is obtained by plotting 8 of the 10 Polls (or part thereof) on a single chart to 
obtain a loose indication of the movement of UK Public Sympathy. The researcher has 
taken some liberties in grouping these polls under this single heading. He has grouped the 
questions "who do you think is mainly to blame? ", "which side are you most inclined to 
support? ", "which side do you tend to support? " with questions which use the word 
sympathies". As the grouping is for illustrative, not statistical, purpose, the liberties are 
perhaps justified. The results (FIGURES 9,10, and 11) do not conflict with common sense 
and are therefore put forward with some confidence. They are also interesting. 
* Sympathy for the "Arab" cause remained very low, close to 5%, from 1955-1976. It tripled, 
to 16%, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). 
o Sympathy for Israel fluctuated widely, reaching a peak (50%) during the 1967 war, and a 
similar peak (47%) during the 1973 war. 
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e Sympathy for Israel fell back during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), but only to 
25%. It was 19% in 1955. This compares with the level of 5% sympathy with Arabs 
maintained 1955-76. This suggests that UK Public Opinion is reluctant to condemn the 
Israelis to the same extent as the "Arabs", whatever their conduct. However, UK Opinion 
is cognisant, and appreciative, of the pursuit of peace (next item). 
e FIGURE 10 shows clearly that Israel was assessed as "doing all it should towards peace" 
by approximately 15% (1988-91), a significant fall from 37% (1978), probably as a result 
of the invasion of Lebanon and Israeli violence in the Intifada. This indication of approval 
recovered (38%) in September 1993, only after the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement. 
* The Palestinian efforts to achieve peace were rated slightly worse than the Israelis (1978- 
91), but approval of them more than doubled (from 7% to 17%) immediately after Arafat's 
1988 Peace Speech at UN Geneva. 
9 The January 1989 poll which closely followed Arafat's Peace Declaration (UN Geneva 
Nov 1988) gave, for the only time, greater credit to Palestinian peace efforts than to Israeli 
(10. iv. and v. ). It is also an important indication of the support which the UK public will 
give to a peacemaker. The corollary is, of course, the implication of hostility to terrorism - 
which is hardly surprising as the victims of terrorism are often members of the general 
public. 
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(50% and 47% respectively), again indicating that the years of terrorism (1968-1973) had 
done nothing to increase UK public support for the Palestinians. 
The potential support for the Palestinians is plain to see in the 1976 poll commissioned by 
the PLO (FIGURE 11). 75% deemed acceptable the "return of refugees", which was PLO 
policy, and the precise contrary of Israeli policy. A campaign to exploit this sympathy and 
to compare the intransigent position of the Israelis with a reasonable Palestinian 
position would have made life much more difficult for the Israelis than pinprick 
terrorism, the main product of which was to associate the Palestinians with atrocities, 
and thus to destroy the credibility of the official PLO policy of peaceful coexistence 
with Jews in Palestine. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This research has already suggested (2.4.3.1) that the Palestinian recourse to 
international terrorism was more an act of desperation through lack of alternatives 
than a thoughtful adoption of the activity within a strategy. The Palestinian actions 
which involved Great Britain'were not manifestations of a strategy towards Great 
Britain, they were products of events. 
Each of the three attacks on British aircraft was a tactical operation, mounted to 
obtain the release of a prisoner. They were not operations intended to force a 
modification of HMG policy. 
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The crucial failing of the Palestinians' relationship with Great Britain was their lack of 
political strategy. Great Britain had a measured stance towards Israel, arising out of 
her experience during the Mandate. She was also well placed to influence the United 
States, whose economic support of Israel was central to that country's expansionism. 
The Palestinian failure to renounce terrorism precluded its utilisation of Great Britain's 
good offices and diplomatic skills. 
Similarly the Palestinians made no sustained attempt to monitor or recruit British 
public opinion to their cause. Opinion polls highlighted the public concern for 
refugees, and dislike of violence by either side. The polls identified issues on which 
the Palestinians could have capitalised. Not only did they fail to utilise these 
opportunities, but they also failed to absorb the clear messages that terrorism was 
alienating their audience and that it was an audience of potential supporters. 
Had the Palestinians retained competent political advisers and skilled public relations 
consultants, they could greatly have advanced their claims. Instead, by their 20 year 
involvement in international terrorism, they prevented the international diplomatic 





4.8 APPENDIX 1. 
4.8.1 Hansard Extracts 
HMG POSITION 
HMG consistency in its advocacy of UN 2,42 and its even-handedness in condemnation of 
violence is evident from a comprehensive review of Hansard (1967-1993). The following 
brief extracts, the first group relating to policy, the second to acts of violence, illustrate the 
point. An extensive list of relevant Hansard references follows: 
Policv 
The Secretary of State gave a comprehensive assessment of the Middle East in his 19-1 
Harrogate Statement of 31 October 1970, restating and explaining LIN 242. 
Ic After the Conservatives had lost office to the Socialists, no change in policy occurred. 10 
30 Oct 1974 880-237 Poligy 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr James Callaghan): The 
three fundamental needs which such a settlement must satisfy remain the same. Israel must have 
satisfaction of her need for recognition by her neighbours of her permanence as a State and of 
her legitimate security requirements. Israel's Arab neighbours must have satisfaction on the 
withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces. And provision must be made for satisfaction of the 
needs of the Palestinians, by which I mean not only the rights of individual Palestinian refugees, 
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as was laid down for so many years by the General Assembly, but also the legitimate political 
rights of the Palestinian people. 
The Prime Minister's mention of "legitimate political rights, of the Palestinian people" is 
significant. Palestinian opposition to LIN 242 centred on the Resolution's reference to the 
Palestinians as "refugees", without recognition of the putative state of Palestine. 
In 1979 the Conservatives regained office. British policy was reaffirmed by the new Prime 
Minister: 
16 Jun 1980 986? -l 146 Venice: European Council Declaration on the 19E 
Middle East 
Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher): The (European Council) Declaration on the 
Middle East restates the two principles that have for many years have been the basis of the 
European position: the right of all the states in the region, including Israel, to existence and 
security; and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. 
Retention of Resolution 242 was also restated (1 Aug 1980 986-855w). 
HMG accompanied its attempts to maintain good relations with both sides with even-handed 
criticism (6 Dec 1982 33-369,29 Nov 1983 49-452w). Fundamental policy towards the 
PLO was reaffirmed: 
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16 Jul 85 83-91w pglia 198 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Richard Luce): 
Our policy is to encourage all committed to working to peace. We maintain close and fiiendly 
contacts with the Jordanian Government. Our policy towards the PLO is well known. We look 
to the PLO to acknowledge Israel's right to exist and to renounce violence. 
In 1988 HMG felt it had achieved this aim, when Arafat recognised Israel (UN Geneva) [29 
Nov 1989 162-332w] 
In an Adjournment debate on Israel the long-standing UK position was summarised 
concisely: 
17 Dec 1993 234-1405 Policv 
. 
199, 
MP (Sir Thomas Arnold): .... For as 
long as I can remember, the texts of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 of 22 Nov 67 and Resolution 338 22 Oct 73 have been the bedrock of the 
United Nations position on the Middle East and that of many member countries. As the years 
have rolled by, the references to those Resolutions has multiplied. Time and again, the House 
and other Parliaments have had detailed discussions of those Resolutions and their implications 
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Acts of Violence 
20 Jun 1972 839-70w PFLP/JRA Attack Tel Aviv Airport 197: 
Prime Minister (Mr Edward Heath): ... 
immediately expressed to Israeli Ambassador 
HMG's horror at this outrage and their sympathy with the families of victims. 
2 Jul 1975 89443 8w Anti-Terrorist Statement201 197. 
Question: What representations were made in protest at the treatment of the late Lord 
Moyne's murderers by the Israeli authorities? 
Minister of State (Mr Roy Hattersley): On 27 June HM Ambassador at Tel Aviv 
conveyed to the Israeli authorities on instructions regret at the honoring of two convicted 
terrorists at a time when we are all anxious to see and end to acts of terrorism. 
201 Backciround: Times Extract 
Times 26 Jun 75. Paqe 1 and 6: Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Zuri assassinated Lord Moyne Nov 44 and were 
hanged in Cairo in 1945. The bodies were handed over to Israel by Egypt on 25th June. Coffins will lie 5 hours 
in Jerusalem's Hall of Heroism which commemorates the exploits of Jewish terrorist groups against the British 
during and after the Second World War ... will be reburied in a section of the Military 
Cemetery on Mt Hertzel 
reserved for heroes and martyrs. Government and army leaders, as well as members of former terrorist 
organisations are expected to attend. ... Israelis I have spoken to do not believe that the glorification of 
the 
murders will detract from Israel's worldwide campaign against Palestinian terrorism. They regard Arab terrorist 
methods as ignoble and indiscriminate compared with those of Hakim and Bet-Zuri (Lord Moyne's chauffeur 
was also killed in the attack). 
Times Leader. Page 17 The great men who led the Israeli nation then (1944) did not accept the support of 
murder and it is a reflection on the men who lead Israel now that they accept other and lower standards. As do 
almost all Arab leaders. (At the time of the killing when other young Jews were fighting in the British Army 
against Nazism, the men who are now regarded as national heroes were denounced bitterly by Zionist leaders. 
Dr Chaim Weizmann who later became Israel's first President described Lord Moyne's assassination as 'one of 
the worst disasters to befall us in recent years". ) 
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29 Nov 1983 49452w Israeli Treatment of Palestinian Prisoners 19 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Richard Luce): 
We have tried to ensure that Palestinian prisoners held by the Israelis are treated humanely in 
accordance with the relevant Geneva Conventions. To this end the Ten acted in support of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross by making representations to the Israel Government 
in Jun 82 and again in Mar 83. We also made bilateral representations to the Israeli authorities. 
5 Feb 1986 91-269 Israeli Interception of Libyan Aircraft 198, 
Question: Does my rt hon and learned Friend agree that although Libya has a gangster 
regime, that does not justify yesterday's air piracy by Israel? Does he also agree that fighting 
terror with terror will only escalate lawlessness and encourage the extremists on both sides? 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): I 
have issued a statement today condemning that action. There was no evidence of terrorists on 
board the aircraft or of any threat to Israel's security. In our view, the interception was without 
justification. I agree with my hon Friend that it is a dangerous precedent, which appears to have 
been in contravention of International Law. 
14 Jul 1993 228-978 Israeli Violence 1993 
Mr Heathcoat-Amory: My rt hon Friend the Foreign Secretary has repeatedly made it clear 
that the Israeli defence forces must respect human rights in the occupied territories. We deplore 
all violence of that nature as well as terrorist activities against Israeli citizens. 
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List of Hansard References 
From 1968 to 1982 (index Volumes 789 to 141 Pt I and 11) the index item 'Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs' became the main heading for foreign references; thereafter it 
became less comprehensive, appearing to include only major statements; this necessitated 
secondary searches under 'Israel' and 'Palestine'; these again were not adequate, as 
discussions on - and using the names of 'Israel' or 'Palestine', were sometimes indexed only 
under'Middle East. ' 
4.8.2 FCO Background Briefs 
The FCO supplied the researcher with 14 Background Briefs relevant to Palestine/Israel. 
The following extracts illustrate the balance and style of the Briefs. That the severe censure 
of Israel (final. extract) was justified, is confirmed by the Human Rights Watch Report 
(Appendix 2). 
The Background Brief, "Palestine Liberation Organisation" (Sept 1989) is devoted to the 
conduct of Palestinian organisations. It does not chronicle their terrorist actions and is in 
keeping with the expressed diplomatic aim of the UK, that of encouraging the peace process. 
Arafat had publicly renounced terrorism in Dec 1988, and was seeking to portray the PLO as 
a purely political organisation. As with Northern Ireland (1994-5) the close involvement of a 
former terrorist leader is central to peace negotiations and it is therefore constructive to 
appear to accept his denial of terrorism at face value; it may be true and, even if untrue, it is 
a fiction helpful to the peace process. 
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"... Minister of State in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, met Arafat in Tunis on 
13 January 1989, and confirmed to the House of Commons on 17 January that Britain's long- 
standi - ng conditions for ministerial contacts with the PLO had been met by the latest PLO 
commitments. Britain, he said, 'should test and work with those in the Palestinian movement 
and in the Arab States who are talking the language of diplomacy, not the language of 
tefforism'. 11202 
A coerced or biased Government would not have made the blunt statement on the PLO 
leadership in "Guide to Arab/Israel Peace Plans" (Feb 1989). 
"The main problem for all the parties was the status of the paper ('Prospects of a Palestine- 
Israeli Settlement' - an official PLO document) and lack of formal and public endorsement by 
the PLO leadership. 71203 
"Intifacla - The Palestinian Uprising" (April 1989) dwells more on the violent Israeli over- 
reaction and abuses of human rights than on Palestinian activities. 
"The intifada has changed international perceptions of the Arab/Israel conflict. After years of 
association with terrorism, the Palestinians are now more widely seen as the victims of a long 
military occupation, whose justification is increasingly questioned. 11204 
202 FCO Background Brief: Palestine Liberation Organisation. Sept 1989, p8 203 FCO Background Brief. Guide to Arabl7srael Peace Plans. Feb 1989, p3 204 FCO Background Brief: Infifada - the Palestinian Uprising.. April 1989, pI 
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"On 17 January, when ý& Shamir went to Nablus on the West Bank on what should have been a 
morale-boosting visit to an army unit, it was widely reported that several soldiers protested at 
being obliged to 'act brutally against people who are innocent and to betray Israeli values 
On 27 February, Mr Rabin stated that since the uprising began the Palestinians had lost 370 
dead, about 8,000 had been wounded and some 22,000 people detained, with 6,200 still in B)F 
detention facilities and 4,000 in prisons. The latest estimated Palestinian death toll is in excess 
of 450, with 15 Israelis killed. 11205 
205 FCO Background Brief:, Intifada - the Palestinian Uprising.. April 1989, p4 
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4.9 APPENDIX 2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT (Extracts) 
"The applicable legal framework for Israel's treatment of the Palestinian population includes the 
Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and broad portions of 
international human rights law. Israel's government has, in defiance of a broad international 
consensus, never recognized the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
During 1995, Palestinians under Israeli direct rule continued to experience widespread abuses, 
including killings through the excessive use of force, torture, arbitrary arrests, and long-lasting 
curfews over wide areas. They also were subject to strict and arbitrary controls on movement, 
which impeded their ability to earn a living, study at universities, obtain goods and services, and 
otherwise conduct their everyday lives 
"Palestinians also suffered at the hands of Israeli settlers, who are licensed to bear arms by the 
state. Settlers continued to use unjustifiable force against Palestinians with little 'risk of 
experiencing the harsh response that the military authorities reserved for Palestinian attacks on 
Israelis. 
"Israeli security and judicial authorities have long practiced a double standard, moving forcefully 
to prevent and punish acts of violence perpetrated by Palestinians against Israelis, but acting 
leniently when armed settlers shot at Palestinians, launched vigilante raids in villages and refugee 
camps, or harassed motorists. Palestinian suspects are tried in military courts, while settlers, 
should they be charged, face judgement in civil courts, where they enjoy greater due-process 
rights. 
206 Human Rights Watch Report. 1995. p 282 
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These points were made in a March 1994 study by B'Tselem that assessed the Israeli judicial 
system's handling of the sixty-two cases in which Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians 
(nearly all of them settlers) between 1988 and 1992. In at least forty-nine cases, B'Tselem 
found, the perpetrator was not in mortal danger. Yet among these cases, only one resulted in a 
murder conviction and one in a manslaughter conviction. 
In responding to Palestinian unrest following the Hebron massacre, the IDF displayed some of 
its most abusive practices. When protests broke out, troops suppressed them forcibly, killing 
twenty-one Palestinians during the six days following the massacre. 
The IDF Spokesman said the post-massacre closure and curfews were imposed wing to the 
"valid security considerations" of prevent[ing] massive disturbances, and the risk to human life, 
and to reduce fhction between Jews and Arabs". However, these disruptive measures were 
carried out on a wholly disproportionate scale, They constituted a collective punishment of 
nearly two million Palestinians for a crime committed by a Jewish settler. 11207 
207 Ibid. p 283 
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5. ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON GREAT BRITAIN 
5.1 Potential Economic Effects 
Terrorism has both Primary and Secondary economic effects. The former are the 
costs of the damage and disruption inflicted by an attack. The latter are the 
subsequences of the attack: the future loss of revenue and the costs of security 
countermeasures. Calculation of the total of the costs is contentious. Assessment of 
the impact of the economic effects is not difficult. 
It is postulated that only two categories of costs should be attributed to aviation 
terrorism: the revenue lost and the additional costs incurred as a direct result of the 
terrorism (or threat thereof). These are the Attributable Costs. Most fall upon the 
government, and upon the stakeholders of the industry affected. 
The calculation of the overall effect on the economy and on the balance of payments 
requires considerable care. Revenue lost to one British airline may be transferred to 
another British airline or transport system. Similarly monies spent on security 
countermeasures may constitute revenue to British industry and commerce, and there 
may be export potential in the expertise acquired. These calculations are not included 
in this research, but their relevance is noted. 
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Several weeks of this research were devoted to the pursuit of cost data. The main 
finding was that total costs, both of attacks and of countermeasures, were unknown, 
nor apparently had there been any serious attempt to compile them. In many cases 
the constituent data was not recorded; in others the results were seriously suspect. 
Even in those cases where careful calculation of cost elements had been undertaken, 
the underlying assumptions differed, thus invalidating comparison or aggregation of 
the results. In the words of one City professional "much of the civil aviation industry's 
costing is a wet finger in the wind". 208 The researcher had already come to the same 
conclusion. 
It is clear from their statements that Palestinian terrorists were aware that terrorism 
had potential as a weapon of economic warfare (2.4-5). They certainly used it in this 
role against Israel. They neither claimed, nor were observed, to so direct it against 
Great Britain. Thus the economic effects of Middle Eastern terrorism upon Great 
Britain were incidental rather than intentional. 
It is clear that aviation terrorism may inflict economic losses. [The use of aviation 
terrorism as a means of extortion is a separate issue. ] Loss to Europe of American 
tourism as a result of the Vienna and Rome Airport attacks (Abu Nidal, Dec 1985), loss 
of tourist revenue to Greece due to widespread and well-founded scepticism about 
Greek aviation security standards (1985-86) are each estimated to have been some 
208 Senior executive, leading insurance brokers, London, Jul 1995 
198 
$loom. Loss of revenue to the airline industry due to fears of terrorism' (Gulf 
confrontation, Aug 1990-Summer 1991) was $2 bn. 209 
Great Britain has a strong, resilient and widely-based economy. It has withstood two 
World Wars and several major military engagements in this century. There is no 
possibility that terrorists could inflict significant damage to the country's economy. 
They can bring disaster to individual commercial undertakings; economic damage to 
these victims does not advance their terrorist cause by one iota, though they may 
enjoy the publicity. 
Not only is the country's economy invulnerable to terrorist attack, but also the 
Conservative government, in power throughout the period of significant aviation 
security expenditure (1979 to 1997), has placed all major costs upon the aviation 
industry. Thus HMG is in the enviable position of having the industry both as a stand- 
in target and as a stand-in defence budget. Further, British aviation security standards 
are (in the researcher's opinion) amongst the highest in the world. Thus the British 
aviation industry receives an economic double-whammy: higher standards and (much) 
less government financial support than its competitors. This raises the cost base of 
all British airlines. It may put the smaller out of business and force the larger to 
withdraw from routes where profits are marginal, leaving their non-British competitors 
in a monopoly position. In 1994 the double-whammy became triple with the imposition 
209 These figures given in, or calculated from: IGLARSH, Harvey J. Fear of Flying: Its Economic Costs. 
Terrorism. 10, pp45-50 (sic), and NORTON, Graham. The Terrorist and the The Traveller a Gulf 
Aftermath Assessment. The World Today. 47, pp 80-81 (sic) 
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of Air Passenger Duty. The E330m 1994-1995, E700m est. 1997-1998, revenue goes to 
the Treasury. 210 
The British government's unwillingness to contribute to the financial consequences of 
terrorism is not insuperable. HMG has been obliged to bear the cost of terrorist 
damage in Northern Ireland since 1974. In 1993, it was also obliged to underwrite the 
risk to property on the mainland (4.3.7). In each case the exclusion of terrorist 
damage (refusal to cover) by the Association of British Insurers forced the 
govemment to accept responsibility. 
The British civil aviation industry is not in as strong a position as the insurers. 
Nonetheless it has not made serious efforts to establish the costs of aviation security 
and to confront HMG with the vicarious effects of its policy. Thus, in Great Britain the 
economic effects of attacks on aviation have been more a function of government 
policy and industry acquiescence than of terrorist actions. 
210 Interview, HM Customs and Excise, 10 Apr 1997 
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5.2 The Costs of Attack 
5.2.1 Basis of Calculation 
5.2.1.1 Standardised Basis 
The results of extensive and time-consuming research suggest that neither HMG nor the civil 
aviation industry has tried to calculate the costs imposed by attacks on aviation. Their total 
economic effect is therefore unknown. 
The assessment of the cost to an airline or airport of an attack would be a straightforward 
exercise in cost accounting. However the result would be dependent upon the conventions 
and assumptions upon which the study was based. Further, it appears that no single set of 
assumptions would be valid for different operators, nor for different events affecting a single 
operator. There are important differences between long and short haul aircraft, between 
scheduled and charter flights, between large and small airlines, between the cost bases of 
different airlines and between the abilities of different airlines (and airports) to manage 
events and disruptions; all of which indicates that the basis of costing for each airline should 
be specific to that airline. Comparison of the costs of different airlines would therefore be of 
limited value. 
5.2.1.2 Straight Line Costs 
Additionally the duration and management of an event have a powerful impact on its costs. 
Some costs are directly proportional to time; these are generally the less significant, (staff 
overtime, aircraft parking charges, etc). Most costs accrue in an irregular sequence of 
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impacts. For example, after one hour of delay the passengers might be offloaded and 
served with refreshments; after three hours they might receive a full meal; after eight hours 
they might receive overnight hotel accommodation and after twelve hours the service might 
be cancelled. 
5.2.1.3 Revenue 
At this point the airline's size and ability to manage ceases to be merely important and 
becomes critical; a small airline might have no option but to sub-charter to another carrier - 
and thus lose all the revenue for the flight; a large but nimble airline might accommodate 
most or even all of the passengers on another of its aircraft and thus retain the revenue, 
often the largest single item in the costs of disruption. 
Less obvious is the loss of future revenue resulting from customer dissatisfaction, probably 
the second largest cost arising from disruption. Clearly it will be dependent on the nature of 
the disruption and on the quality of passenger handling. Thus a disruption self-inflicted by 
the airline's own performance and accompanied by clumsy or churlish handling, will result in 
a much greater loss than a disruption of the whole airport by an outside attacker, during 
which the staff exert themselves to ameliorate conditions and mollify their passengers. 
An attempt to calculate the immediate and the future revenue losses from a standardised 
set of assumptions would be unwise, given the current absence of reliable data and for the 
other reasons given above ( differences between charter and schedule, large and small, and 
intermittent cost accumulation). Market research on a representative selection of disruptions 
is necessary before any model of passenger behaviour and revenue losses can be 
established. 
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In parenthesis: the calculation of future revenue loss should take account of the effect which 
the reports of dissatisfied passengers may have upon the decisions of other potential 
passengers. A recent study suggested that a dissatisfied customer informs, on average, 9 
other people of his dissatisfaction. 211 The study was not of airline customers who, in the 
researcher's experience, often recount details of alleged mishandling for many years after 
the event; in the case of dissatisfied airline passengers, a total audience of 9 is likely to be a 
serious under estimate. 
5.2.1.4 Direct and Indirect Costs 
An ICAO classification of Direct and Indirect Costs forms the basis of most of the costing of 
airline operationS212. It is based upon a set of assumptions, extension of which into the 
costing of disruptions would be misleading ; further, it does not include the critical item of 
revenue losses. Therefore the ICAO cost structure is unsuitable for the costing of attacks on 
aviation. 
Clearly cost control is central to the survival of any commercial undertaking. It is normally 
achieved by ensuring that the revenue per unit of output exceeds the cost per unit of output. 
The chosen unit of output in airline operations is the block-hour (the period which starts 
when the aircraft leaves its chocks [American - blocks] prior to take off, and which ends 
when the aircraft returns to chocks after landing). Various other units, eg the passenger-kM 
or seat-mile, have important applications but are not relevant here. Costs, direct and 
indirect and other, must be covered by the revenue generated by the aircraft. (All other 
211 Sunday Times. I July 1990, p 6.1. 
212 DOGANIS, Rigas. Flying Off Course. London: Routledge, 1991 
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sources of revenue being ignored for simplicity. ) Given a figure for the block-hours, a cost 
per block hour can be calculated. 
This conventional unit, costs per block hour, is valid when applied to most Variable Direct 
Operating Costs (eg fuel costs); it reasonably accommodates Fixed Direct Operating Costs 
(eg aircraft depreciation); it becomes artificial when stretched to include Indirect Operating 
Costs (eg management and administration). The final figure, E per block-hour, is widely 
used in the industry. [Non Operating Costs, although in no way related to the costs per 
block-hour, must also be covered by revenue. It was one of these items, foreign exchange 
losses, which allegedly led to the demise of Laker Airways. ] 
5.2.2 The Costing of Attacks 
The dangers and difficulties of the costing of attacks may be seen from the range of figures 
given to the researcher. For one aircraft type, costs per hour excluding revenue losses 
ranged from E1,000 to E10,000, and costs including revenue losses ranged from E40,000 to 
E60,000 (sic) per hour. Costs per day for another aircraft type were quoted as E23,000 and, 
soon afterwards, F-245,000 (sic). [Figures have been rounded by the researcher in the 
interest of commercial confidentiality. ]213 These costs were calculated for different 
applications; some were based on similar and some on different assumptions. 
Some apparent inconsistencies can be explained: any single event will impose different 
costs upon different departments. Thus an engine change will place one cost upon 
engineering, another upon customer service (passenger handling), a third upon route 
213 Primary sources, British civil aviation industry 
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revenue, etc. However the total cost to the airline -the one cost with real meaning- cannot 
be obtained by the simple aggregation of all departmental costs. It requires a common set of 
assumptions for all costs, a full schedule of the constituent items (to avoid double-counting 
or omissions), and careful analysis. It appears that speculation may often provide a tempting 
short cut. When one important organisation (not British Airways) made public its 
representations to government, the researcher requested the supporting data. The reply was 
'No supporting data. Why change the habit of a lifetime? '214 
Further confusion lurks in the meaning of "billion", a figure which occurs in the context of 
national tourist revenues. Common English usage distinguishes the British billion from the 
US billion; the former is one million million (1012), the latter one thousand million (109). The 
Treasury informed the researcher215 that in all official statements of HMG (Treasury, Civil 
Service, BTA etc al. ) a billion refers to the "scientifie (US) billion, not the "dictionary" (GB) 
billion. In other statements the ambiguity is unresolved. 
It seems that the calculation of costs may often owe as much to art as to science, and 
that statements of costs may sometimes owe more to the objectives of negotiators 
than to the objectivity of auditors. Belief in cost statements may therefore be an act of 
faith, to which apostasy is a wise alternative. 
In terms of their costs, attacks have simple parallels in normal events. Airports are closed by 
fog as well as bombs; aircraft are taken off line by mechanical defects as well as by 
hijackers; aircraft are damaged or destroyed by accidents as well as by sabotage. Similarly 
214 Senior executive of the organisation involved 
215 Interview 24 June 1996 
205 
the civil aviation industry may be subject to technical investigation, legal enquiry and 
litigation for a variety of reasons, of which terrorist attack is only one. 
The main reason and purpose of cost analysis is to provide management with a tool for the 
measurement and control of costs, and thus for maintaining the health and viability of the 
business. There have been several studies of the costs of aircraft accidents but the financial 
benefits of avoiding accidents have not been unambiguously quantified. In any case such 
benefits take second place, in scrupulous and professional airlines, to the moral obligation to 
ensure the highest practicable standards of passenger safety. Aviation management has 
more control over accidents than over attacks; it has less incentive to cost the latter because 
it has no obvious means of preventing attack attempts or of imposing cost control. 
Ignorance of costs is undesirable for several reasons. Firstly, the magnitudes of the 
immediate and future revenue losses are responsive to the quality of passenger handling 
during and after the event. Secondly, to deem the costs to be an unfortunate and 
unavoidable necessity without first quantifying and analysing them, presupposes that they 
cannot be subjected to control and management; it also prevents the application of Risk 
Management techniques to the re-assessment of existing and optimum insurance cover. 
Thirdly, HMG can issue its dictats in comfortable ignorance of the economic consequences 
of its policy. Finally, the importance of informed management decisions was graphically 
illustrated by the sabotage of PanAm 103 over Lockerbie, an attack which directly 
contributed to the subsequent bankruptcy of the airline. Had PanAm been aware of the 
potential costs of its security policies it would - it is to be hoped- have acted differently. At 
present general practice quantifies with care only the costs which are covered by insurance, 
and which must therefore be established with a degree of accuracy. It is the many other 
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costs which are not insurable, and which airlines tend to accept as unavoidable risks, that 
are not quantified methodically. The role of insurers is discussed below (4.3 ) 
It is not the function of this research to become embroiled in the technicalities of accounting 
convention and practice. The handling of indirect costs is particularly problematic. The 
researcher submits that costs which should be attributed to an attack are those. and only 
those. which would have been escaped had the attack not occurred. Economists have 
already appropriated the term "escapability": 
escapability is determined by the time period required before a particular cost can be 
avoided. 11216 
In any case, escapability would not be a felicitous choice of word in the present context, 
some costs of attacks being inescapable (physical damage), whereas others are susceptible 
to good management and therefore to some degree escapable (future revenue loss). For 
this research the term "Attributable Costs" will be used to describe the costs which arise 
directly from an attack. The term Direct Costs is not used in order to avoid confusion with its 
accepted usage, and the grumbles of accountants. 
The researcher submits that there are only two sources of Attributable Costs: costs incurred 
by reason of the attack and revenue lost by reason of the attack. Thus costs incurred would 
not include the indirect costs of overheads or of administrative and management man hours 
(unless additional staff were employed as a direct result of the administrative load resulting 
from the attack). Existing personnel, although diverted from "normal" activities, do not 
216 DOGANIS, ref 212, p 121 
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constitute additional costs unless either, i) additional personnel has to be recruited to 
undertake these "normal" duties or, ii) their diversion results in a revenue loss to the 
business; in each of these cases the cost/loss, if identified, would be Attributable. Similarly 
for overheads, only if extra costs were incurred (eg rental of premises for the investigation 
team) would they be Attributable. 
5.3 The Role of Insurers 
5.3.1 The Costs of Attack: Insured Losses 
Payments made by insurers in settlement of claims are not so much losses incurred in 
conducting business but more the costs of conducting that business. Insurance cover is the 
product which insurers sell. If there were no claims there would be no need for insurance 
and therefore no insurance business. Insurance payments are as much consumer goods as 
are sandwiches and refrigerators. An insurance payment is no more of a loss than is the 
cost of the bread for a sandwich. A loss occurs only if costs exceed revenue. Insurance 
payments are funded by past and future premiums. The true loser is the airline passenger 
who funds the whole civil aviation industry, including its insurers. 
5.3.2 Extent of Cover217 
Aviation involves very large sums of money. A new Boeing B747-400, the long range 400 
seat aircraft upon which most of the world's leading long haul airlines rely, costs between 
217 Quantitative data supplied by senior insurance executives in a series of interviews, 1995 
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$100m and $150m. A more modest, short range, 12-20 seat turbo-prop regional aircraft 
costs between $5m and $10m. The "hull values" of these aircraft, large though they are, are 
several times smaller than the liabilities which may be incurred in the course of their 
operation. Liability for the loss of Pan Am 103 at Lockerbie has not yet been agreed; it will lie 
between $500m and $1000m. Most of this is liability to third parties, essentially the 
passengers; it includes huge sums in legal costs, the euphemism for lawyers' fees. It is 
entirely separate from the insurance of the aircraft hull. Major airlines carry $lbn-$2bn 
insurance cover for a single event. Liability of this magnitude is beyond the resources of any 
airline and would force most into immediate bankruptcy. Insurance is the only means of 
assuring the governments which license airlines that the liability would be met. For that 
reason, British airlines are required, as a condition of their Air Transport Licence (their 
licence to operate as airlines, issued by the CAA), to-maintain adequate insurance cover; a 
similar condition is imposed by the DoT upon foreign carriers wishing to operate in British 
airspace or to land at British airports. 
Confining the discussion to established airlines, and excluding the CIS, three categories of 
insurance cover are offered: 
the Aircraft Hull 
Third Party Liability 
Employers' Liability to Employees 
In each of these three categories, there are two, separated, risks: 
"All Risks", a misnomer signifying all risks except those due to war or warlike activity. 
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War Risks. Risks arising from warlike activity and from terrorism. 
Worldwide Hull and Liability (All Risks) premiums were just under $2,000m in 1994. There is 
an overcapacity in the market, ie the potential cover is greater than the cover required by a 
factor of 2: 1 so, for good risks, it is a buyer's market. Of this 210% capacity, Lloyds of 
London provide 43% and other London insurers 46%. Premium income to British insurers is 
therefore a significant sum, perhaps in the order of $1,000m pa. 
The War Risks Hull market generated premiums of $150 in 1994. Over the ten year period 
1985-1995 it was generally profitable to insurers, who clearly had developed expertise in 
assessing the war risk, which includes terrorism. 
A single major loss could give rise to a claim in the order of $1bn, which no single insurer 
could sustain. There is therefore: 
4" a global pool of insurers. Major underwriting centers in London, New York, Paris, 
Stockholm and Tokyo are supported by a worldwide network of Reinsurers to meet the aviation 
demand. 11218 
5.3.3 War Risks 
War is a special category of risk; it has the potential to cause damage and financial loss on 
a scale and of a magnitude which dwarfs that of an accident. it is therefore distinguished 
from the other causes of loss and is covered in a separate insurance policy. Such policies 
218 CHARD, John, Partners in Aviation Security. IATA Symposium Proceedings. Sept 1992. p 338 
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always include special provisions which allow cancellation or review at short notice (usually 
7 days). Thus the first losses of unexpected war are covered but thereafter insurers are free 
to re-negotiate their policies or to refuse cover. This is no more than good sense given that 
the potential losses are incalculable. 
Attacks on aviation pre-1968, mostly hijacks to Cuba, rarely involved the destruction of 
aircraft, and hull values were then relatively low. Thus the insurance industry (along with 
everyone else) was unprepared for the damage inflicted by the Palestinians in their 
campaign o eliberate destruction which began in July 1968 and peaked in September 1970 
when a BOAC VC-10, a Swissair DC-8, and a TWA B707 were blown up at Dawson's Field, 
and a Pan Am B747 was destroyed at Cairo. By this time the worlds' leading airlines had 
discarded their smaller, cheaper piston aircraft and had re-equipped with larger (140 seat), 
and more expensive jets which were in turn being replaced by the new 350 seat B-747. 
" (The Pan Am B747 at Dawsons Field) was insured in respect of conventional Hull Risks and 
separately insured for War Risks, and litigation ensued to establish whether the cause of loss 
was "War" as defined by the following words: 
I- Capture, seizure or any taking of the property insured or damage to or destruction thereof by 
any military or usurped power. 
2. War, invasion, civil war, revolution, insurrection or war like operations whether there be a 
declaration of war or not. 
3. Strikes, riots, civil commotion. 
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The courts eventually held that the loss was not within these words and that accordingly the 
Conventional Hull Risks Insurers were liable for the whole of the Insured loss". 219 
Note the absence in all of this of any reference to or use of the word "terrorism". 
To remedy this deficiency the insurance industry devised a new standard war, hijacking and 
other perils exclusion clause, AVN. 48B. (The insurers' nomenclature is potentially 
confusing. "Exclusion" clause defines the risks which are excluded from all risks cover; a 
separate policy [war risks] may be purchased to cover those excluded risks). 
"... two parts of that exclusion are relevant. The first is the insurance description of terrorism: 
"Any act of one or more persons, whether or not agents of a sovereign power () for political or 
terrorist purposes (, ) and whether the loss or damage resulting therefrom is accidental or 
intentional. ". 
The second is the insurance description of "hijack". 
"Hijacking or any unlawful seizure or wrongful exercise of control of the aircraft or crew in 
flight (including any attempt at such seizure or control) made by any person or persons on the 
aircraft acting without the consent of the Insured. 
219 CHARD, ibid, p 334 
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Whereas there may appear to be overlap between these two, this is of no concern in an exclusion 
(ie. the greater the emphasis the better). However, when the reverse applies and these phrases 
become specific Insured perils, then the overlap is critical, particularly if one of the perils is 
selected for cover. 
Insurance language therefore makes it clear that hi-jacking is there for that purpose. I-Ii-jacking 
only stands alone in the simple sense of "fly me to Cuba7. The hi-jacking words are also narrow 
in the sense that they are self-confining to the aircraft involved. As always, the easiest way to 
illustrate this is by way of an actual example. 
On the morning of 2nd October 1990 a Boeing 737 operated by the Civil Administration of 
China (CAAC) was hi-jacked in the course of a flight from Ziamen to BaiYen Airport, 
Guangzhou by an individual acting entirely on his own initiative. The flight, due to take 
approximately 50 minutes , took more than 
2 hours before the hijacked 737 landed at Baiyen 
Airport. After landing, the 737 proceeded along the runway but then for some reason, possibly 
as a result of duress when the hijacker realised where he was, veered to the right of the runway 
and on to the grass. The 737 then continued in a relatively straight path towards the airport 
apron where other aircraft were parked. 
The pilot of the 737 at the last minute tried to take-off and fly over the parked aircraft, but 
tragicallyjust as he became airborne, his aircraft collided with a CAAC 707 and a CAAC 757. 
The 737 was destroyed and the 707 and 757 were rendered constructive total losses. 
War Risk Insurers paid the claim for the destruction of the hi-jacked 737, but a dispute arose 
between Conventional Hull Risk and War Risk Insurers as to liability for the claim on the 707 
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and 757. Arbitration on this issue was subsequently heard in London in March 1992. The 
judgement that was given arising out of the Arbitration decreed that it was the 737 aircraft alone 
which was subject to the exclusion of hi-jacking within AVN. 48B. , 
Accordingly, it ruled that Conventional Hull Risk Insurers were liable for the claims involving 
the 707 and 757.11220 
Thus a matter of some $60m hung upon the niceties of the wording of AVN. 48B. 
Until the establishment of Pool Re in 1993 (below 4.3.7), insurers and their lawyers had no 
more success than scholars in defining terrorism. Chard states (above) that AVN. 48B 
contains "the insurance description of terrorism". Careful reading of the clause determines 
that terrorism ("terrorist purposes") is neither described nor defined; it is mentioned and 
therefore it - whatever it may be - is covered by the clause . 
Thus (until 1993) the insurance industry acknowledged the problem of definition by not 
attempting it. Sums of $100 millions hang upon the meticulous drafting of contractual 
documents. Omission of the commas, in the researcher's copy (above), before and after the 
clause "whether or not agents of a sovereign power" from AVN. 4813, changes its whole 
meaning and arguably distorts its intentions by including criminal activity. 
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5.3.4 Conduct of the Insurance Market 
The insurance market involves huge sums of money. It is important to Great Britain's 
economy and to the City of London's role as an international finance centre, it is vital to the 
civil aviation industry - which could not operate without insurance. It is highly lucrative to 
those involved in it. All parties (including those who underwrite it and face potential financial 
ruin) have a vested interest in its satisfactory operation and continuation. 
Airlines usually retain brokers to negotiate terms of cover with underwriters. There is a 
surprising degree of openness, the different premium rates for different airlines being 
disclosed within the market. These rates are not as good an indicator of risk to the airline 
passenger as they might appear. They are distorted by commercial factors, including the 
size of the airline, the importance of the business, the underwriters' recent and accumulated 
profits and losses, and the capacity of the market (supply and demand of insurance cover). 
As an instance, the researcher was asked by one syndicate for his assessment of a major 
airline and replied, with good reason, that it represented one of the worst risks in aviation. 
The response was that the business was too large and too important to refuse. In other 
words the syndicate wished to secure the business for its importance in the long-term, and 
therefore was prepared to accept the dangers of the short-term. Thus that airline would 
probably not have appeared in its rightful place (close to the bottom) in a league table of 
safety and competence. Nonetheless insurance rankings would make interesting reading. 
Insurers strive to maintain to retain a good relationship with those upon whom their business 
depends, the airlines. Thus they pride themselves with settling a hull claim ($50m - $I OOM) 
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within a few days of its submission. Similarly, if liability is disputed between two insurers - as 
in the example cited by Chard - an established mechanism (AVS 1034) is used to pay to the 
airline all or part of its claim; pending arbitration or action between the insurers, each party 
pays 50% of the interim settlement. 
Other claimants, employees or 3rd Parties, are not customers of the insurers. More often 
than not they have a hard, prolonged fight on their hands to obtain settlement. This situation 
arises from on the one hand, the long-standing combative approach to minimizing their 
financial losses by underwriters and their lawyers and, on the other hand the more recently 
learned behaviour of claimants, their lawyers (and the juries - "you've won the lottery") who 
often seek to maximise the insurance pay-out . There are still allegations of over-zealous 
activity by insurers: the exploitation after Lockerbie of the Pan Am relatives helpline (by US 
insurers)221, and the swift pre-emptive pressure on the distressed relatives of the deceased 
residents of Lockerbie to settle for a much smaller sum than legal proceedings would have 
yielded. In 1996 British newspapers were reporting an action brought by Mr Lipsius against 
London Transport Authority (LTA) for the horrific burns he suffered at the Kings Cross 
Underground fire in 1987. This, eight and a half years after the event, gave LTA appalling 
publicity which no airline could afford., 
Such adverse publicity results only indirectly from the actions of the transport company, 
whether LTA or airline, but directly from the actions of their insurers. Certainly in the past 
airlines have behaved very badly, and little has emerged from the investigation of Lockerbie 
to reflect credit on Pan Am. No well-managed airline would now tolerate the collateral 
damage to its reputation which would result from seemingly callous actions by its insurers. 
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The one image that they do not wish to attract is of being careless of hurt or injury to their 
passengers. If LTA passengers cannot easily take their patronage elsewhere, airline 
passengers certainly can. 
Airlines have the power to restrain over-zealous insurers and the more powerful are ready to 
use it. The industry cites the personal appearances and statements of Michael Bishop, the 
Managing Director of British Midland, after a fatal accident to one of its aircraft (Kegworth, 
Jan 1989), as the benchmark of an excellent response to an unhappy situation. In the 
immediate aftermath of the accident Bishop was not able to specify the cause or offer much 
hard data. He was able to show that he cared deeply for his passengers and staff. 
The immediate future is likely to bring higher settlements and increased premiums. Article 20 
of the Warsaw Convention (effectively a no fault: no liability clause) is all but extinct, leaving 
airlines - not their governments - liable for losses caused by terrorist attack on their aircraft 
in which the target is their government - not the airline. If it can be shown that the airline 
knowingly failed to follow the required security procedures, it may be deemed guilty of wilful 
negligence; it will then be liable to unlimited damages, because the liability limits set under 
the Warsaw Convention and other contractual agreements would no longer apply. These 
damages may well exceed its insurance cover in which case a new situation will arise. The 
airline will be bankrupted, leading to pressure for government intervention and/or for an 
industrywide rescue operation, neither of which will be to likely to materialise if the rescue 
funds are perceived to be going to pay lottery win claims and the lawyers who are pressing 
them. A leading possibility is the liquidation of the airline, followed by its prompt 
reincorporation under a new name. 
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In any case airline's insurers will incur huge liabilities. On the face of it insurers might 
therefore be expected to be actively involved in pursuing higher standards of security and 
safety. They are not. 
5.3.5 Insurers' Role in Promoting Security 
In Great Britain, the establishment and enforcement of aviation security involves standards 
and enactments published, in progressively larger volumes, by ICAO, the DoT, the Airport 
Authorities and the Airlines. The achievement of standards is dependent on the 
performance of thousands of personnel. 
Insurers have a formal link only with the insured, in the present case, the airlines - upon 
whom they are also reliant for their income. They are not therefore in a dominant position, 
nor even in the powerful position of a Pilots' Association or passenger organisation which 
can engage in long term negotiation and harassment of the airline, in the pursuit of higher 
safety or security standards. Insurers are members of a competitive market place; they 
endanger their business if their conduct prompts an airline to look elsewhere for its 
insurance cover. 
Furthermore the management of an airline is a highly skilled undertaking, and one which is 
beyond the powers of many airlines' managements (witness airline profits and losses). 
Insurers can survey less technical businesses to assess their exposure to risks of fire, theft 
and accident. To carry out an audit of a major airline, complex and vast, is a massive 
undertaking, well beyond the routine capabilities of insurers. Nor - in most cultures - would it 
be well received by the airline. 
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Attempts have regularly been made (to the researchers personal knowledge), to recruit 
insurers to the cause of advancing safely or security. Typically they start with an approach 
to a broker or underwriter, and the submission of information on alleged deficiencies. The 
recipient would be ill advised to accept such information at face value. However, in practice, 
only the airline could assess its credibility. A formal approach to the airline may well be 
resented whether the allegations have substance or not. The reality therefore is that the 
most that will result is an informal conversation with the airline's insurance manager, tactfully 
phrased. Minor failings in the multitudinous daily activities of an airline are a statistical 
inevitability, and are a part of the raison d'6tre of insurance. An occasional such failing is 
therefore no reason for withdrawing insurance cover - and forfeiting the premium. A serious 
matter amounting to wilful negligence would certainly be in breach of the airline's licence to 
operate. Insurers would look to the relevant government department to enforce its own 
standards; accordingly, insurers might be expected to pass on such information informally 
and discreetly, thus achieving the desired rectification whilst preserving their own good 
relations with the airline. 
The insurers' role is to assess and cover the risks of airline operations, not to become 
involved in the complexity of their management. Substantial misgivings on the competence 
of the management in minimizing safety and security risks will be reflected in increased 
premiums. In general terms (to preserve commercial confidence), a suspect airline faces 
premium rates double those of a highly-regarded airline. The corollary, that the premiums 
paid by the best operators accurately reflect their excellent record, is unfortunately not true. 
There are two reasons for this. 
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The first, common to all types of insurance, is that simple arithmetic dictates that claims are 
paid from funds amassed from the premiums of non claimants. The second reason relates to 
the nature of the aviation risk. Premiums are based on loss experience, which, in the matter 
of war risks/terrorism, is of a very small number of losses. The last total War Risk loss to a 
major Western airline was seven and a half years ago, Pan Am 103,21 Dec 1988; since 
then the other major losses covered by War Risks have been an Avianca B727 (Colombia), 
destroyed 27 Nov 1989, and one of the CAAC (China) multiple losses, 20 Oct 1990. The 
cost of any one of them may be huge (Pan Am 103, approx $700m). The sum involved is. 
beyond recovery from the claimant airline in increased premiums over any practicable pay- 
back period (eg 5-10 years), and in any case that airline may well be a much better risk in 
the period subsequent to its loss because of irresistible pressure to remedy security 
shortcomings. This improved risk will be known to other insurers, who would therefore 
undercut any large premium increase. Thus the existing insurer cannot recover his loss from 
the claimant alone, but must spread it across his customer base. The same effect is 
duplicated through a second mechanism. The enormous potential liability from a single 
event obliges the insurer to cap his own losses by reinsuring; this also spreads the burden 
across the whole market. Insurers call this "a collective responsibility to pay the increased 
premiums Insurers will necessarily impose". 222 
Thus, unfortunately for them, the best airlines pay premiums which more closely reflect the 
average global level of security competence than their own high level. Advocates of higher 
security standards therefore are not able to cite lower premiums as an incentive to individual 
airlines, and thus cannot concentrate their efforts upon a single target airline, but must 
diffuse them over the world aviation industry as a whole. 
M CHARD, ref 218, p 339 
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In the long term this may not be as disadvantageous as it appears to be. Aviation is 
international by nature; therefore to make flying on a (for example) British airline secure, it is 
necessary to make all the airports which it serves secure (and arguably all the world's 
airports because they are interlinked by connecting services); to turn British airports into 
fortresses whilst many airports overseas leak like sieves would not prevent an attack on a 
British aircraft, it would only change the venue. 
5.3.6 The Insurers' Contribution to the Strategic Management of Security 
The issue of Strategic Management is discussed in Section 7. However strategy is by 
definition (and probably indisputably) purposive. No insurer interviewed by the researcher 
has claimed that insurers either have, or participate in, a strategy to improve aviation 
security; nor has the researcher, in 16 years' experience of negotiating security standards, 
seen evidence of the involvement of insurers. 
Given the competitive mechanism of the market, they have little scope for decisive 
intervention. They can, and do, apply pressure for improvement, both confidentially during 
negotiations and openly by raising premiums. Unless the aviation market acts with 
international unity, the reality is that it has little power to discipline or coerce its customers. 
Therefore the British segment is acting reasonably, and prudently, in leaving the setting and 
maintenance of standards in the hands of the designated regulatory authorities; 
governments. Were it to see a need or a business opportunity in more active involvement, 
there are many precedents. The spate of kidnapping of businessmen, often with ransom in 
mind, presented (early 1970s) a threat new in magnitude if not in concept. Lloyds of London 
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had already provided kidnap insurance (following the kidnap of the Lindbergh baby, 
1933223). The renewed interest led to the discovery by insurers that there was no adequate 
source of counter-kidnap expertise available to those seeking advice or protection. The 
brokers, Hogg Robinson, established a firm (Control Risks) to provide this expertise. The 
name Control Risks was singularly well chosen; the knowledge and training which it provided 
to its clients did just that and thereby probably lessened the insurance payouts. 
The morality of kidnap insurance is hotly disputed. Those who oppose it allege that it 
encourages kidnapping by guaranteeing payment. The other view is that it may save a life 
which the government has failed to protect. It is illegal in some countries, but not in the UK. 
Here it provides not only an example of insurers' participation in strategic management but 
also a pragmatic modus vivendi with an irresolvable dilemma. Similar pragmatism drew the 
British government into underwriting when unacceptably large risks were posed by terrorism. 
In this, HMG acceded not so much to the wishes of the insurers as to the underlying 
realities of a market economy, one of which is that terrorists can inflict more damage than 
the insurers could survive without outside aid. Thus a government unable or unwilling to 
employ harsh methods to eliminate terrorists must pay for the worst of the damage which 
they are thereby freed to inflict. As costs increase so will the attraction of harsh response. 
The drawing of the government into war risk insurance cannot be construed as strategic 
management by the insurers. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they can in any way be 
brought into the strategic management of aviation security. It would fundamentally conflict 
with their primary role and raison d'6tre. However they have substantial funds and are 
always eager to minimize their losses. They have organised space missions to rescue 
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satellites. They are rumoured to have bought back aircraft from hijackers. There is a case 
for suggesting that where they are saved from heavy loss by a successful security measure 
or operation, they might wish to contribute a part of their saving towards the costs of the 
advancement of the strategy of security management. 
5.3.7 Pool Re 
The IRA bomb at St Mary Axe, City of London (10 Apr 1992) caused E350m damage. It led 
to HMG being obliged to take over the underwriting of the Terrorist Risk to property on the 
mainland, in a repeat of its experience in Northern Ireland in 1974. 
Property insurance in the City is largely in the hands of major British insurers. They describe 
themselves as "minnows in the world's insurance seas", the reinsurance whales (or sharks) 
are mainly American, Italian and French. After the St Mary Axe losses these reinsurers gave 
notice that they would no longer offer reinsurance on the British mainland against the risk of 
terrorist explosions. This withdrawal by the reinsurers left the insurers exposed to risks 
beyond their capacity. They had little alternative but to seek reinsurance from the 
government. 
This demand was unwelcome to the Treasury. It was particularly unpalatable to the 
Conservative budget-conscious, anti-interventionist ideology of 1993. Nor is it much 
favoured by the insurance industry; it immediately loses commission revenue and, more 
important, it dislikes retreating from its own market place. However HMG and the industrY 
were faced with necessity. 
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The reinsurance company, Pool Re, was the outcome (8 Mar 1993). It is a mutual company 
funded by its members with the government as insurer of last resort (ie the underwriter of all 
risks beyond the. agreed limit). Initially it was non profit-making, and paid commissions 
neither to brokers nor to the primary insurers; it also originally required the insured to cover 
all its properties on the UK mainland against the terrorist risk (and thus with Pool Re). The 
rigidity of Pool Re, which the insurance industry sees as a reflection of civil service 
involvement, has led to the emergence of rivals, offering limited but more flexible cover. 
Pool Re, being established in specific response to the terrorist risk, obviously had to define 
the cover (in insurance terms: the exclusion which was being bought back) which it was 
offering. Hence its definition of terrorism: 
"(Terrorism is) an act of any person acting on behalf of or in connection with any organisation 
with activities directed towards the overthrowing or influencing of any Government dejure or 
defacto by force or violence. 11224 
This definition relates to the risk covered by Pool Re, not to the War Risks exclusion/cover in 
civil aviation. In this latter case terrorism remains undefined - but in the event of its 
definition being an issue in a dispute, lawyers would undoubtedly cite Pool Re's definition, if 
it suited their case. 
The St Mary Axe loss which led to the formation of, Pool Re approximates to the lowest 
estimate ($500m) of the Lockerbie loss ( the highest estimate is $1000m). Prior to the event 
premium rates for War Risks to property had been low relative to those for aviation, where 
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underwriters had already developed greater expertise. Property insurers were faced with the 
possibility of bigger bombs and bigger losses, and with continued exposure during a 
dangerously long pay-back period. This led to their withdrawal from the market. In aviation, 
premiums reflected more accurately the established loss rates. It may also have been felt 
that standards of aviation security would inhibit any serious escalation of losses - whereas 
commercial property was vulnerable to an increase in terrorist activity. 
The expertise of aviation insurers was demonstrated in the Gulf confrontation (1990-91). 
For a period they excluded some of the conflict area from War Risks cover; this did not affect 
civil aircraft operations because no airline wished to operate in the excluded area. Insurers 
did cover neighbouring areas (having been careful to establish the range of Iraqi SCUD and 
other capabilities). Thus, even in the situation of full-scale war and with a very high 
worldwide threat of terrorist attack, aviation insurers continued to provide cover and there 
was therefore no pressure on government to step in. 
This continued cover enabled insurers to recoup some of the losses incurred in the initial 
invasion ($27m BA, $450m Kuwait Airways). It is probable that the standards of aviation 
security worldwide assisted insurers to calculate. the risk with some confidence, and thus to 
accept it. This gives reason to the proposition that they should assist the advancement of 
aviation security. 
5.4 Aircraft Sabotage: The Lockerble Atrocity, December 1988 
The destruction of PanAm 103 was an act of war. Unlike many of the atrocities of war it was 
avoidable and therefore inexcusable. All occupants of the B747-100,16 crew and 243 
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passengers, together with 11 residents of the peaceful Scottish town of Lockerbie, hit bY 
falling wreckage, were killed. Their deaths are the true costs of the terrorists' action. 
In assessing economic costs and contemplating figures of hundreds of millions of pounds, 
sight must not be lost of their insignificance. Economic costs can be recovered, human 
costs cannot. 
The total economic cost of the loss of PanAm 103 is worthy of a separate study. As is often 
the case, the costs which are easily quantified may not be the most important. 
The incident may or may not have been the cause of the demise of Pan American Airways, 
one of the pioneer airlines of the world. Long before 1988 the aviation industry was viewing 
PanAm with scepticism; the paint was peeling from its elderly aeroplanes (the uncharitable 
said the same of its cabin crews), the salaries and conditions of service of some sections of 
staff were leagues better than their European competitors, and in the 1970s efforts - nearly 
successful - had been made to persuade the Shah of Persia to fill its financial abyss. In no 
year between 1970 and its demise (1991) did PanAm pay a dividend. 225 It was a chronically 
ailing airline. 
The state of its finances was doubtless contributory to PanAm's decision to apply large sums 
from the US security levy, not to raising security standards, but instead to advertising its 
supposedly high security standards. Pan American Airways did not survive the loss of 
PanAm 103 and neither did its reputation. The President's Commission226 recorded that its 
security procedures contained serious deficiencies. In the terminology of psychologists who 
225 FAA. Office of Civil Aviation Security. Revenue Losses to Terrorism. 1993. 
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study error and failure, there were latent errors. 227 The everyday description is 'accidents 
waiting to happen'. 
In a sad echo of the causes of the loss of the Turkish DC-10 (346 killed, 3 Mar 1974), the 
performance of the Federal Aviation Agency was again found to have been contributory. 
Estimates of the final settlement costs of liability claims against PanAm's insurers range from 
$500m to $1 000m. The insurers' estimates are at the lower end, the claimants' at the higher. 
The Hull Insurance, $32m, already paid, is included. 
The disaster itself, the criminal investigation and the Fatal Accident Enquiry placed a cost 
burden on this country. A lengthy study would be required to obtain cost details. For the 
purposes of this research, a general estimate suffices. The Dumfries and Galloway 
Constabulary estimates Police Costs to have been E15m, (to July 1995)228, for disaster 
recovery and criminal enquiry. The Crown Office, Edinburgh reports costs of approximately 
E700,000229 (to August 1995) relating to the criminal and fatal accident investigations. The 
Scottish Courts Service reports a total of E950,254 (July 1995)230. These costs are likely to 
be a modest underestimate of Attributable Costs (researcher's definition - costs which would 
not have been incurred if the disaster had not happened), but a serious underestimate of 
actual expenditure relating to the disaster. Both the Crown Office and the Scottish Courts 
Service explained, with reasons, that they had not included all their staff costs. The 
Department of Transport estimated its costs to have been E820,000231. Of this, legal costs 
(lawyer's fees) were E600,000, including E400,000 paid on behalf of the relatives. 
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No attempt has been made to obtain other costs (eg those of the Security Service and 
Foreign Office). An investigation of secondary costs was terminated after study of the first - 
increased crime rate due to diversion of police resources - revealed that the figures were 
likely to be insignificant. 
The total of the above figures is nearly El 8m. 
It is likely - at the common sense level - that the terrorist destruction of a B-747 led some 
potential passengers to cancel their air travel plans. It requires careful investigation to 
separate this cause from other possible causes of reduced global revenue. The FAA 
estimates that the revenue loss to PanAm was $400m in 1989232. The same study suggests 
that TWA experienced a total loss of E40m in 1989 but with a revenue 2ijin ($17m) in the 
first quarter. This makes it very clear that internal transfers occur within the aviation market 
and suggests that care is needed in determining global figures. 
The destruction of PanAm 103 spurred the liberal democracies into major improvements in 
aviation security. Great Britain and the USA not only led by example but also pressed more 
reluctant countries into action. The costs of the consequent security measures (1989 to 
date) are in the thousands of $m's. Security measures have been increased across the 
board: Hold Baggage Screening has been expensively researched and is now being 
introduced; security permeates the operation of the civil aviation industry; security governs 
airport terminal design; aircraft structures are being hardened; diplomatic relations are 
232 FAA, ref 225 
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affected (USA: Hatch Amendment); etc. To a greater or lesser degree these costs should be 
attributed to the Lockerbie atrocity. 
Thus the final cost of Lockerbie is unknown, but must amount to thousands of $m's. This 
huge sum is negligible, a drop in the ocean of the US and UK economies, a loss with no 
perceptible impact. 
The identity of the sponsor of the Lockerbie atrocity is still disputed. Whoever it Is, 
achieved no economic or political gain. No land was returned to the Palestinians, nor 
did the Islamic fundamentalists cowe their enemies, nor did the USA change its Middle 
East policies. No sponsor dared claim 'credit', rightly fearful of richly merited 
retribution. The perpetrators' sole achievement, by the murder of 270 innocents, was 
their own satisfaction and, with that, an ineradicable stain on their cause. 
5.5 Airport Attack : Standing Mortar on the Runway, Heathrow March 1994 
In 1994 the PIRA fired home-made mortars at London Heathrow, on 9,11 and 13 March. 
There were brief but severe disruptions of the airport. 
The aviation industry is reluctant to discuss the costs imposed by the attacks. It 
understandably hesitates to inform terrorists of the results of their actions. The modus 
operandi of PIRA suggests that its objectives were to demonstrate capability and to achieve 
maximum publicity for that demonstration, the infliction of commercial losses being an 
incidental bonus. It is likely that they were seeking to avoid casualties and particularly to 
avoid American casualties. The mortars fell, presumably aimed, on runways and on open 
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ground. It is statistically unlikely that a mortar would hit an aircraft landing or taking off. 
However had that happened it is certainly possible that the aircraft would have been 
destroyed and all on board killed. Therefore PIRA, if it sought to avoid casualties, was 
gambling dangerously. 
Closure or disruption of an airport affects all the airlines using it. The major user of 
Heathrow is British Airways with approximately 475 movements (take-offs and landings) 
daily. The attacks caused 171 disruptions (cancellations, diversions, delays) during the 
week (Monday to Sunday) of the attacks. It is not possible to use a formula of Number of 
Disruptions multiplied by Disruption Unit Cost to arrive at a total cost figure in which 
confidence would be justified. For good reasons of expense, the raw detailed data on the 
various disruptions is not processed, nor are changes in passenger travel arrangements 
tracked. Further the airline has different unit cost figures (eg cost per minute of delay) for 
different purposes. Therefore data for the above formula would be conjectural, and the 
product would be less of an estimate than a guess, and quite possibly a bad guess. 
An alternative approach is to compare revenue figures for the relevant period with other 
periods, making allowance for other known influences. By this method one department of 
the airline calculates the cost of the attacks to have been El Om. 
The British Airports Authority indicates that it suffered a loss in the order of E500,000. 
British Airways accounts for 38%233 of the daily movements at Heathrow. If its cost figure 
(El Om) was extrapolated, this would indicate a total cost to airlines using Heathrow of E: 26m. 
233 The Times, Letter from Chief Executive, BA, 10 Jul 1996 
230 
This is likely to be a serious overestimate, the disruption of a small number of services at an 
outstation being much more manageable than 171 disruptions at main base; nor does British 
Airways' main base have large numbers of aircraft234 sitting round doing nothing, readily 
available. Inflicting losses on foreign airlines has, per se, no possible benefit to PIRA. The 
accompanying publicity would be obtained at the risk of the odium of murdering a foreign 
national. The size of this estimated figure (E26m) is not significant, nor is it of any political 
importance. However any losses may be very serious to an airline achieving only marginal 
profitability. It is not possible, at present, to insure the revenue losses of disruption (unless 
an aircraft is damaged in the attack and then only to a limited degree), because those losses 
cannot be accurately quantified with current methodology. Insurers and their brokers, 
cognisant of potential revenue from premiums, are encouraging airlines to address the 
problem. For the moment, many British airlines are blissfully unaware of the costs of 
disruptions to their services. 
5.6 Act of War: Saddam's Short Tour De Force, Kuwait , August 1990 
On 2 August 1990 Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army, massed along the border, suddenly 
invaded Kuwait. They moved at a speed which took the experts by surprise, as did the 
speed with which they later retreated. 
For reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained, British Airways had continued to 
operate into Kuwait to the moment of invasion, whilst other European airlines had not. A BA 
B747-1 00, G-AWND, on the ground at Kuwait International Airport, was held for the period of 
M4 or pilots 
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the occupation, and was damaged beyond economic repair by the hastily retreating Iraqi 
forces. 
The insurers paid $27M235 agreed value of the hull of G-AWND very promptly after its 
destruction, as is their practice. They also paid passenger claims which fell under Liability 
Cover 
The United Nations established a Compensation Commission to compensate both 
individuals and "corporations, other legal entities and public sector enterprises" for "direct 
losses as a result of Iraqs unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" covering the period 2 
August 1990 to 2 March 1991.236 
British Airways submitted a total claim of E14m to the UN. It wishes to keep most details 
confidential. It disclosed that the figure for "loss of use of aircraft" was based on BA's fall in 
turnover (Aug 1990-Mar 1991) in the market where the aircraft was deployed, from the same 
period of the previous year. This is a reasonable basis for a claim, given the fact that the 
industry has not established methodology for calculation of the losses of disruption. The 
insurers have also submitted a claim to the UN. 
Publicity painted the UN Compensation Commission in glowing terms: 
"It is 10 pm on a Sunday in Geneva. At a building out near the airport, the lights are still on. 
The staff of the United Nations Gulf War claims conunission is still at work. The overtime 
budget has been exhausted, but the staff are working late anyway. Their sense of urgency, even 
235 Interview, Senior Executive, Risk Management, British Airways, 1995 
236 UN Compensation Commission. Form B 
232 
pleasure, resembles a political campaign rather than an international bureaucracy. People will 
be there at one o'clock in the morning .... 
The Conunission kept to its tight internal deadline of 120 days to decide each submission. 11237 
Despite this reported heroism of the United Nations staff, which its critics would say is long 
overdue, neither British Airways' nor their insurers' claims had been paid six years after the 
Iraqi invasion. "We are not", said a senior figure involved, "holding our breath". 
5.7 Mind that Missile: The Wakhan Corridor, January 1994 
In the early 1990s India was the world's biggest jumbo jam. Airliners bound for Europe, from 
Hong Kong, Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and other major airports, converged 
on India - most of them on Calcutta, and battled their way to Delhi; each exerted itself 
to 
obtain the higher flight level which would ensure that its fuel would carry it to destination. 
For aircraft turning north from Delhi towards Afghanistan it was imperative to achieve Flight 
Level 260 (26,000 ft), the minimum for border crossing. Afghanistan itself was not only an 
overcrowded bottleneck but also a radio black hole where more often than not contact with 
Kabul Air Traffic Control was lost for minutes on end. India had minimal radar coverage, 
supported by an Air Traffic Control which was neither uniformly competent nor uniformly 
helpful, and complemented - in the monsoon - by thunderstorms of lethal potential. Along 
this obstacle course, with all the dignity of an anarchists' outing, jostled the world's jumbos. 
237 The Times, 12 Apr 1994 p34 
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When the Soviet Union finally withdreyv from Afghanistan (15 Feb 1989), violent civil war 
continued. In late 1993, satellite reconnaissance and intelligence detected the presence of 
Russian Surface to Air Missiles with a high altitude capability in the west of Afghanistan 
close to the bottleneck airway, in an area controlled by an unpredictable faction. 
In January 1994 British Airways and other airlines took the prudent decision to avoid 
Afghanistan, most rerouting over Iran. The new routings added between 15 and 45 minutes 
(dependent on route and winds) to the flying time to Europe. Rerouting incurs costs: 
o Extra fuel bum 
e Loss of payload (ie passenger and cargo revenue) due to weight of extra fuel 
9 Extra crew time 
9 Additional crews on standby at possible intermediate stops 
* Intermediate landings (tech stops) to refuel 
e Extra aircraft hours. 
One source in British Airways estimates that the cost rate of fuel was E7.2m pa, of lost cargo 
revenue (from Hong Kong only) Elm pa, of intermediate landings E750,000 pa, giving a total 
for these items of approx E9m pa. A second source estimated the total costs (including for 
example aircraft hours) to be E17m-E20m pa. This is roundly compatible with the first, 
partial, estimate. 
Although the hazard was international, and efforts to remove it were made by ICAO and the 
international community, BA made its own attempts to obtain an alternative routing. Largely 
through the diplomatic skills and efforts of its senior Pakistani official, BA negotiated another 
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route, the Wakhan corridor, over eastern Afghanistan. Initially this route was exclusive to 
BA, who made savings at the rate of approximately E20m pa. -[ Sources report that the 
official who made this possible was made redundant without warning and initially without 
notice towards the end of the negotiations. The saving of his salary, E10,000 pa, doubtless 
looked good in the budget of a cost-conscious manager. Against savings of E20m pa and a 
record of 20 years impeccable service it looks anything but good. ] 
Between October 1994 and March 1995,95% of the relevant BA flights succeeded in routing 
down the Wakhan corridor, saving BA perhaps El Om. 
5.8 Terrorism And Tourism 
The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) calls travel "the world's largest industry" and 
tourism "the world's largest employer". It estimates the wealth creation of the former to be 
$3.1 trillion and the employees of the latter to be 130 million (1992 figures). [The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary offers three definitions of 'trillion': 1. ,A million million ... 
(l012 ). 2. ... 
A 
million million million ... 
(1018). 3. -... A Very Large Number.... 238. The third of these has obvious 
attractions to a researcher labouring to understand costs, and perhaps to the accountant 
who compiled them]. 
Regardless of the precision of the WTTC's figures, it is clear that tourism is an important 
source of revenue and of employment in many countries. UK earnings from overseas 
visitors was E7,891 rn (1992)239. Egypt's tourism ministry was expecting $4b and its tourist 
industry $5b for 1992-93. After terrorists targeted tourist attractions, the estimate was 
238 The Concise Oxford Dictionary Of Current English. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p 1306 
239 CSO. Business Monitor Overseas Travel and tourism. MQ6, Quarter 1 1993, p5 
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lowered to $2.6b 240. Tourist arrivals fell from 2500 thousand (1992) to 1975 thousand (1993- 
estimated). To Egypt, struggling with dire poverty, such losses are serious. If the 
government is not able to convince the population that the difficulties should be blamed upon 
the terrorists and not upon the government, then political instability may result and the 
terrorists will have achieved a success. 
Loss of tourism will not have the same impact on a stable government or on a sound 
economy. However, it may hit the tourist and civil aviation industries hard , possibly 
bankrupting smaller or less profitable operations. It is not easy/possible to insure against 
such loss of revenue. At present (1997) the (Conservative) government does not 
acknowledge any responsibility in the matter, nor offer financial assistance to tourist or civil 
aviation industries suffering losses through terrorism. It is possible that these industries may 
decide to combine in a public and damaging attack on this government's policy. 
Unfortunately any such publicity is likely to be an encouragement to terrorists. 
Terrorists may target tourism or civil aviation for a variety of reasons: hostility to secularism 
(religious fundamentalists), hostility to tourist development (FNLC - Corsican nationalists - 
who were also hostile to tourism developers, allegedly linked to the Mafia), hostility to certain 
nationalities (anti-American terrorists), economic warfare (Egyptian Islamists, ETA), to 
coerce the release of captured terrorists (13171-13), publicity (most attackers), etc. Whatever 
the terrorists' objective, one of the likely outcomes of attacks on tourism is a drop in revenue 
to civil aviation. 
240 Financial rimes. 22 Apr 1993, p vi 
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Terrorism can inflict revenue losses upon the civil aviation industry through a variety of 
mechanisms. Only occasionally is the industry the target; the prime examples being the 
Palestinian targeting of El Al and TWA. In these cases, although the reason for the attacks 
was political hostility to Israel, the airlines themselves were targeted for their commerc... 
contribution (El Al) or air services (TWA) to Israel. More often the industry is an unfortunate 
third party, an accessible surrogate for the state in which it is registered. 
The industry will also lose revenue if terrorism, or the fear thereof, results in a local or global 
reduction in air travel. In some cases the tourist industry is the victim of attack intended 
either to reduce the revenue from tourism, or to humiliate the government, or to gain 
publicity. In other cases, when hostility to foreign tourists is the motivation, the tourist 
industry itself is the target; hostility to tourists has not, to date, led to attacks on aviation. 
There is a number of countries in which tourist revenue has been depressed; one is Egypt. 
Another is Sri Lanka, where long-term-insurrection has seriously depressed tourism since 
1982. For several years British Airways withdrew its services entirely. Not only was revenue 
falling but there also were well-founded security fears. The destruction of an Air Lanka 
Tristar at Colombo Airport demonstrated the insurrectionists' capabilities. Tourists are 
sensitive to the presence of violence, even when the threat is of misfortune, and not of 
intent. 
In parenthesis it should be noted that damage to tourism and aviation revenues can be an 
objective of non-terrorist groups. Aviation was the target of semi-violent protest by animal 
rights groups in Great Britain in 1995, opposing the export of live animals to the Continent. 
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SeekingS241 gives examples of successful political campaigns which focus on reducing the 
tourism earnings of their targets. She mentions the successful use of boycotts on states not 
ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment by the National Organisation of Women 1977-82 
which cost them "losses of convention revenue ... in the range of millions of dollars. " More 
significantly she cites a second case: 
"A more dramatic case concerns Mexico in 1975. In November of that year the United 
Nations passed a resolution condemning Zionism as racism ... Mexico was 
hit hardest by the 
US boycott ... A Jewish campaign of advertising and letter writing against holidays in Mexico 
was instantly unleashed. 80% of (Mexico's) tourists were American and Mexico's (UN) vote 
cost $30m-$75m in vacation and convention trade ... Unfortunately 
for Mexico something 
similar had occurred some 15 years before when Mexico allowed itself to display sympathy 
with the nascent Cuban revolution ... A reduction in tourism, a withdrawal of funds and a fall 
in investment, (did) serious damage to the Mexican economy. 
The (1973) 'Jewish affair' demonstrates how dependent Mexico was - and remains - on the 
United States and how vulnerable to pressure from that quarter. With tourism supplying about 
13% of Mexico's current account earnings, and with a current account deficit of nearly 1,650 
million dollars in the first half of the year, the Jewish campaign was obviously extremely 
hurtful. 24211 
The Jewish lobby achieved its political objective of removing Mexico from the nations at the 
UN which condemned Zionism as racism (for which the conduct of Israel makes a good 
case). It was a clear demonstration that a malleable government is vulnerable to attacks on 
241 SEEKINGS, Kate. Politics of Tourism. London: Tourism International, 1993 
242 Latin America (1975). Mexico: An Eye for an Eye. In Kate SEEKINGS, ref 241, p 33 
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earnings from tourism. There is irony in the Jewish lobby's successful use of non-violence in 
a very dubious cause, while the Palestinian use of violence in a legitimate cause met with no 
success at all. 
The lesson to be drawn is not that attacks can effect a change in government policy. It is that 
non-violent pressure can be effective in situations where violence cannot. Governments can 
concede no more easily to terrorism than they could surrender in a conventional war. In each 
case capitulation would cost the government its credibility and it would inevitably lose office. 
Thus a government facing serious terrorist activity is fighting for its own life, and fight it 
therefore will. 
The reduction of tourist revenues (by peaceful means) offers a fittingly appropriate pressure 
upon countries careless of tourists' security. Greece was the source of profound irritation 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s both for its overt connivance with Palestinian terrorism and 
for its persistently and deeply flawed standards of aviation security. The final straw was the 
hijack of TWA 847 by Shiite terrorists after itl took off from Athens (14 June 1985). Their 
conduct to the passengers was particularly foul and barbaric - they tortured and murdered a 
young US Navy diver, Robert Stetham. The hijack lasted 17 days and became a'media 
event, with the cooperation of- if not at the instigation of - major US television networks. The 
US government was deeply angered and President Reagan issued a Travel Advisory on 
Greece (advice to US citizens not to visit Greece because of lax security). The result was 
"... a (suggested) 60% shortfall in tourist receipts, ... catastrophic to the 
Greek economy". 243 
243 WALLIS, Rodney, Combatting Air Tefforism. New York: Brassey's. 1993, p 47 
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The quantification of the effect of the Travel Advisory against Greece would require careful 
analysis. A series of events in 1985-86 depressed tourism and civil aviation: the TWA hijack 
14-30 June 1985, destruction of an Air India B747 over the Atlantic 23 June 1985, Egyptair 
hijack 23 November 1985 (another barbarically conducted action, culminating in a disastrous 
intervention by Egyptian commandos), paramilitary attacks on Rome and Vienna airports 27 
Dec 1985, bomb explosion on a TWA B727, over the Mediterranean, 2 Apr 1986, reprisal 
attack on Gadaffi by the US Air Force, 14 Apr 1986. Factors with no connection with 
terrorism also effect revenue, whether single events (radioactive explosion at Chernobyl, 26 
Apr 1986) or general considerations (global and local economic boom or recession). 
Therefore, to attribute a specific figure of revenue loss to any one of the terrorist events is 
foolhardy unless it has been derived from careful econometric study. However, as a 
consequence of their economic losses, the Greeks made efforts to improve Athens airport 
security. Experienced observers of Athens were not convinced of the quality and durability 
of the improvements; British Airways continued to supplement the result with its own 
separate security processing. Nonetheless the FAA Travel Advisory was established as a 
powerful economic weapon, and a useful energiser of vexatious governments. 
The events of 1985-86 had a clear effect upon the number of overseas tourists to the UK; 
the total 13,897 thousand visits was down 3.8% on 1985; the total visits from N. America was 
down 25%. Despite this the 1986 revenue from overseas residents was up 2% - though 
doubtless down on projection. 244 
Comparison of the effects on airline revenue of a serious aircraft accident and of terrorist 
attack would yield insight into passenger behaviour. There is unfortunately no generally 
244 CSO, ref 239, p3 
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agreed relationship between accidents and revenue. Each airline is a different case and, 
happily, there are too few accidents to generate a statistical overview. Surprisingly many of 
the serious bookS245 on air safety do not even examine the subject. Several learned 
PaperS246 examine the effects of accidents on airlines' stock market rating, but not on 
passenger revenue. The FAA Paper "Revenue Losses to Terrorism" observed that PanAm 
revenue was rising when one of its B747s was involved in the world's worst aviation 
accident, a collision with a KLM B747 (Tenerife, 27 March 1977,583 fatalities)247, and that 
PanAm's revenue continued to rise. 
The public is likely to perceive that airlines have much more control over air safety than over 
terrorism. Therefore a terrorist atrocity may be predicted to have a bigger effect on 
passenger confidence - and therefore revenue - than an accident of similar magnitude. In 
parenthesis it should be noted that PanAm was not seen to have been responsible for the 
Tenerife accident, whereas its contributory culpability for Lockerbie was widely alleged. This 
can only have increased its consequent revenue losses. 
According to a lengthy Economic Intelligence Unit report, terrorist activity in tourist 
destinations may be usefully categorised long-term, on-going and uncertain, or short term. 
Consequent revenue losses tend to fail into the same categories. 248. This same ElU report 
quotes a study (no reference given) by Israel's Ministry of Tourism which finds that, for 
external disruptions to tourism in Israel, the recovery period was approximately two years. 
245 TAYLOR, Laurie. Air Travel How Safe Is It? Oxford: Blackwell, 1988 
NADER, Ralph and, Wesley J. SMITH. Collision Course. Blue Ridge Summift: McGraw-Hill, 1994. - 
246 ROSE, Nancy L. Profitability and Product Quality: Economic Determinants of Airline Safety Perfornance. 
In Journal of Political Economy, October 1990, pp 944-964 
MITCHELL, Mark L, and Michael T MALONEY. Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Air 
Safety. Journal of Law and Economics, October 1989, pp 329 - 355 247 DENHAM, Terry. World Directory Of Airliner Crashes. Yeovil: PSL, 1996, p 138. 248 EIU Travel and Tourism Analyst, #2,1994. 
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The FAA Paper quoted above suggests that it takes uabout a year for the traveling public to 
get over a terrorist incident". The same paper points out that airline revenue recovery may 
in fact reflect effective management activity rather than the return of the lost passengers. 
There is therefore a suggestion that airline revenues may recover from a terrorist 
incident more quickly (perhaps a year) than countries' tourist revenues (perhaps two 
years). It is relevant that terrorism within a country tends to be persistent whereas 
terrorist attacks against aviation are normally single, isolated, instances. However the 
example of PanAm shows that perceived culpability is potentially fatal to an airline. 
In summary, to assess revenue losses from terrorism, account must be taken of the 
magnitude and duration of the terrorist threat, the volatility of the potential travellers 
(country of origin, purpose of visit), and the credibility of the counter-terrorist 
measures; due cognisance must also be given to factors unrelated to terrorism. 
5.9 Economic Effects On HMG 
The United Kingdom's earnings from overseas visitors was E7,891m (1992). 249 22% 
(El, 743m) of this sum derived from visitors from North America and perhaps 8% (E674M)250 
from Japanese visitors. North American visits to Greece dropped 25% at the time of 
Reagan's Travel Advisory (1985-86); Japanese visits to the UK dropped by 19% in the year 
of the Gulf War. Using those percentages as a index of tourist sensitivity to terrorism, the 
249 CSO, ref 239, p5 
250 Researcher' broad estimate from CSO data 
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suggested potential revenue loss to the UK is F-563m in a hypothetical year of worst case 
terrorism. [Revenue from other visitors is assumed constant; N American and Japanese are 
thought to be the most sensitive to danger]. This figure, estimated by the researcher, is in 
the same order as the $700m estimated loss of tourist earnings (Egypt, 1985), but nearly ten 
times (ignoring inflation) the estimated loss to Greece ($100m, 1985). As an indicator of 
potential losses to the UK (a country with law enforcement standards seen to be much 
higher than Egypt and a government of integrity and competence not expected in Greece), 
the figure is likely to be a serious overestimate. This is intended, and serves to underline 
the conclusion which follows. This figure, approximately 8% of average overseas visitor 
revenue (1977-1992, constant 1990 price) was exceeded by the revenue fall in 5 of the 16 
years reported. As a revenue loss it is therefore serious, but neither unprecedented nor 
cataclysmic to Britain's macro-economy. 
To the units of the micro-economy, guest houses, hotels, - tourist attractions, smaller or 
unprofitable airlines, etc, the concomitant revenue loss spells potential bankruptcy. This 
would not greatly concern - and thus would not influence - HMG, unless and until such 
organisations set up a high profile pressure group, and loudly and publicly harassed the 
government. 
The costs of terrorist attacks (PanAm 103 E500m, St Mary Axe E350m, annual tourism loss 
E563m) are huge. They make spectacular headlines and imply serious terrorist damage to 
the economy. This conclusion is erroneous. Most losses to terrorism in GB are borne not by 
HMG but bV commerce. In some cases the loss is covered by insurance and therefore 
should not be regarded as a loss, but as a business cost. In the other cases the loss is 
carried where it falls, by the retailer, hotelier, airline or other; they may not be in a position to 
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take out insurance, either because of the difficulty of quantifying the relationship between 
the loss and terrorist activity, or because there is no methodology to quantify the loss itself. 
In GB the infliction of an economic loss upon commerce, even if it bankrupts individuals or 
organisations, is in itself most unlikely to advance any terrorist cause. [An exception would 
be a commercial operation which was itself the target - not the incidental victim - of a hostile 
group; for example the cargo airline which was forced to stop transporting live animals to the 
Continent by animal rights organisations (GB, 1995). In such cases the terrorists are not 
seeking to reach beyond their victim to Her Majesty's relatively invulnerable Government-] 
Economic loss inflicted on commerce does nothing to advance the territorial ambitions of 
Irish republicans or the Palestinian dispossessed. 
The national economy of Great Britain is not vulnerable to terrorist action. The E350m costs 
of the St Mary Axe bomb (which did not fall upon HMG) represents 0.000496% of Great 
Britain's E706,21 1m GNP or 00116% of the E302,600m Total Government Expenditure 
(1995). 251 A notional threshold of public embarrassment, and thus real damage to the 
government, might be the need to raise income tax by 1p; this equates to E1,600m pa. 252 
Central government has been paying the costs of compensation in Northern Ireland since 
1974. The total for the past 22 years (1974-96) is E1,156m; it covers damage and injury 
from both terrorism and crime (which, in Northern Ireland, are not easily distinguished). 253 
Thus the costs of 22 years of serious terrorist violence do not amount to the equivalent of 1p 
on income tax in a single year. Between 1939 and 1945 the United Kingdom fought an 
economically crippling World War. In 1990 it dispatched its armed forces to resist Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of a country 4,000 miles from Great Britain. The BSE alarm is expected 
251 Interview, CSO, 12 Jul 1996 
252 Interview, The Treasury, 11 Jul 1996 
253 Criminal Compensation Expenditure, 1968-97. The Compensation Agency, Belfast 
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to cost Great Britain F-2,500m over 1996 and 1997.254 On Black Wednesday, the attempt to 
defend the pound against international currency pressure cost the country E4,00OM255 in one 
day. Seen in true perspective, the costs of economic damage inflicted by terrorists on Great 
Britain is of no significance. 
Other effects are important. Two can be distinguished: the first, public or political activity by 
the victims, will put some pressure on HMG. It is theoretically possible but highly improbable 
that they will influence HMG policy in the manner that the terrorists would wish; HMG's 
steadfast aversion to terrorism as a mechanism of negotiation is wel I-establ i shed. The 
second effect, the publicity given to the economic damage, is central to the progress of the 
terrorists' campaign. It provides the entry point to the battleground of real importance, the 
media. Not only do media reports of EN millions of damage generate self-satisfaction in the 
terrorists, but also the reports themselves give the illusion that the economic damage is of 
consequence. It is not. The publicity is. It gives solipsistic feedback to the terrorists and the 
false impression to the public that the terrorists have damaged the country. 
It is most unlikely that HIVIG will be moved from its policies by economic damage. In 
liberal democracies, the over-riding influence on government is public opinion; in 
Great Britain this relationship owes more to the principles of democracy than to 
cynical vote-chasing. It is in the media in which public opinion is determined : the 
government is tried - competent or inept, and the terronsts are examined - Davids 
fighting Goliath or mindless murderers achieving only their own satisfaction. 
Unfortunately, any mention in the media gives narcissistic encouragement to terrorists 
as well as implying credibility to their supposed cause. This gives rise to the 
254 BBC2 News, 0800 hours, 26 June 1996 
255 The Spectator. 12 Jul 96 
245 
fundamental dilemma which handicaps articulate counterterrorism. The more the 
government speaks out against terrorists, the more their importance is implied. 
Conversely, the fewer the statements refuting terrorists rationale and denigrating their 
methods, the more their apparent legitimacy. The real battleground is not runway 28R 
at Heathrow or St Mary Axe, but the courtroom of public opinion. 
Therefore, in assessing the economic costs of terrorism, it is important to be clear 
that, in themselves, they are of no consequence to the government of an affluent, 
stable, liberal democracy. Terrorists who believe that they can influence HMG policy 
by inflicting economic damage delude themselves. Unfortunately delusion and self- 
satisfaction are the mainsprings of terrorism. 
5.10 Conclusion: The Economic Failure of Attacks 
Contemporary international terrorists who target liberal democracies do so in 
furtherance of local territorial objectives (PIRA, Palestinian/Middle East groups) or of 
global ambitions (Islamists). Some seek to influence the policies of liberal democratic 
governments by inflicting economic damage. Political extremists (Red Army Faction, 
Red Brigades) or single-issue terrorists (Animal Liberation Front) may see economic 
damage as an end in itself, though in all probability it is not damage but disruption of 
activity which is their objective. In general terms they are not a current threat to civil 
aviation. 
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Stable, affluent, liberal democracies have economies and governments which can 
withstand the devastation of full-scale war. It is not possible for terrorists to inflict 
economic damage upon them which they could not sustain. Not even by recourse to 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Serious escalation by terrorists of their 
activities would provoke their obliteration long before they achieved their alms. 
Economic damage, although powerless directly to harm government, can be 
catastrophic to commerce. In Great Britain the potential costs of a bombing campaign 
on the mainland led reinsurers - risk assessors par excellence - to withdraw from the 
market (1993). Active terrorism can reduce tourist revenue to Great Britain by perhaps 
E560m in a single year, threatening bankruptcy to many businesses. Loss of 
passenger revenue to a major airline, British Airways, may amount to ElOm-E20M for a 
single, non-culpable event. For an event in which there were serious allegations of 
culpability (PanAm 103), the cost of forfeited passenger revenue was $400M. 
Economic damage is not threatening to government; it is life-threatening to 
commerce. This is ironic; the government, the target of terrorism is unscathed; 
commerce, inconsequential to the terrorists, may be devastated. 
The irony is compounded in Great Britain. HMG espouses a two-pronged policy; it 
imposes upon its civil aviation industry (perhaps) the highest standards of aviation 
security in the world, whilst itself making (probably) the smallest financial contribution 
in the world. It neither funds the industry's costs of aviation security nor pays the 
industry's premiums for War Risk insurance (which covers acts of terrorism). It 
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recovers the associated police costs from the industry. HMG's policy brings to mind 
the phrase 'power without responsibility'. 
The industry has not made thoughtful or serious endeavours to contest this situation. 
It does not appear to have an established methodology with which to cost the effects 
of attacks, or with which to calculate the revenue loss arising from the disruption or 
non-availability of aircraft. It is thus not in a position to assess the total costs of 
terrorist disruption of its operations; therefore it cannot apply careful cost 
management, nor assess the desirability of taking out insurance against such losses, 
nor challenge HMG with the financial facts. 
HMG's two-pronged policy has inflicted significant damage upon the industry; the 
concomitant security costs have undermined its international competitiveness; the 
survival of marginal operators has been prejudiced. The industry has contributed to 
its predicament; its failure to research its security costs has prevented it from making 
any credible protest. Thus the injury to the economy of Great Britain has been self- 
inflicted, the product of the policy of HMG, compounded by the acquiescence of the 
civil aviation industry. 
This section of the research concludes that the costs of economic damage to an 
affluent liberal democracy (or indeed to any affluent country) do not advance a 
terrorist cause by one iota. However the consequent publicity is of great importance. 
It gives solipsistic satisfaction to the terrorists and their supporters. it gives the 
general public the impression that the economic damage is important. The 
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government, having failed to prevent the attack, is placed in a situation from which it 
is difficult to emerge with an enhanced reputation; stem measures will be criticised by 
civil rights activists and by terrorist fellow-travellers, and weak measures by those 
unsympathetic to murder. Economic damage, itself an irrelevance, is an entree to the 
key arena, where terronst resolve and anti-terrorist resolve meet and where the 
public's attitude to the conflict is decided. 
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6. THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON AVIATION 
"it is now for the Geneva institution to prove that it intends to live up to the confidence placed in it ... It is for 
you .... to derive from the ... outrage the lesson it teaches in order that international solidarity, effectively put 
into practice, may render such crimes impossible in the future ... A whole new set of international regulations 
must be drawn up. Political crimes must be suppressed effectively by international measures. " 
(M. LAVAL. French Representative, League of Nations Council Debate on International Terrorism, Nov 
1934) 256 
6.1 Introduction 
The bounds of international cooperation are tightly circumscribed by national 
sovereignty, autonomy and pride. There are grave differences between nations in 
matters of political philosophy, attitudes to and definitions of "political 11 offences, 
traditions of political asylum, legal codes, legal penalties and in their international 
relations with vexatious nations. Commercial interests have the power to dominate all 
of these for good or for evil. It is for good when trade ties forge links and friendly 
relationships which reduce the possibility of hostilities. it is for evil when lucrative 
trade is preferred to political action against atrocity. 
This research suggests that the first Palestinian attacks on aviation (1968) were the 
inauguration of a new phenomenon, modem international terrorism. The world, not 
suprisingly, was unprepared. One international measure, the Tokyo Convention (14 
Sept 1963), was in force. It gave formal powers to the aircraft commander and gave 
256 M Laval's later actions were not as fine as these words 
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territorial jurisdiction over the aircraft to certain -states, including the state of registry 
of the aircraft. The value of international conventions is examined in this Section. In 
essence they are ineffective unless translated into national policy. At the time of the 
first Palestinian hijack (23 Jul 1968) the number of countries which had ratified the 
Tokyo Convention was a grand total of five: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and 
the Philippines. Few nations had any reason to be concerned with aviation security. 
There was no apparent need for national commitment to international cooperation. 
Since 1968 the liberal democracies have improved their unity against international 
terrorism. The fact that several were driven to this position by self-interest, having 
declined to respond to the needs of others, is a window on the realities of 
international cooperation. And it is to the realities that attention should be directed. It 
is easy to compile a lengthy record of the labours of international organisations and 
the minutiae of their conventions and standards and recommendations and 
agreements. It is also misleading. To utilitarians their value is not their number but 
the realities of their implementation. Few stand up to investigation. 
The British response to attacks on aviation has been amongst the best, if not the best, 
in the world. HMG's conduct has been laudable. The evidence is that both the system 
and the individuals involved emerge with credit. There has been a degree of openness 
in HMG which contrasts favourably with the guarded or arcane conduct of many 
governments. HMG actively has consulted a full range of interests and outside 
expertise through the mechanisms of NASC and the Select Committee on Transport. 
Ministers, politicians and civil servants have made themselves available on important 
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matters. Nonetheless there is no evidence of any attempt to make a holistic, strategic 
approach to aviation security (see Section 9). As a result the British response has 
been, and remains, ad hoc. There has been a serious structural failing, the failure of 
HMG to develop a cooperative relationship with industry. 'This is closely allied to the 
doctrinal predisposition of the Conservative administration (1979-1997) to transfer 
aviation security costs to industry. 
Creditable and effective though the British response has been, the present attitudes 
and structure do not provide a satisfactory basis for the future progress of aviation 
security. 
6.2 Response: The Challenge 
6.2.1 At National Level 
Aviation security is a joint venture of government and commerce. Many aspects of 
government have to be coordinated: 'politicians, ministries, police, and intelligence. All 
components of the aviation industry have a part to play. Thus a complicated matrix evolves. 
In few countries will there be one man in charge overall. In a major liberal democracy the 
Prime Minister may theoretically be the ultimate authority; in practice he is less likely to 
direct progress than to encourage consensus. In the absence of a powerful directing 
command structure and given the fundamental conflict between the priorities of government 
and industry, the scale of the task and the normal interdepartmental rivalries, it is inevitable 
that a nation's security countermeasures will be flawed. 
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6.2.2 At International Level 
The matrix takes a different form in each country, supported by a different legal system, by a 
different level of competence and, most important of all, by a different level of commitment. 
To the international community falls the impossible task of coordinating these disparate 
national performances into a uniform international product. The international community is 
not widely known for its ability to act, let alone to act in coordination on a difficult, extensive, 
and highly contentious issue. The community includes both the countries which sponsor 
terrorism and the countries which are the targets of that terrorism. The picture is complicated 
by frequent role reversal: few countries are so principled as to eschew any involvement with 
terrorism (widely defined); there is no equivalent of a mutual ban on nuclear weapons. Most 
countries are selectively sympathetic to terrorism, condoning, if not facilitating, its use 
against their enemies. Least creditable of all are those countries which allow terrorists free 
rein to operate against their friends, having first negotiated immunity for themselves (6-3.2). 
6.2.3 International Law 
One fundamental principle underlies all international law: the protection of national 
sovereignty. From this derives the system whereby Conventions agreed at the United 
Nations are not binding upon a member country until ratified by its national government. 
Ratification is only the first step. It is not supported in international law by a mechanism of 
enforcement. Recalcitrants can be subjected to diplomatic cajolery. The option of trade 
sanctions is difficult to agree and more difficult to enforce. Much more important than 
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ratification is the next step: commitment to implementation, because it is only at national 
level that implementation can be achieved. 
In the cases of countries themselves the targets of terrorism, the issue is more a matter of 
competence than of commitment. To countries not targeted, commitment is a burden. A 
previously neutral country may be put into the firing line by a stance against terrorism; it will 
have to enact domestic legislation and incur heavy costs primarily for the benefit of foreign 
nationals; it may be under pressure to accept the legislative competence of other nations (in 
their definition of terrorist offences, the methods of their police, and the integrity of their 
courts), and the extra-territorial application of their technical standards (aviation security 
procedures). 
It may be regrettable, but it is not surprising that nations will dilute their sovereignty only in 
response to their own need, and not in response to the predicament of other nations. The 
manifestations of this have been criticised by many observers. In a paper which provides a 
useful survey of Conventions on aviation, a leading international lawyer wrote: 
"Between 1930 and 1967, the highest number of hijackings of aircraft in any year was six. But 
in 1968 the numberjumped to 38 ... In 1969 the total was 82 ... Hence ICAO responded with 
the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. What was 
interesting to observe in the negotiations was that those states which believed that they were, for 
one reason or another, immune from hijacking were constantly dragging their feet. But as soon 
as one of their aircraft became the target of a hijack, they immediately turned into ultra 
hawks. "257 
257 CHENG, Bin. Aviation, Criminal Jurisdiction and Terrorism: the Hague Extradition/Prosecution Formula, 
and Attacks at Airports. In Bin CHENG & BROWN. Contemporaq Fýroblems in Intemational Law. 
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6.2.4 The Nature of Umbrella Organisations 
Organisations' characteristics can be identified; 258amongst others are its purpose, structure, 
and ability to exercise control. Clearly there are major differences in character between 
political, law enforcement, military, commercial, and umbrella organisations. All of these are 
involved in the response to attacks on aviation. 
Umbrella organisations (ie those whose purpose is to represent the interests of their 
members) are generally ill-suited to managing change, by reason of their lack of authority 
over their members, the political nature of their top, decision-making, layer, and of the 
attitudes of their staff. 259 They are central to the management of aviation security. 
They are grouped at the two extremes of a spectrum. Highest in status is the United Nations 
and its aviation satellite, ICAO; it represents the governments of the world. The UN General 
Assembly is the point of international decision, though the word 'decision' is misleading; it 
has overtones of decisiveness and commitment, singularly inappropriate to issues which are 
not 'decided' or 'resolved', but merely subjected to a vote, which can then be ignored in part 
or in whole by any or all parties, including those who voted in support. There are no 
authoritative mechanisms for monitoring performance or for enforcing standards, unless the 
Security Council agrees to act. The 'decision' of lesser bodies, the General Assembly or 
ICAO, does not therefore decide anything outside the United Nations; it only removes the 
issue from the agenda, and thus effects only the proceedings within the United Nations. 
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London: Stevens & Sons, 1988 
This point is not now disputed. Seminal works on the subject are MARCH, James & Herbert SIMON 
Organizations. New York: Wiley. 1958, and Chris ARGYRIS, Personaffly And Organization. New 
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York. Harper, 1957. 
There are a few exceptions, NATO being the most notable 
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Beneath the UN in the hierarchy are the various groupings of nations. In Europe the 
organisation with involvement in aviation security is not the European Commission but the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), based in Paris. Membership derives solely 
from geographical proximity which, in itself, provides little motivation for joint action. 
Lowest in the pecking order are the umbrella organisations which represent not nations but 
interested parties: passengers, pilots, other staff, airlines, and airports. This group is a 
confusing alphabet soup, IATA, ACI, AEA, AOA, IFALPA, ITF, UPU, BALPA, BATA, BARUK 
IAPA, IOCU, AUC, WTTC (see Glossary) which conceals a rich mix of organisations, varying 
greatly in commitment, competence, size, and purpose. At one extreme is IATA; the 
International Air Transport Association, the organisation which represents the world's 
airlines. At the other extreme are organisations which represent passengers. They normally 
lack both expertise and power. 
This spectrum is of status. It is not of executive power. Umbrella organisations are not 
normally accorded, by those whom they represent, authority over those whom they 
represent. Even within the limited extent to which they are accorded authority, they have to 
be extremely cautious in its exercise, lest offended members withdraw from membership. 
Thus progress on any subject is likely to be laboured, any formal step being preceded by 
lengthy informal soundings, any plenary discussions being preceded by technical sub-group 
discussions, any resolution being couched in irresolute, anodyne language, and in no 
circumstances any effective enforcement mechanism being established. 
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To a greater or lesser degree, the overriding concern of all the organisations listed above is 
to retain all members in membership. The most senior level of the organisation is therefore 
political; it is at this level that the policy on a technical issue is decided. 
An international umbrella organisation such as ECAC or IATA has some features in common 
with the national decision-making mechanism in a democracy; interested parties have the 
opportunity to seek to press their viewpoint before the issue is decided by a democratic 
process. However the differences are paramount. A leading democratic nation has a need 
to direct the activities of its executive agencies, ministries, police, airports, et al; it has a 
more or less coherent policy which shapes its decisions; it has high calibre permanent staff 
(civil service), motivated by a tradition of public service; it has an overall decision-making 
bodY (the Cabinet in GB). Most important of all, it has authority over its constituent parts 
which they not only acknowledge but also rely upon for their direction and for their own 
authority. In final analysis the international umbrella organisation is likely to have none of 
these. 
The structure of umbrella organisations does not encourage forcefulness in their personnel. 
The most senior positions may be filled by compromise candidates or perhaps worse, by 
individuals whom constituent organisations are seeking to discard. The researcher has seen 
this mechanism at work in IFALPA for many years. Member Associations will often 
manouevre to IFALPA pilots who are in conflict with their colleagues, or as a reward for long 
service. Thus the international organisation may find that a preponderance of its directors 
are old or difficult, or both. The occasional high calibre individual will find himself isolated; 
he is unlikely - by reason of age or temperament - to remain in office for long enough to 
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effect lasting improvements. Similar observations have been made about IATA 260. The 
permanent staff of such organisations - in self-defence - learn to eschew initiative and 
forcefulness of activity, both of which are sources of discomfort to their directors, and 
therefore of hazard to themselves. In international organisations (UN, ECAC, IATA) which 
offer salaries or benefits (tax-exemption) of a generosity unobtainable elsewhere, there is an 
added structural predisposition for the staff to lie low in the interests of job security. The 
formulation of performance targets, let alone their agreement, is inherently difficult for 
umbrella organisations. Therefore objective measurement of their competence is difficult to 
the degree that it is hardly attempted. Those involved in international organisations are 
unkindly said to be in the happy position of being paid by all but answering to none. 
Although umbrella organisations can and do develop collective policies when a common 
interest has been clearly established, their value should not generally be measured by their 
capacity for executive action, which is low. Their value is as a forum for the communication 
of political standpoints, and thus as a means of managing conflicts. They also provide a 
forum for the exchange of technical information, which in aviation security enables the 
technically more advanced to assist and encourage the others towards higher standards. 
Thus umbrella organisations, despite structural defects and despite appearances, do 
fulfil a valuable role. They are catalysts in the process of change. 
2W Interviews with serving and former IATA senior staff. 
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6.3 The International Response 
6.3.1 Sovereignty And Host-State Responsibility 
When country A lays down the aviation security standards required of its airline, an 
immediate problem arises when one of its aircraft lands in country B. Who is to be the 
provider of those standards? Is it to be the police, airport or other agencies of country B, 
who would thus be subject to the demands of country A? Or is country A to be permitted to 
establish its own operation, with mini-sovereignty on the territory of country B? In any case, 
this is likely to be unfeasible for practical reasons of terminal design. 
The obvious answer is for the two countries to adopt common standards. This would 
eliminate the most serious problem, albeit leaving some difficult questions on inspection, and 
on legal liability. The researcher knows of no two countries (1997) which have either agreed 
a Common set of procedures, or which have agreed to accept each others procedures. This 
is an indication of the extreme difficulty of translating even the friendliest of relations into a 
bilateral agreement on a controversial issue. Host-state responsibility remains an intractable 
problem and, given Great Britain's high aviation security standards, continues to prejudice 
British aircraft overseas. At the time of writing, 28 years after Palestinian attacks on aviation 
began and 8 years after the atrocity of Lockerbie, Great Britain has neither bilaterals nor 
alliances on aviation security standards with any other country; Eurosceptics will note, 
without surprise, that this includes Great Britain's European partners. 
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It is more surprising that Great Britain and the USA, the most solid of allies in times of 
trouble, have not risen to the new challenge presented by terrorism. The USA's unstinting 
financial and military support of Israel, despite the latter's staggering record of self- 
advancement by misconduct, has gained it the enmity of the most virulent aviation terrorists. 
It has therefore deployed its considerable powers to protect its international aviation 
operations, including inspections of security overseas. US inspection of British security 
enforcement is considered by HMG to be an unacceptable infringement of sovereignty. The 
impasse has been resolved by allowing US inspections of US airlines' procedures only. 
Whilst at first sight the US insistence upon its airlines being provided with the highest 
standards of security overseas seems to be entirely admirable, its inability to provide the 
same standards in its own territory is a serious lacuna by no means unprecedented in 
American international conduct. Additionally, until the loss of TWA 800, (17 JuI1996) the US 
Government had applied minimal security standards to its domestic air services, and on very 
tenuous grounds; as a result, security at American airports was inconsistent to a degree that 
would have been intolerable to an efficiently managed British airport. Additionally, US 
carriers, who are rightly known for the paucity of their commercial scruples, have sought to 
exploit security to their advantage. In Great Britain there is therefore considerable 
scepticism about American conduct. If the USA attempts to implement the Hatch 
Amendment, it will find itself isolated and facing unanimous opposition from the international 
community. 
The fact remains that the USA has been prepared to commit the ultimate diplomatic solecism 
- challenge national sovereignty - to safeguard the lives of those who fly on its aircraft. It 
showed similar understandable impatience with international sloth and ineptitude by 
intercepting an Egyptian aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers over the Mediterranean 
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(11 Oct 1985), and by arresting Fawaz Yunis, a hijacker, in international waters (13 Sept 
1987). Extra-territorial action is legitimised by US domestic anti-terrorist legislation, the 
international legitimacy of which is strongly questioned 261 . Certainly such actions create a 
very dangerous precedent; many nations face terrorist adversaries; if each felt free to 
intercept civil aircraft on which one was, or might be, travelling, then civil aviation would be 
seriously endangered. However the US actions were more a product of frustration at the 
shabby conduct of other governments (Egyptian and Italian in the above cases) than of US 
gung-ho. In the absence of international procedures and of national integrity, the targets of 
terrorism cannot be blamed for fending for themselves. 
HMG has been steadfast in its adherence to the principle of national sovereignty. It has 
doubtless been driven by unwillingness to concede British national sovereignty, whether to 
the USA wishing to inspect UK security procedures, or to Israel and Middle Eastern 
countries wishing to arm their security personnel, or to other encroachments on the British 
rule of law. The consequence is that HMG is hamstrung, and cannot coerce fellow-countries 
into remedying aviation security deficiencies. This gives rise to the major problem: how to 
ensure that adequate standards of security are applied to British aircraft overseas. 
The first possibility is that of persuasion by diplomatic pressure. The second is coercion of 
British airlines to guarantee standards overseas. The third is to view the problem as 
insoluble, and avoid it. In practice all three are essayed. 
One of the advances in British aviation security which followed Lockerbie was the active 
participation of our diplomats overseas. Prior to Lockerbie their involvement had been 
261 CASSESE, Antonio. Terrmism, Politics and Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989 
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minimal and without specialist training. Following Lockerbie, Post Aviation Security Officers 
(PASO) were established in all major embassies. Properly briefed on the importance and 
detail of aviation security, they began to fulfil a valuable role in the monitoring of local 
standards, and in the diplomatic encouragement of improvement. 
The Department of Transport was repeatedly pressed (1989-1993) by British airlines and by 
the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) to tackle the issue of security standards 
overseas. In 1990 the DoT established a senior post, Principal Aviation Security Inspector 
(Overseas). Until 1994 he and his staff of Inspectors carried out inspections overseas.. 
Their work was valuable, offering expertise and encouragement to airport and security 
managers. Their potential was circumscribed by their want of means of enforcement. The 
researcher met one Inspector at an airport with serious security deficiencies. The Inspector, 
asked about his powers to coerce rectification, replied that HMG had none. He explained 
that normal procedure was to alert the US Federal Aviation Agency, and to indicate that a 
strong intervention would be to mutual advantage. 262 BALPA repeatedly pressed HMG to be 
more forceful in its relations with recalcitrant countries; the pilots' concept was that 
passengers on British aircraft should be assured that every possible step had been taken to 
ensure their safety and security. HMG did not find it possible to exceed the bounds of 
normal diplomacy. Tactfully, British overseas inspections were restricted (in theory) to British 
airline operations. In practice it is not possible to isolate such operations from those of the 
airport. The DoT thus accumulated a file of evidence of aviation security deficiencies which it 
was powerless to remedy. It therefore ceased to carry out overseas inspections, charging 
British airlines with the responsibility (and liability) of ensuring adequate standards, a task 
2Q Interview with DoT Inspector, 1992 
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beyond the capabilities of HMG. This is one of the reasons for the serious tensions that exist 
between the industry and HMG. 
It was never persuaded to issue US-style Travel Advisories (advising passengers not to 
travel to certain destinations, or informing them of observed security deficiencies). Such 
advisories can have great impact on tourist revenues, and a salutary effect; the example of 
Greece (1985) has been discussed (5.8). 
A similar mechanism does exist. It is used by the Foreign Office to inform British nationals of 
locales made dangerous by criminal, insurrectionist or other activities. It has yet to be used 
to embarrass governments with flawed aviation security standards. There are good reasons 
for this course of inaction, as well as bad ones. Firstly it is undesirable to inform terrorists of 
the airports which professionals assess as insecure. Secondly there was (1990-95) the 
difficulty of achieving the consistency to which HMG's culture of integrity aspires. Many, if 
not most, airports of the Third World had desultory security standards by reason of poverty 
or incompetence or corruption. Some of the world's most scrupulous and competent 
countries had security standards which were generally excellent, but which included one or 
more major deficiencies. Amongst these was Great Britain. Some close allies had 
standards that were dismally inadequate, but accompanied by an amour propre of extreme 
sensitivity. 
France was the classic example. Prior to recent moves to privatise airports, security was the 
responsibility of a multitude of rival police forces and agencies. BALPA received more 
reports from pilots on deficiencies at Paris Charles de Gaulle than on any other single airport 
in the world. Delegates to international security conferences in Paris used to offer modest 
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bets that the security officer at Paris CDG responsible for inspecting cabin baggage would 
not be looking at his x-ray screen as the baggage passed through; few were willing to bet 
against what was assessed as a certainty. The Foreign Office reported that its best efforts, 
deployed over several years, had been unavailing. 
The diplomatic repercussions of issuing a Trade Advisory on flights to Paris would have 
been daunting. Thus the dilemma is whether Travel Advisories should reflect only standards 
of security, or whether they should be issued in cognisance of wider issues. This is a 
manifestation of the single issue versus multiple agenda dilemma which always arises when 
a technical issue is referred to a senior, political level for final decision. 
The criterion in all such circumstances should be: how is security best advanced? The 
answer depends upon the nation involved. In the USA recourse might be made to powerful 
Public interest organisations; in France intimations might be made to a senior politician of 
Possible personal public embarrassment; in Byzantine Greece the international pressure of a 
Travel Advisory might be the best means of obtaining the required wide-spectrum response; 
in Africa the allocation of funds to the purchase of equipment and political commitment would 
give best results. The danger of strong action which will be deeply resented by the 
recipient, is that the relationship between the two countries will be badly damaged, to the 
prejudice of other issues. The USA was in an overwhelmingly powerful position (1985) 
relative to Greece, and so was impervious to a damaged relationship. Great Britain is not in 
the same happy position relative to France. 
At the ECAC Aviation Security Symposium in Paris (November 1990) a delegate from the 
industry, to retrieve debate from the comfortable question of difficulties in Africa to the less 
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comfortable subject of incompetence in Europe, cited in a speech "one airport in Europe 
about which had generated more complaints from pilots than the whole of Africa". Many 
delegates were well aware that the airport in question was Paris Charles de Gaulle, and 
awaited, with interest, the possible and entirely justified condemnation of French security 
standards. However the speaker obviously decided that a public statement would have been 
a discourtesy and counterproductive. Thus the Foreign Office was not alone in its caution. 
Having observed the slow pace of improvement of European aviation security since 1992, 
the researcher feels that an occasional discourtesy would have been worthwhile. 
Such caution is not the product only of good reasons. There are less worthy reasons. They 
all stem from HMG's reluctance to place in the public domain its assessment that security of 
Country X is inadequate. Firstly this invites tit-for-tat public exposure of security deficiencies 
in Great Britain; these may indeed be few but would undoubtedly be sensationalised by 
journalists. Secondly it invites public criticism of HMG's failure to influence Country X to 
remedy the situation. Thirdly it invites accusations of irresponsibility if British airlines 
continue to fly to the deficient airport. Fourthly it disrupts the plans of the travelling public, 
and the schedules and profitability of British airlines. Finally it conflicts with the mores of 
diplomacy, an art form traditionally patient and private. 
HMG has retreated from the issue of security standards overseas. The DOT has 
downgraded the post of Principal Aviation Security Inspector (Overseas) and redeployed 
the staff to other duties. It has resolutely refused to accept responsibility for the security of 
British aircraft overseas. Aviation terrorist activity (1968-96) has never reached the level at 
Which the needs of aviation security have taken priority over national sovereignty and pride. 
265 
HMG may earn approval for its realistic assessment of the extreme difficulty of the 
issue. However it has passed the responsibility for security standards overseas on to 
British airlines. Thus the British civil aviation industry, with limited resources, the 
commercial imperative of profitability, no tax-raising powers and no embassies 
overseas, has the responsibility - and legal liability - to achieve something beyond the 
powers of Her Majesty's Government. 
6.3.2 Sauve Qui Peut and Host-State Irresponsibility 
When Middle Eastern terrorists embarked upon attacks on aviation their first target was their 
enemy, Israel (1968-69). They widened their targeting to include the USA (31 Oct 1969,21 
Dec 1969), Austria and Switzerland (21 Feb 1970), Greece (22 Jul 1970) and Great Britain 
(9 Sept 1970). Germany was first attacked in 1972 (22 Feb), and France was not targeted 
until 1976 (27 Jun - the Entebbe incident). Additionally Germany (10 Feb 1970), Italy (23 Jul 
1968), France (30 Sept 1970) and Switzerland (18 Feb 1969) had been the site for attacks 
on other targets. Thus two separate problems were being posed by terrorists: targeting of a 
nation's aircraft and utilisation of a nation's territory as a battleground. 
The reaction of European governments was to seek to avoid being drawn into the conflict. 
This was both understandable and correct, given the likely wishes of their electorate. The 
question to be examined is to what extent governments bought off terrorists. 
Knee-jerk condemnation of governments negotiating with terrorists is not thoughtful. Part of 
a government's responsibility is to safeguard its citizens' lives by making peace with the 
nation's enemies and potential enemies. Wars end in peace treaties between adversaries 
who have devoted the preceding years to killing the relatives and friends of the negotiators 
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opposite. And, obviously desirable though cessation of hostilities may be, it is a source Of 
grave difficulty to nations; demands of unconditional surrender have prolonged many a 
conflict and cost many lives which otherwise would have been spared (the Allies 1944). 
[Equally, peace terms which allow enemy forces and armour to escape, are a similar failure 
of statesmanship (Kuwait 1991)]. 
Peace negotiation with terrorism has its own, and perhaps greater, problems. Firstly, 
terrorists, unlike a state, are not a legal entity; nations are therefore reluctant to "recognise" 
them; to negotiate with them is often seen as implicit recognition. Secondly, the diplomatic 
conventions of war do not apply to terrorist activity - there is no simple recourse to the 
accepted status of neutrality. Thirdly, it is the norm, that a terrorist group will have some 
sympathisers outside its enemy nation (Israel and the Jewish lobby, the Palestinians and 
most Middle Eastern emigrants, the IRA and Irish-Americans, etc). Extensive emigration, 
and the freedoms of liberal democracies translate into widespread terrorist support activities, 
which include pressure on government to allow these activities as a political freedom. 
Government difficulties are compounded when the target nation does not proscribe the 
terrorist organisation, but with good intentions acknowledges them in order to facilitate 
negotiations (Tamil Tigers 1996). How then can other governments ban their supporters? 
Finally, and perhaps paradoxically, it is less easy to coerce terrorists than nations. Nations 
can be bombed into signing and adhering to peace treaties; terrorists are not only more 
elusive, but better protected from harsh countermeasures by public sympathy - however ill- 
informed. Great Britain and the USA, the Castor and Pollux of the United Nations, have 
achieved only fragile cooperation against the IRA. Little wonder that the European 
Community prefers to engage the subject of cucumbers than that of international terrorism. 
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The two decades (1968-88) from the inception of international aviation terrorism to the 
Lockerbie atrocity was a period in which liberal democratic governments struggled to decide 
their policy towards international terrorism. Wadi Haddad's statement quoted earlier - if you 
are not for us, you're against us - is to be taken seriously only as the legitimising of terrorist 
actions. It was not a policy which decided terrorist targeting. Most early Palestinian attacks 
on aircraft (other than their enemy, El Al) had the simple and specific objective of coercing 
the release of one or more captured terrorists (USA - 29 Aug 1969, Greece - 22 Jul 1970, 
USA, Switzerland, GB - Sept 1970). Thus for a government seeking to keep out of the 
conflict, the first desideratum was not to have terrorists in its custody (and there were many 
instances of energetic inter-government pass the parcel )263. 
The next step was to persuade terrorists to agree not to carry out operations on the nation's 
territory or against its nationals. Such agreements effectively offer the terrorists diplomatic 
immunity. Terrorists therefore have the freedom of one nation to operate against that 
nation's closest allies. Connivance of Italian and Greek and French governments with Middle 
Eastern terrorists is documented, and widely believed . 
26' They are all members both of 
NATO and the EC. All have had, at some time in recent decades, a regime little admired 
abroad by reason of its criminality, corruption or self-bestowed divine right to absolute 
selfishness. It is clear that trade and diplomatic ties with their allies were stronger than the 
strains of their clandestine policy towards terrorism. Allegations have been made against 
other governments but no evidence has been published. 
263 Information from security expert 264 Yonah ALEXANDER & Dennis A PLUCHINSKY. European Terrorism Today and Tornorrow. New York: 
Brasseys, 1992 
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Were hard evidence of Britain's European partners consorting with terrorists to be published, 
an interesting situation would arise. The UK's strong alliance with the USA has not been 
seriously threatened by Irish-American support for the IRA; this support has come not from 
the US government, but from within a small community. Europe is different in three respects. 
Britain's ties with, and affection for, Europe are relatively fragile. Several countries in 
Europe have been either enemies or less than heroic allies in two World Wars. Connivance 
with terrorism in Europe has been at government, not ethnic minority, level. And Great 
Britain's attitude to Brussels, the supposed harmoniser of national interests, is one of deep 
scepticism. If the European Continent provides a safe haven for future terrorist attacks on 
Great Britain, a great strain will be put on Britain's ties with Europe. 
This is an unlikely scenario. Countries who have supped with terrorists have all found that 
no spoon is long enough. France allegedly bought immunity in the 1970s and 1980s; the 
breakdown in the agreement was marked by a series of atrocities in Paris (1985/86). Her 
alleged breach of agreement with the terrorist-sponsoring regime of Iran"' (to release Anis 
Naccache imprisoned in France for the attempted murder of former Iranian Prime Minister, 
Shapour Baktiar in Paris) may have prompted the mid-air sabotage of a UTA DC-1 0 (19 Sept 
89) in reprisal. The Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, who allegedly allowed PLO terrorists 
to operate out of Italy266 was himself murdered by the Red Brigades (9 May 1978). 
By the mid 1990s the widespread terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s (Red Army Faction, 
Action Directe, Red Brigades, Moluccan separatists, and Palestinian groups) had abated, 
having taught governments a hard lesson in terrorist management. It had forged a degree of 
265 CLUTTERBUCK, Richard. Negotiating with Terrorists. T&PV4 (4) Winter 1992, p 275. 266 RIMANELLI, Marco. Italian Terrorism and International Ties. In Yonah ALEXANDER & Dennis A 
PLUCHINSKY, ref 264, p 162 
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unity and had led to groupings of nations seeking a common stance (G7, Trevi). Currently 
(1997), France is facing active terrorism in a spill-over from the Islamic insurrection in 
Algeria. Piquantly, in view of her ambiguous, if not duplicitous role in previous decades, she 
is now seeking Great Britain's cooperation in detaining activists. Thus Europe slowly and 
tardily is developing a greater commitment to combating terrorism. 
Questions of competence are still unanswered. Failed, or botched extradition proceedings 
are still reported. 267 Terrorists emerge free from court proceedings. Great Britain, whose 
commitment to fighting terrorism cannot be doubted by any serious observer, is facing 
criticism from many countries for permitting political activists to use London as a base for 
fermenting dissent against friendly Middle Eastern regimes. 268 
The question is no longer one of duplicity, or of commitment; it is one of competence. 
Governments have not yet formulated a policy, and legitimised it with legalisationo 
which copes with the presence of possible supporters of terrorism against other 
countries. However the past decades have demonstrated that terrorism is a problem 
common to half the countries of the world, and one which cannot be tackled 
successfully in the absence of a united front. The feebleness of connivance with 
terrorism has been exposed. 
267 The Times. End August 1996, Denmark to UK 
268 The Times. 7 Sept 1996, p7 
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6.3.3 International Action and Enactments * UN and ICAO 
The several Conventions enacted by ICAO have been well-explored from legal and 
other viewpointS. 21' The aspect relevant to this research is their practical value. 
These enactments provide a justification in international law for national legislation 
and conduct. This is valuable to nations wishing to take positive action against 
aviation terrorism. As already discussed, the enactments are not in practice 
enforceable against recalcitrant nations; at best they provide grounds for diplomatic 
pressure. 
Some opposition to "anti-terrorist" enactment is understandable. The vexatious and 
unresolved issue of definition is central to the drafting of legislation. The difficulties which 
arise are manifest in UN proceedings. As an example, in the UN debate on a Convention on 
Hostages (1980) Middle Eastern and African countries were not prepared to agree to the 
outlawing of national liberation movements . 
270 This putative Convention, initiated by the 
General Assembly on 4 October 1976, was another example of response following events: 
the hostages held at Entebbe (26 Jun 1976) and the terrorist occupation of the German 
embassy in Stockholm (24 April 1975). The African countries resented the (extra-territorial) 
Entebbe rescue operation (29 Jun 1976). As a result Article 12 of the Convention permitted 
hostage-taking by national liberation movements, although this was already prohibited under 
the June 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. Thus the attempt Io 
269 For example, FALLER, E. Aviation Security: The Role Of ICAO InSafeguarding International Civil Aviation 
270 
Against Acts Of Unlawful Interference. Annals of Air and Space Law 1,1992 pp 369-381 
ASTON, Clive. The LIN Convention of Aerial Hostages. In WILKINSON, Paul, ed. British Perspectives on 
Terrorism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p 146 
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depoliticise hostage-taking foundered on the familiar rocks of definition and of conflicting 
national viewpoints. There is nothing new about such differences: 
, ... 
(April 1934)... , the League of Nations 
intervened; resolutions were passed and comýnittees 
were established with a view to combating terrorism on an international basis. All these 
exercises were quite futile for the obvious reason that, although some governments were 
opposed to terror, others favoured it because it served their purposes. Three decades later the 
United Nations faced a similar situation. v271 
It is now not three but six decades later and the UN has still failed to extricate nations from 
the snare of international terrorism. 
It is inevitable that the enactments are forthcoming only in response to terrorist action. 
National sovereignty dictates that nations concede to the international community only that 
smallest element of their national autonomy for which there is a demonstrable need. Thus 
concession in anticipation of a possibility - but in the absence of hard experience - is not a 
realistic ambition. [The nuclear arms ban could be cited in refutation of this generalisation. 
It is not convincing, given knowledge of nuclear potential and of the behaviour of unstable 
psychotic regimes, and the probable outcome of their coincidence. ] 
Thus the Hague Convention on hijacks (16 Dec 1970) followed the outbreak of international 
terrorist hijacks (1968-70), culminating in Dawsons Field (Sept 1970). The Montreal 
Convention on attacks (23 Sept 1971) followed two airborne sabotages (1970). The Rome 
Resolution (21 Sept 1973) followed Israel's military interception of an Iraqi airliner (19 Aug 
271 LAQUEUR, Walter. The Age Of Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld And Nicholson, 1987, p 21 
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1973) in the airspace of a neighbouring country (Lebanon). Article 3 (bis) of the Chicago 
Convention (Montreal 10 May 1984) followed the destruction of KAL 007 by a Soviet fighter 
(31 Aug 1983). The Protocol (Montreal 1988) followed Abu Nidal's paramilitary attacks on 
Rome and Vienna airports (21 Dec 1985). 
This response-to-demonstrated-need-reaction is a feature of responses, both international 
(eg Proposal by Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of UN following Munich Massacre, 8 
Sept 1972)272 and national (eg US-Cuba Anti-Hijack Pact 1973, which helped to end the 
spate of local hijacks). Responses should not be condemned for being post hoc; this is 
inevitable. Less acceptable perhaps, are the standards of procedural and administrative 
competence of ICAO and ECAC (8.5.5). The difficulties of directing or motivating 
autonomous (national) delegates have already been mentioned. In the absence of 
performance targets, a certain weariness is often to be observed in international 
proceedings, and a readiness to accept any outcome as the best that realistically could be 
expected 
"As Doctor Sidhu [Secretary General of ICAO] emphasized, States throughout the world have 
given abundant proof of their political will to fight against acts of unlawful interference: the 
three Conventions relating to security, the Tokyo Convention (1963), the Hague Convention 
(1970), and the Montreal Convention (1971) have each been ratified by about 140 States. 
Likewise, the Supplementary Protocol to the Montreal Convention, adopted in 1988, to 
suppress unlawful action of violence at international civil airports, went into effect in record 
time, and at present there are 24 contracting parties. 92273 
272 LAQUEUR, Walter & Yonah ALEXANDER. The Terrorism Reader. p 370' 273 ITA Magazine No. 64, Dec 1990, p 19 
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Contrast this rosy assessment with those of two outside experts: 
"Despite the 17 intervening years between the enactment of the Montreal Convention and the 
drafting of the Montreal Protocol, ICAO's legislative technique has not improved to any 
noticeable extent. The 1988 agreement's very purpose was to strengthen the glaring weak 
points of the 1971 treaty and to overcome the ridiculous short-sightedness which enshrined so 
many loopholes in a convention which required absolute clarity in its wording. It is almost 
unbelievable that the route chosen by ICAO's member states to come to terms with these 
difficulties should be identical to that which failed in the past. 19274 
"Futile treaties can continue to be negotiated in pleasant places to ease the minds of diplomats 
involved in the negotiation, national constituencies that confuse words with meaningful action, 
and statesmen concerned with making a pretense of action without substance. ý9275 
It would be misleading to overlook the qualitative values of such treaties as a means of 
encouraging and educating the international community, and as a means of fostering 
informal working relationships between nations, like-minded agencies and officers. 
However a quantitative assessment of the value of treaties is also illuminating. 
The ineffectiveness of enactments in obtaining the cooperation of nations reflects the 
structural weakness of international law. Nor is it surprising that nations with a hostile intent, 
and which sponsor or pursue undeclared war, ignore the strictures of the UN. It is logical 
274 HILL, Robin. Airport Violence and Aut Dedere Aut Judicare. In T&PV 1 (1), p 94 275 RUBIN, Barry. Legal Approaches to International Terrorism. In Terrotism 13. Basingstoke: Taylor & 
Francis, p 277 
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that the weakness of the LIN should stimulate more committed nations to seek progress in 
other forums. 
6.3.4 Alliances and Bilaterals 
It is a truism that, the more the parties involved, the fewer the common interests; it follows 
that both the terms of any common agreement and the adherence thereto will also be 
weaker. The UN and larger groupings exist to search out and establish common cause, if 
only that of conflict avoidance. They are ill-suited to the vital process of the enforcement of 
agreements. Implementation remains the role of nations and is dependent upon its 
compatibility with national purpose. Hence those nations seeking effective action must make 
recourse to smaller alliances. 
Aviation terrorism is international and therefore should be combated internationally; faute de 
mieux, alliances and bilaterals emerge as islands of sanity in the international quagmire. 
None relate to the details of aviation security programmes; inconsistent (ie. inadequate) 
standards and host-state responsibility have proven to be insuperable barriers. Therefore 
alliances focus on the generalities of terrorism; bilaterals provide the easiest approach to the 
vexed issue of extradition. 
An important alliance (W), was that of the Group of Seven, the world's leading nations: 
USA, Canada, Great Britain, German, France, Italy and Japan. G7 issued unequivocal 
Statements from their meetings in Bonn (16/17 July 1978) and Tokyo (4/5 May 1986) and 
Venice (June 1987). However, even the world's leading nations are unable to match their 
firm words with equally firm actions. To give just one of many possible examples: included in 
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the 1978 Bonn Statement is the much-valued provision that, where a country refuses the 
extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or does not return such 
aircraft, the heads of state or governments will take immediate action to cease all flights to 
that country, at the same time the governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights 
from that country ... Afghanistan is the only country to have been so punished (1981). 
Action against a country in turmoil and of no commercial or diplomatic significance is risk- 
free and painless, and hardly an inspiring example of world leadership. Commercial interest 
is a fault-line at which G7 and other alliances are always liable to crack. However G7 serves 
a valuable purpose of securing the attention of Heads of State to the subject of terrorism, 
which otherwise it would lack. 
The European Community's efforts have faced the same difficulties: not only the issue of 
national sovereignty, autonomy and pride, but also different political philosophies, different 
definitions of and attitudes to "political" offences, different traditions of asylum to political 
refugees, different legal codes, different penalties, different relations with Middle Eastern 
states (some of which are involved in terrorism) and different commercial interests. Again, to 
give one example of the resulting compromise, these difficulties are manifest in the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977): 
"Its main weakness stems from Article 5: 
'Nothing in this convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the 
requested state has substantial grounds for believing that the request .... has been made 
for the 
purpose prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or 
political opinion or that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. ' 
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Furthermore, Article 13 allows signatory states to enter a reservation permitting them to reject 
a request for extradition on the grounds that the offence is of a political character, 
notwithstanding the f 276 act that a listed offence is involved". 
Thus European conventions share a common tendency with United Nations conventions, 
which is to include what pilots call 'a cast-iron cop-out clause'. No hijacked pilot looks to 
international conventions for his salvation. 
International politics are not the product of principle. They are both dominated and 
undermined by national need, national sovereignty, national autonomy, national pride and 
national economic interests. This last is a major stumbling block in the path of international 
cooperation. The Middle East is the fount of serious threats to security, both in the form of 
international terrorism and of open war. It is also the source of vital oil supplies and great 
potential wealth, temptations of which members of the anti-Saddam Coalition are cognisant. 
France's unwillingness to support the US Cruise missile attacks on Iraq (Sept 1996) were 
reported to relate to her eagerness to benefit from lucrative oil contracts. 
"France has been at the forefront to end the UN Sanctions against the Baghdad regime and 
French petrol companies, including Total and Elf-Aquataine, have sent several delegations to 
Iraq during the past year to discuss the development of the country's oil fields if the embargo is 
lifted. In June Amer Rashid, the Iraqi Oil Minister, predicted that the embargo would be lifted 
by the end of the year and noted that oil contracts with French companies were US $4 billion 
276 CARDONA, M. The European Response to Terrorism. In T&PV4 (4), p 251 
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(12.56 billion) had reached a 'very advanced stage'. - When Mr Rashid visited Paris last June 
277 
no fewer than 70 French company heads turned out in order to meet hia' . 
Even when international cooperation is apparently achieved, trade sanctions do not stop 
large scale clandestine trade. South Africa and Israel, both subject to international 
condemnation in the 1980s, established close and successful trade links both with each 
other and with Taiwan. 
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Arms and ordnance are vital to aggressive nations and to dictators. However, it has not 
proved possible to cut off their supplies. Nations find it difficult to resist the argument "if I 
refuse supplies, someone else will provide them and take the income"; the undercover arms 
trade is rich, powerful and well-organised and has access to the vast arms stocks of the 
former Soviet bloc. There are few examples of trade sanctions bringing recalcitrant 
countries into line. Nor do sanctions hurt dictatorial regimes. Saddam Hussein and his 
family squabble over luxury sports cars and base lucrative businesses on supplying goods 
which sanctions have removed from the open market. The Iraqi people may suffer, but 
unless they mount a successful rebellion, the decision-makers are uninfluenced. 
It is unrealistic to expect the international community, as a whole, to unite in a prompt 
and effective response against attacks on aviation. Economic sanctions are 
notoriously hard to mobilise and even then disregard or evasion is the norm. Further, 
the less democratic the regime at which they are directed, the less beneficial is their 
effect. However agreements and bilaterals between countries with a common interest 
can be highly productive when they mandate cooperation in intelligence, 
277 The rimes, 5 Sept 1996, p 12 278 Interview with South African official, Jun 1996 
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counterterrorism and policing. Even where such agreements do not exist, there may 
well be cooperation between like-minded agencies, albeit at a less formal level. Such 
agreements between a small number of countries do not easily become the building 
blocks of wider international agreement, which is conditional upon trust and 
commonality of intereSt. 279 In global terms, attacks on aviation are not a problem of 
magnitude sufficient to unite the intentional community. Unless that point is reached, 
the reality of international cooperation will remain a sad reflection of human nature. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise. 
6.3.5 Extradition and Legal Processes 
Publications which dwell on the number and content of international enactments give a not 
unfavourable indication of the international response to terrorism. Examination of the 
implementation of those enactments is less inspiring. 
It proved impracticable (3.7) to compile a comprehensive record of the legal proceedings 
relating to terrorist offences, updating the FAA's 1986 Publication "Legal Status of Hijackers" 
and Murphy's 1992 work. 280 However it is clear that actual (cf proclaimed) international 
cooperation has much improved on its sauve qui peut, headless chicken, beginnings. This 
reflects the maturing process which liberal democracies have undergone. All the G7 
countries have been the targets of serious terrorist groups; they have learned, the hard way, 
the need for international cooperation. A lofty tradition of terre d'asile is easy to maintain to 
the discomfort of other nations, but only until their cooperation on similar issues is wanted. 
279 A senior policeman recently remarked that he would as soon confide in Interflora as Interpol (1997) 280 MURPHY, JF. Apprehension, Prosecution and Punishment of Terrofists. New Jersey: Roman and 
Allenheld, 1985 
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The need for an international response to international terrorism has been articulated for 
decades (League of Nations Debate, 1934, opening quotation to this Section). The conduct 
of liberal democracies in the face of a new form of an old threat does not reflect great credit 
on the statesmanship of the period (1968-88). Nor can the West claim that its noble efforts 
in the UN were subverted by the USSR. Certainly the Soviet Union was capable of mischief, 
and gave active support to many national liberation movements, including the Palestinians. 
Nonetheless from the 1970s it generally cooperated in UN efforts to combat international 
terrorism: 
modem terrorists ... can 
blackmail any government ... The struggle against 
international 
terrorism is a common cause of all peace-loving nations. 99281 (Dmitry N Kolesnik, Soviet 
Representative at the UN, Nov 1972) 
The failure by the West to coordinate an adequate response arose more from their own 
disparity, if not ineptitude, than from the machinations of the Soviet Union. 
The adequacy of a nation's response to terrorism is a composite of many elements, of which 
international cooperation is only one. Each element is a product of commitment and 
competence. 
The subsequences of terrorist actions - extradition and legal proceedings - are an exercise 
in realpolitik, sometimes far removed from the pieties of international conventions. 
Extradition is a particularly revealing window on the reality of goodwill between nations. This 
281 FREEDMAN, Robert 0. Soviet Policy towards International Terrodsm. In Yonah ALEXANDER. 
International Terrorism. New York: Praeger, 1976, p 133 
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does much to explain the reluctance of governments to furnish pertinent data on both 
extradition and legal processes. 
There is no doubt that there has been a marked improvement over the past 30 years, 
reflecting increased terrorist activity and increased commitment by nations to international 
cooperation. The general pattern is well-represented by the conduct of France. Initally, it 
was driven by two considerations, a tradition of terre d'asile and a desire to keep out of the 
firing line. This gave rise to her general tolerance of international terrorists and a number of 
specific instances of scorning international obligations (release of Abu Daoud, leader of 
Black September "with unseemly haste", ignoring German and Israeli extradition requests, 
Jan 1977). 282 Also: 
"... the Italian authorities have long wished to bring to justice over 200 persons wanted in 
connection with terrorism who have taken refuge in France. In June 1984 the French 
authorities again ignored an Italian request for the extradition of Antonio Negri, ... wanted on 
charges of membership of a terrorist group, kidnap, manslaughter and possession of weapons. 
He is alleged to be a terrorist leader". 
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France has since improved upon this dismal position. Her cooperation with Spain against 
ETA has increased in steps since 1982 to the point (1996) at which joint operations have led 
to the arrest of key ETA leaders. It is noteworthy that this improvement resulted from 
France's own interests (removal of GAL counterterrorist squads from French soil and French 
needs for international cooperation against her own terrorist enemies); it was not the product 
of altruism nor of a sense of international responsibility. 
282 GOREN, Roberta. The Soviet Union and Terrorism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, p 130 283 WILKINSON, ref 14, p 147 
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This exemplifies the fundamental of cooperation in its international community. It 
comes to pass only when it reflects the interests of nations. Nations, like donkeys, 
may be motivated by carrot or by stick. France, discussed above, was motivated to 
cooperate with Spain by the carrot of self-interest. Greece (6.8) was motivated to 
attend to its standards of aviation security by the stick of a US Travel Advisory. It is 
noteworthy that aviation security, a technical matter, is much further from the national 
psyche - and therefore a much easier issue - than are the processes of law, which 
have both legal and political dimensions. At this level, the sticks available to 
humanitarian democracies have little motivating impact on difficult nations. A full 
record of the subsequences of aviation terrorism: legal and extradition processes, 
would provide an insight into the realities of international cooperation. The available 
record is not edifying. 
Alona Evans' study, was confined to the offence of hijacking 284 . Her 
data is not structured 
for precise evaluation. It indicates that, for the period 1961-1972 there were 157 hijacks, or 
attempts thereat, of US aircraft; 75 hijackers were taken into custody. Given that many 
attacks involved more than one hijacker, the rate of apprehension of offenders was well 
below 50% - hardly an overwhelming disincentive. Failure of international cooperation was 
not the sole cause of this poor showing although, in these early days, the concept of 
international cooperation had barely emerged. 
284 EVANS, Alona. Aircraft Hijacking: What is being Done? In The Amefican Joumal of Intemational Law, 
67,1973 
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"Between January 1960 and June 1976, twenty states requested extradition of 78 hijackers but 
the requests were granted in only 5 cases, although 42 of the offenders were prosecuted by the 
recipient state is . 
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apprehended terrorists have nearly an 80 per cent chance of avoiding death or 
imprisonment". "' 
The data in Murphy's in-depth investigation of the punishment of terrorists does not lend 
itself to a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of legal processes. 287 The events are 
not identified and therefore international terrorist attacks cannot be distinguished from other 
offences. The sentences imposed are recorded, but not the sentences served - often a very 
different quantity. 
There is evidence to the present day (Sept 1996) of continuing confusions over the 
application of legal and extradition processes to suspected terrorists: 
"A Sikh separatist alleged by the Home Office to be a dangerous international terrorist is 
expected to win a case at the European Court of Human Rights which will clear the way for him 
to claim 000,000 in compensation from the British Government". 288 
Central to the Home Office allegation is evidence collected in telephone taps, which is 
inadmissible in British courts. Thus, in such cases, the courts affirm the innocence of the 
accused. 
285 WILKINSON, Paul, ref 14, pp 288-9 2136 RAND Survey. In LATEY, Maufte. Terrorist Facts and Fancies in the World Today. Feb 1988, P 36 287 MURPHY, JF, ref 280 2138 Sunday Times, 29 Sept 1996, p 18 
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"Despite intense lobbying by M16, M15 and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Home Office has 
continued to resist passing legislation to allow interception evidence" . 
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Inability to resolve such issues, however difficult, casts doubts on the competence of HIVIG. 
It is one of the reasons for which HMG is regarded with a sceptical, if not jaundiced, eye by 
the civil aviation industry. 
6.3.6 Degrees of Culpability 
A record of nations' adherence to the obligations of international conventions, of legal 
processes and of extradition processes relating to acts of terrorism would be of particular 
interest to those with a utilitarian view of the subject. However any record must also include 
the circumstances of each entry. Some actions have undoubtedly been the product of 
government irresponsibility or self-interest. Others are equally clearly pro bono publico, 
albeit breaches of international convention. 
When the Algerian authorities released the hijackers of KUW 422 (April 1988), Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, British Foreign Secretary, attempted to lead European countries to a condemnation of 
Algeria 
. 
290 His proposals included a call for economic sanctions upon Iran, Cyprus and 
Algeria, a most unrealistic expectation. More seriously his actions suggested that HMG did 
not have a sophisticated understanding of the realities of the situation. There had been an 
immediate threat to the lives of the 31 remaining hostages. To obtain their release the 
289 Ibid 
290 HILL, Robin. Problems of International Cooperation to Improve Standards of Aviation Security with 
Reference to the Passenger. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1990 
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Algerians had undertaken first to end the siege peacefully and second to give the hijackers 
safe passage. The first undertaking was not concession, it was a mutual benefit. The 
second was perhaps a necessity and certainly the strongest card in the Algerians' hands. 
The Algerians could have reneged on their undertaking and subsequently have 
apprehended the hijackers - or killed them in a staged incident. However this would have 
seriously damaged the status of Algeria as a trusted negotiator in such situations, a role 
which has served international aviation well since the first Palestinian attack on aviation 
(1968). The proposition is that Algeria's conduct in releasing hijackers who had committed 
murder was not culpable. Algeria, presumably to maintain her freedom in her negotiating 
role, has not signed any of the Conventions relating to aviation terrorism. This precedent, if 
followed by other nations, would nullify the value of International Conventions. The present 
turmoil in Algeria (1997) must prejudice her future role as a negotiator. 
At the opposite extreme of the continuum are the acts of extreme culpability, where no lives 
are in immediate danger and where one country allows the freedom of its territory to 
terrorists who are perpetrating, or have perpetrated, their atrocities in another, no matter 
whether this freedom is a supposedly judicial or overtly political decision. The examples of 
France, Italy and Greece have already been cited. 
Other breaches of Convention and failures of legal or extradition processes fall between 
these extremes. 
Accepting the inefficacy of the economic sanction mechanism, the international community 
should consider repeated public condemnation as a first, means of applying pressure. 
There is no reason to allow the self-esteem of countries guilty of gross failures to go 
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unchallenged. A well- and frequent ly-pu bl icised blacklist would be a valuable source of 
discomfort to democratic countries. It would have lesser, but nonetheless worthwhile effect 
upon others. 
The citizens of the EC, potential victims of terrorism, may reasonably expect all member 
states to take the necessary steps to safeguard their rights. Membership of the EC is 
already linked to human rights. Whether the EC could tie such condemnation to the 
withholding of aid is an interesting question. The thought of French farmers pressing M. 
Mitterand to honour his obligations is not without its attractions. 
6.3.7 The Importance of Response 
Some scholars have doubted the effectiveness of imprisonment as a method of deterring 
terrorists. It is a role of scholars to cast doubts upon conventional wisdoms. However it 
behoves them to offer improvements if they do not wish utilitarians to cast doubts upon the 
effectiveness of scholars. 
The examination of the effect of a single factor upon a holistic entity can be valuable, but 
only if the complexity of the whole is used to provide the perspective. Terrorism is, like 
illneSS291, a phenomenon with a multitude of causes, of objectives, of manifestations and of 
perpetrators. To cite the ineffectiveness of a single measure in eliminating the whole is a 
methodology which can lead only to nihilism. Interestingly, it is a methodology much utilised 
in aviation security by those opposed to any particular proposal: "attackers will be able to 
overcome that". Correct but irrelevant: some attackers may overcome a sensible 
291 CORBETT, William T. A Time To Redefine Policy? Security Management, June 1990, p 41 
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countermeasure. It will stop others, and thus contribute to the complex whole of , 
countermeasures. 
It is certainly possible that some terrorists in some circumstances, will not be deterred by the 
prospect of imprisonment: those whose terrorist credentials are improved by a period of 
imprisonment, those who enjoy the fellowship of like-minded prisoners, social misfits who 
find comfort in prison, and fanatics to whom detention is an acceptable cost. To extrapolate 
these particular cases into a general finding that the prospect of imprisonment deters no 
terrorists and therefore has no value in deterring terrorism, is patently fallacious. 
Imprisonment first and foremost removes terrorists from circulation. This is particularly 
relevant to attacks on aviation - especially hijack - because they require considerable skills 
and qualities. The terrorist at liberty can pass on his expertise to others. He can also 
participate in further attacks, as has often been the case. The 16 day hijack of KUW 422 
(1988) was allegedly led by terrorists previously involved in the 21 day hijack of TWA 847 
(14 Jun 1985) . 
292 Leadership skills and bomb-making skills are vital to terrorist 
effectiveness. The bombs that destroyed Swissair (1970) and PanAm (1988) are believed to 
be the work of the same man, Marwan Khreesat. Thus to allow freedom to such men or, 
worse, to release them (Abu Daoud 1977) 291 and is to refuel terrorism. [The possibility that a 
terrorist may be "turned" and recruited by a counterterrorist agency is acknowledged. It is 
not credible that this has happened in all cases. ] The simple fact is that terrorists had a 
record of considerable success in coercing the rapid release of aviation terrorists from 
imprisonment. The prospect of such brief imprisonments may indeed have no deterrent 
292 See also WILKINSON, Paul. Lessons of Lockerbie. London: RISCT, 1989, p 17 293 Wanted by Israeli and German Governments. Released uwith remarkable haste' by French. 
See CLUTTERBUCK, Richard. Negotiating with Terrorists. T&PV 4 (4). 
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effect. Long term imprisonment is a different matter. Nizar Hindawi (who attempted to use 
his pregnant financee as a human bomb to destroy an El Al B-747 (April 1986) reportedly 
laughed when he heard that he had been given 4 to 5 years; he collapsed when told he had 
misheard the judge - who had said 45 years. He had previously written to his colleagues 
urging them to trade hostages for his release 294 - and that was before he knew his sentence, 
allegedly the longest ever awarded by a British court. Clearly a terrorist's shock at long 
imprisonment is no proof that foreknowledge would have deterred his attack. It does 
suggest that it was not a part of his prior considerations and that he would, at the least, have 
found it discouraging. The conclusion is that lengthy imprisonment will be a deterring factor 
to the many potential attackers who fit the economic rational actor model, 295 if not to the 
blinkered fanatic. The many attacks mounted to coerce the release of prisoners suggests 
that the terrorists would agree with this conclusion; that, ipso facto, is the deciding evidence. 
A rare, but widely agreed example of countermeasures achieving dramatic success is the 
US-Cuba Hijack Pact (1973). Combined with other measures, including (well-planned) 
screening of passengers and carry-on baggage, it reduced hijacks from a5 year average of 
296 31+ pa, 1968-72, to 1.4 pa, 1973-77 
A similar analysis could be made of each individual countermeasure. Each would face the 
same criticism ("they'll find ways round it") and each, if well-planned, would be a contribution 
to the total system. The correct technique of evaluation of a countermeasure is not the 
absolute - is it perfect? - but the comparative - is it better than the alternatives? This 
question can only be answered from the perspective of the strategy (9. below). 
294 TAYLOR, Maxwell and Ethel QUAYLE. Terrojist Lives, London; Brassey's, 1994, p 172 295 ENDERS, Walter, Todd SANDLER, and Jon CAULEY. UN Conventions, Technology andRetaliation in the 
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Strategists will be aware they are combating antagonists who, as one loophole is 
closed, will move to another; therefore their policies must be dynamic, continually 
reallocating priorities. They will know that they are bound to an asymptote, moving 
towards their goal of 100%, but never reaching it. They will leave the nihilists to 
bewail the gap that remains, and be satisfied in their own knowledge that their efforts 
continue to close it. 
6.4 The British Response 
6.4.1 Allocation of Responsibilities 
The British response to attacks on aviation involves several government departments. The 
Department of Transport took over the responsibility for the coordination of their inputs to 
aviation security from the Board of Trade in 1979-80. It does not have executive authority 
over them. Essential secondary roles are fulfilled by the Security Service, the Home Office 
and Police, and the SAS. An essential tertiary role is fulfilled by the Foreign Office. 
The civil aviation industry - airlines, airports and associated organisations - has the 
responsibility for implementing the non-governmental components of the response. In 
essence, HMG directs the activities and the industry- undertakes them. Additionally HMG 
provides the intelligence and military support, and funds some research. In practice, the 
industry carries an estimated 95% of the costs and undertakes more than 95% of the 
activities in terms of man-hours. 
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The Police provide both routine law-enforcement (anti-criminal and other normal policing) 
and some aviation security services at airports. The costs of the latter are not met by HMG, 
but recovered from the airport. 
The Department of Transport (DoT, formerly DTp) undertakes the regulatory and audit 
functions. The Security Service provides Threat Assessment and training. [The Threat is a 
function of a potential attacker's capability and the probability of his mounting an attack. ] 
The Foreign Office provides expertise on international dimensions relevant to aviation 
security. The Home Office has a strategic interest in the utilisation of police forces and in 
legal processes. The Special Air Service provides a military intervention capability which 
can be called upon by the Police in extreme situations. 
6.4.2 The National Aviation Security Committee 
The activities of the National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) are classified. Broadly, it 
is a consultative committee on which all major organisations with an interest in aviation 
security are represented. 
It has been criticised by some of its members for its size. It is certainly true that large 
committees can be ponderous, even tedious, and must be conducted with a degree of 
formality. However once the modus operandi is understood, good use can be made of the 
committee. Nor is the membership unnecessarily large; each organisation represented has 
a role, or potential role in the advancement of aviation security, albeit peripheral in a handful 
of cases. NASC has also been criticised for providing a vehicle for the advancement of the 
interests of government departments. It is the researcher's personal experience that this 
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criticism is unjust. It is true that civil servants are extremely able and well-versed in the 
behaviour of committees and may seek to persuade the NASC to accede to their wishes. 
The same opportunity is open to each organisation on the committee. Furthermore the 
conduct of NASC proceedings has always been beyond reproach. It has, in the researchers 
experience, never indulged in the machinations common in many committees: devious 
chairmen, procedural chicanery, or dubious minutes. The NASC provides a forum for multi- 
partite discussions, in which formal positions may be stated and recorded. It plays a 
valuable role. 
6.4.3 Department of Transport 
The DoT is the lead government department. It has two roles: to coordinate the activities of 
other government departments, and to regulate and audit the aviation security activities of 
the industry. Given that the achievement of security is a wide-ranging and public activity and 
that the covert component is small, the DoT is well-placed for its responsibilities. There 
have been, and are, serious tensions in the DoTs relationships with other departments and 
with the industry. It is important to establish to what extent these tensions are an inevitable 
concomitant of the DoTs pursuit of higher security standards, and to what extent the 
tensions reflect Department, or HMG, ineptitude. The utilitarian view is that such tensions 
generally have the effect of inhibiting progress, albeit with an occasional, positive effect in a 
specific, narrow area. 
Three distinct periods can be identified in the evolution of DoT's security activities: 1980-88, 
the development years prior to Lockerbie, 1989-93, the re-energization years post 
Locketbie, and 1993 on, the reorganisation years. In discussing the role and performance of 
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the DoT, two fundamentals must be borne in mind. The first is that there have been only 
four serious terrorist attacks on British aircraft in the 28 years 1968-96, the last of which was 
22 years ago (Nov 1974). The second is that ultimate responsibility for aviation security lies 
not in the hands of the nominated civil servants, but on the desks of Ministers and those who 
decide the policy and appoint the staff to implement it. Thus if the performance of a civil 
servant is deficient, blame should not be laid upon him, he will in all probability have been 
exerting his best efforts. Responsibility lies with the Minister or senior official who appointed 
the functionary to a task for which he was unsuited. 
A note on the style of the civil service may contribute to understanding the conduct of the 
Department. The researcher met several different professional groups in the course of his 
duties with BALPA and IFALPA: airline managers, management pilots, aviation doctors, 
lawyers, journalists, insurance managers and hotel managers. His experience was that in 
intellect the civil servants were approached only by the journalists. In integrity they were 
approached by none. All the other professional groups listed had been prepared to use 
deception (to a greater or lesser degree) to achieve their ends. Some used little else. 
Although the researcher negotiated extensively with the DoT for 14 years, he encountered 
deception only rarely and at a trivial level, and always involving the same civil servant. [The 
researcher acknowledges the possibility that he was extensively deceived and failed to 
detect it. No evidence of this has emerged. ] In fact the relationship between the Department 
and BALPA had many of the characteristics of a partnership, neither party having authority 
over the other, a high level of mutual trust, and much commonality of interest. The concept 
of partnership between government and industry is discussed later (7.6). The loyalty of civil 
servants to the Department is also noteworthy and relevant. Within all organisations there 
are personal friendships, rivalries and animosities. Normally these are rapidly revealed to 
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an outsider. Civil servants were consistently discreet; occasional confidences were 
exchanged about difficult personalities, but it-was rare in the extreme for the professional 
competence of a colleague, whether senior or junior, to be questioned. The Department as 
an organisation was similarly loyal to its employees. Laudable in many ways though these 
loyalties are, they also translate into a major organisational failing: long-term retention of 
civil servants in positions for which they are unsuited. This is one of the differences in 
corporate style between government and commerce. 
6.4.4 Civil Aviation Authority 
The industry consists of the airlines, the airports, and associated activities. 
The airlines are dominated by British Airways (55000 employees) and British Midland 
(5000). A total of 15 airlines are registered members of BATA (British Air Travel Association 
- the airlines' association). The airports are dominated by the British Airports Authority 
(BAA) which owns seven airports, including Heathrow (54,000 employees on site) and 
Gatwick (25,000 employees); Manchester Airport (14,000 employees) is owned by the local 
council. In the third sector of the industry, the cargo and parcel services, the suppliers of 
aircraft catering, and the security organisations have major aviation security responsibilities. 
The demarcation of responsibilities between airport and airline is not as simple as it may 
appear. For example the security of the airport is normally deemed to be an airport 
responsibility, but the immediate vicinity of an aircraft to be an airline responsibility. 
Baggage may be screened by the airport, but handled by the airline. A multitude of such 
dual responsibilities makes for potential confusion, and accompanying gaps in security 
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cover. The normal behaviour of an organisation - to seek control over all activities which 
involve, or impact upon it, has been checked by the complexity of security, the impossibility 
of guaranteeing invulnerability, and the potential for liability to bring bankruptcy. Both 
airlines and airports have mixed feelings about security responsibilities. 
The most important factor in determining attitudes to security is the recovery of costs. The 
conduct of a major airport is carefully regulated. The CAA is obliged under the Airports Act 
1986 to refer the charges of major airports to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) every 5 years. Based on the MMC report, the CAA publishes its own documents. 
These specifiy (by way of a complicated formula) the maximum revenue yield per passenger 
in each given year, eg $4.825 + SHt-i for Heathrow, year beginning 1 Apr 92 . 
297 "SH" is the 
allowable Security cost per passenger for Heathrow, "w" defines the year (1 Apr 92 on). 
"SH" is known as the S factor; it permits recovery of all or part of additional (ie new) security 
costs; it was initially set at 95% in 1991 for the year 1992-93 . 
298 Thus and in simple terms, 
airports can recover existing security costs from airlines via their normal landing and other 
charges (subject to the maximum allowable revenue per pax) and can recover most of the 
costs of additional security measures via the S factor. Thus airports can pass on to airlines 
nearly all their security costs. No such simple mechanism is available to airlines. For this 
good reason, airports are less resistant to DoT pressures than airlines. The corollary is that 
the Department prefers to place responsibilities upon the airports, not upon the airlines. 
The third sector of the industry is steadily being integrated into the aviation security system. 
The option of staying outside is not open to them. They can pass on their costs to their 
customers. 
297 Economic Regulation of BAA South East Airport 1992-97, CAP 599. London: CAA, 1991, p APP 2/1 298 Ibid, p 31 
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A problem common to all three sectors is that of competitiveness. There are few countries 
as committed to aviation security as Great Britain, nor do other forms of transport (road, rail, 
sea) require costly security. Therefore the British civil aviation industry is at a competitive 
disadvantage to foreign airlines and airports, and to alternative forms of transport, both 
domestic and foreign. 
6.4.5 British Air Line Pilots Association 
The membership of BALPA is restricted to pilots and flight engineers who hold professional 
flying licences. Total membership is 8550 (1996), of whom 5654 are in current employment 
with British airlines. In general terms the bigger and more important the airline, the larger 
the proportion of pilots who are BALPA members. This has one unfortunate downside; the 
financially less secure airlines, some of which may seek to minimise expenditure on safety 
and security, are those over which BALPA has least influence. 
BALPA has two categories of activity: Industrial, which relates to pilots' conditions of 
employment, and Technical. "Technical" is the BALPA (and IFALPA) term for Aviation 
Safety activities, presumably chosen to minimise its positive public relations impact. The 
Association's Security Committee reports directly to the National Executive Council. The 
Association has always been scrupulous in protecting the integrity of its Technical Section, 
by preventing its subordination to Industrial objectives. Thus, whereas the interface between 
the Industrial Section and the airlines is unavoid-ably confrontational, that of the Technical 
Section is somewhat closer to mutual cooperation. However, as the Association is always in 
pursuit of higher safety and security standards, and as the airlines are always cost 
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conscious, the two interests are often in contention. On the matter of aviation security, 
conflict is the norm. 
The Security Committee is small. Members are always current pilots (or flight engineers). In 
most years there are approximately six active members; in the earlier 1980s there were only 
two, rising to ten in 1993. It is represented on NASC. Members of the Security Committee 
thus liaise with HMG, and negotiate direct with their own airlines, and sit on Airport Security 
Committees. The Chairman of the Committee is a member of the IFALPA Security 
Committee. 
The Committee has authority to seek the advance of aviation security on behalf of the 
National Executive Council. Otherwise is has no authority whatsoever. It can give advice to 
pilots, but not instructions. However the Committee has useful strengths. It is entirely free 
of vested interests, save that of advancing the security of British aviation, and thus can claim 
more objectivity on the subject than can any other interested party; this has particular 
relevance to its assessment of achieved standards of security, an important role in view of 
the unequalled information sources available to the Committee. Not only can it make contact 
with 5,654 (1996) British airline pilots, it can also exchange information with airline pilots the 
world over, via IFALPA. Thus the Security Committee is usually better informed of an 
airline's security standards than the airline itself, and nearly always better informed of 
security standards overseas than HMG. 
The Security Committee is established within Great Britain's aviation security infrastructure. 
For obvious reasons, its commitment is to the advancement of aviation security. It 
cooperates with HMG, the airlines, the airports and other interested parties. It subordinates 
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itself to none of them and has had differences with all of them. During the development and 
re-energizing periods of British aviation security it had more common ground with HMG than 
with the industry. During the current reorganising period it is finding more in sympathy with 
industry, believing that HMG is in the process of abdicating its responsibilities, by 
transferring its problems to the industry. The issues are discussed in the paragraphs which 
follow. 
6.5 The Progress of the Response 
6.5.1 Introduction 
This sub-section (6.5) is intended to give an understanding of the nature of the process of 
advancing aviation security in Great Britain since 1968. It is not a comprehensive record, 
tracking each administrative change and the implementation of each security measure. The 
analysis of each period considers the roles of HMG, the industry and BALPA, and illustrates 
the mood of the period by charting the progress of a selected countermeasure. Two 
imperatives overlay the sub-section (as they do all sections), the need to withhold 
information useful to potential attackers and the need to respect official and personal 
confidentiality. 
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6.5.2 Development 1968-88 
The first Palestinian attacks on aviation found the civil aviation industry of the world 
unprepared. Great Britain was no exception. The first attacks were predominantly hijacks, 
as was the first (and indeed all Jhree serious Palestinian) attack on a British aircraft 
(Dawsons Field, Sept 1970). 
An aviation security desk was established originally in the Board of Trade. The larger 
airlines already had some form of a security section (if only one officer), to protect their 
assets from fraud and theft. The new problem of aviation security was passed to this 
section. There were no countermeasures in place: no access control, passenger, or 
baggage screening, nor guarding of aircraft. Outside the USA this level of security (nil) was 
the norm. In the USA the Cuban hijack epidemic had prompted the introduction of armed 
sky-marshals and efforts to develop other security measures. 299 The US response included 
sky-marshals, passenger profiling, passenger and cabin baggage screening, stringent 
penalties and the trilateral Canada-US-Cuba Hijack Agreement (15 Feb 1973). These 
countermeasures - in their breadth - offer a model, or paradigm, for success in response to a 
specific and narrowly-defined problem. 
At this time BALPA's security operation was minimal. It was entirely in the hands of the 
Association's Chairman, a reflection of the confidentiality of the subject. The Security 
Committee was established in June 1974.300 Until 1987 its chairman was the Chairman of the 
Association and its members were nominees of the BA Long-Haul (formerly BOAC) and 
Short-Haul (formerly BEA) pilots' groups, and of the committee representing the pilots of the 
299 MOORE, Kenneth C. Airport, Aircraft and Airline Security. Boston: Bufterworh-Heinemann, 1991, P5 300 BALPA. Report on Annual Delegates Conference incorporating the Annual Report and Accounts. 1974, 
P10 
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"independent" (non BA) airlines. In 1987 a security specialist was'appointed chairman, and 
the membership was drawn from volunteers instead of nominees. It adopted the policy of 
giving all pilots the maximum possible information, instead of the minimum necessary. This 
was a reflection of the need to involve pilots in the day to day monitoring, administration and 
enforcement of security, in a manner analogous to their traditional involvement in safety. 
Airlines underwent a similar process, abandoning their early attitude that security was a 
matter for the Security Branch. 
The first British countermeasure was the introduction of the screening of passengers and 
their cabin baggage, a measure intended to detect hijackers' weaponry. Early archway 
metal detectors (AMD) and hand-held magnetometers were crude devices. The AMD 
coverage was incomplete; weapons carried in certain position were likely to be undetected. 
Neither device was capable of detecting materials other than metal. Plastic explosives and 
non-metallic weaponry would therefore not be intercepted. Equally serious were the 
difficulties of setting the sensitivity. There was no satisfactory balance to be found between 
allowing weapons to go undetected, and detecting every tiny metallic item (eg keys and 
pens); this latter option caused lengthy queues, inevitably the sensitivity was then reduced. 
At the time technology had no answer. The alternative, 100% handsearch, in terminals not 
designed for it, would have caused serious delays and congestion. Authorities sought to 
minimise congestion, because terrorists had already targeted terminals (Tel Aviv, 30 May 
1972; Rome, 17 Dec 1973; Orly 13 and 19 Jan 1975; etc). 
Airside passes (lDs) were introduced in the early 1980s, but not within a comprehensive 
access control system. There were not electronic, nor were they closely inspected. The 
theory was that any person not wearing an ID should be challenged. Aircraft loaders and 
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engineers refused to wear them, on the accurate grounds that the attachment clip was too 
weak. However other solutions, such as displaying the card within a transparent pocket, 
were equally firmly rejected probably because no impediment to widespread theft was 
wanted. [Heathrow was known as Thiefrow in the 1970s and 1980s]. Equally reprehensible 
was the amour propre of the police and customs and their reluctance to submit to security 
procedures. 
By 1988 the Department still had barely more than half a dozen staff (plus secretarial 
support) engaged in aviation security. They had produced a national programme which was 
laid down in the Aviation Security Handbook (ASH), issued to airlines and airport. The 
production of an adequate and comprehensive national programme is a massive undertaking 
and well beyond the small staff of the Department in the early 1980s. The national 
programme was, by modern standards, deeply flawed. Parts of it were mandatory but many 
important aspects were only advisory - and therefore ignored by airlines which disagreed 
with them. There were no provisions for monitoring the standards achieved (by inspection or 
test). Some areas: the practicalities of passenger/bag reconciliation at transit stops (where 
passengers could fail to re-board, unnoticed), the searching of incoming aircraft, were not 
addressed. On the positive side, the principles on which the programme'was based were 
fundamentally sound. It identified and followed priorities; thus, high-risk flights (mostly those 
involving Israel) were covered by more stringent procedures. The programme laid down 
standards (or objectives) but did not attempt to define methodology; this is clearly a correct 
principle; methodology is a matter for airline and airport management, and beyond the 
expertise of the Department. 
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A detailed assessment of the state of security countermeasures in 1986 is contained in the 
1986 Report of the Select Committee of Transport. "' 
A fundamental problem in the early 1980s was the lack of commitment to security by the 
industry. It was understandable. No British aircraft had been the victim of a serious terrorist 
attack since 1974. Britain was not an ally of Israel in the latter's land-grab and war with the 
Arab World. It was obvious to insiders that security measures were a fence with inviting 
gaps. It was not easy to justify expense to the industry and inconvenience to passengers by 
reference to an attack which might never come. Airline staff knew that their careers hung 
upon dispatching aircraft on schedule; delays were quantified and scapegoats sought. 
The mood of the times can be illustrated by an example 302 . The prime contemporary security 
measure was passengerlbaggage reconciliation. Thus if a passenger failed to board the 
aircraft it was mandatory to remove his hold bag. On large aircraft this process of locating 
his hold bag was likely to cause a minimum delay of an hour, rising to a possible 2-3 hours. 
The staff of British Airways were particularly apprehensive of summary dismissal, the airline 
was managed in an uncompromising style. In 1986 the Captain of a Tristar was informed by 
the dispatcher that four passengers had failed to board the aircraft butthat, as they had no 
hold bags, the aircraft could depart. The Captain asked for corroborative evidence. The 
dispatcher left the aircraft. He returned and stated that there has been confusion. The 
"passengers" were not passengers, but friends who had accompanied passengers to the 
lounge to see them off. The Captain asked to see the passenger list. The dispatcher 
returned with the list and informed the Captain that the four passengers were actually two, 
and that they had been prevented from boarding by the action of the immigration authorities. 
301 Fourth Report from the Transport Committee, Session 1985-86, Airport Security. HOC 597,1986 
302 Report of BA Captain to the Security Committee, 1986. 
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He suggested that, as the passengers could not have foreseen this, their baggage would not 
contain a device and that the aircraft should depart. The Captain did not accept this as good 
advice. The dispatcher investigated further and reported that the passengers were on 
board. The Captain checked this information and found that it was untrue. He then ordered 
that the baggage of the missing passengers be removed from the aircraft. Twenty minutes 
into this process the missing passengers were found; they had been lost in the terminal. 
The Captain took the view that there had been a deliberate attempt to mislead him. He 
reported the incident to BA's Head of Security and to BALPA's Security Committee. The 
dispatcher's department replied to the Head of Security that "the Captain had not understood 
the situation". The Head of Security gave his view that the dispatcher, and probably his 
manager, were obviously not telling the truth, but stated that there was little he could do 
about it. The Security Committee identified the problem as a consequence of BA's emphasis 
on punctuality, and suggested that the only solution was for Sir Colin Marshall to state his 
personal support for giving security priority over punctuality. The Head of Security relayed 
this to Sir Colin, who agreed and circulated a letter over his signature to the relevant staff. It 
resolved many difficulties. 
6.5.3 Re-energization, 1989-93 
6.5.3.1 The Stimulus: Lockerbie 
At 1905 hours on 21 December 1988 a Pan American B747-121A/SCD, Maid of the Seas, 
Flight PA 103 operating from London Heathrow to New York, JFK, was destroyed by a 
terrorist bomb. The aircraft was level at Flight Level 310, (c. 31000'), in British airspace prior 
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to its Atlantic crossing. Large sections of wreckage, including wing fuel tanks, fell into the 
Scottish town of Lockerbie. All 259 passengers and crew and 11 residents of Lockerbie 
were killed. I 
The perpetrators have not yet been apprehended (March 1997). Complicity of the states of 
Syria and Libya, and of Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC has been alleged. The extradition of two 
Libyans, probably intelligence agents, is currently sought by Great Britain and refused by 
Libya. The more important culprits are those who ordered the attack. In a dictatorship, that 
means the dictator or his immediate associates. This raises the difficult issue of the 
mechanism by which a Head of State can be brought to justice. 
The atrocity put, for the first time, urgency into British aviation security. PanAm 103 was not 
the first aircraft to be destroyed by terrorists. Swissair, TWA, South Korean, Air India and 
other aircraft had been brought down by bombs. The death toll in the Air India atrocity was 
329, higher than that of PanAm 103. However PanAm 103 had taken off from Great Britain's 
premier airport, the wreckage had killed British citizens in their homes, 270 innocent people 
had been murdered, including 43 British subjects. The aircraft belonged to one of Great 
Britain's closest allies. It crashed four days before Christmas, adding poignancy to the 
horror of the event. 
The possibility that the attack was the product of deficient British, security was openly 
debated. This fuelled media interest. It also ensured the closest attentions of HIVIG to its 
aviation security activities. Three lines of enquiry were set up. -, The first investigated the 
causes of the crash. The second sought to identify the methods and perpetrators - in the 
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event that terrorism was found to be involved. The third reviewed the adequacy of prevailing 
standards of aviation security. 
The first proceeded by way of a forensic investigation, a Fatal Accident Enquiry and 
subsequent legal activities. It was complemented by the Report of the (US) President's 
Commission, "' the Executive Summary of which bluntly condemned both the Federal 
Aviation and PanAm. The researcher's personal experience of contemporary British 
standards suggests that these condemnations of US practice were fully justified. One 
example of PanAm's lax security was the carriage of a no-show passenger's baggage, and 
without the prior approval of the Captain . 
304 Passenger-Baggage Reconciliation (interpreted 
at the time as removal of a passenger's baggage if he failed to board) had been laid down as 
the foundation-stone of defence against sabotage since the 1970s. PanAm's disregard of 
this fundamental calls into question its security ethos in toto. The requirement had been 
clearly laid down in Section XV of the (US) Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) 
after the 1985 hijack of TWA 847 out of Athens. 
" 
... conduct a positive passenger/checked 
bag match resulting in physical inspection or non- 




The Determination of The (Scottish) Fatal Accident Inquiry made a valuable contribution to 
aviation security in highlighting the limitations of Passenger-Baggage Reconciliation, which it 
referred to as "negative reconciliation": "the failure of an intending passenger to board the 
aircraft would trigger off the prescribed procedures" . 
306 The Sheriffs definition omits the first 
303 Report of Presidential Commission, pi 
304 lbid, pp 13-14 
305 lbid, p3 
306 Determination by Sheriff Principal in the Fatal Accident Inquiry relating to the Lockerbie Air Disaster. 
March 1991, P 73 
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key step, the detection of "the failure .... to board This omission illustrates the need 
for 
unremitting attention to detail in designing, or discussing, security procedures. The 
Determination contrasted "negative reconciliation" with "positive reconciliation". It prompted 
the development of the much sounder concept of Accounting for And Authorising Carriage 
(the 3 A's): no bag is carried unless accounted for. 
It is very interesting that the important distinction between what would have prevented and 
what caused the event is implicit in the 1976 Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry 
(Scotland) Act. 307 When this same distinction was articulated in the field of Air Safety it was 
though to be innovative (1993). 
I "A new study from Boeing suggests that finding an accident's cause is not nearly as important as 
is finding what could have prevented it. 
.. Russell says that it is a new way of 
looking at accidents and also incidents, not just for 
investigators but for the industry as a whole. 308 
The acceptance of this philosophy in Air Safety is long overdue. 
There are many important aspects of the Lockerbie atrocity. Most have been well- 
explored . 
309 The researchers own conclusion is that the US/PanAm security system was 
rotten: defective in conception, implementation and inspection. The question central to this 
307 Section 6 (1)(c) 
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research is whether deficiencies in British aviation security and their concomitant, the 
vulnerability of British aircraft, were revealed by Lockerbie. , 
The first line of enquiry into the atrocity itself also involved the question of responsibility for 
any revealed security deficiencies 
It is clear from the Sheriffs Determination that the interface between British security 
measures and those of the FAA/PanAm was in serious confusion, a product of the difficult 
issue of host-state responsibility. The FAA/PanAm security measures were themselves 
confused. The DoT had not the resources -to inspect British, let alone US, security 
procedures. It could with justification plead ignorance of deficiencies. The DoT, gave 
evidence that it had carried out 136 inspections at British airports (April-November 1988) - 
310 
This figure comes as a surprise to the researcher in view of the inadequacy in number of 
DoT staff, the fact that they were primarily engaged in drafting policy (their title "Aviation 
Security Inspectors" was a misnomer), and, their unfailing refusal to undertake inspection 
responsibilities. The researcher does not accept that the 136 "inspections" constituted 
serious in-depth inspection. - Thus, in 1988, the DoT had, little idea of the standards of 
security which were achieved in practice. The DoT did not have the staff to enforce its own 
security standards. It certainly was not in a position to undertake the lengthy process of 
harmonising FAA and DoT standards and inspecting and enforcing the product. 
[Harmonisation is not achieved to this day (March 1997); the two operate in parallel. ] 
The handling of the intelligence on the Toshiba IED is more problematic. The Sheriffs 
Determination tells a sorry tale of confusion and lack of urgency. Inter-departmental 
310 Sheriffs Determination, p 91 
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difficulties are indicated by the DoT allegation of "lack of any assessment of the area of 
threat from the security services" . 
31 ' The failure to inject urgency into the telex warning to 
UK airlines and airports ("... he indicated that screening staff should be informed of the 
position"), and the failure to pass on photographS312 of the Toshiba IED (received 8 
December and sent out in the second week in January) are a serious indictment of a system 
inadequately resourced to fulfil its obligations. In 1988 there were no procedures in force 
which covered the transfer of passengers and bags from an airline under high threat to one 
under lower threat , (which routinely happens in cases of disruption). Thus, in the absence 
of adequate general procedures, and with the dilatory processing of the specific warning, it 
was entirely possible that the [ED could have been transferred, undetected, to a British 
aircraft. These deficiencies were brought to the attention of the Department by BALPA after 
the event, and were remedied. However the Department failed for a further five years to 
remedy another equally dangerous deficiency (6.7.2.9). 
At the instigation of BALPA one particular principle, whenever relevant, is incorporated into 
enactments by the DoT: the Aircraft Captain has ultimate authority for the security of his 
aeroplane. All major operational decisions are referred to him for approval. It is clear that 
such provisions were either not included in the US security programme, or were not 
enforced . 
31 3 The baggage of the no-show passenger did not contain the IED. However, had 
the Captain of the connecting flight from Frankfurt been informed of the security procedures 
at Frankfurt, it is likely that he would have refused to accept the interline bags. The loss of 
PanAm 103 would have been prevented. 
311 Ibid, P 92 312 WILKINSON, ref 292, p9 313 Report of Presidential Commission, pp 13-14 
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Lockerbie thus presented HMG with two immediate crises: the aftermath of the atrocity, and 
the possibility of its own culpability. HMG also faced the long-term task of achieving a more 
effective system of aviation security. Lockerbie had proved that aviation security was not a 
costly exercise in improbability. The need for improvement was accepted by all parties in 
government and industry. A special meeting of NASC was convened (Jan 1989). Paul 
Channon, the Secretary of State, addressed the meeting. He invited all organisations to put 
proposals to the DoT. 
6.5.3.2 Transport Committee 
Parliamentary interest prompted a second investigation of the subject by the House of 
Commons all-party Transport Committee; it heard statements from all interested parties. 
The Committee published a comprehensive report314 in July 1989, eight months after 
Lockerbie; it gives a good picture of the contemporary level of British aviation security. The 
report itself is a reflection of the general development of a more sophisticated approach to 
aviation security. To offer an analogy: if the Committee's earlier (1986) report was a 
thoughtful tinkering with an existing engine, the 1989 report laid down specifications for a 
new car. Many of the most significant of these specifications were accepted by HMG: 
legislative backing for aviation security provisions, inspection and test of the security system, 
increase in size and powers of the DoT Aviation Security Inspectorate, and screening of all 
transfer baggage. It is important to the understanding of the process to note that the 
proposals did not originate in the Committee, they had long been debated by interested 
parties. The Committee, having heard all viewpoints, gave its considered and influential 
support to the proposals. 
314 HC 509. Transport Committee Third Report. Airport Security. July 1989 
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HMG - in reality the Secretary of State for Transport - after considering the advice of the DoT 
Aviation Security Inspectorate, totally rejected only two of the Transport Committee's 
recommendations: the establishment of an Aviation Security Fund, paid for by a levy on 
passengers (discussed- below: 6.6 Costs of Response), and automatic prosecution following 
any breach of an aviation security directive. HMG also kept its options open on a number of 
recommendations, none of primary importance. 
The government (ie the DoT) reply to the Transport Committee was published by the House 
of Commons. 315 It took the form of a point by point response to the main conclusions and 
recommendations. The logic of each response was spelled out and was therefore open to 
inspection and challenge. This system of openness is a credit to HMG and the civil service, 
and an example to others. 
The Transport Committee is in a unique position with the structure of government. Its 
members are all MPs, drawn from the three major parties. The Committee demonstrated that 
party rivalries can be subordinated to the pursuit of the national good within a defined 
context. The Committee thus provides a model for the depoliticisation of aviation security. If 
Great Britain is to develop a strategic response to attacks on aviation (7), a key feature will 
be long-term policies agreed and retained irrespective of party in power. A further strength 
of the Committee is its ability to hear witnesses from Ministerial to the humblest levels and 
including M15 and M16 intelligence officers, experts from industry, and scholars from 
academia. It is thus uniquely well-placed to form an overall view of the subject in the context 
of the national good, having regard to political, 'civil service, industry and user interests. On 
315 Transport Committee: Government Observations on the Third Report of the Committee, Session 1988-89 
(Airport Security). House of Commons, Dec 89 
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the sensitive but important and wide-ranging subject of aviation security the Committee 
fulfilled an invaluable role. Regrettably its involvement in the area has been occasional 
(1985 and 1989). A permanent watching brief would be more appropriate. 
6.5.3.3 Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (A&MSA) 
The Aviation and Maritime Security Bill was introduced into Parliament on 14 December 
1989, less than 12 months after Lockerbie. It received Royal Assent on 26 July 1990. 
"3. The main purpose of the Act is to deal with the principal deficiencies in the Aviation 
Security Act 1982, namely: 
(i) the powers to give directions have broad scope but do not lend themselves to 
quick remedial action; 
(ii) directions can be given to airports, airlines and air navigation authorities but not 
to other undertakings having access to airports, aircraft or air navigation 
installations; 
(iii) there are no provisions requiring individuals (such as passengers and employees) 
to observe aviation security procedures. 
4. The Act also extends to maritime activities similar powers to those available for aviation 
security. "' 
16 
In summary, the ACt317 comprehensively revised the legislation on aviation security. It 
enabled HMG to ratify the Montreal Protocol of 1988 (Section 1), to bring within the scope of 
316 Department of Transport. Guide to Parts I and IV of the Aviation and Maritime Securit Act 1990. para 3 317 Aviation and Maritime Secudty Act 1990 
y 
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legislation all undertakings (cargo agents, catering suppliers, maintenance firms etc. ) of 
relevance to aviation security (Sections 2,3,6), and individuals transgressing aviation 
security measures (Section 5). It also added certain offences to the list of extraditable 
offences (Section 49). Finally it extended corporate responsibility for offences under the Act 
to directors of the corporate body (Section 50). The Act gave a solid foundation to a wide- 
ranging improvement of aviation security. Opportunity was also taken to cover maritime 
security, mostly by mirroring aviation security measures. HMG has implemented a structure 
of aviation security which offers a benchmark for other liberal democracies, but which 
nonetheless has culpable deficiencies. 
The deficiencies remedied by the Act were indeed serious. However the major failings of 
administration were not attributable to deficient legislation but to the resources allocated to 
aviation security. Prior to Lockerbie a small staff, in the order of eight, plus secretarial 
support, was undertaking a task later deemed to require an establishment of 135. The DOT 
therefore preferred the mechanism of Aviation Security Circulars (ASC) to that of statutory 
legislation. The ASCs could be quickly and easily drafted in house, in plain English, a much 
simpler process than that of the parliamentary drafting of statutory enactments. However 
ASCs had advisory status and though the DoT protested to BALPA that its advice was 
effectively mandatory, no-one seriously believed it. Airlines exercised their right to reject the 
advice whenever they disagreed with it. BALPA urged the DoT to address the issue, if 
necessary by launching a prosecution. However it was the unrevealed opinion of BALPA 
that such a prosecution would probably fail, as would any under the Statute. The (statutory) 
Directions were poorly drafted and were full of phrases which would have enriched lawyers 
usearches 
... shall be sufficient reasonably to ensure ... 
018 or, worse, "Where hold baggage 
318 Direction to Aircraft Operators under the Aviation Security Act 1992.12 July 1988, para 2. Ditto to 
Aerodrome Managers, 18 Feb 1988, para 3. 
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is searched by hand or scanned by X-ray, the standard shall be sufficient reasonablv to 
satisfy the aircraft operator that ... n. 
31 9 BALPA believed that a prosecution, successful or 
unsuccessful, would commit the DoT to ensuring compliance with its enactments, and would 
have a salutary effect on those Aircraft Operators who scorned the good advice in ASCs. 
The A&MSA did not immediately lead to improvements in wording. "The operator shall take 
such steps as are necessary reasonably to satisfy himself"was still to be found . 
320 However 
a firming of the DoT intent to enforce security is clear from Section 4 of the A&MSA, which 
gave: 
Gfipowers to Aviation Security Inspectors to issue enforcement notices where there is a failure 
to comply with a general requirement of a directions. The person served with an enforcement 
notice will be required to carry out remedial action. - The notice could result in certain 
operations having to be stopped until remedial action has been taken". 
The word "general" is significant. It enables the DoT to enforce the general requirement, 
that is the intention, of a Direction, as well as its specific wording. By early 1993 the DoT 
had served two Enforcement Notices, one on an airline and one on an airport. Nonetheless 
the DoT, in its explanation of Enforcement Procedures, made it clear that it would proceed 
by discussion and persuasion wherever possible. 
The DoT's unwillingness to issue Enforcement Notices on the vital security measure of 
Search, Check and Guard allowed a major deficiency to remain unremedied until 1994/95 
(6.7.2.9). 
319 Direction to Aircraft Operators under the Aviation Security Act 1982,17 May 1990, para 6. 320 Direction to Aircraft Operators under the Aviation Security Act 1982,26 June 1992, para 2 
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In summary, the AWS Act provided a comprehensive legislative framework for the 
administration of aviation security in Great Britain. Before its enactment, there were four 
major problem areas: domestic standards, compliance with enactments, overseas standards, 
and the financing of aviation security. The Act addressed only the first two. What the Act 
could not do was to address the need for partnership between government and industry, 
based upon willing cooperation. To this, the traditional legislative methodology of edict and 
enforcement is a second best. The proposition that it is also inappropriate for the 
management of aviation security, is examined in the final Section of this research. This 
concept was not advanced at the time. Therefore the A&MSA was an important component 
of HMG's wide-ranging response to the Lockerbie atrocity. It was necessarily accompanied 
by the civil service resources appropriate to the scale and complexity of the administration of 
aviation security. Hidden deep within the AWSA was perhaps its most important provision, 
Section 50 was a clear statement that non-compliance would no longer be an easy option, 
and that the accompanying discomfort would be felt where it belonged. 
"Section 50 - Offences by bodies corporate 
22. Subsection 0 provides that when a body corporate is guilty of an offence under the Act 
and the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or because of neglect on 
the part of, a director or other senior officer of that body, he as well as the body corporate shall 
be guilty of that offence. " 
An excellent summary of the A&MSA 1990 is to be found in the Guide to Parts I and IV of the 
Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 published by the Department of Transport in July 
1990. It is not possible to compare it, provision by provision, with the legislation which 
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preceded it. This was an ad hoc structure founded upon'enabling legislation, the Aviation 
Security Act 1986. The DOT published (statutory) Directions under this Act at need. DOT 
preference for expressing recommendations in the form of non-statutory, easily generated, 
Aviation Security Circulars has'been mentioned. In theory, statutory Directions could be 
enforced, whereas the authority of Recommendations was tenuous. However, important and 
less important issues were spread over both. Hence enactments were something of a hotch- 
potch, poorly drafted, loosely respected and minimally enforced. The importance of the 
A&MSA 1990 was not so much in its detail, which was careful, but in its sound structure of 
wide-ranging powers. It was a positive and thoughtful legislative response to Lockerbie, an 
extreme of inhumanity previously deemed barely credible. 
6.5.3.4 Relationships 
In 1989 the Aviation Security Inspectorate had a staff of seven inspectors. By 1993, its 
successor, TRANSEC, had an authorised establishment of 135, with approximately 120 in 
post. Approximately 96 were engaged on aviation security; the remainder were involved in 
the security of other transport systems: maritime, tunnel and rail. 
The Department had an uneasy relationship with the industry. The DoT sought to drive 
security forward but offered no serious contribution to the cost. The industry wished to 
proceed more slowly and economically, some of the issues (100% Hold Baggage Screening) 
being the source of major disruption and passenger inconvenience. The industry was keenly 
aware that it was carrying the bulk of the costs and that many of its international competitors 
were not so burdened. It was also aware that security standards overseas were a patchwork 
of inconsistency. In short the industry felt that it knew as least as much about security as the 
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Department, and considerably more about civil aviation. Unkind stories abounded about the 
Department's Inspectors ringing up to ask the whereabouts of Heathrow, or complaining that 
an aircraft did not park at the stand chosen by the Inspector. The attitudes of Inspectors to 
the industry varied widely, from those of a perverse parking warden to those of a considerate 
colleague; happily most were in the latter category. However the general relationship 
between Department and industry was not that of a partnership; it was more confrontational 
than cooperative. It is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise in the absence of the 
sharing of costs, that is, of financial partnership. 
The British Air Line Pilots Association had a much closer relationship with the Department 
than with the industry. This is not the paradox that it may appear. The pilots' priority was to 
advance aviation security as quickly as possible, which placed them in the Department's 
camp and thus opposed to their employers. BALPA had difficult relationships with the 
biggest and the smallest airlines. British Airways was aware that HMG was seeking to 
transfer to it burdens beyond the powers of the government itself. Therefore BA took a very 
measured view of the Department, and chose to proceed, as far as possible, at its own pace. 
The small airlines, operating short sectors with 30 minute turnrounds, had a different 
problem. For example, they calculated that the employment of an additional staff member to 
guard or search the aircraft during turnround would make many services unprofitable. They 
therefore added the guarding/searching task to the crews' duties, conveniently overlooking 
the fact that the crew was already fully committed to its primary tasks. BALPA kept the 
Department informed of the realities of security standards. The Department, for all its bullish 
enactments, proved unwilling to enforce them, preferring to back off in the hope that more 
cooperative attitudes would develop. Thus BALPA was not so much positioned between the 
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Department and industry, as on the far side of the Department, pressing it to press the 
industry. 
The Gulf confrontation and war (Aug 1990-Feb 1991) prompted a temporarily more 
cooperative relationship. All parties acknowledged an increase threat of attacks on aviation. 
There was a general tightening of. security, but with one inexplicable exception (6.7.2.9). 
Happily no serious attacks on aviation occurred. First class intelligence action resulted in 
the expulsion of dubious Iraqi "diplomats" from their bases worldwide. Other terrorist groups 
held their hand when the Iraqi forces were rapidly overwhelmed. 
The pre-war uneasy relationship between Department and industry returned. No attack had 
materialised during the high threat period. The Department embarked in an exercise to 
categorise airfields which, to all other parties, appeared to be ill-conceived. Significantly, 
the Department appeared to be unwilling to be deflected, but drove the exercise on, seeking 
to impose its will on industry. The Department began to divest itself of the poisoned chalice 
of security standards overseas. When the Principal Inspector (Overseas) retired, it took the 
opportunity to downgrade the post and to reduce the staff of overseas inspectors. The crisis 
of the Gulf War having passed, the Department embarked upon a programme of 
reorganisation, imposed upon it for budgetary reasons. It began to dismember the 
establishment which it had carefully built up after the trauma of Lockerbie. 
6.5.4 Reorganisation, 1993-95 
Reorganisation is unavoidably disruptive. Whilst in progress it is disturbing to personnel; 
fearful of their job security or prospects, they are distracted from their duties. 
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Reorganisation may improve the service or product, if that is its aim. It is unlikely to have a 
similarly beneficial effect if the aim is cost cutting. The Department's reorganisation was 
carried out in a single exercise. It reduced the establishment by one third, from 
approximately 120 to 80. This massive cut was unprecedented in the 30 year experience of 
one senior civil servant. 3" The exercise took two years to complete (Oct 1993-Oct 1995), a 
length of time which would have been unacceptable in commerce, and one throughout which 
the staff of the Department were seriously distracted. The reorganisation eliminated all three 
Grade 6 posts, and reduced the Grade 7 posts by approximately one third. [In the civil 
service, the lower the Grade, the more senior the post. Director, TRANSEC is Grade 4, the 
Deputy Director Grade 5]. In essence all senior posts below Director and Deputy Director 
were downgraded. The staff in these posts effectively have powers to direct the British civil 
aviation industry; this includes the giant and complex organisations BA and BAA. 
Understandably the relationship between the Department and industry became more fraught. 
One industry insider has commented (unattributably) that guard dogs have their place in 
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security but not as used by HMG, to do the thinking . 
This unkind comment does an injustice to the Department's staff, who are seeking to 
advance aviation security in the face of apparent obstruction by the industry. The comment 
is nonetheless a not inaccurate illustration of the current relationship between Department 
and industry. The structure of a sounder basis is examined below (7). 
321 Interview, DoT, 1996 
322 Interview, senior industry figure. June 1996 
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6.5.5 Europe: ECAC 
Those seeking to understand the administration of aviation in Europe are advised to embark 
upon a less ambitious project. An oversimplification would describe air traffic being the 
purview of Eurocontrol, air safety the purview of the EU, aircraft operation that of the Joint 
Aviation Administrations (JAA), facilitation and aviation security that of ECAC. The EU has 
relationships with JAA and ECAC which are "informal, nebulous and fraught". 323 The latter 
organisations are pan-European and include 28 countries (April 1993), some ex Eastern 
Bloc, which are not members of the EU. JAA and ECAC have separate Directorates. The 
EU claims exclusive (ie not shared with member states) legal competence over air safety, 
but does not claim technical competence - which informally it leaves to JAA. The EU does 
not claim competence in aviation security; some legal opinions are that it could claim 
competence under the Maastricht Treaty; some legal opinions are that it could not. The 
researcher's interpretation of the Treaty is that the EU could claim competence if it wanted it, 
or disclaim it if it did not want it. The EU, but not JAA or ECAC, can issue mandatory 
enactments which, like the sweep of a double-edged sword, have considerable impact 
whether well or ill directed, 
ECAC, the European Civil Aviation Conference, was established in 1954. Governments 
represented on ICAO's Committee against Unlawful Interference normally send the same 
representatives to ECAC's Security Committee. It is the European regional office of, though 
not subordinate to, ICAO. Nor in practice is it independent of ICAO. 
"ECAC is therefore an independent inter-governmental organisation with a close working 
relationship with ICAO. It cannot be denied that the close financial nexus between ICAO and 
323 Interview, senior official of the CAA. 15 October 1996 
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ECAC has often impeded the work of the ECAC secretariat, which has revived calls for the 
,, 324 more independent European Organization. ... 
ECAC has only two areas of responsibility: aviation security and facilitation (loosely, 
coordination of activities to improve service). The EU accepts ECAC's security role, 
occasionally sending observers to ECAC's meetings. The JAA, although not charged with 
aviation security, has sometimes encroached into the area via its training responsibilities. 
Such intrusions are not well received by ECAC, delegates rightly doubting JAA's expertise, 
and the ECAC staff rightly apprehensive of ECAC's future. If there are admirers in Great 
Britain of the European administration of civil aviation, the researcher met none of them in 
29 years. 
ECAC's formal security activity is the formulation of a common pan-European policy. This 
policy relates to the details of security measures; it is laid down in ECAC Doc 30. It covers 
ground very similar to that of ICAO Annex 17. Annex 17 contains Standards "to which 
325 Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention" , and Recommended 
Practices uto which Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with the 
Convention"; thus the Standards are compulsory in theory if not in practice; the 
Recommended Practices are not compulsory even in theory. ECAC Doc 30 "desire(s) that 
n 326 all Member States .... should be guided by the ..... recommendations .... . 
This 
paraphrases into "recommendations which may be used as guidance material, desirably", an 
aspiration four steps removed from compulsion. 327 
324 AUER, Andre. Governments: Legal Aspects. In Proceedings of ECAC Symposium on Civil Aviation 
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Security, Paris, 6-8 Nov 1990, p3 
ICAO. International Standards And Recommended Practices: Security. Annex 17 To The Convention On 
326 
International Civil Aviation, Dec 1992, pA 
327 
ECAC CEAC Doc 30 (October 1992), pv 
A degree of decisiveness known in the Royal Air Force as *going firm on a definite maybe" 
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In parenthesis, utilitarians may have some difficulties with the lawyer manque language of 
ECAC's policy statements. The policy on security has three WHEREAS's and two 
DESIRING PS; 328 policy on facilitation has two WHEREAS's, four RECOGNIZINGs, two 
INVITING's and two DESIRING oS329. Each statement ends "The Conference resolves to 
adopt"; thus, in formal terms, the whole is no more than an item of internal paperwork. 
This, the status of enactments, is at the root of queries on the utility of ECAC in its formal 
role. As with ICAO, it is an umbrella organisation with no means of implementing its 
enactments. This implementation is entirely dependent upon the individual decisions of 
ECAC's constituent nation states. ECAC has no source of information on security 
standards, other than that which nations supply on their own performance. It has no means 
of applying pressure, let alone enforcing its recommendations (which would be a 
contradiction in terms). IFALPA, which had observer status at ECAC, believed this to be a 
fundamental weakness. The President of IFALPA wrote to the President of ECAC: 
"The Federation believes that greater consistency of practice would be achieved if enactments, 
where appropriate, were accorded Mandatory status. The Federation notes that other 
European organisations give this status to enactments on subjects of less public importance 
than Aviation Security. 
The Federation therefore asks that you consider the benefits of constitutional amendments to 
give mandatory status to ECAC enactments on Aviation Security where appropriate. 030 
328 ECAC Doc 30. p xvi 
329 lbid, pv 
= IFALPA Correspondence, 8 October 1992. 
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The President of ECAC rejected the suggestion. This may well have been an accurate 
assessment of the realities of national sovereignty, but no apparent steps were taken to put 
force and direction into ECAC's activities. 
The IFALPA observer expressed serious reservations about ECACs administration. Until 
1992 each security item was discussed at least four times before achieving its final status as 
a (perhaps ineffective) recommendation. It progressed from Security Sub-Group to Security 
Committee to Security-Facilitation Coordinating Committee to Plenary Session, assuming 
that it was not returned at any stage for reconsideration, which frequently it was, those not in 
agreement with a proposal opposing it at each successive stage. Another source of 
difficulty, despite guarantees to the contrary, was the last-minute presentation of complex 
papers for immediate decision. The third source of stagnation was the apparent lack of 
communication between the Security Committee Chairman and the Secretariat from one 
meeting to the next. Umbrella organisations are not subject to commercial necessities, nor 
perhaps to the disciplines of any imperatives at all. 
Structurally, ECAC is analogous to ICAO. Its value is not as an executive agency, but as a 
forum in which advocates of progress can press their case upon the recalcitrant; the need is 
therefore for well-informed diplomacy. National delegates to the Security Committee were 
administrators with aviation security responsibilities, variously lawyers, policemen, expert 
civil servants and non-expert civil servants, according to the various national administrative 
structures. Representatives of the United States, Canada, EU, IFALPA, AEA and a small 
number of other interested organisations were also invited to attend as observers. 
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The IFALPA observer (1989-93) reported highly of the calibre and character of all delegates. 
Perhaps the most committed of them to the speedy and across-the-board advancement of 
aviation security was the United Kingdom delegate. Many others were less convinced of the 
need to disrupt aviation and spend millions of pounds to combat a remote, perhaps non- 
existent, threat. None was as driven by the experience of Lockerbie as the United Kingdom. 
Few had recent experience of attacks on their aircraft. Unfortunately for progress, the UK 
representative was devoid of diplomatic skills and offended most, if not all, other delegates. 
Although they continued to respect his commitment, they were most unwilling to obey his 
strictures. Progress was therefore unnecessarily impeded. The researcher submits that 
criticism should not be made of the UK delegate, whose good intentions were not to be 
doubted, but of the ethic of HM civil service which puts trust in its servants above 
dispassionate performance appraisal. Nor is this generalisation invalidated by an 
occasional reorganisational bloodbath. 
The IFALPA observer also reported that the subordination of the common cause to national 
amour propre, was not unknown. It was illustrated in its extreme by the occasional conduct 
of the French delegate. As an example, he sought to have all conclusions of a four day 
meeting (Paris, 9-12 April 1991) - reached after committed and industrious work by all 
delegates - set aside on the grounds that he had not had adequate time to study the French 
wording. He appeared to overlook that whereas most nations sent no more than three 
delegates, the French had 12, and that he, the chief delegate, had chosen to take one day 
off. His mischief infuriated most delegates, a few were just stunned. Happily it was 
dispatched in one elegant sentence by the delegate from the Netherlands: 
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"I have to remind my good fflend M. .... that he is not the only delegate to have to work in a 
foreign language". 
Of the 15 national delegations, only the UK and Ireland were working in their native 
language. This example, albeit anecdotal, illustrates the real pitfalls which impede 
international cooperation. A supposed single issue can be subordinated to other, apparently 
irrelevant, issues - in this case the need to affirm the primacy of the French language. 
ECAC proceedings have to be available in both English and French when meetings are held 
in Paris. For that reason the Secretariat seeks to hold meetings elsewhere (thereby inflicting 
gastronomic hardship upon all delegates). Significantly the French even have their own 
name for ECAC - CEAC (Conference Europeenne de I'Aviation Civile). 
6.6 The Costs of the British Response 
6.6.1 Introduction 
This research has already suggested that the costs of attacks are not known 
This sub-section considers the costs, not of attacks, but of countermeasures. It 
concludes that many of these costs are also unknown. Attacks present a problem of 
methodology; of the calculation of consequential costs (revenue losses), probably the 
biggest single item. The costs of countermeasures would be relatively 
straightforward to calculate. The evidence is that this calculation has not been made. 
Some reasons can be identified. Firstly, decisions on countermeasures are driven by 
security imperatives and not by economic criteria. Secondly, to a greater or lesser 
degree, decisions are taken by one party, government, and costs fall upon another 
party, the industry. Thirdly the total cost of a countermeasure is an aggregation of a 
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number of costs, known and unknown; the need to calculate the total has not been 
felt. 
This sub-section notes international practice in the recovery of costs. It examines the 
situation in the UK and considers the implications. 
6.6.2 International Practice 
The cause of the loss of TWA 800 (17 July 1996) has not yet (January 1997) been 
established. Reports that the aircraft was destroyed by a sudden explosion raised the 
possibility that a bomb had been the cause. 
As a result, the US House of Congress passed (28 September 1996) a Bill funding a 
$429.4m programme to upgrade aviation security, including: 331 
e $91.1 m for explosive detection systems. 
* $37.8m for trace detectors to screen electronics and other carry-on items. 
$8.9m for 114 canine teams 
41 $20m increase in the FAA security research budget. 
* $18m to double the FAA security workforce. 
e $10m for passenger profiling. 
This sum covers only the capital costs of the equipment. The costs of installation - involving 
major redesign of airport terminals - are not given. "The FAA estimates the total program will 
331 Aviation Daily. 10 Sept 1996 
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cost $6bn over a decade" ... 
"An FAA study indicates that costs to airlines would approximate $2.5bn 
in the first year and $2bn each year thereafter". 332 The apparent incompatibility of these figures is 
normal in security costing. These costs to airlines relate to the introduction of passenger- 
bag match (ie passenger reconciliation) on domestic flights. At present the FAA requires it 
only on international flights. 
These figures relate to proposed additional security countermeasures. The cost of existing 
countermeasures is not known. 
What is the cost of security to the average US air traveller? " 
Admiral Cathal Flynn, US FAA Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security: 
"The FAA does not have a good figure on the cost of security for domestic air travel. The 
estimated cost is single dollars per flight. ... Besides the direct costs there are fairly significant 
second order costs that need to be taken into account". 333 
It is to be doubted that any country has an accurate estimate of the costs of its aviation 
security. El Al, the Israeli airline, was quoted as spending $35m a year in 1992, of which the 
Israeli government rebated 80%. 334 Countries responding to an EC'AC stud Y335 (1989) 
reported costs ranging from $40m to $1.5m. Six of the sixteen countries which replied to the 
questionnaire were unable to supply a full answer. 
332 Aviation Week and Space Technology. 7 Oct 1996 333 Interview with Admiral Cathal Flynn. Intersec, Oct 1995, p 337 3M Janes Akport Review, June 1992, p 33 335 ECAC Working Paper, SEC/18-WP4,1989 
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6.6.3 Costs of Response in Great Britain 
Security costs fall primarily upon four parties: HMG, airlines, airports and associated aviation 
businesses. Taken one step further, these costs are borne by the taxpayer (HMG) and by 
shareholders and customers (commerce). Other parties are involved, but to a lesser extent: 
for example, employees whose salaries might relate to profitability; this is a secondary order 
of detail and is not considered to be significant. The point has been made that the airports 
are empowered by statute 336 to transfer the bulk of known security costs, 75% (1986-1991), 
and 95% (1992-1997), and of unforeseen costs (the "S" factor) onto their core customers, 
primarily the airlines. In the short term the airlines may pay from reserves, by reducing 
dividends to shareholders, or by transferring funds from other budgets (employees' salaries, 
etc. ) In the long term the costs will be transferred to their customers, the passengers, 
through increases in fares. 
HMG's financial contribution is the sum of relevant costs borne by Parliament, DoT, the 
Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and in the course of Legal 
Enquiries. Most roles fulfilled by HMG could not be undertaken by non-government 
organisations: legislation, the security service, M16, armed force - Special Branch and SAS. 
The concomitant costs fall upon HMG. The possibility remains that it might one day seek to 
recover them. Meanwhile it should be credited with the acceptance of necessity, not with 
generosity. Police costs associated with aviation security are already recovered from 
airports, and by the airports from the airlines. 
336 Airport Act 1986. Part IV, para 40 (1) 
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The DOT has disclosed some Of its CoStS. 
337 It estimates that the A&MSA (1990) put a cost 
upon the Department of E150,000. No estimate of the costs of the drafting and 
parliamentary processes are available. Annual costs of DoT aviation security activity were: 
E4.95m (1992-93), E6.34m (1993-94), E7.2m (1994-5). Total aviation security staff numbers 
were 17 (Oct 88) prior to Lockerbie, and 96 (May 1995). These cost figures include E2.6m, 
E2.7m, E2.6m in the successive years for programme cost. R&D, training aids, overseas 
assistance, and funding of two ICAO posts. The researcher estimates that DoT costs were 
between EO. 5m and Elm in the year prior to Lockerbie. 
Security costs incurred by airports and by specialist security firms are carefully calculated, 
because they are passed on to their customers, the airlines. BAA make the point that the 
figure of 95% recovery of costs is misleading, firstly because of the delay of recovery and 
secondly because they do not include any profit element in their costing of security (thus 
there is no return on capital). BAA estimated that it incurred a cost of E12.53m (1990_91)338 
due to the two year period allowed for repayment, as a result of which they successfully 
negotiated a reduction in the period to one year. 339 
The CAA was also persuaded to raise the recovery rate from the prevailing 75% to 95% in 
the same review. The CAA regulates the BAA in detail and with care, relating its charges to 
a level below but related to the RPI (Retail Prices Index) and setting a maximum revenue per 
passenger. 
A system of cost recovery has an obvious potential to create friction between the invoicer 
and the invoiced. This has been addressed by the CAA which has encouraged and, it 
337 Private letter to researcher, 25 May 1995 338 CAA: MMC2 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission. BAA p1c, 1991, Table 12.6., p 202 339 CAA: Economic Regulation of BAA South-East Airports 1992-97. CAP 599,1991, para 151 
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believes, achieved improvements in transparenCY. 340 Other evidence of cooperation was 
observed during the course of this research. This is encouraging to those who advocate 
partnership in aviation security (6.8). 
The researcher made a personal approach to five of the largest British airlines, and gave a 
presentation to BATA (14 Feb 1995), in pursuit of figures of airlines' aviation security costs. 
The evidence was that most of these costs were unknown. Subsequently two airlines 
conducted studies and released their findings to the researcher. 
Based upon these figures and CAA figures for UK airlines output (11993) in Tonnes-km, and 
assuming 4% inflation per annum 1993-96, and assuming that scheduled airlines' security 
costs are double those of charter airlines per Tonne-km (this factor estimated from airline 
data available), a broad estimate of the total direct costs of security countermeasures to 
British airlines (1996) but excluding security duties of non-security staff and excluding all 
consequential'costs (aircraft disruption, revenue losses etc. ), and assuming the accuracy of 
figures provided, is in the range of E105m-E135m. Bearing in mind the exclusions above, 
this figure can only be an underestimate. 
A figure for the total cost of security to British airlines would be the aggregate of the above, 
plus the exclusions, plus the costs of attacks and hoaxes (which often involve disruptions, 
sometimes CoStly). 341 In the immediate future it would also have to include the costs of 
enhanced security including Hold Baggage Screening and perhaps passenger profiling, and 
higher standards for domestic operations, plus the cost of new US legislation. Estimates for 
340 Ibid. paras 153-158 341 American Airlines threatened to recover costs of El 00,000 from a hoaxer who caused a diversion, 7he 
Times, 13 Sept 1996, p3 
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the cost of Hold Baggage Screening range from 50p to El per bag. This figure is more 
significant to charter services than to scheduled services, given the traditional narrow profit 
margins on package operations. An indication of the potential costs of US legislation was 
given at the 1996 ECAC Symposium: 
"Goverriments legislat for more measures to provide political comfort, where security 
effectiveness is questionable, as President Clinton has with the notorious Hatch amendment in 
April. When Senator Hatch introduced the amendment, which I have read in the record of the 
US Senate debate, he had the honesty to admit that the application of FAA security measures to 
all flights inbound to the USA would level the commercial playing field for US carriers by 
imposing the same expensive and time consuming measures and procedures on foreign carriers. 
British Airways has some experience of the cost of FAA measures. 
We had an operation, now terminating, of three times daily flights to the United States using 
aircraft wet leased from USAir which cost British Airways 1880K more per year than the 
equivalent UK measures. I look to the UK government to defend British Airways against the 
extra territorial application of US law and I am sure that other European carriers expect the 
same of their govemmentS. "342 
To smaller airlines the costs of security can be critical. One informed the researcher that 
their net profit on the GB to Copenhagen route had been E60,000 before receipt of the 
security invoice from Copenhagen, which was for the sum of E60,000.343 Similarly a single 
security countermeasure can attract serious costs. Guarding of individual aircraft (enforced 
342 BA Head of Security. The Costs of Aviation Security., An Airline View. ECAC Symposium, London. 1996, 
343 p Interview, Aidine Manager, 1993 
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during the Gulf confrontation) was costing British Airways E300,000 pa at Brussels alone 
(1991-92). 344 
All of which makes it the more surprising that British airlines have not confronted HMG with 
the cost impact of its enactments. There is a mechanism available to them which they have 
never attempted to use. Compliance Cost Assessment (CCA) was introduced by HMG as 
part of its Deregulation Initiative: 
"A CCA is a structured appraisal that all Government Departments must prepare when 
evaluating policy proposals likely to affect business. Its purpose is to inform Ministers and 
officials of the likely costs to business of complying with new or amended regulations so that 
compliance costs can be assessed, and unnecessary burdens to business identified well before a 
decision is taken on whether or not to go ahead with the proposals. A policy submission to 
Ministers should highlight the important features of the CCA, if one has been prepared, and the 
full CCA should be an annex. 
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. 
The DoT argues that the CCA Scheme applies only to policy enacted after its inception 
(December 1992), and that its own policy proposals pre-date 1992, most being embodied in 
the A&MSA 1990. Industry could have challenged these interpretations. Alternatively it 
could have invited the DoT to comply voluntarily with CCA as a gesture of responsibility and 
good faith. Industry has done neither. 
The simple fact is that British airlines had not, until recently, even started to calculate their 
total security costs. They were not in a position to challenge HMG's cavalier attitude to 
344 Interview, BA Manager, 1994 
345 Dti. Press Notice - Deregulation Task Force Members Announced. 6 Jul 1994 
330 
costs, nor to mount a case on grounds of eroded competitiveness, nor even to conduct 
careful cost-benefit analysis. The financial wound they have suffered was not self-inflicted, 
but their self-defence was not well-conducted. 
"British Airways profit for 1995/6 was announced on Monday at a new record of 1585m, with 
041 
annual turnover of L7,760m. The percentage security cost to profit ration was 14.5% . ... 
6.6.4 HMG Policy 
The civil aviation industry of Great Britain is one of the largest in the world. Heathrow is the 
world's busiest airport (international passenger numbers). British airlines are second largest 
(measured in tonne-kms and passenger-kms on scheduled services, 1994). 347 Therefore the 
introduction, implementation and improvement of British aviation security has been a 
massive undertaking. The standards achieved, certainly amongst the best, of any major 
country, are a credit to the British civil aviation industry and to HIVIG. [In the aviation context 
Israel is not considered to be a major country. Its international airline, El Al, is 30th in the 
above ICAO rankings. El Al's procedures, passenger profiling which involves repeated, 
potentially offensive, questioning and the concomitant long (two or three hour) check-in 
times, would not be acceptable away from the war zone of Israeli activities. ] 
In all but one of the 16 countries in the 1989 ECAC Study (6.5.5), the government either 
totally (8) or partly (7) bore the cost of statutory aviation security. The one government 
which made no contribution was HMG. The United Kingdom replied u(Cost) Not known as 
346 BA Head of Security, ref 342, pp 5/6 
347 ICAO Annual Statistics. Appendix 15, Table 5,1994, p 163 
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this is expended by airport authorities and airlines". HMG clearly saw its role as a dictator of 
standards, without responsibility for, or interest in, their costs. 
"Lord Clinton-Davis 
To ask Her Majesty's Government what have been the costs of aviation security in the United 
Kingdom in each of the years from 1988 to the present. [23rd June] 
To ask Her Majesty's Government how the costs of aviation security in the United Kingdom 
compare with those in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. [23rd June] 
To ask Her Majesty's Government who bears the costs of aviation security in the United 
Kingdom and which authorities bear such costs in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. 
[23rd June] 
The Earl of Caithness 
In the UK the airports and airlines are responsible for meeting their own security costs, in the 
same way as they are responsible for funding other items of operational expenditure. no central 
record is kept of the costs incurred. The arrangements in other countries are a matter for the 
individual governments concerned. iiM 
After this Ministerial statement, the Security Committee (BALPA) submitted a Paper to the 
Department. The Summary read: 
348 The House of Lords. 30 June 1992 
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"British Goverment policy on Financing Aviation Security is clear: the costs are bome by the 
industry. This policy differs from those of many of our competitors in two respects: 
1. The Aviation Security standards which we seek, and achieve, are higher than most, if not 
all, other countries. 
The British Government's financial contribution to the costs is lower than most, if not 
all, other countries. 
The Security Committee has observed that British airlines have been inconsistent in, and 
sometimes obstructive to, the pursuit of higher Aviation Security standards. it has concluded 
that their concern for their competitive position is a major factor. 
It has further concluded that other countries' system of financing Aviation Security may 
constitute unfair comPetition. 
It therefore recommends a comparative review of the systems of financing Aviation Security 
used by Great Britain and its major competitors. " 
The final sentence was: 
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"Financing of Aviation Security was last reviewed in 1988, prior to Lockerbie. Details of the 
(government's last) review (1988) are confidential to NASC but the Association feels that its 
conclusion owed more to Government policy than to powerful reasoning. 99349 
The evidence is that this final sentence identifies the core of the issue. During the first 
decade of the Development Years (1968-88), security measures (passenger-bag 
reconciliation, early passenger screening) caused some disruption but were not major cost 
items. During the second decade (1979-1988) the strong-minded Margaret Thatcher was 
Prime Minister. Her primary objectives were the dismantling of the nanny state and the 
reduction of state expenditure. Thus for the first decade the case for state financial support 
was perhaps not strong, and for the second decade the timing was not propitious. The Re- 
energization Years (1989-93) were immediately preceded by the end of Britain's boom and 
were thus a period of government economic parsimony. This continues to the present 
(1997). The government strategy for economic recovery has been to restrict government 
spending in all areas. Whilst single-mindedness is essential to the successful pursuit of any 
strategy, small-mindedness is a different matter. A government which is careless of the 
impact of its strategy at the tactical level is giving a hostage to electoral fortune. Across a 
wide spectrum: Victims' Compensation (minimal compensation to victims of violence)350, 
confiscation of lifetime savings of the elderly to meet nursing feeS351, Control of Handguns 
(minimal compensation to individuals and business) Maintenance of Listed Buildings 
(Draconian imposition of prohibitive costs upon owners)352, Child Support Agency 
(retrospective invalidation of legal agreements), the government's determination to reduce 
its expenditure has suggested the inflexibility of the small-minded. Further, the 
349 BALPA Security Committee. Financing Aviation Security. Aug 1992, 
350 The Times, 6 Apr 1995, p1 
351 The Times, letter, 18 Sept 1995 
352 The Spectator, 26 November 1996, pp 58-9 
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(Conservative) government has been opposed to state intervention in industry. Thus the 
years of massive aviation security expenditure (1991-96) have been years in which HMG 
has been unwilling to make a financial contribution for reasons both doctrinal and dogmatic. 
There are essentially two arguments for government contribution. The first is in the context 
of national defence: that the nation, or even the government, was the target of terrorist 
attacks and that the aviation industry was a proxy victim. The second is in the context of 
commercial competitiveness. Major international airlines fly the same aeroplanes and 
charge similar fares. The most important distinctions between them are their tangible service 
and their less tangible brand image. Rigorous security may have an adverse effect on 
service, both through its intrusion on passenger facilitation and its consumption of funds 
which otherwise could be expended on passenger comfort. Thus HMG's rigorous 
requirements are likely to. erode competitiveness. Airlines are notoriously unwilling to 
advertise that their safety or security standards are better than their competitors, this being 
seen as challenging fate. [PanAm spent much of its security levy on advertising its security 
standards, thus challenging belief as well as fate. ] The problems of competitiveness are 
exacerbated by the massive financial support given by other governments to their national 
airlines (Air France, Iberia). In contrast HIVIG exacts from airline passengers an Air 
Passenger Duty (Departure Tax) which will yield an estimated E700m (1997-8). Onequarter 
of this later sum rebated to the airlines would cover the direct costs that they incur in 
protecting their passengers from HMGs enemies. 
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6.6.5 Costs in Perspective 
The subject of the costs of aviation security is not only unexplored, it is uncharted. A basic 
methodology must cover the calculation of costs, analysis of comparative- effectiveness of 
countermeasures, and the calculation of cost effectiveness. To devise and apply such a 
methodology would be challenging within the British national context. To resolve issues of 
international fair competition it should also be undertaken in an international context. The 
realities of international cooperation suggest little prospect of success. A methodology could 
be designed and imposed by the European Union. The EU is unlikely to move into such an 
contentious area unless either invited or obliged. This indicates that the British civil aviation 
industry should work in partnership with HMG to pursue a "level playing field". 
Questions of cost-effectiveness arise with the proposal of any new security measure. Any 
security measure can be penetrated; if prohibitively difficult to penetrate it can, like the 
Maginot Line, be circumvented. Worldwide, approximately 2 billion hold bags are carried 
annually. Heathrow handles approximately 53.4 million passengers (1994). The volume of 
the movements sets the biggest problem. It militates against the depth of screening which is 
sought by advocates of security. The volume demands that the successively closer, more 
time-consuming screening be focused on successively smaller numbers. Thus advances in 
achieved security standards may be attained by improvements in screening techniques or by 
improvements in the focus of (items selected for) those techniques. This is the basis of the 
flow system whereby at each stage suspect items are separated and streamed through a 
finer filter. This system is used in the screening both of baggage and of passengers; in the 
latter case it is called "profiling". A methodology of cost-effectiveness, if it is to have real 
value, must be able to quantify the impact of any security proposal. 
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Cost-effectiveness is a tool with which comparisons can be made between security 
measures. It is not a principle upon which either the objectives or standards of aviation 
security can be based. Thus it guides tactical choices, but not the formulation of strategy. 
All strategy is derived from value judgements. These assumptions are the first order factors, 
the foundations. Costs and cost-effectiveness, important though they are, are second order 
factors. The primary first order factor is the value judgement of the importance of aviation 
security. The researcher has propounded the view that responsible civil aviation safeguards 
the lives of those who depend upon it to a degree unsurpassed in any other area of large 
scale, potentially hazardous, human activity: medicine, law enforcement, road transport, 
shipping, etc. This level of care has become a public expectation. , It is thus enshrined in 
legislation by government and reflected in the culture of the (market-led) civil aviation 
industry. It may be that a public perception (correct or incorrect) that PanAm had wilfully 
failed to adhere to this cultural norm - the duty to care - was material to the airline's demise. 
Thus though the costs of security are not a strategic consideration, the cost of 
inadequate security most certainly is. 
6.7 The Pilots' Response 
6.7.1 IFALPA 
IFALPA responded vigorously to the first incursions of international terrorism into civil 
aviation (1968). For 10 years its activity earned it a leading place on the world's aviation 
stage. In 1977 the President of IFALPA was invited to address the United Nations General 
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Assembly in the form of the UN Special Political Committee (26 October 1977). Thereafter 
IFALPA ceased to occupy centre stage, though its security efforts continued, and still 
continue (11997), but out of the public eye. 
IFALPA was better prepared for international terrorist attacks on aviation than was the 
international community. This was a result of the exposure of US airline pilots to the Cuba 
hijack epidemic (1961 on). The experience of US ALPA of widespread opposition to action 
was a foretaste of what was in store elsewhere: 
spent an awful lot of time trying to talk people into doing the things that were possible to do, 
and I must say that when it came to doing something effective, ALPA was not only the prime 
mover, we were almost the only mover. " 
- We had to fight like hell for the most basic changes in ground screening, X-ray surveillance of 
luggage, magnetometers. It was obvious that the companies and the FAA were going to do as 
little as possible, and we finally had to threaten to take action on our own, and if it meant 
defying the government ban on flight crew carrying handguns, well, we just had no choice, 
because we just couldn't tolerate it any longer. I had to fight four-fifths of the airlines on the 
use of low-pulse x-rays, which were just beginning to show up to screen luggage. FAA was 
dubious about it, and of course Ralph Nader and his ilk screamed. " "' 
US ALPA is the biggest, and perhaps the most powerful, of the world's Pilots' Associations, 
few of which could contemplate such a bold defiance of their governments. 
353 Captain Charley Ruby quoted in HOPKINS, Prof. George E. Flying the Line, pp 267-268 in JACKSON, 
Captain CC. The History of IFALPA, Vol I (Unpublished MSS, 1996), p 306 
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When the first international hijack occurred (23 July 1968): 
"Under its new President, Captain Ian Bartelski, IFALPA reaction was swift and two Principal 
Officers, Ola Forsberg (Vice-President) and Jim O'Grady, quickly went down to Algiers. 
During the first visit they hardly managed to penetrate officialdom; it did, however, provide 
IFALPA not only with all the facts but also with a good basis for a publicity campaign. After 
this the two went down to Algiers again, this time they found the atmosphere had changed, at 
least enough to result in talks with Foreign Minister Bouteflika. But although they were well 
received, nevertheless no immediate release followed. IFALPA's governing body, the Principal 
Officers, lacking nothing in persistence, sent down another delegation, this time, Captain Vitaly 
Nicolaieff (France), supported by his colleague Captain Jacques Langradin. But from the point 
of view of Member Associations, time was dragging on and, with still not direct contact with the 
crew, the idea of a boycott of Algiers had sprung up almost spontaneously. ... Vitaly Nicolaiefrs 
bargaining position was much strengthened and indeed, soon after his visit, all passengers and 
crew were released. 9v354 
The IFALPA History intimates that IFALPA initiated the "entirely new policy .... no safe place 
to go". 355 Although the claim of originality is not verifiable, early support for the "no safe 
356 haven" concept is a matter of record . IFALPA combined realism and prescience 
in its 
pursuit of this important policy: 
"From the very beginning IFALPA has been aiming at "no safe place to go" - ie severe 
punishment and/or extradition everywhere. We are fully aware, however, that political asylum 
354 JACKSON, ibid, pp 307,308 355 JACKSON, ibid, p 308 356 IFALPA I Manual. RES/DIR 4.2.3.5., quoted in Report On Special Conference On Hijacking, London, 17- 
18 Dec 1969, p 12 
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will be granted in a foreseeable future, but we insist until further that, before granting this 
asylum, severe penalties must be imposed. %v357 (wording sic) 
"Summing up my impressions about International Law at the present time I would say that, 
while it covers well the entire range of unlawful interference, it is definitely not strong enough 
yet. The main reason is that it skillfully avoids the political problems that, after all, constitute 
the most dangerous element for us today 91 . 
359 
IFALPA also introduced a new concept, that of any state which detained the crew of a 
hijacked aircraft for more than 48 hours, being declared "an offending state". This was 
prompted by the conduct of the Algerian Government during the first Palestinian hijack (23 
July 1968). The Algerians had immediately released most hostages, but the crew and five 
Israeli passengers had been detained until 1 September. Significantly the 1969 Conference 
resolved to accompany its declaration of "offending state" with action: "to institute an 
immediate ban ... on the operation of aircraft into the offending state . .. 
" . 
359 However and in 
essence, the ban was not worldwide, but related to "the Associations involved" and 
depended upon prior consultation. IFALPA is little more than a committee for coordinating 
the activities of Member Associations; it is powerless to direct them. Thus Associations wary 
of the strong, and brave, decisions at the Conference immediately began to attenuate them. 
Some Associations faced three serious possible threats: a boycott being classified as illegal 
industrial action within national legislation, airlines opposed to a boycott resorting to court 
injunctions against a Member Association, as had been threatened by the US airlines' 
357 IFALPA. Annual Report of the President 1971, p 12 
358 Ibid, p 13 359 Ibid, p 309 
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organisation (ATA) against US ALPA, or dismissal of individual pilots supporting the boycott. 
These are real threats, not lame excuses. For such reasons a watering down process 
immediately began. At the Special Conference on Hijacking (London, 17-18 Dec 1969), 
which was the first Special Conference ever convened by IFALPA, the Directive status of the 
Amsterdam resolution was reduced to that of a Policy Statement. A proposal to hold a 24 
hour stoppage to draw attention to the fact that "governments had been dragging their 
feetn360 on hijacking was rejected, largely because it was not supported by the two biggest 
Associations in the world; US ALPA did not believe that its pilots would support a ban - some 
being threatened with punitive action by their employers. The BALPA representative stated 
361 that "such demonstrations were useless, ineffective and improper". 
Happily there were also capable and prescient campaigners in IFALPA. The 1971 Annual 
Report of the President includes a thoughtful, seven page, Position Report on 
Hijacking/Sabotage, and a six page Attachment reporting the IFALPA 1970-71 Campaign; 
appendix (X) outlines proposals for a specific Anti-Hijacking Campaign (The T+ Program). 
These documents reflect great credit on those who sought 'to lead IFALPA towards 
responsible, effective action. Influential outsiders also directed attention to the leadership 
vacuum in the international community: 
We have said before and we say again that pilots have a special responsibility to exercise 
leadership on this issue ... With government efforts to enforce an 
international air piracy law 
waning, the pilots' responsibility to assume leadership increases. Pilots have been in the 
vanguard of almost every campaign to improve air safety. Air piracy is the worst threat of all 
360 lbid p 39 361 lbid, p 41 
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only forthright action by pilots vAll stir other organizations and agencies to continue the 
inexorable campaign of eradication - it vAll take a long and vigorous campaign 9.062 
Many would agree with this statement. IFALPA's reaction to hijacking was coherent and 
committed; the same could not be said of either ICAO or IATA. 
"... It is noteworthy here that in no case of hijacking or of passenger/crew detention did IATA 
assume a direct interventionist role. For this, it was in just as good a position to take physical 
action (for example, sending a delegation, imposing a boycott) as was IFALPA. Instead, IATA 
policy appears to have been to leave everything to the governments concerned - which, of 
course, had in effect proved grossly inadequate. IATA also seems to have kept a low profile in 
s063 the face of IFALPA's own proposal for a ban on an 'offending state' . 
"... Early in 1969 the Council of ICAO had itself proposed to 'get on its horse' by sending a 
delegation of its own members whenever a case of the unreasonable detention of passengers or 
crew was involved. At Aden* this was exactly the situation and, after a day or two with no 
discernable progress in the negotiations, ... accordingly I sent them a telegram asking when we 
might expect a delegation from Montreal. There was no reply. When I mentioned this some 
time later to Jack Newton, he indicated that in practice Council members could not be organised 
for any kind of instant response. ... 
064 
*Researcher's Note: 13 September 1969 hijack of Ethiopian DC6 to Aden, involving a 
gunfight between armed hijackers and an Ethiopian secret police agent. 365 
362 Aviation Week Editorial. 5 Oct 1970 quoted in Appendix X to the IFALPA Annual Conference Papers 1971 W3 JACKSON, ref 353, p 311 364 JACKSON, ref 353, p 315 365 MICKOLUS, ref 33, p 139 
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In practice Council members could not be organised ... " is a statement that 
does not 
stand up to any kind of scrutiny. Similarly IATA's inaction was a reflection of both ineptitude 
and absence of will. Thus IFALPA set an example to ICAO and IATA, both of which were 
much bigger, richer and potentially more influential international organisations. 
Aviation terrorism ran increasingly rampant. In 1972 IFALPA turned its earlier resolve into 
action: 
"The worldwide 24 hour boycott of civil air transportation on June 19,1972, was prompted by 
a record of 34 successful international and domestic hijackings from January 1,1972, through 
the first week in June. According to reports, the boycott was more extensive and more 
effective in its impact on international air transportation than could have been anticipated. 
Service was substantially curtailed in most of Europe, in several Nfiddle Eastern and African 
states, in much of Latin America, and in Canada. In the United States the Air Transport 
Association obtained a temporary restraining order from the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, prohibiting the Air Line Pilots Association from participating in the strike; 
however, the pilots of some carriers did join .......... 
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44 a protest demonstration consisting of a 24 hour world-wide stoppage was declared for 19th 
June 1972. 
governments and companies began to take notice. And so did the Press; even the American 
Aviation Week, not particularly noted for supporting the pilots' viewpoint, regretted that it 
3W EVANS, ref 284, pp 670,671 
343 
should be left to the pilots alone to spearhead the anti-terrorist campaign. Further, in spite of 
the anticipated interruption to travel, most public reaction was also sympathetic - some 
sections indeed positively supportive. So far, nothing of this mood had been reflected at the 
UN but when the IFALPA demonstration, ... 
looked inevitable, President Ola Forsberg 
(Finland) was invited to go to New York for talks with the (newly appointed) Secretary 
General, Kurt Waldheim. ... he ... had a discussion with Waldheim. This went on till quite late 
in the evening; however, when Waldheim, while requesting the abandonment of the IFALPA 
24 hour cessation programme, showed no disposition whatsoever on his part to resuscitate the 
hijacking/sabotage subject again at any UN level , 
367... Forsberg phoned ... to say that -we had 
no choice but to implement the stoppage. 
Nevertheless, when it came to the crunch, the two largest Associations, ALPA and 
BALPA, had failed to deliver. 
In the case of ALPA, their President JJ O'Donnell had conducted the strongest personal 
campaign in favour of the stoppage, however when faced with an injunction filed at the 
Supreme Court by the American Transport Association (ATA), he found that he did not have 
solid enough backing among some pilot groups to risk legal action. 11369 
BALPNs failure to support the international community cannot be ascribed to legal 
impediment (1972 pre-dates present restrictive UK legislation) nor to industrial weakness. 
The IFALPA History offers no illumination, nor was one offered at the Special Conference on 
Hijacking and Sabotage (12-13 Dec 1972), which reviewed the stoppage. The main clues 
367 Waldheim's unwillingness to act contrasts with his willingness to make high sounding statements. See 
FRIEDLANDER, Robert A. Coping with Terrorism: What is to be Done? In Yonah ALEXANDER, David 
368 
CARLTON & Paul WILKINSON, eds. Terrorism: Theory and Practice. Boulder: Westview, 1979 
JACKSON, ref 345, pp 320,321 
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are the BALPA Chairman's earlier procedural objection ("... no formal vote had been taken 
at the end of the Study Group's discussions on hijacking. "369 ) and his statement to the 1972 
Special Conference: 
"(He) re-affirmed his Association's view, however, that the Principal Officers were wrong to call 
for the 24 hour cessation of operations without due consultation with Member Associations and 
exhorted them to pay particular attention to such policy and constitutional requirements in 
future. "-"' 
On balance it is probable that BALPA's pusillanimous performance is attributable to the 
same of its leadership. This failure of US ALPA and BALPA hit at the heart of IFALPA's 
credibility with other Member Associations, many of whom had faced down their 
governments and employers in order to support the stoppage. 371 
The proposition of a worldwide cessation of -flying is not mentioned in any IFALPA 
President's Annual Report after 1973. 
Post hoc, and partly propter hoc IFALPA did not use its biggest weapon -a worldwide 
cessation of aviation - again. Apart from the very real threats posed by legislation and by 
predatory employers, there is a third dynamic constraining IFALPA's freedom of action. Its 
relationship with individual pilots is both remote and frail. Hence any attempt to mobilise 
pilots into an action which exposes them to potentially serious legal, financial and 
employment liabilities, jeopardises the Federation's very foundations. The conclusion is not 
369 IFALPA. Report of the Special Conference on Hijacking, London 17-18 Dec 1969, P 10 370 IFALPA. Report of the Special Conference on Hijacking and Sabotage, Mexico 12-13 December 1972, p4 371 Ibid, pp 4-5, and App A, 8, C. App C (Statement by the Argentinian ALPA) is particulady cogent 
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that the uniting of the world's pilots is no longer possible. It is that such an action requires a 
very high order of management skills, such as are not normally to be found in unpaid 
positions, the occupation of which is determined not by stringent selection but by the 
ephemeral idiosyncrasies of election processes. 
By the late 1980s IFALPA's security activity had effectively passed out of the hands of the 
Principal Officers and had become a technical issue researched by its Security Committee. 
This Committee, 20-30 airline pilots, met annually. Most of its energies were devoted to 
developing detailed policy on security countermeasures and to issuing security advice to 
pilots. By 1992 the IFALPA (Security) Manual had gone the way of much IFALPA 
documentation and had become complex and impenetrable. Advice on an issue was spread 
throughout the Manual, not cross-referenced, and often contradictory. Thus to a Member 
Association seeking its guidance in negotiations, it was a quagmire. At the time a pilot 
negotiating security standards had to refer to ICAO Annex 17, ECAC Doc 30, IFALPA T 
Manual (Annex 17), his national security enactments and his airline's security instructions. 
Each of these documents had a different system of organisation, rarely indexed. The result 
was predictable and splendid confusion. 
The IFALPA solution was to organise its Manual to mirror the definitive document, ICAO 
Annex 17. Annex 17 was reproduced on the left hand page with IFALPA comments aligned 
opposite, on the right hand page, thus producing a user-friendly document. The most 
significant change introduced with the new manual related to "offending states". This 
potentially powerful mechanism had lapsed into ineffectiveness because of failure to utilise 
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its main strength: the attachment of pariah status to an offending country through public 
condemnation by a prestigious, non-political, international body. - 
In parenthesis it is relevant that the same fate had befallen IFALPA's classification of states 
in which there were failures of air safety (cf security) standards. The methodology hinged on 
pressing states to remedy deficiencies, by exposing them to humiliating publicity; this 
classification had degraded into an internal IFALPA system, without accompanying publicity. 
At one time the United Kingdom had a Black classification ý (the worst) for its North Sea 
helicopter facilities; the first the Chairman of the CAA knew of it was a chance remark over 
lunch by the Chairman of BALPA. 
IFALPA's revised Security Manual placed obligations upon the Federation within its 
offending state mechanism, as well as outlining discretionary actions. Initially the Principal 
Officers of IFALPA rejected these paragraphs as " not ... suficiently mature ... since 
they 
proposed deletion of existing policy text without presenting any rationale therefor; 
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although the "existing policy" was confused and contradictory, and although they had been 
fully informed of the rationale of each succeeding draft. A good example of the power of the 
offending state mechanism was the Lebanon (1991-2) A senior delegation of IFALPA was 
invited to Beirut. The Minister of Civil Aviation asked for Lebanon's removal from the list of 
offending states, promising immediate rectification of deficiencies. The IFALPA delegation 
agreed; the Security Committee rejected their recommendations, preferring to match a 
promise of rectification with a promise of removal from the list. 
372 IFALPA. Principal Officers' Review of Report of IFALPA Security Committee Meeting, Helsinki, 21-22 
September 1993, p 2. 
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IFALPA also has powerful and less confrontational means of influencing bureaucracies, if 
not events. It maintains a permanent representative at ICAO. It has observer status on the 
ICAO Committee on Unlawful Interference, which produces ICAO Annex 17, the definitive 
international document on aviation security standards. The viewpoint of a practising pilot is 
generally well received and therefore the opportunity is valuable to IFALPA. 
IFALPA is an organisation of great potential power. Short of atrocities of such 
magnitude that they themselves provoke 'the international community of pilots'to act, 
IFALPA must rebuild its potential before it can deploy its power. Meanwhile it is not 
so much a sleeping giant as a giant suffering from loss of identity. 
6.7.2 BALPA Security Committee 
6.7.2.1 Perspective 
The British Air Line Pilots Association has taken an interest in aviation security since 1968. 
As briefly mentioned above, until 1974 the issue was largely in the hands of the Chairman of 
the Association; he chaired the Security Committee (founded June 1974)373 until 1987. 
Thereafter the Committee comprised only security specialists, including its Chairman, and 
reported direct to the National Executive Council of the Association. This reorganisation 
proved to work well. 
One of the first strategy decisions of the new Committee was to seek to involve all pilots in 
security, in the same manner as they had always been involved in safety. This necessitated 
373 BALPA. Report On Annual Delegates Conference 1974, p10 
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informing pilots as fully as possible. There are few specific aspects of security which justify 
strict confidentiality; those that do (eg undercover operations) are strictly classified by the 
relevant government agency, and no information whatsoever about them would ever reach 
beyond privileged circles (which obviously excludes non-government organisations). Thus 
there never was any danger of breach of such confidence by BALPA. Nonetheless it is clear 
that the more information that reaches an antagonist or would-be attacker, the better he can 
plan his attack. Therefore BALPA Newsletters to pilots were written with care, in the 
knowledge that they might be carried in pilots' briefcases to hotels in countries sympathetic 
to Middle Eastern or other terrorist groups. Achieving the appropriate balance between 
information and confidentiality is not difficult, and the Newsletters offered potential attackers 
no useful data. 
The second policy decision of the Security Committee was to seek to build relationships of 
mutual trust with interested parties in government and industry, based on scrupulous 
accuracy of information supplied by the Committee, and on confidentiality of information 
supplied to the Committee. It was not difficult to establish mutual trust with civil servants. 
With industry trust is more the exception than the rule, deception of the workforce being an 
established industry management style. This is one reason for the Security Committee 
having a much better relationship with HMG than with its own employers. The second 
reason, already touched on, is that HMG sought to advance security standards, whereas 
industry, which paid for them, was less enthusiastic. 
On the advancement of standards, the Committee had a simple policy: to support any 
advance to the point of implementation, and then to seek further advances. This policy was 
effective in countering the industry's standard set of responses to any security proposal: 
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* It cannot be done. 
e It could be done, but it will bring the airline/airport to a standstill. 
* It might not bring the airline/airport to a standstill, but it will cost EN (large number) 
millions. 
e It might not actually cost EN millions, but there are other greater priorities. ý 
o The staff will never accept it. 
9 BALPA should leave security matters to the experts and stick to flying aeroplanes. 
6.7.2.2 Relationship with Pilots 
The relationship between individual pilot members and BALPA spreads across a spectrum 
from complete disinterest to major commitment. Pilots at the former end maintain 
membership for its potential protection value against victimization by employers and against 
the legal costs of misfortune with aircraft. Those at the latter end are likely to have a deep 
but narrow commitment to one aspect of the Association's activities. The majority take a 
measured interest in the Association, usually accompanied by strong views on its failings. 
Pilots, by nature and by profession, are accustomed to make their own decisions, and tend 
to see attempts to influence them as attempts to dictate to them, and react accordingly. The 
membership is not a ready-made and malleable audience for the Association. A second 
difficulty attends those seeking to establish close communication links with the membership. 
It tends to regard Association activists sceptically, suspecting (rightly in many cases) that 
they are in pursuit of their own agenda, to which they are seeking to harness the 
membership. Finally, pilots receive large numbers of communications, often stultifyingly dull, 
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both from their employers and their Association. Additions to the number are unwelcome. 
The Security Committee was well aware of these difficulties. 
Thus, though the Committee took pains to establish formal communications in newsletters 
and in the Association's journal, and solicited pilots' reports, it was aware that the potential 
was limited. It therefore encouraged informal communications in personal phone calls or in 
the course of normal sociability. Some of its most valuable information was received through 
informal channels. The most dramatic example occurred the evening after the loss of 
PanAm 103. A pilot telephoned a member of the Security Committee to point out that in 
certain circumstances the baggage on PanAm 103 could have been transferred to a British 
aircraft. Within 24 hours this information had been developed into a wide-ranging study; and 
the results telephoned to a senior official at DoT. He said simply, "Point taken", and initiated 
immediate action to address the issue. 
The individual members of the Committee, 5 to 12 in number, were the source of most 
information. As far as possible the Committee was drawn from all sections of the 
membership, large and small airlines, domestic, European and international routes. Each 
had a network of colleagues within his own airline. Thus the Committee was able to keep 
itself well-informed on security standards worldwide. 
IFALPA provided an even wider network. The Chairman of the BALPA Security Committee 
represented the Association on the IFALPA Security Committee, and thus had personal 
contact with pilots from 20-30 other nations. As an example, in 1984 British Airways wished 
to resume services into Teheran (which had been withdrawn soon after the revolution). Little 
information on the security situation at the airport was available in Great Britain, but Air 
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France had already resumed its service. - With a phone call to the French ALPA 
representative on the IFALPA Security Committee (coincidentally Captain Michel Bacos, who 
had been the Captain of the Airbus hijacked to Entebbe), BALPA received an excellent 
briefing on Teheran. Captain Bacos reported that security itself was very efficient but that 
youthful revolutionaries like to strut through the aircraft cabin carrying AK 47s. The danger 
was obvious. BALPA telephoned the DoT to enquire about the safety catch mechanism on 
the AK 47. The DoT official chose to be unhelpful, and suggested that BALPA address its 
enquiry to the Iranians. [BALPA preferred to approach a US official. ] Subsequent BA 
operations into Teheran proved Captain Bacos' information accurate. 
An issue which caused great turbulence was the security screening of pilots. Following the 
Lockerbie atrocity, positive steps were taken to assure the sterility of all movements across 
the landside/airside barrier. Vehicles were searched (previously deemed impracticable), as 
were personnel. From the outset the Security Committee decided that pilots should be 
included. Apart from the sound security basis for this decision, the Committee intended to 
undermine the case for the exemption of any group. VIPs, senior management, police, 
customs and other "special cases" were all staking their claims, presumably on the basis that 
they were too important to undergo screening. It was the Security Committee's view that 
they were lucky to be walking on the same earth as Airline Captains and that therefore they 
could follow the pilots through the security checks. 
The introduction of the screening of pilots caused massive inconvenience to some groups. 
At some (less well organised) airports pilots were obliged to queue outside, unprotected from 
rain. Those flying domestic services found themselves security screened each time they 
landed, perhaps six times a day, and perhaps involving a very lengthy detour, carrying their 
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luggage. There were many well-justified complaints. In fact these gave less difficulty than 
the two or three irrational reactions. This is less of a paradox than it may appear. The 
source of a justified grievance can be removed; the source of irrational behaviour is more 
problematic. One pilot was highly incensed because he was screened in full view of the 
passengers and felt humiliated. He became a vociferous critic of the Security Committee, 
writing in The Log (the Association journal) and making a lengthy attack on the Committee at 
an Annual Delegates Conference (11990). His case was without substance. Debates at 
conference owing more to the thuggery of the Commons than to the delicacy of the Lords, he 
prompted strong responses. Thereafter he showed no further interest in security. It is not 
desirable to leave serious criticism unanswered; it can seriously damage members' 
confidence in the Committee and is injurious to the morale of hard-working Committee 
members. However, accountability is a central tenet of the democratic system and there is 
no reason to exempt aviation security. 
6.7.2.3 Relationship with DoT 
Prior to Lockerbie, BALPA's relationship with DoT was brittle. DoT had taken over 
responsibility for aviation security from the Board of Trade after a reorganisation of Ministries 
in 1979. Some of the middle-ranking staff involved had also been transferred. The 
importance of the subject at the time is indicated by the staff numbers allocated to it - 
approximately five plus secretarial support. DoT was officially the lead organisation, but 
without authority over the others: the Police, Security Service, Home Office and Foreign 
Office. A gentlemanly turf war was in progress, exacerbated by the relatively junior rank of 
the DoT Aviation Security Inspectors. DoT endeavoured to subordinate BALPA to its 
decisions, stating that BALPA had no role in the decision-making process, and also stating 
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that BALPA was behaving improperly "in hawking its views round Whitehall". Had BALPA 
acceded to these views it would have been left with no role save that of endorsing the DOTS 
decisions. This would have constituted an abrogation of its responsibilities to Association 
members. It took steps to maintain good relations with all government departments and 
ignored DoT displeasure. It also began to build relationships at higher levels in DoT. 
Improvements began. They were much boosted in the aftermath of Lockerbie, and became 
harmonious following the establishment of TRANSEC and some senior new appointments 
(1990). Thereafter BALPA enjoyed access to high levels within DoT whenever the need 
arose. In the areas where BALPA did not achieve the progress which it sought, the failures 
were of inexperience in pursuing difficult and ambitious targets. They were not attributable 
to any refusal to give the case a fair hearing. The same is true of the Select Committee on 
Transport (1989) and the Standing Committee's deliberations on the Aviation and Maritime 
Security Bill (6.5.3.2). 
The propriety of the conduct of the Department is best illustrated by two instances when it 
opposed, in part or in full, proposals advanced by BALPA. The first occasion was when 
BALPA responded to Paul Channon's request (Jan 1989) for recommendations. BALPA 
submitted a lengthy document (6.10 APPENDIX 2) containing 27 specific recommendations, 
well aware that many were opposed by the Department. The Department gave a careful 
written reply to each individual proposal. It thereby not only placed its position on record but 
also left it open to debate. BALPA noted the sharp contrast between the Department's 
conduct and that of airlines in a similar negotiating position. The second instance related to 
BALPA's advocacy of a Security Incident Reporting System. This was intended to formalise 
the reporting of security deficiencies by pilots, and to utilise the extensive potential 
intelligence provided by their daily movement through the world's major airports. The 
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Department continually rejected this proposal - probably more aware than BALPA of HMG'S 
inability to remedy deficiencies. As a result of lobbying by BALPA (6.7.2.4) provision for a 
Reporting System was included in the Aviation and Maritime Security Act. Subsequently the 
Department decided to water the system down into negligibility, but very correctly and 
courteously forewarned BALPA of its decision,, once again opening itself to potential 
challenge. The Association's experience of the Department was that it conducted itself with 
scrupulous integrity. 
The Association sought and obtained access to Ministers at the Department of Trade. It 
wished to maintain Ministerial interest in aviation security, to support the Department's 
actions and, on occasion, to oppose the Department's inaction. " It probably succeeded in the 
first two objectives and, on one occasion (6.7.2.4), in the third. On another occasion 
(6.7.2.9), the Minister was not persuaded to issue the desired instructions, however it was 
clear that he listened closely to the argument and was thereby well-briefed. One 
insuperable problem was posed by Ministers' short tenure of office, preventing the 
establishment of a long-term relationship of trust. 
"Britain has suffered from transport not having a sufficiently high political profile. The position 
of Secretary of State has been for someone on the road up or on the road out. We have had 
something like ten secretaries of state in 13 years. No wonder the DoT leaves so much to be 
desired". 374 
Nonetheless such meetings established the Association as a powerful and well-informed 
lobby, and thereby enhanced its influence on aviation security. 
374 MARSHALL, David. Aviation Security: A Legislator's Perspective. In Paul WILKINSON. Technology and 
Tefforism. London: Frank Cass, 1993, p 121 
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6.7.2.4 Relationship with Select Committee 
A BALPA delegation, led by the Chairman of the Association, appeared before the Select 
Committee on Transport (1989) having previously made a written submission. It was clear 
that the Committee was both interested and informed in the subject. The Association was 
given a full and fair hearing. The Committee asked expert questions; interestingly they also 
asked simple lay questions ("You mean I cannot take my alarm clock onto an aircraft? Don't 
be silly"), reflecting their constituents' practical viewpoints. It appeared to accept readily the 
necessity of excluding undesirables from employment where they might prejudice security, a 
proposal challenging to political correctness. With the exception of an instance of apparent 
lobbying on behalf of the Police Federation (ill-advised, because the Police did not want 
responsibility for aviation security), the Committee was impressive. 
6.7.2.5 Standing Committee 
The Association lobbied Parliament during the passage of the Aviation and Marine Security 
Bill (1990). The DoT had accepted most of the Association's proposals for the Bill, including 
enlarging the scope of legislation to include cargo agents and catering and other suppliers. 
It did not accept the proposal for a Security Incident Reporting System. BALPA therefore 
sought to have the Bill amended in the course of the legislative process. The best 
opportunity was at the Standing Committee stage. The Conservatives had a controlling 
majority. BALPA approached four members of the Committee, the Conservatives Patrick 
McLoughlin, a junior Minister at the Department of Transport, and David Wilshire, and the 
Socialists Peter Snape and Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody. Their conduct was a credit to 
356 
Parliamentary democracy. Each gave BALPA's case careful hearing and then offered 
support. Of particular interest to students of the realities of the parliamentary process was 
the advice of Peter Snape. He said that the Socialist side was willing to propose BALPA's 
amendment, but that it would then automatically be opposed by the Conservatives, and lose. 
He said that though the Socialist could make parliamentary, capital out of that result, he 
would prefer to see the amendment succeed. He advised BALPA to concentrate upon 
obtaining Conservative and Ministerial support. He also offered insights (off the record) into 
the personalities and dynamics of the Standing Committee which proved to be entirely 
accurate. In the event Michael Portillo, the senior Minister, accepted Patrick McLoughlin's 
recommendation and instructed that the Association's amendment be incorporated into the 
Bill; it was carried unopposed. As with the Select Committee, the conduct of the Standing 
Committee and the Ministers left BALPA with a high regard for the manner in which both 
parties, and the parliamentary process, served the public interest in the matter of aviation 
security. 
6.7.2.6 Relationships with Airlines 
Pressures on airline managers are great. All airlines are cost-conscious; some of the 
smaller are barely profitable; British Airways, the largest and most profitable, is ruthless in its 
pursuit of economies. None welcomed the considerable burdens of aviation security. With 
some the Security Committee established good relationships. With others it did not; there 
were two root causes. The first was the policy of HMG to transfer the problems and costs of 
aviation security on to the industry. The DoT briefly built up a team of Senior Grade civil 
servants (1991-94) but demolished it before long-term relationships could be established. 
Thus the industry regarded (and still regards) the competence and style of the DoT with 
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scepticism. It therefore cooperated no more than was necessary. The second root cause 
was the considerable reluctance of airline management to take advice from pilots, their 
employees. 
The Security Committee's greatest difficulties were with British Airways. The airline's 
uncompromising style was unforgiving of managers (apart from the most senior Directors, 
who survive scandals which would be immediately terminal to their subordinates). The 
careers of senior and middle managers hung on the achievement of cost and performance 
targets. Aviation security is guaranteed to increase costs and decrease punctuality. Nothing 
else about it is guaranteed, certainly not occurrence of attacks nor the effectiveness of 
countermeasures. Thus without the whole-hearted support of the, senior Directors, the 
introduction of security measures was in conflict with the performance-d riven culture. Whilst 
successive Directors of Safety Services (who directed security) unfailingly gave 
representations from the Security Committee a fair hearing, their subordinates were 
generally obstructive. This obstruction extended from withholding information, to economy 
with the truth, to simple mendacity (for example, an assertion (1992) that the DoT had given 
BA exemption from the preflight security checks of aircraft, easily established as untrue by 
an immediate visit to the Department). The Association had confrontations with successive 
Heads of Security (although sympathetic to the pressures under which they worked), but the 
gravest difficulties were with successive pilot managers with security responsibilities. Some 
were courteous, some discourteous; all sought the subordination of the Association to their 
instructions. Occasionally agreement was reached on a particular issue. Never did a 
relationship of long-term trust look achievable. British Airways was the extreme example. 
Similar but lesser difficulties were experienced with some other airlines. 
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The Association responded appropriately. Firstly it built a close relationship with the 
Department. Secondly, the Association kept the - Department fully informed of the 
realities of security practice. Thirdly, it communicated security advice direct to pilots, 
advice which was sometimes in conflict with the airline's instructions 
Many of the Department's enactments were in the form of recommendations. The 
Department claimed that these were effectively mandatory. The status of the Highway Code 
was cited: although not a statute, its provisions are admissible in a court of law. Clearly this 
depends upon a case being pursued in court. This the Department showed no sign of doing, 
rightly averse to informing the public, and aviation terrorists, that worldwide security 
standards had much in common with a can of worms. The civil aviation industry interpreted 
recommendations as advice, and therefore discretionary. The Association repeatedly 
pressed the Department to make all enactments mandatory. This the Department slowly 
conceded. However this mandatory status was not generally in place in the years 1980-92 
when it was badly needed. Later when compliance had improved and some aspects of the 
Department's expertise had diminished, the Department moved towards statutory 
enactments, terminology being chosen to meet the requirements of lawyers instead of those 
responsible for the implementation of aviation security. 
An important consequence of the airlines' resistance to DoT "advice" was the regular and 
I 
direct communication by BALPA of security advice to pilots. The Security Committee kept 
pilots accurately informed of the Department's enactments, both mandatory and advisory. It 
also gave advice on the technicalities of implementing the enactments. It is a necessary 
concomitant of the Captain's final responsibility, and a fundamental principle of the safe 
operation of aircraft, that on matters of safety the Captain has final authority. The lives of all 
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on board depend upon his good judgement. Therefore pilots react very strongly against any 
attempt to force upon them a course of action which conflicts with their better judgement. All 
responsible airlines accept this. Therefore when a Captain insists on the implementation of 
security measures before he takes off - particularly when those measures constitute the 
advice of HMG - airlines are obliged to accede to his instructions. On occasions they may 
grumble or press for a change of decision but they cannot overrule him. Any attempt to 
victimize a pilot for his adherence to safety or security standards would be guaranteed to 
provoke a united response from the pilot community, which would receive immediate and 
public backing from BALPA. British Airways, for all its menacing management style, never 
seriously attempted to intimidate its Captains, well aware that it would thereby not only stir 
up a hornets' nest, but also prejudice its very high standards of operational safety. As an 
example, in the researcher's 18 years as a BA Captain there were only two instances in 
which he was subjected to any kind of management pressure on an operational decision; 
both were trivial. The more overt of the two occurred in 1992, when he briefly delayed the 
departure of a B747-400 to carry out pre-departure security checks (required by DoT but not 
by BA). A manager entered the flight deck and asked if there was a problem - effectively 
seeking an explanation for the delay. The researcher replied "You have just stepped into a 
minefield. I advise you to step out quickly". The manager left. The researcher was 
congratulated by his colleagues for his forbearance in not utilising a shorter and more 
colloquial term to advocate immediate departure. This incident illustrates the power of the 
pilots of responsible airlines. It was this power that the Association sought to harness, in 
order to achieve better security standards than the managements of some airlines deemed 
necessary. 
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6.7.2.7 Security Policy 
The Association's Security Programme was submitted to the Select Committee on Transport 
(1989). The Summary and List of Recommendations contained in that document are 
attached to this section (APPENDIX 2). The recommendations are eclectic; some originated 
in BALPA; others were adopted from IATA; others were well-known desiderata. 
The Association's policy in the furtherance of its programme was to avoid concentrating on 
any one issue to the exclusion of the others, to utilise all available avenues, to support any 
advance on offer, and to seek improvements after implementation - not before, in order not 
to cause delay - and to respect confidentiality most scrupulously. An extreme example of 
its utilisation of all available avenues occurred with the recommendation on media control 
during a hijack (Recommendation X, APPENDIX 2). This was prompted by the media circus 
when was permitted to surround the hijacked Kuwaiti B-747 (Larnaca, 8-13 April 1988) - At 
the heart of the proposal were two concepts. The first was that the hijack of the aircraft was 
a means of hijacking the media, and that the occasional murders were partly intended to 
maintain media interest. The second was that live coverage, particularly television, impeded 
negotiations and obstructed intervention. This recommendation was deemed impracticable 
by HMG. When the proposal was put to the IFALPA Security Committee (Washington, Oct 
1988) it was welcomed by pilots from several countries in which press freedom was not a 
sacred cow. Amongst these was the USSR. The Soviet pilots relayed the recommendation 
to their government, where it found favour. The USSR took the proposals to ICA0171 . Thus 
a proposal of humble origins in Harlington, travelled via Washington, to the Kremlin and 
375 ICAO. Working Paper, Agenda Item 13.2., A 27-WP/I 14,20 Sept 1989, Executive Committee, ICAO 
Assembly - 27th Session 
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thence to the ICAO [where, unhappily, it foundered in the familiar mire of international 
ineptitude]. 
The Security Committee's assessment of security standards was more pessimistic than the 
Department's and the industry's, both of which had a vested interest in optimism. It was not 
until 1991 that the Department introduced covert testing of the security system. Prior to 
Lockerbie it did not even inspect it openly. Pre-warned inspections are of little value, the 
forewarning allows a special performance to be staged. To give one of many examples: an 
official inspection reported vigilant security in Larnaca. The Security Committee, sceptical, 
sought reports from pilots. The first stated that the security checkpoints were unmanned and 
the security staff were gathered in one office, watching a football match on television. 
It was beyond the manpower resources of the Security Committee to pursue all security 
deficiencies. Furthermore the receptiveness to advice of all parties: Ministers, Department, 
industry and pilots was not a constant, but ebbed and flowed. Therefore the Security 
Committee maintained at all times a "shopping list", in order to be in a position to take 
immediate advantage of any increase in receptiveness. It conducted an annual review of its 
progress, paying particular attention to areas of failure. It is neither practicable nor 
z 
constructive to seek to list its successes, all advances in security being the outcome of the 
efforts of many organisations. A review of the Committee's biggest single failure (1988-93) 
is instructive (6.7.2.9). 
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6.7.2.8 Safety Issues 
Any unlawful interference with an aeroplane is likely to prejudice air safety. The importance 
of not interfering physically with the Captain and flight crew is self-evident. The importance 
of not coercing them to act against their better judgement has already been emphasised. 
There are numerous instances (from Dawsons Field [11970] to the Kuwait B-747, [1988]), of 
hijacked aircraft being forced to land at unsuitable airfields either unlit, or without landing 
aids, or with inadequate runway length or surface, or blocked with trucks by the airport 
authorities. Apart from the dangers of such landings, any interference with aircraft operation 
has many potentials to cause disaster, for example, by collision, by running out of fuel (the 
TWA B-707 hijacked into Damascus by Leila Khaled, 29 Aug 1969, did not have enough fuel 
to carry out an overshoot - this in itself is a serious emergency). It is a myth that 
international terrorist hijackers are skilled in aircraft operation, lethal incompetents would be 
a more accurate description. The PFLP terrorists who hijacked the BOAC, TWA and 
Swissair aircraft to Dawsons Field (1970) did not realise that an aircraft cannot simply turn 
round in crowded airspace without probability of collision; they forced large jet airliners into a 
dark, disused airfield. Eighteen years later the hijackers of the Kuwait B-747, after trying to 
land on a blocked runway at Beirut airport, ordered the Captain to land in the sea. When the 
Captain informed them that this was impossible, they produced the passenger information 
card, which gave the emergency evacuation instructions and showed the aircraft floating on 
the sea. They forced the Captain, at gunpoint, to begin an approach onto the sea. Close to 
the surface the Captain said to the hijackers "You said you wanted to meet Allah. Your wish 
is about to be granted". This caused the hijackers to relent, and the B-747 landed safely at 
Larnaca - on the ground. Piquantly the pictures on the emergency card had been drawn by 
the Captain's wife, an artiSt. 
376 
376 Information on this incident from the IFALPA Security Committee 
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In event after event, airline pilots have displayed outstanding skill and courage in 
safeguarding their passengers from the extreme dangers posed by interference with the safe 
operation of aircraft by terrorists, criminals and other morons. On occasions tragedy has 
been unavoidable. Three instances have already been cited: the crash of a hijacked 
Cubana Viscount forced to land at night into darkness (17 of the 20 on board killed, 1 Nov 
1958), the collision of two B-747s at Tenerife after diverting from Las Palmas, closed by a 
terrorist bomb (27 March 1977,575 K), the crash of the hijacked Chinese B-737 at 
Guangzhou, which destroyed two other aircraft, a B-757 and a B-707 (2 Oct 1990,132 K). 
There are other instances of catastrophe following violent attacks on flight crew ( Malaysian 
B-737,4 Dec 1977,100K). On some occasions the conduct of a, pilot amounted to 
conspicuous gallantry: 
"Just how critical was the searching of passengers was only too poignantly demonstrated when, 
only two months before the Buenos Aires Conference (1971), First Officer Jun of Korean 
Airlines had thrown himself on two live hand grenades dropped by a hijacker, losing his life in 
the subsequent explosion. 9377 
Hoaxes can seriously endanger an aircraft by forcing a pilot into an abnormal or undesirable 
course of action. The same is true of disruptive behaviour, violence or drunkenness in the 
passenger cabin. For this reason offenders face severe penalties. 
It is more surprising that flight safety has also been endangered by supposed allies. The 
worst culprit of recent times has been the US Navy. Warships of the Sixth Fleet took up 
377 JACKSON ref 353, p 316 
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positions along the length of the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, to 
protect the oil routes from interdiction by the Iranians. Fearing attack by Iranian military 
aircraft, US ships intervened into the control and navigation of the world's airliners in the 
busy airspace above the Gulf. The incompetence of the US Navy was unbelievable. Their 
standard interception call, made on 121.5 - the civil emergency frequency, was: "Aircraft 
travelling south-east at 500 knots in the region of the US Fleet, identify yourself' or worse, 
"Turn right immediately". The crew of an aircraft believing that the call might be addressed 
to them, would seek to establish whether this was the case: "Roger, Sixth Fleet, please state 
your position". The reply was always the incredible, "Negative, the position of the Sixth Fleet 
is a military secret". All the several aircraft which heard the original command were thus 
placed in a potentially dangerous position. One on occasion a BA jumbo on approach to 
landing in Dubai was ordered by the US Navy to go around (overshoot). He had to comply. 
All such interferences with safe flight would normally earn a custodial sentence. High level 
representations were made by HMG to the Americans, but the difficulties persisted for 
months. The pilot managers of British Airways, the airline most effected, sought to avoid 
consultation with BALPA. The BALPA Security Committee therefore offered detailed 
operational advice direct to all pilots. This advice was subsequently utilised by the DOT; it 
was also distributed by IFALPA to all Pilots Associations. 
The US Navy in the Gulf caused tragedy when the USS Vincennes destroyed a civilian 
Iranair Airbus with a missile. Whilst it is invidious to criticise military personnel who believe 
their lives to be at stake, the tragedy could have been avoided with minimal competence on 
either side. The Americans' inability to identify civilian aircraft was a matter of record. I 
At 
one stage they reportedly could not interrogate civil transponders, nor had they any VHF 
frequencies other than the emergency 121.5 (the military uses a different frequency range - 
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UHF), nor had they details of civil airline schedules. Finally, they allegedly misinterpreted 
the radar readout on the Airbus, possibly mistaking reducing range for reducing altitude, and 
concluding that the aircraft was descending to attack. The Iranians were culpably misguided 
to despatch civil airliners from the same airport as military attack aircraft during a conflict. 
Elementary competence would have prevented the tragedy. The most obvious would have 
been direct communications between the US Navy and the Air Traffic Control at Bandar 
Abbas. Unfortunately the US Navy was not even in communication with the air traffic 
authorities of its allies on the west coast of the Gulf. 
A remarkably similar blind spot was reported recently on the subject of the Pentagon Papers 
(the history of the United States involvement in Vietnam from the 1940s to the late 1960s 
prepared by the Pentagon for its own purposes): 
"The claim for a temporary injunction against 7he New York 77mes in the US District Court 
started to go badly wrong when the Judge ... was surprised to 
find that the government had 
delivered 47 supposedly top secret volumes to his chambers and left them unguarded. The US 
Attorney sensibly asked his government clients which parts of the study (much of which was 
anodyne or already in the public domain) were sensitive and why, so he could address argument 
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on this subject and was told, to his astonishment, that this 'information is classified . 
The systems of aviation: selection, training, testing and monitoring are designed to 
assure the highest possible standards of safety. Unlawful interference or other 
intrusion of incompetents will always reduce those standards. 
378 The Times, 13 Aug 1996, p 37 
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6.7.2.9 Case Study: A Failed Campaign 
There is a small and finite number of avenues through which an aircraft can be attacked. 
Attack necessitates either the positioning of weaponry (sabotage) or the positioning of both 
weaponry and personnel (hijack). The possibilities of armed attack, military interception, and 
surface to air missiles are accepted, but excluded as different problems. The weaponry may 
be positioned on the aircraft either in the passenger cabin or in the exterior - baggage holds, 
engineering bays etc. The destruction of Air India (23 June 1985), UTA (19 Sept 1989) and 
particularly PanAm 103 (21 Dec 1988) by devices in hold baggage had prompted serious 
protective countermeasures. However other attacks had utilised weaponry brought into the 
passenger cabin: PanAm B-747 (11 Aug 1982), TWA B-727 (2 Apr 1986), Korean B-707 (29 
Nov 1987) and Avianca B-727 (27 Nov 1989); all had involved fatalities; the Korean and 
Avianca had been destroyed, killing all on board. Further, it was known that the weaponry 
used in some hijacks had ben pre-positioned in the aircraft cabin by conspirators. 
Passenger and cabin baggage screening had been steadily improved. However there 
remained the possibility that the small components of a disassembled weapon would escape 
detection. The variable and often lax overseas standards of security suggested that the 
concealment of weaponry on board by passengers or staff at overseas airports would be an 
attractive option to terrorists. 
The BALPA Security Committee advocated a regime: Search, Check and Guard to protect 
aircraft from this form of attack. This involved a search of the aircraft, cabin and exterior at 
the start of the cycle, a check of the passenger cabin on each occasion that passengers 
disembarked, and guarding of the aircraft after such searches and checks. 
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These principles were embodied in a recommendation to the Select Committee (March 
1989) [Recommendations XI and X11, APPENDIX to 6]. The Department responded (April 
1989) with a Direction (statutory) which, given goodwill and cooperation from the airlines, 
would have provided effective protection. Goodwill and cooperation being in short supply, 
some airlines scrutinised the wording closely and put their own interpretation on it. 
The implementation of the measures was not straightforward for operational reasons - mostly 
those of passenger handling. However those airlines which opposed the measures 
preferred not to resolve the difficulties but to trade upon them. The words "to a standard 
sufficient to satisfy the operator" were a serious loophole in the enactments and one which 
probably would have doomed any legal enforcement action. There were other defects. An 
aircraft coming into service from the BA Maintenance Base at Heathrow was subject to a 
stringent security "search", whereas a BA B-747 arriving from Africa or India was subjected - 
at the best - to a cursory "check". The subject was in serious confusion. The Department 
established a Working Party which failed (Sept 1991) to resolve the difficulties. It also 
published various further enactments. Nonetheless it stopped short of enforcing 
enactments. The fundamental problem was the absence of a cooperative partnership. 
The Security Committee gave continual attention to Search-Check-Guard, assessing it as 
the biggest single deficiency in aviation security. In Great Britain it pressed all parties and 
lobbied Ministers; the DoT Working Party (above) was established after one such meeting. 
The Gulf confrontation and war (Aug 1990-Feb 1991) markedly increased the threat of 
terrorist attack. For this brief period there was a more cooperative relationship amongst all 
parties. However Search-Check-Guard remained a contentious issue. One airline in 
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particular remained obstructive. It claimed that tests had established that the cabin crew 
needed 25 minutes to carry out a security check of the passenger cabin, after which they 
were in too dishevelled a state to receive passengers. This claim was at odds with the 
reality reported by pilots. Approximating, a B-747 has 60 rows of seats and 15 cabin crew. 
Each member of the cabin crew could search 4 rows of seats in less than 5 minutes without 
difficulty. All wardrobes and galleys could be searched in another 3 minutes. The Security 
Committee advised all Captains to insist upon the best practical check of the passenger 
cabin; this conflicted with the airline's instructions. Far from resenting the extra duties, as 
the airline had alleged, it was normal for some of the members of the cabin crew to thank the 
Captain for his interest in their safety. Though a reasonable standard of check was 
achieved, it became clear that prior planning and training were essential to consistent 
performance. An important lesson was that it is not possible, without prior preparation, to 
respond quickly to an increased threat with raised standards. 
In 1992, the year following the Gulf War, the threat was perceived to have fallen and some 
airlines returned to their previous obstructive stance. The Security Committee once more 
took the matter to the Department. A newly appointed senior civil servant made it clear that 
he saw BALPA as interfering with the Department's responsibilities. When it also became 
obvious that he was unfamiliar not only with the subject but also with the Department's own 
enactments, the Security Committee terminated the meeting. A strong informal complaint 
was lodged at a higher level. The Association also decided to draw the attention of the 
Minister to the long-standing failings of Search, Check and Guard. 
The Security Committee had also reached an impasse with some airlines, in particular with 
British Airways. It therefore wrote a Newsletter to all pilots quoting the Department's 
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enactments and giving technical advice on their interpretation and on management of 
Search, Check and Guard. The Newsletter explicitly advised pilots "of significant differences 
between Government Security Enactments and Airline Operation OrderS"379 . 
It also stated 
that "Some airlines, notably British Airways,, are choosing to ignore (the Department's) 
Advice" 
. 
3"0 The British Airways repIY381 said that "we have in place a procedure that in our 
view meets the level of threat that this Advice is intended to counter" (words with no meat 
under the wool) and that BALPA's statement was "unwarranted". The Security Committee's 
answer was that it was "richly merited". 
It was not until 1994/5 that the Security Committee was broadly satisfied with the British 
implementation of Search, Check and Guard. The Committee had started to campaign for 
this security measure in March 1989, expecting it to be implemented promptly. In fact it took 
seven years. It is not difficult, with hindsight, to identify the causes of this failure. 
The Committee was convinced of the strength of its case. It therefore continuously 
underestimated the time needed to achieve implementation, always thinking in terms of 12 
months. Had it foreseen the extent of the procrastination, it would undoubtedly have taken 
an action which it regularly considered and always rejected: the public disclosure of the 
unremedied security deficiency. There were two powerful reasons for avoiding this action. 
Firstly it would have given valuable information to potential attackers. Secondly it would 
have adversely affected the Committee's harmonious relationship with HMG. The discretion 
and loyalty of civil servants has been mentioned; they expect the same of their associates. 
The fact that the airlines would have been infuriated was not an issue, the Committee 
379 BALPA Security Newsletter Pilots'Responsibifities. Aug 1992, p 2. Not publicly available 
380 Ibid. p5 381 Ibid 
370 
believed that some had been deliberately obstructive, and the Association was no stranger 
to conflict with airline management. 
The Security Committee did prepare the ground for public disclosure. In 1992 when it 
became obvious that the Department was not prepared to enforce an adequate Search, 
Check and Guard regime, the Committee realised that it had become too reliant on the 
Department. It had too many eggs in one basket. It therefore extended its network of 
contacts, briefing the Association's current (1997) President, Lord Stanley Clinton-Davis and 
through his good offices, members of the House of Lords. It also briefed a well-disposed 
and interested management consultancy and a leading academic, Professor Paul Wilkinson, 
whose activity in the field of aviation security was known and appreciated by the Association. 
The advice of the management consultant was prophetic. He said that the Association had 
failed to understand that governments were structurally almost incapable of moving fast. 
The Security Committee turned down an invitation to brief John Prescott, the then Shadow 
Transport Minister. He had, at the time, given the impression of being a loose cannon and 
the Committee feared that its information might have been disclosed. This may have done 
Mr Prescott an injustice; it is mentioned as evidence that the Committee wished to maintain 
control of the issue. 
The Security Committee felt that it had failed, in that a desirable objective had not been 
attained within a reasonable time span. Objectively, it was more a failure of the total system. 
The underlying, but unstated concept is that all reasonable steps are taken to ensure the 
I 
safety and security of passengers on board British aircraft. At the heart of the issue is the 
interpretation of "reasonable". Airlines could have claimed, with justice, that British 
standards were better than most of their international competitors. BALPA might have 
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agreed, but certainly would have submitted that serious deficiencies in Search, Check and 
Guard had been identified and that it was unreasonable to leave them uncorrected. The 
Department appeared unwilling to force the issue, preferring to await the cooperation of the 
industry. One underlying reason was the Department's unfamiliarity with the technicalities of 
airport and airline operation. This was compounded by the lack of continuity of civil servants 
in the post. In 1992 the Security Committee recorded that "four different officials have been 
responsible for this issue over the past three years. It has now passed to a fifth Given the 
loyalty of the civil service to its members, each new official would have been allowed a 
lengthy settling-in period. With five successive officials settling-in, this amounts to total 
stagnation (which would bankrupt a commercial organisation). The same report noted that 
"the (DoT) refused to offer, or work to, any timetable". 
Thus it was the total administrative system which failed to implement Search, Check and 
Guard. It failed to provide passengers on British aircraft with a "reasonable" level of 
security. Had the passengers been the judge of what is "reasonable", there is little doubt of 
their verdict. 
6.7.2.10 Conclusion 
The Security Committee could claim to have made a positive contribution to aviation security 
in Great Britain. It identified most of the key issues as early as 1989: financing of secun y, 
compliance with enactments, host-state responsibility, and security standards overseas. 
However not until 1993 did the Committee reach the conclusion that the system of 
management in aviation security in Great Britain was seriously flawed (8.8). 
382 BALPA Security Committee Report. 23 Jan 1992 
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It is very doubtful whether many countries have a better system. However some other 
governments have a more cooperative relationship with their airlines, partly because they 
make a greater financial contribution; how far this will survive serious privatisation remains 
to be seen. Many other governments seek to exclude their airline pilots from the decision- 
making system. BALPA was continually asked by other Pilots' Associations how access to 
government might be achieved. 
This is in sharp contrast to the access to senior civil servants, to Ministers, to MPs and to 
members of the Lords which, when justified, was available to BALPA. 
BALPA, in turn, offered its Security Committee solid support. Successive Chairmen made 
themselves available to lead important meetings. The Committee sought to keep in touch 
with the views of the members of the Association. Thus it was confident that its efforts had 
the support of both the leadership and the membership. 
If a different structure for the management of aviation security in Great Britain 
establishes a cooperative relationship between government and industry, the Pilots 
Association will be able to make a greater contribution, and perhaps one which will be 
welcome to both parties. 
6.8 Conclusions: Hindsight 
Civil aviation's response to malicious attacks upon it has been creditable. In 1968 there was 
little or no security. Hijackers roamed with freedom; hijacks of aircraft of the free world 
reached the level of 70 a year (FAA figures). Now (1995-7) the rate is 1-3 pa. Saboteurs 
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had unrestricted access to baggage, cargo and stores., Now systems of 100% Hold 
Baggage Screening are being installed; cargo regimes and security controls on stores have 
been implemented; tactical defences are in place. 
More important, the causes of attacks have been addressed. The principle'of no 
concessions to terrorists, long advocated by HMG, has now been widely accepted. The 
respectable international community has achieved a consensus of opposition to attacks on 
aviation, an important manifestation of which is the widespread adoption of IFALPA's no safe 
haven concept. Thus putative attackers are doubly discouraged, first by their likely failure to 
exact concessions, second by well-founded fears for their personal prospects. Earlier 
sections of the research have offered evidence that attacks on aviation have proved 
counterproductive to the Palestinians, the pioneer proponents of this technique of terrorism. 
It has lost much of its attraction as a terrorist method. It remains a means of pursuing an 
undeclared war. However the sponsors of such acts now have sure knowledge that they 
personally may be the targets of a savage response, viz the US Air Force attack on Colonel 
Qadaffi (1986) and its improved bombing skills (Gulf War 1991). 
International government umbrella organisations: UN, ICAO, ECAC have convincingly 
demonstrated that they are structurally incapable of executive action. Their agencies can 
operate only where there is no effective national government; they cannot take authority over 
established government. This is not to say that they are organisations of no value. The 
various Conventions and ICAO Security Enactments offer a useful foundation, by way of 
stimulus or justification, for progress. However their international enactments should not be 
expected, per se, to effect changes in the outside world, for they cannot. They do provide a 
means of empowering national governments to act. Neither action nor leadership should be 
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expected of umbrella organisations (government or otherwise), encouragement is the most 
of which they are capable. Their value is not to be measured by the number or detail of their 
enactments, but by the realities of compliance with those enactments. 
International cooperation had the frankly dreadful beginnings of Sauve Qui Peut, the various 
forms of buying-off terrorists (1968-85). Since then inter-European and international 
cooperation has much improved, but arguably, it has more been driven by terrorists than led 
by governments. If it is measured by the success of subsequences, legal processes and 
extradition proceedings, it remains seriously flawed. 
HIVIG can look back over the past 28 years with some satisfaction. It has led the world in its 
policy of no concessions to terrorists, a policy affirmed in the Spaghetti House (September 
1975) and Balcombe Street sieges (Dec 1975), and established in the international (and 
terrorist) psyche at the time of the siege of the Iranian Embassy (May 1980). 
This last event also publicised the formidable skills of the SAS, a much-appreciated 
deterrent to terrorist attacks on British aircraft. HMG must be given credit for foresight in 
establishing and funding the SAS Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) capability after the 
Munich massacre (1972). 
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HMG has also driven the British aviation programme to a position of pre-eminence. It 
responded promptly and firmly to the attack on PanAm 103. It enacted comprehensive 
legislation and re-energized Great Britain's aviation security programme. Other nations in a 
similar situation did not respond with similar competence. The US response to Lockerbie 
383 MORRIS, Eric &Alan HOE. Tefforism: Threat And Response. London: Macmillan, 1987, p 135 
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was inconsistent, powerful in some respects, but weak in others (domestic security, kerb- 
side check-in). The US failed to consummate the wide-ranging and thoughtful 
recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. The 
French response to the loss of the UTA DC-1 0 was not discernible in security levels at Paris, 
nor was it evident in heightened support for progress' at ECAC. The evidence is that HMG: 
Ministers, MPs, and DoT, behaved with competence and integrity. However the sound 
foundations laid after Lockerbie have not been used to build a modern and comprehensive 
system of aviation security. Rather, budgetary constraints and reorganisational upheaval 
within the Department have led further into the blind alley of confrontation with the industry. 
Latterly the Department's relationship with the industry, never harmonious, has deteriorated. 
HMG is steadily reverting to the traditional government role of enactment and enforcement, 
an anachronism convenient to itself but not conducive to the public good. 
The British Air Line Pilots Association, as a consequence of the style of government in Great 
Britain, has had close involvement in the advance of aviation security. BALPA's access to 
government has been the envy of several other Pilots Associations, who have sought 
BALPNs advice on the subject. Of all the parties involved in the progress of British aviation 
security, BALPA is arguably the best-positioned: better informed of achieved standards and 
freer from conflict of interest than either government or industry, and able, in the ultimate, to 
bring the public into the debate. BALPA would certainly claim that professional pilots are 
the guardians of the travelling public. 
The total costs of aviation security in Great Britain are unknown, nor is there evidence of a 
serious attempt to calculate them. The benefit of this is that the progress of security has had 
priority over its costs, although the evidence is that security standards are intrinsically 
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related to aviation's high safety standards. Nonetheless accurate costing is essential to the 
industry's case for HMG assistance, and to the argument of unfair competition which HMG 
could present to the EU. 
The present confrontational relationship between government and industry is inevitable 
given the industry's justifiable view that "governments regard the aviation industry (as) a 
milch COW". 
384 The industry's enthusiasm for additional security costs could be equated to 
the turkey's enthusiasm for Christmas dinner. A cooperative relationship between 
government and industry could, if properly structured and managed, achieve the pooling of 
the different talents and strengths of the two parties. Civil servants are unkindly described in 
an aphorism as literate but not numerate. In commercial matters they are inexperienced and 
even gauche. 
"Before I leave my milch cow theme, let me give you an example of this attitude which is 
reflected in this symposium. The aviation industry was put under considerable pressure to give 
money to sponsor social events and was also asked to provide subsidised air fares. British 
Airways made a major contribution. Along with my industry colleagues, I was astonished to 
find that the registration fee for aviation industry and other non government attendees was 
385 100% more than government representatives". 
On the other hand, industry has commercial experience and acumen but lacks the 
fundamental integrity and intellect of the civil service, nor has it the same access to the 
legislative and diplomatic processes. 
384 BA Head of Security, ref 342, p1 385 BA Head of Security, ref 342, p2 
377 
The evidence suggests that the management and decision-making should pass, as far 
as possible, from the exclusive confines of the civil service to a new body, essentially 
a mutual enterprise of government and industry. Mutuality - working together - is not 
a realistic objective unless both parties are sharing the costs and the responsibilities 
of aviation security. If HMG is unwilling to contribute to the costs - even though it 
raises E700m in Departure Tax from passengers, more than double British airlines' 
(and thus most of the industry's) direct security costs - then HMG is turning its back 
on the best interests of aviation security. 
The model for such a body is that of a Crisis Management team, in which experts of 
different disciplines are brought together to address a mutual crisis. This concept is 
examined below (7.6.1). 
Aviation security in Great Britain is not facing a crisis; it is facing a challenge. A new 
structure would be the best response. The strategic advantages of this proposal are 
examined in the next Section (7). 
The British response (1968-1996) to international attacks on aviation has had its 
failings. Nonetheless, HMG would be justified in claiming that in commitment and 
competence, it has led the world. 
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6.9 APPENDIX 1. INTERNATIONAL ENACTMENTS 
1. Chicago Convention (1944) and Buenos Aires Protocol (1968) - These establish the 
basis of international law on civil aviation but do not relate directly to aviation security. 
2. Tokyo Convention (1963) - Gives jurisdiction to state in which aircraft is registered. 
Empowers the aircraft commander to disembark such persons on the territory of any 
state. Offences committed on an aircraft shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition, 
as having been committed not only where they occurred but also in the territory of the 
state of registration of the aircraft, etc. 
3. Haque Convention (1970) - Relates to unlawful seizure (hijacking). Charges states to 
establish their jurisdiction over aircraft registered in their state and/or landing, with an 
alleged offender on board in their state. Charges states to prosecute or extradite an 
alleged offender. 
4. Montreal Convention (1971) - Provisions similar to those of the Hague Convention 
(1970). The important difference is that whereas the Hague Convention relates only to 
unlawful seizure (hijack), the Montreal Convention relations to unlawful acts of most 
types. 
5. Article 3 (bis) of the Chicago Convention amended by Protocol (Montreal 1984) - 
Charges states not to use weapons against civil aircraft. Instructs civil aircraft to 
I 
comply with instructions if intercepted. Instructs states not to misuse civil aircraft for 
other purposes. 
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6. Protocol (Montreal 1988) Supplementing the Montreal Convention (1971) - Adds to 
offences listed in the Montreal Convention 1971, acts of violence at international 
airpo s. 
7. Rome Resolution (1973) - Condemned Israel for the action of its military aircraft which 
violated a neighbouring state's airspace and forcibly diverted and seized a civil aircraft. The 
resolution recalled and condemned another act of unlawful interference by the same state. 
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6.10 APPENDIX 2 BALPA PROPOSALS TO THE TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, MARCH 
1989 
SUMMARY 
THE THREAT: PRESENT AND FUTURE 
Attacks on aviation targets are a permanent feature within the armoury of terrorism; Great 
Britain could at any time face an increased Threat for different, unforeseeable reasons. 
THE COUNTERMEASURES 
There is no single blockbuster by which terrorism can be destroyed. Our countermeasures 
must be layered, utilising all options: International, National and Front-line. 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
The underlying concept to be pursued is that an attack on one nation is an attack on the 
international Community. 
Advances in the International Response to terrorism must be sought more vigorously at 
ICAO and ECAC. 
NATIONAL RESPONSE: THREE INITIATIVES 
Three Initiatives are advocated for adoption at National Level and for pursuit at International 
Level: 
Treatment of Terrorists who are Released by Duress or Wanted for Trial, as Fugitives 
from Justice. 
International Control of the Media during a Hijack. 
Implanting of Marker Substances in Explosives during Manufacture. 
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FRONT-LINE RESPONSE 
Department of Transport: Securitv Standards and Recommended Practices 
Pan American 103 was destroyed despite being subjected to more stringent security 
procedures than apply in the UK. 
The Principle is advocated of a high level of Security Standards, raised at frequent, irregular 
intervals to impede the planning of attacks. 
The Pace of Change of improving our security process is too slow. Positive direction is 
needed to overcome the industry's opposition to progressive development. 
FIVE MAJOR DEFICIENCIES IN SECURITY STANDARDS can be identified. 
The Lack of a Security Incident Reporting System. 
The Lack of an Effective Security Inspectorate. 
Failure to Enforce Published Standards. 
Deficiencies in Passenger/Possession Reconciliation Procedures and Practice. 
Security of British Aircraft Overseas. 
SIX NEW STANDARDS ARE PROPOSED 
Airside Passes Holders should undergo appropriate security screening. 
Cargo and Catering Contractual responsibility for security should be placed upon 
agents and suppliers. 
Passenger Information Aircraft Captains should be informed of VIPs and Potentially 
Disruptive Passengers on board. 
Duty Free Goods Liquor, perfume and electronic equipment should be banned. 
Air Service Agreements Security Clauses should be a part of all Air Service 
Agreements. 
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Security Consciousness The Industry should assess the security aspects of all its 
activities. The priority of security should be reaffirmed by 
senior management. 
TECHNOLOGY 
The need for improved Technology is urgent. The technology of today will detect only the 
weapons of yesterday. 
Certain Existing Techniques are not be utilised but should be: Suitcase Banding, Sniffer 
Dogs, Card Readers, intrusion Detection Systems and Passenger Profiling. 
The Development Programme should pursue X-Ray Screening linked to Computer Graphics, 
Gateway Arches for the Detection of Explosives and Plastic Weapons, Explosive Detection, 
and Advanced Card Readers. 
FUNDING 
A major advance in security is now overdue. Costs will be incurred in training, in equipment, 
and in development. 
Terrorist attacks are directed at the aviation industry but motivated by hostility to the 
Government. The Government must accept some financial responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
This Paper is the distillate experience of 4,620 civil pilots. Each of the Recommendations 
has been considered carefully for practicability and benefit. All require the expenditure of 
resources. A few involve delicate or difficult issues (Personal Freedoms, Race Relations, 
Rehabilitation of Offenders, and the Freedom of the Press) and demand political courage. 




THE WORK OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BODIES (ICAO, INTERPOL, ET AL) BE 
FURTHER ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED, AND WHERE NECESSARY 
SUPPLEMENTED. 
RECOMMENDATION 11 
UNITED KINGDOM PURSUE THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONALISM THE 
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM, LITILISING THE ICAO FIVE POINT PLAN. 
RECOMMENDATION III 
UNITED KINGDOM PURSUE A STRAIGHTFORWARD EXTRADITION TREAT FOR 
ATTACKERS OF CIVIL AVIATION TARGETS. 
RECOMMENDATION IV 
THE CONCEPT THAT TERRORISTS RELEASED UNDER DURESS ARE DEEMED 
FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE BE ADOPTED NATIONALLY, AND SUPPORTED AT ICAO. 
RECOMMENDATION V 
THE POLICY OF NO PUBLICITY DURING A HIJACK BE ADOPTED NATIONALLY, AND 
SUPPORTED AT ICAO. 
RECOMMENDATION VI 
THE POLICY OF INCORPORATING MARKER SUBSTANCES INTO EXPLOSIVES BE 
ADOPTED NATIONALLY, AND SUPPORTED INTERNATIONALLY. 
RECOMMENDATION VII 
THE PRINCIPLE BE ADOPTED OF HIGH STANDARDS OF FRONT-LINE SECURITY, 
RAISED AT FREQUENT BUT IRREGULAR INTERVALS. 
RECOMMENDATION VIII 
THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY DEFICIENCY REPORTING 
SYSTEM. 
RECOMMENDATION IX 
THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY INSPECTORATE. 
RECOMMENDATION X 
THE ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY SANCTIONS UPON THE 
ADMINISTRATORS OF SECURITY. 
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RECOMMENDATION XI 
AN IMMEDIATE REVIEW BE UNDERTAKEN OF PASSENGER, HOLD AND CABIN 
BAGGAGE PROCEDURES, WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF ACHIEVING 
PASS ENGER/POSSESS ION RECONCILIATION. 
RECOMMENDATION XII 
THE"THREE QUESTIONS" BE MADE MANDATORY FOR ALL DEPARTURES. 
RECOMMENDATION X111 
A SURVEY BE MADE OF ALL OVERSEAS AIRFIELDS TO ASSESS THEIR STANDARDS 
OF SECURITY. 
RECOMMENDATION XIV 
WHERE SECURITY STANDARDS OVERSEAS DO NOT MEET UK REQUIREMENTS 
THEN BRITISH OPERATORS BE OBLIGED THEMSELVES TO MEET THOSE 
REQUIREMENTS. 
RECOMMENDATION XV 
APPROPRIATE SCREENING PROCEDURES BE MADE MANDATORY FOR ALL 
HOLDERS OF AIRSIDE PASSES. 
RECOMMENDATION XVI 
CONTRACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY BE PLACED UPON THE SUPPLIERS 
OF AIRCRAFT CATERING. 
RECOMMENDATION XVII 
CONTRACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY BE PLACED UPON CARGO 
AGENCIES. 
RECOMMENDATION XVIII 
A REVIEW OF CARGO SCREENING TECHNIQUES BE UNDERTAKEN. 
RECOMMENDATION XIX 
NEW STANDARDS BE LAID DOWN TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF CARGO AND 
CATERING SUPPLIES. 
RECOMMENDATION XX 
HOME AND FOREIGN OFFICES, WITH FOREKNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIALLY 
DISRUPTIVE PASSENGERS PASS THE INFORMATION TO THE AIRLINE CONCERNED. 
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RECOMMENDATION XXI 
CAPTAINS BE INFORMED WHENEVER A VIP IS ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT. 
RECOMMENDATION XXII 
CARRIAGE OF DUTY FREE LIQUORS, PERFUMES AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT BE 
BANNED, UNLESS PURCHASED ON BOARD THE FLIGHT CONCERNED. 
RECOMMENDATION XXIII 
SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS BE CONTAINED IN ALL AGREEMENTS ON THE AIR 
SERVICES OF UK OPERATORS. ' 
RECOMMENDATION XXIV 
A PROGRAMME BE INSTITUTED TO INCULCATE SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS 
THROUGHOUT THE INDUSTRY, AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT SHOULD AFFIRM ITS 
PRIORITY. 
RECOMMENDATION XXV 
THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME SHOULD BE PURSUED WITH MORE URGENCY. 
RECOMMENDATION XXVI 




INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
PASSENGER PROFILING 
RECOMMENDATION XXVII 
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7. CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
7.1. Introduction 
This research submits that aviation terrorism and modern international terrorism 
appeared in 1968. One by one liberal democracies have become involved, either as 
targets or as terrorists' battlefields. They have responded individually with varying 
competence and commitment. Not to this day have they combined effectively and 
responded with common standards of aviation security and with mutually satisfactory 
legal and extradition processes. ICAO and the international community have 
demonstrated their inability to lead nations out of the snare of attacks on aviation, a 
relatively easy dimension of international terrorism. In the absence of an international 
strategy, long advocated by experts, responsibility falls to the national level. 
It is essential to give credit to those nations who have made a positive and powerful 
response to aviation terrorism. Their efforts have, for the present, nearly eliminated 
attacks on aviation from the international terrorist armoury. The importance of this 
must be emphasised. A feeble response would have permitted attacks on aviation to 
have become established, and accepted as an unfortunate fact of life, like tribal war in 
Africa, genocide in Yugoslavia, oppression in Palestine, murder in the USA or crime- 
levels in Britain. However the impact of such attacks has been firmly established; 
given lax security, they will certainly recur. Thus, although liberal democracies have 
achieved their present success with ad hoc measures, the need for a systematic 
response remains. 
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The strategy of war has been well-explored. The strategy of counterterrorism has not 
had the same attention, although terrorism may be the modern form of war. This 
research, as its title implies, is primarily a retrospective assessment of the past three 
decades. It concludes that the British and international responses to attacks on 
aviation did not amount to a coherent strategy. It offers the foundations of a more 
systematic approach. It does not embark upon the lengthy and important undertaking 
of developing a comprehensive strategy. That is a task for later research. 
Using a methodology similar to risk assessment, this section examines the context of 
attacks on aviation, to establish the nature of the activity. A systematic approach is 
developed, starting with frameworks of counter-insurgency, and proceeding to expert 
works on aviation security. It culminates in a reasoned advocacy for strategy at the 
national level, both to attain a more satisfactory national system of aviation security, 
and as a building-block towards cooperation between nations. 
7.2. The Context of International Terrorist Attacks on Aviation 
The researcher has not lost sight of the fact that international terrorism is only one of the 
sources of attacks on aviation, nor that the Palestine conflict is only one of the sources of 
international terrorism. 
The researcher submits that the model derived below has a general validity. Clearly it would 
be adapted to address each specific case. Fortunately most countermeasures have some 
value against all forms of attack. The Figures below are illustrative, not definitive. 
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FIGURE 12 ATTACKS ON AVIATION: THE CONTEXT 
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FIGURE 12 (opposite), outlines the context of aviation security. It utilises the terminology of 
Section 3. 
Attack Potential is the ability to attack: personnel, resources and expertise,. 
Attack Probability is the likelihood of attack; it is a function of instrumental and decision 
factors, (FIGURE 13). 
Attack Danger is the product of Attack Potential and Attack Probability; clearly, in the 
absence of (eg) resources or volition, it is zero. 
Attack Outcome is the immediate outcome of an attack. 
Attack Subsequences relate to the attackers and their instigators. 
Attack Consequences relate to the target and victims. 
Attack Le-qacv is the final legacy of the attack to all involved. 
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FIGURE 13 ATTACKS ON AVIATION: THE ATTACK CHAIN AND COMPONENTS 
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FIGURE 13 (opposite) adds detail to FIGURE 12. It is largely self-explanatory. The term 
"Cause" refers to the supposed underlying terrorist cause. The four objectives are those 
suggested in Attack Aetiology (3.4). Probability factors are sub-divided into Instrumental and 
Decision. Success criteria and prediction are, it is suggested, the key factors in the go/no- 
go decision, bearing in mind that the key assessors are the instigators, not the attackers. 
The stimulus is the trigger (3.4.2). The attack process is initiated by command or on the 
attackers' own initiative. Outcome/Attackers relates to the attackers' fate; escape, capture, 
or death. 
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FIGURE 14 ATTACKS ON AVIATION: ATTACK & COUNTERMEASURE COMPONENTS 
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FIGURE 14 (opposite) aligns countermeasures with the attack components. It is apparent 
that the components grouped under Attack Potential and Attack Probability are susceptible 
to preventive measures. These, with one exception, are government responsibilities. The 
exception is victim protection in which, together with the protective measures which oppose 
Attack Danger, industry plays the major part. Restating the earlier observation that desire 
for success is the overriding influence on attackers, it is clear from FIGURE 14 that Attack 
Subsequences must feature prominently in their calculations. Unfavourable subsequences 
thus have a major role to play in the deterrence of attacks. There is a useful distinction to be 
drawn between deterrence, which influences attackers' motivation to attack, and prevention, 
which influences their ability to attack. Deterrence is arguably the more fundamental. It is 
particularly important in the strategy of counterterrorism because the ultimate strategy - 
elimination of the cause of the conflict - is likely to be inaccessible in cases of international 
terrorism, and unachievable in cases of religious and other extremism. 
FIGURE 14, the first differential of the general context of attacks on aviation, suffices for the 
present purposes. It could be further differentiated until the finest useful detail was exposed. 
It shows that prevention is largely a government responsibility. In GB, responsibility for 
protection (front-line aviation security measures) has been placed upon industry. Whether 
HMG has concentrated upon enforcing protection whilst being negligent of prevention is a 
matter which would justify close examination elsewhere. 
FIGURE 14 also illustrates that there is a probable international component in each 
countermeasure. The point is taken up below (9.6). FIGURE 14 is the general context of 
the responses to attacks on aviation. It is this which strategy must address. 
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7.3. General Operational Frameworks 
Kitson, Hoffman and Taw, and Behm and Palmer, have developed operational frameworks 
which relate to insurgency, Mau-Mau, Malaya, Cyprus, et al. Although they cannot be 
directly applied to the different context of attacks on aviation, they do provide good examples 
I 
of strategic approaches to specific forms of conflict. 
General Sir Frank Kitson was a central figure in the British Army's responses to insurgency 
in Kenya, Malaya and Muscat and Oman. His first book, Low Intensity Conflict (1971), is a 
thoughtful treatment of the subject based upon his personal experience. In a new Preface 
(1991 ) he suggests that "the events of the past two decades seem to have confirmed the analysis". 
The same could be claimed for Sir Frank's framework, which is outlined beloW. 
386 
Kitson identifies four areas in which "decisions have to be made". He likens these to the four 
sides of a frame. His framework is thus not conceptual, but operational, the functions 
necessary to successful counter-insurgency. The four sides of his frame are: 
9 Coordination of the various measures which make up the overall plan. 
-a Establishment of a political atmosphere within which government measures can be 
introduced with likelihood of success. 
9 An effective intelligence organisation 
s An appropriate framework of law. 
386 KITSON, Frank, Bunch of Five. London: Faber & Faber, 1977 
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Hoffman and Taw, in an extensive study for the US Department of State, make a qualitative 
analysis of seven case studieS. 387 They state (p. v): 
"Each government must then tailor its approach by emphasising its strengths among these 
elements, which include: 
1. Command and coordination. 
2. Effective antiterrorist legislation combined with measures to build public trust and 
support. 
3. Coordination within and between intelligence services. 
4. Foreign collaboration amongst governments and security forces. " 
Behm and Palmer, respectively a member of the Attorney-General's Department and of the 
police in Australia, present a powerful case for a strategic approach to counterterrorism and 
are bold enough to detail it388. Paraphrased by the researcher, their elements specify that 
strategy must (be): 
9 Dynamic 
e Holistic, combining all potential contributions 
9 Comprehensive and coordinated 
e Enhance the security environment to encourage cooperation 
* Maximise uncertainty for terrorists 
e Operate within an appropriate legal framework which treats terrorism as a crime 
387 HOFFMAN, Bruce and Jennifer Morrison TAW. A Rand Note -A Strategic Framework for Countering 
388 
Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992 
BEHM, Alan J and Michael J PALMER. Coordinating Counter-Tefforism. - A Strategic Approach to a 
Changing Threat. In Terrorism 14 (3), 1991 
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* Pursue a negotiating policy of no concessions to terrorists 
Pursue appropriate international instruments to ensure no safe havens. 
Amongst the features of their response policies are: 
* Measures to prevent media exploitation by the perpetrators of public violence. 
They emphasise, as do Kitson, Hoffman and Taw, the needs for a holistic approach and for 
coordination. They develop the point by advocating the demolition of barriers between 
departments to obtain both synergy of the parts, and maximum benefit from expenditures. 
They address the need for operating within an appropriate legal environment and the need 
for intentional cooperation. 
It is particularly interesting that they advocate a legislative and organisational concept based 
on counterdisaster organisations. The same conclusion has been reached in the course of 
this research (8.8). Underpinning the concept is the coordination which is vital in crises but 
which falls easy victim to personal and organisational self-interest in normal times. 
There is much common ground between these works. An impediment to simple comparison 
is that the dimensional units of Kitson and of Hoffman and Taw are "areas in which decisions 
have to be made", whereas the elements of Behm and Palmer include the qualities and 
characteristics of strategy. The reconciliation of *conceptual and operational models is 
challenging. 
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Winston Churchill, expresses very clearly the difficulties in translating strategic concepts into 
operational methodology: 
"The truths of war are absolute, but the principles governing their application have to be 
deduced on each occasion from the circumstances, which are always different; and in 
consequence no rules are any guide to action 11389 
7.4. Contemporary Strategic Approaches to Aviation Terrorism 
Several scholars and writers on aviation terrorism make contributions to the development of 
a strategy of response. Wallis with good reason, emphasises the need for 
international isation of response 390 . He propounds five international measures: advisory 
group for the management of hijack response, advisory team of experts to investigate 
attacks, military response force, international court and detention centre. These priorities, 
the IATA 5 Point Plan, do not purport to be a strategy. However each has merit and might be 
included in an international strategy. They have been advocated by IATA for at least nine 
years, but have not been adopted by the international community. 
Finger addresses the role of the UN . 
391 Three of his six points relate to the drafting and 
ratification of conventions., The fourth is the interesting suggestion of an annual report of 
non-ratifying states. This is analogous of IFALPA's Offending States (8.7.1). The fifth and 
sixth are recommendations for actions by other organisations, specifically IFALPA . 
Finger's 
recommendations do not amount to a strategy; they complement Wallis's priorities. 
389 BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy. In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 1. London: 
390 
Macmillan, 1968, p 285 
391 
WALLIS, Rodney. Combating Air Terrorism. New York: Brasseys (US), 1993 
FINGER, Seymour M. The United Nations Response to Terrorism. In Yonah ALEXANDER and Robert J 
KILMARX. Political Terrorism and Business. New York: Praeger, 1979, p 267-280 
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Clutterbuck suggests several strategic priorities. 392 He highlights the contribution to be 
made by new technology, particularly in the field of passenger identification. He 
recommends judicial cooperation within the EU and the international enforcement of ICAO's 
standards. 
BALPA would not claim that its recommendations (8.10 Appendix 2) amount to a strategy. 393 
Nonetheless they are systematic and address international cooperation, national standards, 
technology, attack subsequences and the role of the media. 
Wilkinson has long advocated a strategic approach to counterterrorism. His early 
recommendations focus upon political will, refusal of terrorist demands, legislation treating 
terrorism as common crime, and rebuttal of any justification of terroriSM. 394 In addressing 
aviation terrorism he advocates a systematic approach based upon command and 
coordination, intelligence, resources, security procedures, international i sed response and 
media relationshipS. 395 396 
The most valuable of these contributions are incorporated into the strategy proposed in the 
sections which follow. 
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7.5. Strategic Framework for Aviation Security 
7.5.1. Introduction 
This section adopts the framework approach of Kitson and of Hoffman and Taw. A fuller 
treatment of strategy would examine alternative approaches. The components of the 
framework are the major areas of activity, chosen for the importance of their potential 
contribution, and distinguished by the nature of their function. The first is derived from the 
works cited above, the remainder from analysis of FIGURE 14: 
e Command, Coordination and Policy 
-P Internationalisation 
o Multilateral* Alliances 
o Multilateral* Law 
* "between two or more nations", including bi- and trilaterals, cf international - the 
world community. 
e Aviation Security Programme 
* Contingency Programme 
* Technology 
o Intelligence 
9 Diplomacy (international) and/or 
@ Politics (domestic) to address cause 
9 Culture 
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7.5.2. Command, Coordination and Policy 
Strategy must be comprehensive, systematic and coordinated. This necessitates a point of 
overall command. At this point the policies are defined, through which the strategy is to be 
pursued. Policies are particularly relevant to response to coercion, and to incidents, high- 
emotion circumstances where there may be great pressure for short term solutions, to the 
detriment of long term strategy. 
7.5.3. Internationalisation 
The long term objective must be for a global response to international terrorism. This 
research shows that this objective is unachievable in the medium term, but that continued 
pressure brings benefits. International isation implies that such pressure would be applied to 
all international organisations (ICAO, IATA, IFALPA etc) and wherever productive. FIGURE 
14 shows that each factor in Attack Potential and in Attack Probability is either totally or 
significantly dependent upon international cooperation. The need for internationalisation is 
all-pervading. In its absence, gaps will remain in countermeasures which national strategy 
cannot close. Internationalisation is a distant hope; it must be pursued though all avenues. 
7.5.4. Multilateral Alliances 
Wilkinson makes two key points: 
397 
* Global progress must be pursued through national progress 
4P Bilateral cooperation is the most practicable means of international action 
397 lbid, p 378 
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Common international standards would be the bedrock solution to comprehensive aviation 
security, and must remain an objective. It has proved impossible to achieve real - fully 
implemented - progress at UN level. Therefore priority should be switched to the less 
ambitious but more achievable option of bilateral and multilateral agreements between 
genuine liberal democracies with competent and incorruptible governments. The obvious 
starting points for Great Britain are Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The USA has 
problems both with vociferous minorities and with commercial predatoriness. The G7 and 
Trevi alliances should also be pressed to make real advances. 
Such alliances would achieve mutually reliable aviation security standards. Equally 
important, the partners would act in harmony to pressure other nations and the international 
community. 
7.5.5. Multilateral Law 
Multilateral law is included in the strategic framework. It is the essential jurisdictional 
concomitant to multilateral political alliances. 
7.5.6. Aviation Security Programme 
The need remains for protective aviation security measures. To be effective, they must be 
coordinated within a programme to prevent attackers and weaponry from exploiting gaps. 
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7.5.7. Contingency Programme 
The contingency and the aviation security programmes are separate. Contingencies require 
crisis-management programmes, to operate in an impending or actual incident. Specialist 
teams of intelligence, police and military are likely to take the leading roles, not the industry 
staff who administer the aviation security programme. 
7.5.8. Technology 
Technology will remain the key to the effective implementation of protective measures. It 
has already transformed explosive detection (computed tomography), passenger and 
baggage tracking (bar codes) and access control (smart cards). It must be pursued with 
continued urgency. As one avenue of attack is closed, serious attackers will turn to another. 
7.5.9. Intelligence 
Strategic counterterrorism must reach beyond response to attack. It must be proactive, and 
seek to discourage, deter or disrupt attacks before they materialize. This demands high 
quality intelligence on all aspects of terrorist activity, starting with the nature of the (alleged) 
grievance and covering all activities preceding and culminating in possible attack. Good 
intelligence is the key to understanding the terrorists' minds and methods, and is thus the 
key to any strategy of counterterrorism. 
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7.5.10. Diplomacy and Politics 
Threats to aviation are likely to be both international and domestic. In all cases the 
underlying cause should be addressed. Many will be inaccessible (overseas territorial 
disputes) or intractable (extremism), in which cases deterrent and protective measures will 
remain the main defence. Other causes may be more susceptible to diplomatic efforts 
(overseas) or political efforts (domestic). 
7.5.11. Culture 
The life and energy of any system comes from its human dimension. The strategy will 
have many different audiences: the personnel involved, the travelling public, the general 
public, the potential attackers and their support community, and others. The media is both 
an audience in its own right and an avenue to the others. All these audiences must be 
addressed with appropriate messages, to win support from the travelling public, to win the 
commitment of industry and security personnel, to deter potential attackers, etc. In particular 
the media must be persuaded to subordinate its own priorities to those of safeguarding life. 
7.6. Command Structure 
7.6.1. The Proposed Command Structure 
The evidence of British Responses (8) suggests that the system of British aviation security is 
direction by government and implementation by industry. Thisl confrontational relationship 
constitutes a pressure towards minimum standards; a cooperative relationship, pursuing a 
mutual benefit, would press towards higher standards. 
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A cooperative relationship can only be based upon shared decision-making and shared 
costs. It is submitted that its effect would be to raise British aviation security standards. It 
would also benefit HMG, by incorporating into the national strategy those of the industry's 
resources which are presently deployed to inhibit HMG's demands. Thus the industry would 
assist the international isation policy through its membership of IATA, ACI, AEA, etc. It would 
assist intelligence, especially in passenger identification, where there is great potential for 
the industry's need for rapid passenger processing to be synergised with the intelligence 
need to identify potential attackers (10.9.4) 
The proposition is that government and industry should have equal voice on a new aviation 
security strategy committee. Membership of the committee would be a matter for further 
careful study. The proposed framework of strategy suggests a role for the Foreign Office 
(international isation and diplomacy) Security Service (intelligence), DoT (Aviation Security 
Programme), Police (Aviation Security and Contingency Programmes), for airlines and 
airports, and for staff representatives. The case for legal, communication and political 
science expertise would also have to be examined. Clearly HMG could not delegate its 
ultimate authority. The committee would therefore answer to a Ministerial Committee. 
7.6.2. The Present Command Structure 
The considerable achievements of the present command structure have been 
acknowledged. However the structure is ill-suited to a strategic approach. Some of the key 
dimensions: international isation, multilateral alliances and laws, culture and the causes of 
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attacks, fall outside the scope of NASC. Each of these dimensions is a government 
responsibility, upon which it cannot be pressed by industry. 
It is to be doubted that a formal command structure was ever established to coordinate, for 
example, the Department of Transport and the Security Service. Its absence is suggested 
by the indecisive handling of the intelligence on the Toshiba IED (8.5.3.1) where, 
conceivably, authoritative command might have saved PanAm 103. Similarly, a coordination 
structure based on strategic principles would have embodied the holistic approach specified 
by all the strategists quoted (9.3), and thereby pursued a cooperative relationship between 
HMG and the civil aviation industry. 
The inputs of the Select Committee (1985 and 1989) made a valuable contribution to 
progress. It is to be regretted that the Committee did not review security on a more regular 
basis. 
Neither NASC nor the Select Committee have a command role. That remains the exclusive 
prerogative of the DoT. It is clear that this structure is incompatible not only with a 
4 
cooperative relationship between government and industry but also with the systematic 
management of progress. 
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7.7. Conclusion 
This section has presented the case for a strategic approach to aviation security. Not 
only would this be more effective and wider ranging, it would also be more efficient in 
that it would reap the benefits of a cooperative relationship between government and 
industry. 
The need for an effective international response is acknowledged. History proves that 
it is well-nigh unachievable. Therefore a policy of cementing bilateral and multilateral 
alliances is advocated both for the immediate benefits of cooperation and as a means 
of compelling international progress. 
The proposal for a strategic approach is presented in outline only. Whether HMG 
could be persuaded to make a feasibility study is a moot point. Kitson has pointed 
out that the decisions to establish an appropriate framework mirror those 
subsequently taken within the framework . 
39" The present (March 1997) Conservative 
administration is provenly antipathetic to increased government expenditure. The 
threat to British aviation is not high and during a period of quiescence, there is little 
incentive to act. It would neither be wise nor responsible to await a second 
Lockerbie. 
"m KITSON, ref 386, p 282 
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8. CONCLUSIONS: OVERVIEW 
8.1. Underlying Values 
The researcher is not a pacifist, but he is implacably opposed to the murder of innocents. As 
a member of the community of pilots, he is committed to the safety of air passengers. Thus 
his attitude to attacks on aviation is one of total hostility. 
However, he believes that utilitarianism is best served by adherence to the facts, including 
those which are unpalatable. Selectivity of evidence is not a sound basis for solutions. Had 
this research suggested that terrorist attacks on aviation advanced the cause of the 
attackers, the conclusion would not have been withheld. 
The conclusion has been to the contrary: where attacks target liberal democracies, they are 
counterproductive to any terrorist cause, because the injustice of their method exceeds that 
of any other injustice. The researcher submits that this general conclusion can be derived 
from the Palestinian experience. 
There are two caveats. The first is that the conclusion relates to stable liberal democracies. 
It may not be valid for weak or brittle administrations. The second, and more important, is 
that the tactic - albeit counterproductive overall - is demonstrably contributive to short-term 
and to solipsistic objectives. It will therefore remain in the terrorist armoury. 
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8.2. Attacks on Aviation 
Palestinians are not the only international terrorists, nor are international terrorists the only 
attackers of aviation. Any interference with the lawful, professional operation of an aircraft 
jeopardises the lives of all aboard. It is a myth that international terrorists are skilled 
operators of aircraft, they are ignorant and incompetent. The two pilots who operate a 
modern British airliner are likely to have a total of between 20 and 45 years of flying 
experience, and will have undergone several years of rigorous instruction. None of this is 
replicated in the superficial training of terrorists on airfields in Iran or elsewhere. When 
passengers survive unlawful interference, it is thanks to their pilots who, despite the violence 
to themselves, deploy great operating skills to overcome the lethal ignorance and demands 
of their attackers. 
Aircraft have been destroyed or hijacked by terrorists, criminals, fugitives and the deranged. 
All of these remain a potential threat. Criminals and fugitives were responsible for most 
early attacks on aviation. The international terrorist threat emerged in 1968. Since then it 
has been regarded as the gravest danger, being both systematic and supported by the 
resources of malevolent states. The countermeasures developed against terrorists: 
protective security and policies of response, were fortunately even more effective against 
other attackers, who were unlikely to find sympathetic or compliant governments to protect 
them. Therefore, countermeasures to non-terrorist attacks have not been addressed as a 
separate issue. 
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Despite the success of countermeasures in reducing their incidence, attacks have not been 
eradicated from the terrorist armoury. Thoughtful and rational terrorists may eschew the 
methodology, but terrorism is often low on rationality and high on emotion. 
Attacks on aviation are also established in the methodology of conflict between nations. To 
an aggressor they have many advantages over conventional war. These advantages 
become imperatives when the target is a major military power. However it is now clear that 
the destruction of a civil airliner, if not casus beffl, may well be cause for lethal, closely 
focused, reprisal. The obvious deterrent effect of this is doubly beneficial. The need for 
absolute deniability by the perpetrators - to avoid retribution - greatly restricts the number of 
objectives which they can pursue by an attack on aviation: extortion, release of prisoners, 
political concessions are examples of objectives, declaration of which facilitate ident cation 
of the attackers. However, neither the possible action of a leader believing himself 
invulnerable in his bunker, a Saddam Hussein or atrocity-inclined Ayatollah, nor a possible 
anonymous statement of hostility should be disregarded. Nor should that of organised 
crime, although it would be unable to link demands to attacks on aviation for reasons already 
outlined. The inescapable conclusion is that the general threat to aviation will remain much 
diminished if powerful countermeasures are maintained. 
8.3. The Origins of International Terrorist Attacks on Aviation 
Early criminal and fugitive attacks on aviation demonstrated its viability as a method of 
defying the authorities, extorting large sums and of obtaining transport. Given the increasing 
incidence of terrorism worldwide, it is reasonable to surmise that the incorporation of the 
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tactic into the terrorist armoury was a probability; if the Palestinians had not done it, 
someone else would have. 
For the Palestinians it was a blocked response, almost a last resort. Unable to better the 
Israelis in conventional war, nor able to move them with fedayeen attacks, and angered by 
the world's unconcern, there was logic, perhaps inevitability, in their recourse to international 
terrorism. 
The thoughtful Palestinian leader Abu lyad stated that " it was the only way to impose the 
n399 Palestinian cause on world opinion and to rally our masses. The early hijacks were 
spectacular and successful. They achieved Abu Iyad's aims. They also coerced the release 
of terrorists from many countries, including Britain and intransigent Israel. There is no 
greater inspiration than success, nor encouragement to re-use a tactic. Within 2 years the 
Palestinians had identified all the essentials of hijacking, which they subsequently 
disseminated to other international terrorists. In particular they demonstrated the facility with 
which the tactic could hijack the world's media, and harness it to a terrorist cause. 
At this point the Palestinians embarked upon a course of self-destruction. They turned to 
airborne murder and atrocity, and progressively outraged the West. Their success at 
Dawsons Field and concomitant usurpation of Jordanian territory prompted King Hussein to 
eliminate the threat to his kingdom by evicting them. They further appalled the Western 
world (Munich Olympics, 1972) and proceeded to alienate most of their political allies 
(seizure of OPEC Ministers, 1973). Some wise Palestinian voices had advocated the 
399 IYAD, Abu. My Home, My Land., A Naffative of the Palestinian Struggle. New York: Times Books, 1981, 
pp34-35 
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abandonment of terrorism (1971) but had not prevailed. The Palestinians lost all semblance 
of strategy as their military warlords prevailed over their weak political directors. 
The methodology of international terrorist attacks on aviation was aided by the mischief- 
making Soviet Union and utilised by mindless murderers (Abu Niclal). It was adopted as a 
favoured weapon by states which became the sponsors and the directors of terrorism 
(Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran). The Palestinians had released an evil genie from its bottle. 
8.4. The Success of the Tactic, The Failure of the Strategy 
The Palestinians achieved undeniable "successes" in their tactical aims of hijacking or 
destroying aircraft, coercing the release of prisoners, extortion, massive media exposure, 
and - perhaps most important- encouraging other Palestinians. 
The evidence is that these tactics were counterproductive to their strategic aim of recovering 
their lost lands from the Israelis. Abu Iyad, quoted above, spoke of imposing the Palestinian 
cause on world opinion. Arguably his objective was wrong. He should have addressed the 
attraction of world sympathy, not of world attention. There is a destructive element of 
Marxism in the concept of creating disorder as a route to a different order. The Palestinians 
totally misread the Western mind in their belief that attacks on Western aircraft would 
somehow harness the West to their cause. 
They also misread their situation, mistakenly likening it to that of successful anti-colonial 
movements in Algeria, Aden, Vietnam and elsewhere. In these, the sheer scale of the 
insurgencies vanquished half-hearted opposition. By comparison Palestinian attacks were 
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imperceptible pinpricks on the stronghold of liberal democracy. Terrorism arouses great 
hostility. To say that if it does not succeed it is likely to fail is a truth, as well as an aphorism. 
Thirdly the Palestinians misread global politics. The overwhelming issue was the Cold War. 
The Russians were happy to make mischief in the Middle East in the hopes of reaping 
advantage. By allying themselves with the Russians, the Palestinians ensured that the USA 
allied itself with Israel. They exacerbated their predicament by their terrorist attacks on US 
targets. These ensured that the USA could not give support to their "terrorist" cause. 
The success of the Palestinian tactics was disastrous to their strategic purpose. Nor have 
other terrorist groups turned tactical success in attacks on aviation into the strategic 
advance of their cause. Certainly there were early and noteworthy examples of valuable 
publicity and of successful extortion of huge sums which may have sustained terrorist 
operations in the medium-term. This is not the same as achieving long-term objectives. 
Croatians, JRA, ASALA, and Sikhs have all had tactical successes. None have attained their 
strategic goals. The brilliant interventions at Entebbe and Mogadishu in 1976 and 1977 
inflicted massive defeats on international aviation terrorism and much reduced the hijack 
menace. The Mogadishu terrorists were seeking to coerce the release of the Baader- 
Meinhof leadership from German prisons. Their failure prompted the suicides of Baader, 
Raspe and Esslin. The Baader-Meinhof Group never recovered. European terrorist 
involvement in attacks on aviation has not re-emerged as a serious threat. 
Attacks on aviation are spectacular and achieve unparalleled publicity. They are likely to 
remain in the terrorist armoury for their solipsistic value and as a means of expressing 
hostility. Strategically, their use cannot be beneficial to a terrorist cause. It can be terminal. 
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8.5. Israel and Palestine 
It is unlikely that any objective observer could fail to condemn the conduct of Israel towards 
the Palestinians. Equally, until Arafat's renunciation of terrorism in 1988, there is little to find 
to praise in the conduct of the Palestinians. Between 1948 and 1988 a state of war between 
Arabs and Jews simmered and periodically erupted. The Israelis ruthlessly propagated the 
message that all Palestinian resistance to Israeli expansionism was terrorism, and the 
Palestinians played into their hands. 
The Palestinians have made more progress since 1988 than in the 40 preceding years. As 
this research draw to a close (March 1997) it is evident that they still face an intransigent 
enemy. Within the past few days the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has 
announced a second tranche of new Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, 400 and the Israeli 
President, Chaim Weizmann has affirmed that "the job (of Jews outside Israel) was to 
support Israel. Beyond that they should keep out of Israeli politiCSn. 
401 It is clear that, to the 
Israelis the status quo is "what we have, we hold", and each day they take more. The 
Palestinians would be well-advised to heed the failure of international terrorism, and to 
pursue their just cause through peace and diplomacy. 
8.6. Addressing the Cause of Terrorism 
A strategic analysis would indicate that the best response to terrorism would be to address 
and remove the cause. 
400 The Times. 4 Mar 1997, p 10 401 The Times. 27 Feb 1997, p 14 
411 
It has been suggested that the causes of terrorism may be viewed as spread along a. 
continuum, the negative being largely hostility to opponents, the positive being more a 
definable objective (recovery of territory, political change, etc). It is more difficult to address 
the negative end than the positive. It is almost impossible to address fanaticism wherever it 
lies, fanatics not being negotiators. There are thus causes which must be met by 
deterrence, by prevention or by pre-emptive action. The same is true, albeit to a lesser 
degree, in the case of most international terrorism. The cause is likely to fall within the 
sovereignty of another nation and thus be inaccessible. The Israelis would not have 
returned the land of Palestine to obviate attacks on British aircraft. In any case, they were 
well aware that their territorial ambitions were furthered by such attacks. 
Even when the cause is both coherent and accessible, it is not easily addressed. To 
negotiate with terrorists is to imply success to their methods. Peace-making to end war is 
relatively simple, though often badly mishandled, eg. insistence on unconditional surrender. 
Peace-making with terrorists has many problems: a multiplicity of small groups, no overall 
authority, terrorists' demands for immunity from prosecution. There is also a likelihood that 
agreement to one group's demands will energise their opponents into terrorist response. 
The possibility that there is justice in a terrorist grievance must be examined. This presents 
difficulties and possible accusations of disloyalty. In many cases it impacts upon political 
I 
alliances or upon lucrative commerce (as in the export of arms). 
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Each terrorist cause must be examined on its merits and appropriately addressed. In no 
case can this include acquiescence or connivance with terrorist attacks upon innocents or 
upon allies. 
There is widespread agreement on the need for a policy of no concessions to terrorists, to 
discourage the use of the tactic. This research has cited success as the fundamental 
objective of terrorism. However there is another, equally difficult case: that in which terrorist 
methods are used in pursuit of a just grievance. To address the grievance may be seen to 
be an encouragement of terrorism. To refuse to address the grievance until terrorist 
methods are abandoned is arguably to choose war in preference to peace. The challenge is 
to address the grievance without rewarding terrorism. It is important. All credible 
justifications of terrorism must be removed if the methodology is to be condemned 
unreservedly, and combated without reservation. 
8.7. Tactical Priorities 
8.7.1. Strategic Context 
The case for a strategic response to attacks on aviation has already been advanced. A 
holistic approach to the subject is the best means of ensuring that the debate is fully 
informed. This facilitates the identification of gaps in the tactical response, and of potential 
choke-points upon which countermeasures can usefully be applied. Examples of such gaps 
and choke-points follow. 
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8.7.2. Instigators of Terrorism 
The limited scope for addressing the causes of attacks has been discussed. Next in 
importance to the causes are the instigators. These key figures unleash terrorist attacks on 
aviation, both those utilised by states as a method of undeclared war, and those mounted by 
sub-state actors. There is good evidence that Syria, Libya and Iran have all played a major 
role in attacks on aviation. Many sub-state groups are under the direction of a warlord; Abu 
Nidal is a good example. None of the countries named, nor terrorist groups, tolerate 
unauthorised activity. It follows that responsibility for their actions lies either with, or very 
close to, their leader. It is to be doubted that self-sacrifice features in the plans of such men. 
By contrast there is an abundant supply of potential terrorists. No generation is short of 
young men and women willing to risk their lives, given adequate motivation. It is therefore 
more effective to focus on key individuals, and take them out of circulation: terrorists with 
expertise, their leaders and their instigators. This is to not suggest extra-legal operations, 
but careful attention to the development of an appropriate and legal methodology. Nations 
are willing to undertake naval and aerial bombardments, with a high probability of the loss of 
many innocents' lives. They have difficulty in authorising, for example, the dispatch of 
Special Forces to capture and bring to trial the most culpable of individuals. If the threat of 
terrorism is to be addressed at source, methods of discouraging the instigators of terrorism 
must be devised. 
8.7.3. Data Collection 
The foundation of strategic planning is intelligence, knowledge of the total situation. This 
research has already suggested that there is no evidence that comprehensive data on the 
aims, methodology, outcomes and subsequences of terrorist attacks on aviation has been 
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collated. This is a culpable deficiency. Without such data it is not possible to devise the 
appropriate countermeasures, nor to decide upon policy objectives and priorities. 
8.7.4. The Detection of Attackers of Aviation 
There are four general methods of intercepting known terrorists: by means of intelligence or 
information received, by movement analysis (the tracking of known individuals), by passport 
inspection, and by recognition from photographs. These methods are primitive. It is entirely 
possible for an experienced terrorist to pass through a major airport undetected, given 
absence of intelligence, a false passport and a suitable disguise. There is a need to ensure 
the detection of any known terrorist. 
This calls for a suitable Biometric Identification System (BIS). There are several systems 
under development: retina scan, palm-prints, thumb-prints, facial characteristics and cranial 
thermal patterns. The requirement is for a system that will consistently detect a known 
person by matching his unique characteristics with those in a data bank. The ideal system 
would be remote, like a security camera, to ensure acceptability to bona ride passengers, 
who resent fingerprinting and other intrusive methods. The clatabank would be under the 
control of the police or security service. The need to identify known persons highlights the 
need to obtain biometric identification of known terrorists and their associates at every 
opportunity. It is not a sound policy to screen each passenger (54 million at Heathrow in 
1993) and each hold bag (2 billion p. a. worldwide), whilst failing to detect the tiny number, 
perhaps 10, perhaps 30, of experienced aviation terrorists as they seek to board aircraft. 
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The design and management of such a system would be an exercise in govern ment-ind ustry 
cooperation. The government would gain access to the airlines' computer system, a huge 
resource. The industry would require a BIS which yielded passenger handling benefits: the 
ability to enhance service to airline privilege card holders, and to offer rapid processing to 
passengers of established bona fides. This suggests a BIS which can be encoded on a 
smart card, a card which might be developed to control all aspects of the passenger-airline 
relationship: reservation, payment, ticketing, immigration, etc. Such a system would identify 
the tranche of passengers who constituted a very low security threat. 
A parallel technique is passenger profiling, a system of identifying from the huge numbers of 
passengers the small number of potential attackers. The technical problem is the 
construction of a valid and reliable profile. This was straightforward for El Al who have made 
extensive use of the technique. As an airline flying international routes and much patronised 
by the Jewish community, the profile was easy to construct. The Israelis have not had 
similar success in constructing a profile for their charter airline services, nor for suicide 
bombers. 402 It remains to be seen whether a profile can be constructed for an international 
airline such as British Airways, patronised by discerning passengers of all backgrounds. 
Conceptually, the ability to focus on the few potential threats and apply in-depth screening is 
greatly to be preferred to the more superficial screening of millions of passengers, all but a 
handful of whom have no evil intent. 
In Great Britain's present confrontational climate, the introduction of a profiling system would 
undoubtedly be opposed by airlines in the sure knowledge that they would bear the costs. 
However, if both government and industry were to acknowledge the potential mutual 
402 Unattributable Interview with Israeli aviation security official. Aug 1995 
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benefits, they could enter a joint development contract and the concept could be properly 
explored. If no cost-effective system were to emerge , the need for BIS would be unaffected. 
It remains vital to the detection of known terrorists and criminals, and valuable to passenger 
handling. 
8.8. International Priorities 
The desire for international agreements is limited by international enmities and rivalries. 
The achievement of agreements is hindered by differences in cultures and in political 
systems. The implementation of agreements is impeded by differing levels of administrative 
competence, technical expertise and financial resources. 
The failure of the liberal democracies has been less forgivable. They have not achieved an 
effective and unified response to terrorism, including attacks on aviation. The root problem 
has been national unwillingness to relinquish freedom of action and expression. Whilst 
other countries may not view a terrorist group with the same hostility as the target nation, the 
ubiquity of such groups: PIRA, FNLC, ETA, AD, RAF, RB, GIA, etc, invites the darkest views 
on the competence of the EU and of governments who have failed to unite effectively against 
the common methodology of terrorism. 
There is an international dimension in each component of the response to terrorism (9. 
FIGURE 14). It could be argued that the international community cannot even aspire to a 
strategic response to attacks on aviation, because there are no international command 
bodies with authority over their constituents. When ICAO, IATA, IFALPA, etc, proceed at all, 
they do so on the basis of consensus. The best that can be sought is treaties between 
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allies. Great Britain should pursue bilaterals and alliances, probably starting with Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Such alliances offer a step towards international isation. A 
priority, is to prevent terrorists from evading justice. Within the alliances a common legal 
framework should be developed. The legal systems of liberal democracies are intended to 
protect the citizens of liberal democracies, not their enemies. There is a case for the wider 
use of exclusion orders and of the not proven verdict. It is likely that legal and national 
differences would most easily be resolved by the establishment of an international court. 
Liberal democracies could realistically adopt the strategic objective of establishing attacks 
on civil aviation within the category of internationally banned weapons. 
A more difficult issue is the means of applying effective coercion to state-sponsors of 
terrorism. Lenin ( the capitalist will sell you the rope with which to hang him) would relish the 
amorality of the arms trade. Unfortunately, unemployment in the ordnance industry is a more 
immediate threat to politicians than international displeasure. Concerted pressure on state- 
sponsors and on their trading partners must remain an objective. Public humiliation is a 
powerful weapon and good use should be of well-publicised black lists. However, dramatic 
results should not be expected. It is an unfortunate fact of life that morality melts much more 
easily than gold. 
8.9. Public Support for Counterterrorism 
Liberal democracies face three fundamental dilemmas in fighting terrorism: any negotiation 
with terrorists imputes a degree of political legitimacy; any action, military or political, beyond 
a normal police response implies a significant threat; any public or media rejection of their 
aims or methods furnishes them with publicity. Thus each of these responses, all of which 
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are imperative, has a downside which must be calculated, and incorporated into the strategic 
planning. 
These difficulties are reflected in the operational management of the political atmosphere, in 
which the media plays a key role. In sophisticated liberal democracies, facile government 
propaganda will be counter-productive. Therefore a balanced case must be presented. Of 
this the terrorists will obviously seek to take advantage, proclaiming the justice of their cause 
and the malevolence of the government. Thus the media is a battleground for public 
support. The government must participate despite paradoxical benefit to the terrorists ,- 
Journalists will highlight the immediate, inevitable, downsides of the strategy and ignore its 
distant pay-off. They must be persuaded of their obligations to the system which allows 
them their freedom. At stake is the foundation-stone of the liberal democracy's response, its 
value system. The public must be persuaded that it is the government, not the terrorists, 
whose ends justify its means. Public support for temporary restrictions of civil liberties and 
for firm conduct in anti-terrorist operations, translates into a political atmosphere and a legal 
framework appropriate to counterterrorism, both cited by strategists as essentials. There is 
no place in the liberal democratic philosophy for the tolerance of terrorism. 
8.10. Conclusion 
The importance of terrorism to liberal democracies is in its challenge to liberal 
democratic values. At present (1997) the number of its victims is small. Therein lies 
the danger. The international liberal democratic community has yet to be convinced 
of the need for a powerful, unified response. No nation can safeguard its citizens 
whilst its terrorist enemies enjoy their freedom in neighbouring countries. 
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Terrorism is now an established method of violent protest, and of pursuing 
undeclared war. It has been utilised by Irredentist, nationalist, ethnic, ideological and 
single issue groups. Great Britain contains many disaffected groups: political 
extremists, Scots and Welsh nationalists, ethnic, and single issue groups. Any of 
these might adopt terrorist methods. It is vital to squeeze terrorism into 
insignificance, lest it become well-established, and by contagion grow into a more 
widespread practice. Access to guns is difficult to control, and explosive devices are 
easily improvised. Therefore potential users must be discouraged by social attitude 
and by the certainty of capture and lengthy incarceration. There are many examples of 
new forms of malevolence which have become established and then accepted as 
necessary evils. The need is to ensure that attacks on aviation never follow the same 
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